CHAPTER ONE

Leon Trotsky

"YOU ARE BANKRUPT. YOU HAVE PLAYED OUT YOUR ROLE. GO WHERE YOU BELONG:
TO THE DUST-HEAP OF HISTORY."

Trotsky to Martov, when the Bolsheviks seized complete power at the Congress of the Soviets, October 25, 1917/

When Leon Trotsky, president of the Congress of the Soviets, and second only to Lenin in the Bolshevik faction, uttered these words, he was one of the most powerful men in the world. He powerful expelled the former Julius Cedarbaum of Odessa, now known as Martov, leader of the menshevik sing of the Soviets, and took absolute power. The slogan, "All power to the Soviets" which had brought them victory, now became, "All power to the Bolsheviks." Yet Trotsky steadily let the absolute power slip from his hands until his famed "Clemenceau" speech ended his position in the Soviet government.

Leon Trotsky, born Lev Bronstein, was the son of a provincial entreBronstein,
preneur who enjoyed a comfortable income. Young Trotsky, as a student,
worked himself up into a fine ideological frenzy over the new rites of
Marxism, one of those whirling dervishes which are set in motion by
new ideas, and he became a prominent writer in the movement. Inevitably,
he went abroad to visit the leader of the party, Lenin. When he arrived
at the Lenin flat in London, Madame Lenin called out to her husband,
"The Pero (the pen) has arrived."

The Lenins were a sensitive, intellectual couple such as one might meet at any avant-garde cocktail party in Paris or New York. They found young Bronstein to their liking, although he and Lenin were not always in agreement. At the time of the Revolution of 1905, 14/4/4 they were both in

St. Petersburg, but neither of them was yet an accomplished revolutionary in fact. The Czarist government was already beyond saving. As Ezra Pound later observed, "The officials fled at the onslaught of the revolution, but the Communists did not know enough to set up shop in the offices.

After a few days, the Czarists moved back into their offices, and begn to issue orders. The revolution was over."

In order to facilitate his escape, Bronstein took the name of a guard, Trotsky. Stalin had already criticized him in several articles, habit of dashing habit of dashing had out of the Party at will, whenever anything pleased or displeased him. It was of this tendency that Stalin wrote in 1905,

"Up till now our Party has resembled a hospitable patriarchal family, ready to take in all who sympathize. But now that our Party has become a centralized organization, it has thrown off its patriarchal aspect and has become in all respects like a fortress, the gates of which are opened only to those who are worthy." p. 69. v I Colectd works of Stalin.

Lenin had retired to Switzerland, with a cutbresk of the war. Max Lerner writes of this period, "After the outbresk of war, his pace increased,. Cut

off from action, he sat day after day in the libraries of Zurich and Berne, sharpening the outlines of/revolutionary theory of the state."

Did not Spengler say that this was the "Age of Literature"? While others plotted revolution, Lenin plotted how to take power, and in this compiracy, his aid was the library. He and his wife had rented a room from a Swiss cobbler, Kammerer, in Lurich for 28 francs a month. The cobbler and his wife were reluctant to rent to Madame Lenin, and dumpy, unpreprossessing woman with bulging eyes (the result of disease), who thereby derived her conspiratorial names in the Party, "The Lamprey", or, more commonly, "The Fish." When Lenin appeared, the couple relented, and let their new tenants enter. Lenin always wore a visor cap, and the cobbler remarked in later years, "I would have taken him for a mechanic."

Lenin was wont to sit, in he afternoons, in the Eintracht Restaurant, and here he was spotted one aftern on by a casual visitor, Ezra Pound. Pound recalls that he idid not care for the little fellow's looks, and although he knew that Lenin was a revolutionary, he decided not to speak to him.

While Lenin sat among his books, the Czarist government moved inev/ital to its end. Far from the scene, Lenin did not know how bad the situation had become for the old power, and on Jan. 221, 1917, while addressing an audience of young people on the subject of the 1905 Revolution, he pessimistically remarked,

"We of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution."

From a long range point of view, Lenin may have been right, for who can say what form the revolution has yet to take. At any rate, Lenin did not live to see the first decisive chapter, the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky for absolute power.

Through the intercession of a German munitions speculator named Help-

hand Parvus, Lenin and some of his associetes were sent through Germany from Berne on a sealed train, and from Finland into Russia. When Lenin errived, he was hailed as the lead r of the

Lenin was probably the first successful revolutionary in the history of the world who had to be sent word that his revolution had succeeded. Madame Lenin, or Krupskaya, recalls the circumstances,

"Once after dinner, when Ilyich was getting ready to leave for the library, and I had finished with the dishes, Bronsky ran in with the announcement,

""Haven't you heard the news? There is a revolution in Russia!"

"We went to the lake, where on the shore all the newspapers were
hung up. There really was a revolution in Russia."

A Provisional Government had been set up under the leadership of Alexander Kerehsky, and Lenin resolved to return to Russia at once. Through the kind intercession of a German manitions speculator named Helphadd Parvus, Lenin and some of his associates were put on a sealed train in Berne and sent through Germany to Finland. When Lenin arrived in Russia, he was hailed as the ideological leader of the Revolution. He at once set about seizing power.

As Trotsky later pointed out, "In March, 1917, the Bolsheviks in the Soviet were an insignificant minority....Worst of all, the course of events had caught the Bolshevik Party napping. None of its tried and trusted leaders were in Petrograd. The Central Committee's Bureau there consisted of two workingmen, Shlyapnikov and Zalutsky, and one college boy, Molotov." "Stalin", by Trotsky, page 185.

In evaluating the situation, Trotsky decided to ally himself with Lenin, as the surest road to power. As he says, "Without Lenin, no one had known what to make of the unprecedented situation; all were slaves of old formulae. Yet clinging to the slogan of democratic dictatorship now meant,

as Lenin put it, 'actually going over to the petty bourgeoisie.'" Stalin, by Trotsky, page 203.

Lenin was willing to add Trotsky's followers to his hard core. As Sayers and Kahn describe it, "In August, 1917, Trotsky made a sensational entry into the Bolshevik Party. He brought with him into the Party his entimotley following of dissident leftists. As Lenin humourously put it, it was like coming to terms with a 'major power.' (The Great Conspiracy().

"Lenin, in his strategic idea, lacked a sense of reality; he lacked precision and proportion. He thought of strategy in terms of Clausewitz, more as a philosophy than as an art or a science."

Lenin made a major bid for power with a well-thoughtout prospectus, "The Threatening Catastrophe," which he published in September, 1917. In this program, he said,

"Ownership of capital which is manipulated by the banks is not lost or changed when the banks are nationalized and fused into one state bank, so that it is possible to to reach a stage where the state knows whither and how, from where and at what time millions and billions are flowing. Only control over bank operation, providing they are merged into one state bank, will allow, simultaneously with other measures which can easily be put into effect, the actual levying of income tax without concealment of income and property. The state, for the first time, will be in a position to survey all the monetary operations, then to control, then to regulate, economic life.

[&]quot;....FINAILY, to obtain millions and billions for large state operations

without paying the capitalist gentlemen sky-high commissions for their services. It would facilitate the nationalisation of syndicates, the nationalisation of the insurance business, facilitate the control of and compulsory organization of lebor into unions, and the regulation of consumption. The nationalisation of the banks would make circulation of checks compulsory by law for all the rich, and introduce the confiscation of property for concealing income. The five points of the desired program, then, are nationalisation of the banks and the syndicates, abolition of commercial secrets, compulsory trade unionism, and compulsory organisation of the population into consumer organisations."

It was this program, with its offers of wide-sweeping controls over the entire social and economic life of the perople, which brought unexpected and powerful support to the Bolsheviks. Combined with the fact that the Bolsheviks were the only discplined group operating in Russia at that time, as the Encyclopeadia Britannica points out, this program assured Lenin's success.

The actual situation was that with the overthrow of the White Russian government, which had ruled the nation for a thousand years, the Slavs were thrown back into the same predicament that they had been in in the ninth century. Their Duma was an uproar of leaderless elements, and they had no Vikings to invite into the country as their rulers. The Kerensky government was a government of Inhicherins, dreamy, irresponsible, wistful interference such as wander through the scenes of Chekhov's plays. But Lenin was not to be asked to take power, as Rurik and Vlas had been asked a thousand years before. The shaky Kerensky government had to be given a kick into oblivion, and it was with this goal in view that Trotsky and Lenin began to plan the October Revolution.

Curzio Melaparte has recorded, in his book, "Coup D'Etat; the Tehhnique of Revolution," Dutton, 1932, a dialogue between Lenin and Trotsky on the

eve of the October Revolution, when Trotsky was already president of the Congress of the Soviets:

"TROTSKY: We need not get a majority. It will not be the majority that will have to get into power. Few people are wanted; the masses are of no use.

LENIN: The insurrection must not rest on a plot nor on a party, but on the advanced section of the community.

TROTSKY: The whole population is too cumbersome for an insurrection. There need only be a small company, cold-blooded and violent, well-trained in the tactics of the insurrection.

LENIN: We must hurl all our units into the factories and barracks.

TROTSKY: We must seize Headquarters rather than the whole front. Not war, but revolution. Insurrection is a percent piece of noiseless machinery. It is not an art, it is an engine. Techincal experts are required to start it, and they alone can stop it."

It was due to Trotsky's later loss of power that the Moscow School for Revolution was named for Lenin rather than for himself, because he was the tactician of the revolution. On October 9, 1917, the Military Revolutionary Committee was set up by the Bolsheviks, and This Trotsky was named chairman. With this added authority, he issued orders to the Red Guards to draw rifles from the arsenals. Both the Kerensky Covernment and the Bolsheviks were maneuvreing for an important stretgic position at this time; that is, they were planning to command the Red Forces during the civil war, which it was obvious would soon engulf the country. But the Kerensky regime was not trusted by the people; its orders were often disregarded. It was an interim government, such as has been able to remain in power in the United States for a quarter of a century, but which could not hold the loyalty of any sizeable group of Russians, in 1917. What was needed was a group which was not identified in the popular mind with the old, discredited Czerist regime, as the Kerensky government certainly wash and the

Bolsheviks assumed this role. Trotsky ordered the cruiser Aurora to pout proceed from Kronstadt and to bombard the Winter Palace with blanks, as the Congress of the Soviets opened there on the evening of October 25, 1917. To the accompaniment of this barrage, and as the Red Guards surrounded the hall, Trotsky ordered Martov, leader of the Mensheviks, out of the Assembly. The Bolsheviks now had absolute power in Russia, and they have retained it ever since.

Of this period, Trotsky says, (My Life, 1930),

"We were undeviating in our march to power. Three weeks ago we had gained a majority in the Petrograd Soviet. We were hardly more than a banner -- with no printing works, no funds, no branches. No longer ago than last night, the government ordered the errest of the Military Revolutionary Committee, and was engaged in tracing our addresses. Today a delegation from the city Duma comes to the 'arrested' Military Revolutionary Committee to inquire about the fate of the Duma. I replied, 'The present Duma reflects yesterday: if a conlfict arises, we will propose to the people that they elect a new Duma on the issue of power.'"

The suddenness and the ease of their victory, a tribute to the accuracy and correctness of their methods, left both Trotsky and Lenin somewhat dazed. Of that evening, after their success had been won, Trotsky wrote of Lenin,

"Vladimir Ilyich looked tired. He smiled and seid: 'The transition from the state of illeglaity, being driven in every direction, to power -- is too rough! It makes one dizzy.*"

Lenin was not too overshelmed by success to overlook any opportunity of consolidating it. The instrument of consolidation was terror, ruthless macaures against the enemies of the regime. Trotsky wrote of him at this time,

"This was the period when Lenin, at every passing opportunity, empha-

sized the absolute necessity of terror. He said, "Just there lies the real revolutionary pathos. Do you think we can be victors without the most severe revolutionary terror?"

Trotsky was willing to assume the role of Robespierre, the insturment of the terror, without reflecting on the fole of Robespierre. From this moment, he never looked back, nor did he look forward. He seemed content to enjoy power as a temporary thing, without seeing where it was leading him, acknowledgeing the fact that \$\phi/\psi\psi\psi\psi\$ the instance he relaxed the reins, someone else would seize them. Winston Churchill remarked of him at this time, "There was a time when Trotsky stood very close to the vacant throne of the Romanovs."

Perhaps Trotsky did consider himself as a sort of revolutionary prince At any rate, he wielded the power. He excused his personal arrogance with the term "revolutionary superiority", and to many visitors, he was the moving *pffff spirit of the new regime. Bruce Tockhart wrote of him in his Diary, after an interview with Trotsky in February, 1918,

"He strikes me as a man who would willingly die fighting for Russia provided there was a big enough audience to see him do it."

J.Sadoul, in his Notes sur la Revolucion, characteized the Trotsky of this period as "this pitless dictator, this master of all the Russias." Sadoul also noted that "Trotsky dominates the insurrection, being its soul of steel, while Lenin remains rather its theoretician."

Sadoul's choice of terminology heres is especially interesting, when he speaks of Trotsky's "soul of steel" for "steel" of course, was the name of Stelin.

During the next several years, Trotsky remained the protect of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. He was Comissar of Foreign Affrirs; in March 1918 he was appointed Commissar of War, and presided over the Supreme War Council. To battle the White armies, he created the Red Army, and in less than two years he armed five million men. He organized the international

propaganda ministry of the "permanent revolution" the Comintern. To maintain control over internal affairs, he organized the Cheka, the secret police. Yet such was his incapacity for 1/4/4/1/p personal leadership that not one of these organizations was 1/4/4/ directed by men who were immediately loyal to him, as events soon proved.

Despite this fury of activity, Trotsky was beginning to retreat from a dominant role in the revolution. His writings of this period show an increasing concern with revolutionary theory, and few treatments of actual situations. Typical was his statement to the Third World Congress of the Comintern, in July 1921,

"We have brought the bourgeoisie for judgment before the court of Marxism."

While Trotsky was making these vainglorious pronouncements, the Marxist revolution was losing country after country in Europe. Communist seizures of power in Germany and Hungary were short-lived. The Italian Communists went down in defeat before the victorious Mussolini. Only in Russia was the Communist revolution secure, and this fact counted heavily against Trotsky in his coming struggle with Stalin over the issue of "Socialism in one country."

His predilection for being in front led Trotsky into a dangerous cul-de-sac in March of 1921, the massecre of the Kronstadt sailors. It was the Kronstadt sailors who had brought the cruiser Aurora up to shell the Winter Palace, at Trotsky's order, during the October Revolution.

Now they mutnied, and Trotsky personally led the troops which overpowered and slaughtered them. The ruthlessness with which he carried out this punitive action shocked many of the his fellow-Bolsheviks. They were ready to approve the sternest measures egainst the "bourgeosie", the Czarist "exploiters of the people", but suddenly they realized that even a good Communist was not safe in the new Russia. It was significant that the turning

of Bolshevik against Bolshevik, the purges which were to fill the camps with former comrades, were begun, not by Stalin, but by Trotsky.

During this period, Stelin was slowly but surely consolidating his power. Immediately after the civil war, he was Commisser of Nationalities, a position which gave him direct control over almost half of the population of Russia. In 1919, Lenin, as a sign of trust, appointed Stalin 1/4/4/61/14/4 Commisser of the Workers and Peasants Insprectorate. This post, which was intended to prevent the bureaucracy from sinking back into the sloth and corruption which had characterized it from Czarist days, and which the Czarist regime, in turn, had inherited as an essential part of the bureaucracy from the defunct Byzantine Empire, some five hundred years earlier.

Stalin also was the only correspondent between the Orgburo and the Politburo. Trhoughout the civil war, the Politburo had been limited to five men, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamehew and Bukharin. Of the five, Stalin consistently performed the greatest amount of work. As Isaac Deutscher remarks of him at this time, "Like none of his colleagues, he was/idm/s/r/ immersed in the party's daily drudgery and in all its kitchen cabals."

Stalin's opposition to Trotsky had been evident long before the Revolution. On Dec. 31, 1910, he had written to the Central Committee of the Party from exile in Solvychegodsk,

"...A Trotsky bloc (he would have said 'synthesis') would be rank unprincipledness....But we must act firmly and relentlessly and not fear reproaches from the Liquidators, Trotskyites and Vperyod-ists."

Trotsky /dept/ded/the/organi/tation/of/the/trade/uni/figat/figat/

Ilass Stalin's formal opposition to Trotsky was staked out on four points;

- 1. He opposed Trotsky's plan for organizing the trade unions along military lines.
 - 2. He demanded "Socialism in one country" as a program for Russia,

rather than using the nation's resources to support permanent revolution in other countries until Communism had won a world victory.

- 3. He defended the NEP program against Trotsky's attacks, and he also upheld the program of "socialist accumulation of capital."
- 4. Finally, he denied the proposal of Trotsky that dissident groups should be allowed to function in the Bolshevik Party.

As early as 1921, while Trotsky was at the height of his power, Stalin had begun to posses him on these points. Soon after Trotsky's messacre of the Kronstadt sailors, Stalin moved openly against him. The Kronstadt massacre had taken place in March of 1921. In July of that year, Stalin made a public criticism of Trotsky's pamphlet, "The Role and Task of the Trade Unions."

Headline, "Our Disagreements," Stalin said,

The mistake Trotsky makes is that he underrates the difference between the army and the working class, he puts the trade unions on a par withthe military organisations, and tries, evidently by inertia, to transfer military methods from the army into the working class....it is evident that Trotsky fails to understand the difference between labour organisations and military organisations that he fails to understand that in the period of the termination of the war and the revival of industry, it becomes necessary, inevitable, to contrast military with democratic (trade union) methods, and that, therefore, to transfer military methods into the trade unions is a part mistake. Pegler nor any of the critics hy and the facilitary trade unions during the 20s were organized as Trotsky suggested. It is possible that Stalin enticipated that the trade unions, if

organised along the militant lines advocated by Trotsky, would become a troublesome and independent force to deal with in the future. It is not power when the head of the State is made to treat with the leaders of the various power groups within the State as though he is dealing with foreign powers. Apove all, one must avoid the fate of an Eisenhower, whose time

is taken up with eternally placating the leaders of the trade unions, the corporations, the army, the racial and religious fractions, and so on, like an elderly minister involved in a feud between conflicting laides' aid groups in a small town.

Stalin also offered a policy statement in July, 1921 which became part of basic Stalinism. He said,

"The war is over, but ## as the Western Socialists are not yet able to help us restore our economy, we, being economically encircled by industrially more developed bourgeois states, are compelled to grant concessions, to conclude trade agreements with industrial bourgeois states and concession agreements with individual capitalistic groups; in this (economic) sphere also we are left to our own resources, we are obliged to maneuvre."

On the 3d of April, 1922, Stalin was apptointed General Secretary of the Central Committee. On May 26, 1922, Lenin had his first attack of arteriosclerosis, although the news was not released until June 4. Stalin was now in a position to unseat Trotsky, in the "socialist compettition" for the right to be his heir. Deutscher says of Stalin at that time,

"The remarkable trait in Stalin was his unique sensibility to all those psychological undercurrents in and around the party, the untalkedof hopes and tacit desires, of which he set himself up as a pount mouthpiece. In this, he was very different from the other triumvirs."

Because of his very flamboyancy, Trotsky made the other leaders of the party uneasy, and they feared his power, which as a matter of fact he did no exercise. Stalin, on the other hand, was unassuming and hard-working, which led his colleagues to suppose that he was not over-ambitious. As Troysky recounts in his biography of Stalin, "We are not afraid of Stalin, " said Yenukidze to Serebryakov. 'As soon as he begins to give himself airs, we'll remove him.' But in the end it was Stalin who got rid of them."

According to Trotsky, Lenin said of Stalin, at the time of Stalin's assumption of the General Sec etaryship, "That cook will concot nothing but peppery dishes." Stalin's method of assuming power is also described by Trotsky,

"The twelth Congress, which lasted for a week between April 17 and 25m 1923, raised Stalin from junior to senior partnership in the triumvirate. Zinoviev's plurality in the Cantral Committee and the Politburo was destroyed. Stalin gained control of both. But his most important achievemen at the Twelfth Congress was in the Central Control Commission and the network of provincial control commissions. At the Eleventh Congress Stalin had become the secret boss of the Central Control Commission; the majority of its members were his men. But the provincial, county and local control commissions, many of them elected before he became General Secretary, were beyond his control. Stalin tackled the problem in characteristic fashion. On one pretext or another, cases subject to the jurisdiction of hostile control commissions and involving the interests of Stalin's political machine were transferred from hearing wherever pessible to the Central Control Commission; moreover, whenever it could be done without attracting too much notice, on one or another pretext, a number of hostile control commissions were simply abolished by the Central Control Commissions. Thism supplemented by organized contriving at provincial and regional conferences/ of the control commissions, produced fruitful results."

This is one of the most illuminating post mortems on record. Trotsky explains in a paragraph how he, the leader of the O tober Revolution, the founder of the Red Army, the organizer of the Comintern and the secret police, was ousted from power by a man who was able to exert pressure at all levels of the government. In this vein, Trotsky also says,

"I remember during the Civil War asking a member of the Central Commit-

tee, Serebryakov, who at that time was working with Stalin in the Revolutionary Council of War of the Southern Front, whether he could not manage without Stalin for the sake of economizing forces. Serebryakov replied: 'No, I cannot exert pressure like Stalin. It is not my specialty.' The ability to exert pressure' was what Lenin prized so highly in Stalin."

Trotsky says that Lenin's health broke sharply in December, 1921. His first stroke in May, 1922 largely incapacitated him, a second one paralyzed his right side on Dec. 16, 1922. On Marc 9, 1923, he suffered a third stroke It may have been that Lenin served as a father figure for Trotsky, for with the beginning of Lenin's illness, Trotsky failed to act to shield himself from Stalin's attacks. Max Eastman says, "He never made one move after Stalin attacked him that was not, from the standpoint of diplomatic tactics, a blunder."

Robert Vincent Paniels, in The N w Leader, Nov. 9, 1959, says, "In 1923 Trotsky collapsed and withdrew under the cover of what I strongly suspect must have been a psychosomatic illness."

In his autobiography, *#### Trotsky says that he caught a cold while duck-hunting in 1923, and that for the next couple of years he suffered from continuing high temperatures and physical weakness. In his biography of Stalin, he says,

"Some time after the middle of January, 1924, I left for Sukhum, in the Caucasus, to try to get rid of a dogged, mysterious infection, the nature of which still remains a mystery to my physicians. The news of Lenin' death reached me en route."

Trotsky's retreat from the scene of power, during what he knew was Lenin's final illness (the third stroke is usually considered fatal) can only be explained as a flight, and as an evasion of the assumption of final power. It was now obvious that either he or Stalin would take full power, and in reality, Stalin had already assumed it through the machine which he had so carefully built with the control commissions.

Trotsky describes for us the amazing spectacle of one who only seven years before had been termed "the master of all the Russias," and who now set taking the sun in a resort while his rival seized power. He writes,

"At Sukhum I spent long days lying on the balcony, facing the sea. Although it was January, the sun was warm and bright. Between the balcony and the glittering sea there were huge palms.....As I breathed the sea air in, I assimilated with my whole being the assurance of my historical rightness in opposition to the epigones. Over the palms and sea reigned silence, sparkling under the blue canopy. Suddenly, it was pierced by salvoes of artillery. The cannonading was going on somewhere below, on the seashore. It was Sukhum's salute to the leader who at that hour was being buried in Moscow."

Trotsky sent no word to the his expectant supporters at Lenin's funeral, preferring to maintain an aloof silence. While he congratulated himself on his "historical rightness" in opposing the "epigones", the epigones were entrenching themselves. Literary to the end, Trotsky dismisses his opponents as "epigones," or as latecoming imitators. Perhaps he should have looked up the Greek roots of the word, "epi" meaning on or over, and "gone" that which generates. Strictly, it means one who is located on or over a gonad, close to the generative power, and in this sense, it seems to describe Stalin accurately enough, for he had remained close to the seat of power.

Meanwhile, Stalin was carrying the battle to his enemy, with a direct attack upon Trotsky's conception of the Party. He said, on Jan. 17, 1924, addressing the Thirteenth Party Congress,

"Trotsky's prnouncements, his letters and articles, on the subject of generations and factions, are designed to induce // the Party to tolerate groups withinits midst. This is an attempt to legalise factions, and Trot-

This is the haggling of a bazear, the sly trading practices of little merchants, but what has this to do with great politics?

sky's faction above all.... If we were to allow groups in this situation, under these complex conditions, we would ruin the Party, convert it ////
from the monolithic, united organization that it is into a // union of groups and factions contracting with one another and entering into temporary alliances and agreements: that would not be a party. It would be the collapse of the Party. Never, for a single moment, have the Bolsheviks conceived of the Party as anything but a monolithic organisation hewed from a single block, possessing a single will, and in its work uniting all shades of thought into a single current of practical activities."

This was a second tenet of Stalinism, the Party as a monolithic organiAfter all, a temporary advantage over another faction is not power.

zation. The first, of course, was that as the only Socialist country, surrounded by bourgeois industrial states, the Soviet would have to maneovre.

At the same time that Stalin was presenting a concrete, long-range program,

Trotsky was becoming increasingly vague, and refusing to join the issue.

His adherents saw with dismay that their here was likely to fail them. It

was at this point that Zinoviev remarked to buth Fischer,

"Stalin has opposed us, not with manifestoes but with power, and he can be met only with greater power, not with manifestoes."

Trotsky also met Stalin's show of power by sneers and recriminations. In his autobiography, he \$47\$ remarks as following,

"Tell me," Skylansky (Trotsky's physician) asked, 'what is Stalin?'
"Stalin,' I said, 'is the outstanding mediocrity in the party."

Stalin's attacks on Trotsky before the Party Congresses were to the point, reviewing his career and his goals without mercy. For instance, on Jan. 18, 1924, Stalin said,

"It was rather amusing for us to hear Trotsky hold forth on the subject of democracy, the same Trotsky who at the Tenth Party Congress had demanded that the trade unions be shaken up from above."

As Ezra Pound has remarked in advice to a young writer, the least bit

of dry biscuit will rise up to testify against one.

Meanwhile, Trotsky was confiding to his friends that he had already conceded the struggle. He recalls, in his biography of Stalin,

"In the spring of 1924, after one of the Plenums of the Central Committee at which I was not present because of illness, I said to (I.N.)Smirhov:

'Stalin will become the dictator of the U.S.S.R..'Smirnov knew Stalin well.

They had shared revolutionary work and exile together for years, and under such conditions people get to know each other best of all. 'Stalin?' he asked me with amazement. 'But he is a mediocrity, a colorless nonentity.'

"'Mediocrity, yes; nonentity, no,' I snswered him. 'The dialiectics of history have already hooked him and will raise him up. He is needed by all of them -- by the tired radicals, by the bureaucrats, by the nepmen, the kulaks, the upstarts, the sneaks, by all the worms that are crawling out of the with he upturned soil of the manured revolution. He knows how to meet them on their own ground, he speaks their language and he knows how to lead them. He has the deserved reputation of an old revolutionist, which makes him invaluable to him as a blinder on the eyes of the country. He has will and dering. He will not hesitate to utilize them and to move against the Party. He has already started doing this. Hight now he is organizing around himself the sneaks of the Party, the artful dodgers. Of course great developments in Europe, in Asia and in our country may intervene and upset all the speculations. But if everything continues to go automatically as it is going now, then Stalin will just as automatically become dictator."

On Nov., 19, 1924, Stalin renewed his attack at the Plenum of the Communist Group in the AUCCTU,

"What is Trotskyism? Trotskyism possesses three specific features which bring it into irreconcilable contradiction with Leninism....Firstly, Trotskyism is the theory of permanent (uninterrupted) revolution. But what is

permanent revolution in its Trotskyist interpretation? It is revolution which fails to take the poor pessantry into account as a revolutionary force. Trotsky's 'permenent revolution' is, as Lenin said, 'skipping' the pessant movement, 'playing at the seizure of power'. Secondly, Trotskyism is distrust of the Bolshevik Party principle, of the monolithic character of the Party, of its hostility towards opportunist elements....Thirdly, Trotskyism is distrust of the lead rs of Bolshevism, an attempt to discredit, to defame them."

It was Trotsky who observed, in his autobiography, that "To operate with abstract moral criteria in politics is notoriously hopeless. Political morals proceed from politics themselves, and are one of its functions."

This is related to Nietzsche's aphorism, "There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena."

Was not Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" an abstract moral criteria in politics, a noblesse oblige to the Communists in other countries which must be supported, even at the expense of losing the one country where Socialism had won? He explains his theory as possible following,

"The peasant revolution is impossible, of course, without the active participation of the peasants in the form of armed detachments, local committees and the like. Yet the fate of the peasant revolution is decided, not in the village, but in the city. A shapeless remnant of mediaevalism in contemporary society, the peasantry cannot have an independent policy; it needs an outside leader. Two new classes vie for that leadership. Should the peasarty follow the liberal bourgeosile, the revolution would stop half-way, in order to subsequently roll back. Should the peasantry find its leader in the proletariat, the revolution must inevitably pass beyond bourgeois limits. It was precisely on that peculiar correlation of classes in a historically related bourgeois society that the perspective of permannt revolution was founded."

As Trotsky points out, "In Europe, begining with the Middle/444 emergen of the Middle Ages, each victorious peasant uprising did not put a peasa government in power, but a Leftist burgher party.

From this excerpt, it will be seen that Trotsky's concept of classes drew its essentials from feudal concepts, which had their origins, it is true, in his personal observation of the serfs who had been ruled by his father. In his later travels in Europe, he does not seem to have come into contact either with workers or with farmers, which would have embbled him to bring these fedual concepts up to date. His concept of permanent revolution would be completely invalid in America, because America has never had a peasantry, and the European peasantry was not at all what Trotsky imagined it to be. The crisis of the peasantry is its displacement as a class, not its serf-condition.

The weakness of Marxism, as well as of his later followers such as Trotsky, is the supposition that there is a permanent *** straification of classes and problems, which can only be altered by the processes of Marxism. It is this to which Trotsky refers when he says, "Marx sm considers itself the conscious expression of the unconscious historical process."

Granted that there is a conscious expression of am unconscious historical process, is it not egotism to suppose that it must express itself through Marxism, or through Trotskyism, or *** through Stalinism? Rether, should not these various "isms" gear themselves to the unconscious historical process, the "slouching towards Bethlehem to be born" of the blind masses? This, apparently is what Stalin succeeded in doing.

Lenin had already replaced the two traditional pleasures of the Russian peasant, the church and the market, by making him literate and by giving him a sense of mission, of belonging to an army on the march (the same expression has been used to describe the American of recent years). Traditionally, the peasant has never had political responsibility. There had been a successful Communist Revolution in Mexico and the land had been distributed to the peons after the landowers had been shot. The poons then needed seed and mules to work their land. They went to bankers and money lenders, and mortgaged their

land. Many of them spent the money on tequila, and lost their mortgages, with the result that, after a successful Marxist revolution, there were fewer landowners in M xico than before.

Another fundamental disagreement between Trotsky and Stalin was their argument over the "socialist accumulation of capital." As a purist, Trotsky objected to this process. But a socialist state must accumulate capital for socialist projects just as a capitaliatist state must accumulate capital projects, that is, unless they borrow the money and pay interest for it. Socialist capital, like capitalist capital, has a way of becoming merely capital and perhaps it was this that Trotsky feared. The accumulation of capital sometimes causes the masters to become the servants of this force, for capital has a way of seeking its own destiny, through the flight of capital, the velocity of capital, and other phenomena. Neither the dollar nor the rouble has any specific ideology.

As Robert Vincent Daniels says, in commenting upon Deutscher's book, "The Prophet Unarmed,"

"Through the eyes of Trotsky and his supporters, Deutscher discerns at least in part the true nature of Soviet socialism -- a bureaucratic alternative to capitalism in which the workers and peasants are systematically exploited by the police state in order to accumulate capital."

What is capital? Capital is the stored-up or reserve power of the masse and it was Lenin's recognition of this force, and his announced program for taking possession of it, in his article The Threatening Catastrophe, in September, 1917, which brought him to the fore. Russia has always been in need of capital, yet in the first hectic days of the Revolution, the victorious Communist leaders, as well as the peasants, wasted Russia's capital. They nationalized the property for their own, but used it as though it still belonged to someone else. The story is told of a group of peasants who got drunk after the revolution, and during the celebration they set fire to a great forest.

Some of the calmer heads went around beging the others to help save the forest. "Why should we?" they were told. "Let it burn! It's our forest now, isn't it?"

It was this lack of responsibility which Ad led to such Soviet laws as forbidding anyone to cut down a tree without State permission.

Trotsky points to the surplus, as the NEP program began to lead Russia to recovery, as the force which aided Stalin to power. He writes,

"In the matter of the national surplus product the bureaucracy and the petty bourgeosie quickly changed from alliance to enmity. The control of the surplus product opened the bureaucracy's road to power."

Maurice Hundus has treated the "socialism in one country" debate as follows:

"Here, then, they were, ardent crusaders for world revolution.... and with the Marxian theory of the impossibility of building a Socialist society in one land threatening them with failure. Something had to happen to cut the Gordian knot...Along came Stalin and very ruthlessly proceeded to do the necessary cutting. He enunciated the doctrine that ONE NATIONcan build Socialism within its own domains. Stalin had to wage a fierce war with Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders to get this doctrine offically accepted and acted upon. BUT HE WON HIS WAR, and now (1933) Russia is marching full steam ahead in the belief that she can build the new society alone, regardless of whether or not other nations join her."

Hindus later commented further on this development:

"The Bolsheviks split openly into two hostile factions./ péone, headed insisted by Trotsky, this to that even while going ahead with a program of internal development, Russia must base her eventual salvation on world revolution or perish; the other, headed by Stalin, maintained that Russia could survive and grow only if instead of basing her fate on world revolution, she strowe to build within herself a socialist society. Here, then,

in the battle of which I have already written of Trotsky's "permanent revolution" against Stalin's "socialism in one country."

Lawrence Dennis has pointed out that "Great revolutions are epics of social unification, and never social atomization." The revolution can consolidate its victory only if it unites the people behind it, and this the "liberal" revolutions have always failed to do (Kerensky et al.) At the time of the Bolshevik seizure of power, Russia was greatly in need of a unifying force. The White Russian leaders had long since disspirated the vitality of their Viking stock, over a thousand years of steadily decreasing efficiency, and had taken to Westernizing themselves, in a vain effort to restore their capabilities, as though Europe were some sort of spa which could revitalize their weary muscles.

The Provisional Government of Kerensky offered no suitable alternative to this policy, and neither did Troţsky's desire for "permanent revolution." Trotskyism was further social atomization, the lending of the Russian people energies not only to Europe, a la Turgenev, but throughout the entire world. Lenin once remarked to Trotsky that every revolution since the Middle Ages had resulted in a greater centralization of the state power. Surely this was a revelation of the unconscious historical process. But Trotsky failed to held it. He did not understand, was incapable of understanding, that revolution is the method by which the masses periodically regroup to meet their difficulties. It was this regrouping which Stalin understood instinctively, not intellectually, and he nominated the Bolshevik Party as the ground for regrouping. Because it was not an intellectual matter, Trotsky's attempts to resolve it in debate were doomed to failure. While he pamphleteered and issued manifestoes, the power steadily accumulated in the vessel which Stalin had placed at the fountain.

Even though he acted instinctively, Stalin attempted to meet Trotsky by debating the issues before the Party Congresses. The thirteen volumes of Stalin's published writings and speeches devote more space, about one-fourth of the total; to the issues between himself and Trotsky than any other subject

The debate went on for more than ten years, long after Frotsky himself had been exiled. On Jan. 17, 1925, Stalin said, before the Plenum of the Central Committee,

"Obviously, Trotsky does not understand, and I doubt whether he will ever understand, that the Party demands from its former and present leaders not diplomatic evasions, but an honest admission of mistakes. Trotsky evidently lacks the courage frankly to admit his mistakes."

Trotsky perhaps had never read Nietzsche's aphorism, "Surplus power, alone, is the proof of power." The power which Trotsky wielded, for a short time, as dictator of the Russias, was not strengthened by a correspondeing power, or surplus of power, within himself, with which he could meet the changing situation. Unconsciously, he longed for the "good old days" when he was an irresponsible revolutionary, when the motto was, "Attack, attack, attack!" But now the problem was to build, and this he could not do.

Max Eastman has written, "I think the main reason Trotsky sidestepped the power is a good one -- namely, that he could not wield it. He could not handle men. He did not live among men. He lived among ideas."

Trotsky says, in his autobiography,

"I was often asked, and even now (1930) I still am asked, 'How could you lose power?'"

He does not answer the question directly. He excuses his failure by such terms as "reaction", "changes in the anatomy of the revolutionary ############ society", "philistines" and "epigones." Finally, he says,

"Stalin has been the chief instrument in carryng out this overturn. He is gifted with practicality, a strong will, and persistence in carrying out his own aims. His political horizon is restricted, his theoretical equipment primitive. His work of compilation, the Foundations of Leninism, in which he made an attempt to pay tribute to the theoretical traditions of the party, is full of a young student's errors. His ignorance of foreign

languages compels him to follow the politicallife of other countries at second hand. His mind is stubbornly empirical and devoid of crative imagination. To the leading group in the party (in the inner circles he was not known at all) he always seemed a man destined to play second or third findle. And the fact that today he is playing first is not so much a summing-up of the man as it is of this transitional period of political backsliding in the country. Helvetius said it long ago: 'Every period has its great men, and if these are lacking, it invents them.' Stalinism is above all else the automatic work of the impersonal apparatus on the decline of the revolution."

Trotsky did not understand that power is always impersonal. The greater power becomes available in the modern state, the more impersonal it becomes. This has been shown by the fact that the immediate families of the leaders of modern states, the Hitlers, the Mussolinis, the Stalins, the Roosevelts, the Churchills, have not been able to take up the reins of the power. It for Trotsky, power was always personal; therefore, it failed him as soon as he was unable to personally respond to it. He correctly attributes Stalin's success to the fact that he was able to respond to an impersonal apparatus.

Trotsky also excused his failure as the decline of the revolutionary impulse among the masses. He writes,

"When the curve of histroical development rises, public thinking becomes more penetrating, braver, and more ingenious. It grasps facts on the wing, links them with the thread of generalization...But when the political curve indicates a drop, public thinking succumbs to stupidity. The priceless gift of political generalization vanishes somewhere without leaving even a trace. Stupidity grows in insolence, and baring its teeth, heaps insulting mockery on every attempt at serious generalization. Feeling that it is in command of the field, it begins to resort to its own means."

In this paragraph, Trotsky reveals his own failure to understand the

can ot continue long at that level, orthat intensity. Trotsky refused to reconcile himself to the subsiding of this intensity.

thinking process of the masses. It is not that in times of rising historical development, that they suddenly develop an ability to understand the political generalizations of the Trotskys -- rather, they respond to the entire situation, of which Trotsky's political generalizations are only a part. Also, the political awareness of the masses responds according to the danger, rising or subsiding with the need, for this is instinct, and it Trotsky also criticizes Stalin's "primitive" theoretical equipment.

This was a favorite subject with him, and he returns to it several times in his biography of Stalin. He writes,

"Koba (Stalin) had neither theoretical curiosity nor perseverance in study nor discipline of thought."

"The prison may not have stimulated Noba's interest in theories, but neither did it break his fighting spirit."

"Koba came to the revolution as a plebian democrat, a provincial and an empiricist. Lenin's ideas about the international nature of the revolution were both remote and alien to him."

Trotsky also points out that "Bolshevism was never addicted to the fetishistic worship of a nation's borders." The problem was not the worship of Russia's borders, but the necessity for strengthening Russia. As Stalin said on June 27, 1930, in addressing the Sixteenth Party Congress,

"#####/ The essence of Trotskyism consists, first of all, in the denial of the possibility of building Socialism in the U.S.S.R. with the forces of the working class and the peasantry of our country. What does this mean? It means that if, in the near future, help does not come in the form of a victorious world revolution, we shall have to capitulate to the bourgeoise and clear the road for a bourgeois-democratic republic."

Despite Trotsky's insistence that Stalin was weak on theory, Deutscher says, "The young writer (Stalin at the age of twenty-two) was no mere propagandist; he also showed himself to be a technician of the revolution, keenly interested in the specific means that would lead the

party to the desired end."

In July 1921, in his address, "The Political Strategy a d Tactics of the Russian Communists," Stalin had said,

"The Marxist theory, which primarily studies objective processes in their development and decline, defines the trend of development and point to the class or classes which are rising to power, or are inevitably falling, which must fall."

This definition is as apt an example of theory as can be found in Trotsky's own writings.

Trotsky, as he lost power, began to create for himself an image of Stalin as a sinister figure, a diabolical betrayer of the revolution, and other fancies. He remarks, in his biography of Stalin, of Stalin's period of exile in Siberia,

"Subsequently, Stalin became neither a marksman nor a hunter, in the sporting sense of the word. Indeed, judging by general appearances, it is easier to imagine him placing traps at night than firing a gun at a bird in Tight."

Trotsky also reviewed Stalin's activities during the Revolution. He writes,

"At the core of political life was the problem of power. The Provisional Government supported by the Mensheviks and the Populists, yesterday'
comrades of the underground, prison and exile, enabled him (Stalin) to look
more closely into that mysterious laboratory where, as everybody knows, it
is not gods that glaze the pots."

Trotsky says of Stalin's position during the October Revolution,
"It may well be that Stalin's advantage over the others was his
lack of compunction about going over and his readiness for rapprochement
with the Compromisers and fusion with the Mensheviks. He was not in the
least hampered by reverence for old formulae. Ideological fetishism was

alien to him; thus, without the least remorse he repudiated the long-held theory of the counter-revolutionary role of the Russian bourgeosiie. As always, Stalin acted hider/ empirically, under the pressure of his natural opportunism, which has always driven him to seek the line of least resistance."

Here again Trotsky shows his lack of understanding of the processes of power. While he exulted over the chance to expel Martov and the Mensheviks from the Congress of the Soviets -- "Go where you belong -- to the dustheap of history!" -- Stalin remained silent. It is a weakness to enjoy the personal exercise of power. Also, the line of least resistance is the line of conforming to the unspoken desires of the masses. Every important/leader of modern times has followed it. It is this tendency which led Trotsky to denounce Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler as having given in to the "petty bourgeosie."

Trotsky speaks of having been injured by "slander" during the prolonged struggle with Stalin. He writes,

"Nor were these the only methods of Stalinist rebuttal. ### He and his henchmen even stooped to fish in the muddled waters of anti-Semitism. I recall particularly a cartoon in the Rabochaya Gazeta (Workers' Gazette) entitled, 'Comraded Trotsky and Zinoviev.' There were any number of such caricatures and doggerels of anti-Semitic character in the Party press. They were received with snickers. Stalin's attitude towards this growing anti-Semitism was one of fffided friendly neutrality. But matters went so far that he was forced to come out with a published statement which declared, 'We are fighting Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, not because they are Jews, but because they are Oppositionists.' It was absolutely clear to everyone who thought politically that this deliberately equivocal declaration was aimed merely at the excesses' of anti-Semitism, while at the same time broadcasting throughout the entire Soviet press fract the very pregnant reminder, 'Don't forget that the leaders of the Opposition are Jews.'

Such a statement gave carte blanche to the anti-Semites."

Now that the issues had been placed before the Party in public debate, Stalin began a series of moves to oust Trotsky from his positions. In April People's Commissar for War, 1925 Trotsky was ousted from his position as \$\frac{76\pministrative}{10\pministrative} \frac{10\pministrative}{10\pministrative} \frac{10\pministrat

In 1926 Trotsky and Kamenev were expelled from the Politburo. They were now firmly established as the Opposition bloc, a group which soon became identified as the Anti-Party bloc, or, more simply, the opponents of the Stelin khanate, the ruler of the horde. On Dec. 13 1926, Stalin said to the Seventh engarged plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern,

"The opposition bloc is the embryo of a new party, undermining the unity of our Party. The task is to smash this bloc and liquidate it."

Stalin spoke of Trotsky's "guerilla mentality," his "hetman mentality," saying, "There will no longer be a party: instead, there will be the personal opinion of each hetman. That is what Trotsky refuses to understand."

Goaded by these attakks, Trotsky played into the hands of his enemy. As Sayers and Kahn point out, "With the threat of war hanging over Russia in the summer of 1927, Trotsky renewed his attack on the Soviet Government, and publicly declared: 'We must restore the tactics of Clemenceau, who, as is well-known, rose against the French Government at a time when the Germans were eighty kilometres from Paris.' Stalin denounced Trotsky's statement as treasonable."

Trotsky's remark here was an academic one, but it gave the effect

of an actual conspiracy, and cost him much of his support. As Stalin said on Aug. 1, 1927, of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition,

"They knock on one door and open another."

*Stalin's speech to the joint session of the Præesidium Exxcutive Committee and the Control Commission of the Comintern on Sept. 27, 1927 did much to finish off his opponent. Stalin said,

"Why did not Trotsky succeed in seizingpower in the Party? How can this be explained? Did Trotsky not have the will and the wish to laddership? Is he a lesser speaker than the present leaders of our Party? Would it not be more correct to say that as a speaker Trotsky stands higher than our many present leaders of the Party? How can one then explain that Trotsky, despite his oratorical skill, despite his will to leadership, despite his ability, was eliminated from the lead rship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? Trotsky is disposed to explain this by the fact that our Party, in his opinion, consists of voting sheep blindly following after their Central Committee. But only people who despise the Party and regard it as rabble can talk this way about it.... This is the view of a shabby party gristocrat about the Party."

On Dec. 7,1927, Stalin continued his attack before the Fifteenth Party Congress, saying,

"Speaking of themselves as 'signallers', the oppositionists pretend thereby to the leadership of the Party, of the working-class of the country. The question is, on what basis? Have the oppositionists proved in action that they are capable of leading anything in general, not even speaking of the leadership of the Party, the class, the country? Is it not a fact that the opposition, headed by such persons as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, head already led its group for two years and/....led it to definitive collapse? Is it not a fact that the opposition led its group during these two years from defeat to defeat? Does the this not show that the leaders of the opposition have turned out to be incompetent, the theory that their

leadership turned out to be leadership towards defeat and not towards victory? If the leaders of the opposition turned out to be incompetent in small things, what ground is there to believe that they would be competent in big things? Is it not clear that people who have suffered bankruptcy in the leadership of a small group cannot be entrusted with the leadership of matters 1/ as big as the Party, the working-class, the country?"

Thus only a decade after Trotsky stood at the pinmacle of absolute power, he stood before those whom he had led and heard himself denounced as an incompetent leader. There are few instances of any despot losing power failing to in such a manner, or/forfeit/Ag his life as the penalty for his incompetence. That he was incompetent, no one in the Party Congress could fail to deny, for the situation itself **** exposed his incompetence like a fatal disease whose ravages could no longer be concealed. He, not Stalin, had been the dictator of all the Russias: he, not Stalin, had founded the Red Army, the Comintern, the secret police. Power is a form of energy, and it follows the laws of energy. Power seeks the line of least resistance. It does not flow uphill. The power did not flow uphill from Trotsky to Stalin. It flowed down to Stalin, who was willing to receive it.

Stripped of his power, Trotsky was exiled by the Khanate to the Mongolian steppes, the town of Alma Ata, an area beloved by Spengler as the birthplace of world conquereors. Now began the final chapter of his history. He left power with his family, a retinue of servants, and considerable influence in many parts of the world. It was this influence which was to be his downfall, and the instrument was the Cheka, which he had founded.

Wolin and Slusser, in their definitive work on the Soviet Secret Police, mention that "A task of major importance assumed by the Checka during the Civil War was the detection and frustration of anti-Soviet plots. During this period the Cheka initiated a practice which later became characteristic, the fabrication or inflation of plots by provocation."

If Trotsky was not plotting against the Stalinist khanate after his loss of power, why not? And why were not his supporters, not only in the Soviet Union, but the ideological ragtails of the "permanent revolution" which had nested in the great urban centers of the world, also plotting against the Stalnist khanate? This may well have been the thinking of the state police //// apparat. \$/////// Walin and Slusser also point out that

"It was Stelin who made the most effective use of the secret police. Even before Lenin's death in 1924 he had achieved a unique position in the Party, stronger than that of any of his actual or potential rivals. He was a member of the Orgburo and Politburo, as well as General Secretary of the Party, in which capacity he wielded plentry powers over the admission, custing, transfer and promotion of Party members. As a member of the Politburo he sat on the collegium of the Cheka before 1922. At least until May of 1922 he served as Commissar of Workers' and Pasants' Inspection, a position which gave him the right to send his representatives into any and all of the agencies of the Soviet goervnment.... The role of the secret police in crushing opposition in the Party can be dated approximately to 1923. It was in that year that Stalin, armed with a letter intercepted by the GPU, obtained the reluctant approval of Kamenev and Zinciev for the arrest of a Party member (Sultan-Galiev) on charges of acting against the Party's nationality policy -- an ominous precedent."

Wolin and Slusser point out that Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, at that time head of the Cheka, were in substantial agreement on the nationality Add/policy as well as on industrialization, and that Stalin was also close to Genrikh Yagoda, Dzerzhinsky's chief deputy, who replaced him after Dzerzhinsky died of overwork.

Trotsky writes of Yagoda,

"The chief of the OGPU (Yagoda), a former pharmacist, displayed exceptional interest in poisons. He had at his disposal several toxicologists for whom he organized a special laboratory, providing it with means without stint and without control. It is, of course, out of the question that
Yagoda might have established such an enetrprise for his own personal needs.
Far from it. In this case, as in others, he was discharging his official
functions. As a poisoner, he was merely instrumentum regni, even as old
Locusta at Nero's court -- with this difference, that he had far outstripped
his ignorant predecessor in matters of technique!"

The state police began to take a more active interest, not only in Party matters within the Soviet Union, but also in the activities of Party members who were sent abroad on special missions. In the immediate wake of the Revolution, unfinished business of the Czarist government was handled abroad by various opportunists and adventurists, the flotsam and jetsam which stays afloat by any possible means during periods of great social change, the product of the old, trying in vain to adjust to the new. One of these officials, who used the psueodonym, M.T.Larsons, was in charge of contracting for silver coinage at the Royal Mint in London. He recounts the story of Leo Wolin, one of the "Experts" of the Currency Administration. He was head of the Special Section in charge of disposing marketable bonds which had been held by the Czarist Treasurer. He disposed of these bonds on the Paris Bourse and the Berlin Exchange during 1924 and 1925. I March, 1926 he was arrested in Moscow and accused of "having utilized his official position to disorganize the currency and stock market together with several other officials in the Commissariat of Finance and private stockbrokers, of having been criminally speculating on the Exchnage in gold, foreign currency and State securities."

On Mat 4, 1926, Wolin, A.T. Shepelevsky, and L. Rabinovitch, all of the Commissariat of Finance, were sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out the next day. Their activities were classed as "wreckning", that is, of endangering the slowly emerging Soviet economy.

In this connection, Stalin criticized Rykov in a speech before the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission April, 1929, a speech which not made public until 1949, recounting the difficulties which the young regime had faced in this regard:

"....You know the stooy about the export of gold to America. Many among you think, perhaps, that this gold was exported ... in accordance with a decision of the Soviet of People's Commissars, or of the Central with the consent or knowledge of Committee, of/of/the Central Control Commission. But this is untrue.... The Central Committee or the Soviet of People's Commissars have nothing to do with this matter. There is a ruling that gold can be exported companies with the sanction of the Central Committee. However, this was violated. W ho permitted the export of the gold? It appears that the gold was exported with the permission of one of Rykov's subsidiaries with Rykov's knowledge and consent ... Another example . // There were negotiations with one of the big private banks in America whose property was nationalized after the October Revolution, and which asked for compensation for its losses. It might appear that the negotiations were conducted with the permission of the Soviet of People' Commissers of of the Central Committee. But this is not true ... The Central Committee and the Soviet of the People's Commissars have nothing to do with this matter. When the Central C mmittee learned about these negtoiations, at decided to drop them. But here is the question. Who permitted these negotiations? It appears that they were permitted by one of Rykov's subordinates, with Rykov's knowledge and consent."

After Trotsky had been ousted, of course he denounced these who had superseded him as "petty bourgeois", "betrayers of the revolution" and other epithets, a war of name-calling which has gone on between the Stalinists and the Trotskyites to the present day. Many of the Trotskyites settled in publishing, the United States, and became prominent in education and the trade union movement. In 1940, while working on a biography of Stalin, Trotsky was mur-

dered at Coyoacan, a suburb of Mexico City. The operation was said to have been carried out by Beria, head of the Russian secret police, at the orders of Stalin.

Trotsky w/s/s/1/to/w/t deteriorated rapidly after being removed from power. He and his wife traveled from country to country, issuing a series of polemics against Stalin, who could not have been much disturbed by them. After all, he had allowed his political opponent to depart peacably, with his worldly goods, and no one could call him a brutal dictator after such leniency before the eyes of the world.

In his Diary, Trotsky records that while staying in Paris in 1935, he spent a great deal of time reading light fiction such as the detective stories of Edgar Wallace, and listening to light classics such as Madam Butterfly and the Wagnerian operas on the radio. He had reverted to type, a displaced, rootless intellectual with no visible function in the modern world. Once again he was a homeless revolutionary, but this time there was no revolution to look forward to. The revolution was over for him. He quarrelled with his landlord, and wrote in his diary,

"There is no creature more disgusting than a petty bourgeois engaged in primary accumulation. I have never had the opportunity to observe this type as closely as I do now."

Victor Serge wrote in memory of him, "And so in his last years were lonely ones. I am told that he often paced up and down his study at Coyoacan, talking to himself. (Like Tchernichevsky, the first great thinker of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, who, brought back from Siberia where he had spent twenty years in exile, 'talked to himself, looking at the stars,' as the police guards wrote in their report."

Bertram Wolfe and others have pointed out that Trotsky himself was the greatest violator of the elaborate security precautions which had been taken to safeguard himself against assassination. What had he to live for? As Neitzsche says, "One has regarded life carelessly, if one has failed to

see the hand that --kills with leniency."

The Trotskyites believe that Stalin had Trotsky killed because he still feared Trotsky's pen, but this hardly rings true. Stalin lived among real perils, such as the German army. The timing of Trotsky's death suggests that Stalin may have taken another factor into account. Trotsky was still the nominal leader of a nominal opposition to the Bolsheviks, an opposition which by this time was almost completely international in character. What was to prevent some enemy of the Soviet Union, in the war which had already begun, from sending Trotsky in as a divisive force to split the Russians and weaken their will to resist? Perhaps Stalin remembered the sealed train which the Germans had provided for Lenin in 1917, so that he could return to Russia and carry on the revolution. If the Japanese had offered to lend Trotsky in Vladivostok at the head of an army, would he have refused

Trotsky said, in his biography of Stalin, "It should not be forgotten that the political machine of the Bolshevik Party was predominantly made up of the intelligentsia, which was petty bourgeois in its origins and conditions of life, and Marxist in its ideas and in its relations with the proletariat."

In this connection, Leonard Wolf has remarked,

"The Marxists are quite right in believing in the materialist determination of history. What makes them so wrong, so exasperatingly imbecile, is their fantastic delusion that our material interests alone determine our historical actions. If only they did, what a much better world we should live in."

One of the principal factors in the Marxist Revolution was Nihilism, a fatalistic belief that all ended in nothing. The Nihilists were displaced intellectuals who had no real contact with the Russian soul, who were primarily Western in their attachments. Their reason had been destroyed by reason, as reason has a habit of doing. The end product of pure thought, pure rationalism, is the destruction of rationality.

The rationalist, then, the product of the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason, follows a logical path from reason to irrationality. As Ortega says,

"There are beginning to rise on the European horizon groups of men who, however paradoxical it may seem to us, do not want to be right, to have reason."

Stalin had attacked this group, in 1905, when he wrote, "Echoing their like-minded friends in Western Europe (called Bernsteinians) they said: 'For is the movement is everything -- the final aim is nothing.'"

A recent defector to the West has told of finding this type, which he identifies as a Karamazov type, in the highest-echelons of the //com///st/

**Total Soviet bureaucacy; officials who issue meeingless orders, who deliberately insert non sequiturs into important conferences, and who perversely make statements which they do not mean, which, indeed, have no meaning.

This type is well-known in the modern State. It has arisen, apparently, not only as a by-product of the Age of Reason, but also because of the great concentrations of power today.

The very powerful like the murmur of familiar voices, saying things which are not disturbing, no matter how meaningless. I remember on several occasions, while in the entourage of the richest man in the world, making meaningless or ridiculous statements, advancing absurd propositions, which were stated in an affable, sincere tone, and hearing them met with a celm half-smile, a "Perhaps." The very powerful do not really listen, hence the Karamazovs are found today in the halls of the mighty, murmuring their insane little platitudes, and, on occasion, having their suggestions accepted:

An attorney once told me that the only people who really disturbed him, in legal cases, were those witnesses who appeared to be convincingly same. The Karamazov type may be identified, by those who have the eye for it, by an almost imperceptible heightening of intensity as they go through the

ritual of being "convincingly sene."

Trotsky was not a Karamazov type. Perhaps that quality might have saved him. He was another type produced by the Age of Reason, the type which defie reality, defies it with their last breath, the intellectual to whom physical life has become a myth, biology a folk tale, and social customs mere aberrations which must be cured, if necessry by force.

Lenin said early in the game, "It has been pointed out that solits usually splits have been headed by intellectuals.... I should be very much in sympathy with the idea that our committees should contain eight workers to every two intellectuals."

The rise and fall of the Trotsky type of intellectual was predicted by a num/ber of thinkers. Ortega said, "In 1917 there began a generation, a type of life which, in all its essentials, would have come to an end in 1932."

In this connection, Ortega mentions that both bolshevism and fascism became political forces to be reckoned with in 1917. The role of Trotsky was ended by 1932, and the role of Mussolini as a world power faded rapidly from that/work/year.

The Trotsky-type intellectual was and is (those who have survived) distinguished by great arrogance, as described in a moving self-revelation by Franz Werfel,

"I have experienced many varieties of arrogance, in myself and in others. But since I shared these varieties for a time in my youth, I must confess from personal experience that there is no more consuming, more sneering, more diabolical arrogance than that of the artistic advance guard and radical intellectuals who are bursting with a vain mania to be deep and dark and subtle and to inflict pain. Amid the amused and indignant laughter of a few Philistones, we were the insignificant stokers who preheated the hell in which manking is now roasting."

If he had been appraised of it, at the height of his personal power, Trotsky could have read his own doom in a book which was published in London in 1921. Aimee Dostoewski, daughter of the great novelist, wrote, in a study of her father's work,

construct a huge Oriental Empire. He is fraternising with the Mongolians and establishing friendly relations with India, Persia and Turkey. He keeps Bolshevism like a scarecrow for sparrows, in order to keep off old Europe, and prevent her from meddling in Russian affairs, and hampering the construction of the national edifice. On the day when it is completed, the Russian moujik will destroy the scarecrow, who will have served its turn, and astonished Europe will see rising before her a new Russian Empire, mightier and more solid than the old. Your moujiks are good architects, and like wise men, which they have always been, they have no idea of inviting the intellectuals to be their architects. They have realized that these sick men could destroy the finest civilization in the world, but that they are quite incapable of constructing anything in its place."

When the Trotsky intellectuals came time to leave, when their role had been played out, they could not be expected to be asked to depart in terms less rude than those which Trotsky himself had used to an older and even less useful type of revolutionary in 1917, the Martov Mensheviks. The Soviet secret police had become an efficient factory in which various needs can be produced for the State. The process of getting rid of the intellectuals had to begin in an area which the intellectuals themselves controlled, that is, communications, particularly words. Thucydides has described a similar process in the ancient world,

"Words had to change their helphing ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation

was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a questi inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a justifiable means of /defedee/ self-defence. The advocat of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspect To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot still shewder; but to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In fine, to forestall an intendingeriminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended, until even blood became a weeker tie than party, for the superior readiness of those united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such associations had not in view the blessings derivable from established institutions but were formed by ambition for their overthrow; and the confidence of their members in each other rested less on any religious sanction than on complicity in crime."

What shocked the Trotsky intellectuals was the rudeness with which they, who had lost contect with the essential Russia, were brought back with into contact of it. They had looked to the West; now the West could not save them. The West had considered Communism as a matter of the machine — the Russian thought of it as a matter of the soul. Western Communism had been a plaything for those whose means allowed them to stay out of the factories and the fields — the aristocracy and the intellectuals. Communism gained little following in America because America had no aristocracy and few intellectuals. In 1870, George Francis Train, the prototype of Jules Verne's hero in "Around the World in Eighty Days" was imprisoned in France for taking part in the Marseilles Communist uprising. He was an eccentric posterior in the Marseilles Communist uprising. He was an eccentric posterior of the Prussian aristocracy. Her sister married Professor Jaffe, minister of finance during the short-lived Communist regime in Germany.

These Western "Communists" lived in a world of fantasy which was neither East nor West. Nevertheless, their command of myth and symbol gave them great power for a time. No one has exiled them. They have exiled themselves -- from the world of reality.

In a cell of the Lubianka prison, a man coughs late at night. On the floor below, a sleeper stirs uneasily at the sound.

In an apartment in the Bronx, a man coughs late at night. On the floor below, a sleeper stirs uneasily at the sound.

Who is free?