

Joachim
Hoffmann

Stalin's War of Extermination

1941-1945

Planning, Realization
and Documentation




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Dr. Joachim Hoffmann is clearly the most qualified specialist in Soviet military history in Germany. For over thirty years he has pored over Russian language documents about the Second World War. *Stalin's War of Extermination* can be seen as the most important result of Dr. Hoffmann's long-lasting research. Because he followed certain official guidelines, the Freiburg Court Vice-President Johann Birk confirmed that this book does not violate any German law. This procedure was necessary in order to protect the author from criminal prosecution in Germany, where historians dissenting with official German myths are frequently subject to prosecution and sometimes even imprisonment.

The dust cover of this book attempts to capture artistically what Dr. Hoffmann describes and substantiates in this book: Since the 1920s, Stalin planned to invade Western Europe in order to initiate the "World Revolution." The outbreak of the War between Germany and the Western Allies in 1939 gave Stalin the opportunity to prepare an attack against Europe which was unparalleled in history both in terms of Stalin's far-reaching goals as well as in terms of the amount of troops and armaments amassed at the Soviet border. Of course, Stalin's aggressive intentions did not escape Germany's notice who in turn planned a preventive strike against the Red Army. However, the Germans obviously underestimated both the strength of the Red Army and the determination of its leaders. What unfolded in June 1941 was undoubtedly the most cruel war in history.

Dr. Hoffmann's book shows in detail how Stalin and his Bolshevik henchman used unimaginable violence and atrocities to break any resistance in the Red Army and to force their unwilling soldiers to fight against the Germans who were anticipated as liberators from Stalinist oppression by most Russians. Stalin ordered not only to kill all German POW, but also to kill Soviet soldiers who fell into German hands alive, because they failed to fight to their death. Dr. Hoffmann also explains how Soviet propagandists incited their soldiers to unlimited hatred against everything German, and he gives the reader a short but extremely

unpleasant glimpse into what happened when these Soviet soldiers, dehumanized by Soviet propaganda and brutality, finally reached German soil in 1945: A gigantic wave of looting, arson, rape, torture, and mass murder befell East Germany. After reading this book, the world should thank the German Army that they prevented Stalin from succeeding with his plans of World Revolution, despite all the wrongdoings the Germans committed themselves.



Joachim Hoffmann, Dr. phil., born 1930 in Königsberg, East Prussia; studied modern history, eastern european history and comparative ethnology at the University of Hamburg and Berlin's Free University. He received his PhD in history in 1959. Between 1960 and 1995, he was historian at the *Militär-geschichtliche Forschungsamt der Bundeswehr* (Research Department for Military History of the German Army). His field of expertise was "Armed Forces of the Soviet Union"; Dr. Hoffmann has authored numerous articles and books about political, diplomatic and military history of the 19th century and about the history of the German-Soviet war. In 1991 he was granted the "Dr. Walter-Eckhardt" Award, and in 1992 the "General Andrej Andrejewitsch Wlassow" Cultural Prize. Retired, he lives near Freiburg, Germany.

THE TRUTH ABOUT KATYN

Report of Special Commission

for Ascertaining and Investigating the Circumstances of the Shooting of Polish Officer Prisoners by the German-Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest

THE Special Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Circumstances of the Shooting of Polish Officer Prisoners by the German - Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest (near Smolensk) was set up on the decision of the Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Committed by the German-Fascist Invaders and Their Associates.

The Commission consists of: Member of the Extraordinary State Commission Academician Burdenko (Chairman of the Commission); member of the Extraordinary State Commission Academician Alexei Tolstoy; member of the Extraordinary State Commission the Metropolitan Nikolai; President of the All-Slav Committee, Lt.-Gen. Gundorov; the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Kolesnikov; People's Commissar of Education of the Russian S.F.S.R. Academician Potemkin; the Chief of the Central Medical Administration of the Red Army, Col.-Gen. Smirnov; the Chairman of the Smolensk Regional Executive Committee, Melnikov. To accomplish the task assigned to it the Commission invited the following medico-legal experts to take part in its work: Chief Medico-Legal Expert of the People's Commissariat of Health Protection of the U.S.S.R., Director of Scientific Research in the Institute of Forensic Medicine Prozorovsky; the Head of the Faculty of Forensic Medicine at the Second Moscow Medical Institute, Doctor of Medicine Smolyaninov; Senior Staff Scientists of the State Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine under the People's Commissariat of Health of the U.S.S.R. Semenovsky and assistant Professor Shvaikova; Chief Pathologist of

the Front, Major of Medical Service, Professor Voropayev.

The Special Commission had at its disposal extensive material presented by the member of the Extraordinary State Commission Academician Burdenko, his collaborators, and the medico-legal experts who arrived in Smolensk on September 26, 1943, immediately upon its liberation, and carried out preliminary study and investigation of the circumstances of all the crimes perpetrated by the Germans.

The Special Commission verified and ascertained on the spot that 15 kilometres from Smolensk, along the Vitebsk highway, in the section of the Katyn Forest named "Kozy Gory," 200 metres to the S.W. of the highway in the direction of the Dnieper, there are graves in which Polish war prisoners shot by the German occupationists were buried.

On the order of the Special Commission, and in the presence of all its members and of the medico-legal experts, the graves were excavated. A large number of bodies clad in Polish military uniform were found in the graves. The total number of bodies, as calculated by the medico-legal experts, is 11,000. The medico-legal experts made detailed examinations of the exhumed bodies and of documents and material evidence discovered on the bodies and in the graves.

Simultaneously with the excavation of the graves and examination of the bodies, the Special Commission examined numerous witnesses among local residents, whose testimony establishes with precision the time and circumstances of the crimes committed by the German occupationists.

The testimony of witnesses reveals the following.

THE KATYN FOREST

The Katyn Forest had for long been the favourite resort of Smolensk people, where they used to rest on holidays. The population of the neighbourhood grazed cattle and gathered fuel in the Katyn Forest. Access to the Katyn Forest was not banned or restricted in any way. This situation prevailed in the Katyn Forest up to the outbreak of war. Even in the summer of 1941 there was a Young Pioneers' Camp of the Industrial Insurance Board in this forest, and it was not liquidated until July, 1941.

An entirely different regime was instituted in the Katyn Forest after the capture of Smolensk by the Germans. The forest was heavily patrolled. Notices

appeared in many places warning that persons entering without special passes would be shot on the spot.

The part of the Katyn Forest named "Kozy Gory" was guarded particularly strictly, as was the area on the bank of the Dnieper, where 700 metres from the graves of the Polish war prisoners, there was a country house—the rest home of the Smolensk Administration of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. When the Germans arrived this country house was taken over by a German institution named "Headquarters of the 537th Engineering Battalion."

POLISH WAR PRISONERS IN SMOLENSK AREA

The Special Commission established that, before the capture of Smolensk by the Germans, Polish war prisoners, officers and men, worked in the western district of the Region, building and repairing roads. These war prisoners were quartered in three special camps named: Camp No. 1 O.N., Camp No. 2 O.N. and Camp No. 3 O.N. These camps were located 25-45 kilometres west of Smolensk.

The testimony of witnesses and documentary evidence establish that after the outbreak of hostilities, in view of the situation that arose, the camps could not be evacuated in time and all the Polish war

prisoners, as well as some members of the guard and staffs of the camps, fell prisoner to the Germans.

The former Chief of Camp No. 1 O.N., Major of State Security Vetoshnikov, interrogated by the Special Commission, testified: "I was waiting for the order on the removal of the camp, but communication with Smolensk was cut. Then I myself with several staff members went to Smolensk to clarify the situation. In Smolensk I found a tense situation. I applied to the chief of traffic of the Smolensk section of the Western Railway, Ivanov, asking him to provide the camp with railway cars for evacuation of the

Polish war prisoners. But Ivanov answered that I could not count on receiving cars. I also tried to get in touch with Moscow to obtain permission to set out on foot, but I failed. By this time Smolensk was already cut off from the camp by the Polish war prisoners and guards who remained in the camp."

Engineer Ivanov, who in July 1941 was acting Chief of Traffic of the Smolensk Section of the Western Railway, testified before the Special Commission: "The Administration of Polish War Prisoners' Camps applied to my office for cars for evacuation of the Poles, but we had none to spare. Besides, we could not send cars to the Gussino line, where the majority of the Polish war prisoners were, since that line was already under fire. Therefore, we could not comply with the request of the Camps Administration. Thus the Polish war prisoners remained in the Smolensk Region."

The presence of the Polish war prisoners in the camps in the Smolensk Region is confirmed by the testimony of numerous witnesses who saw these Poles near Smolensk in the early months of the occupation up to September 1941 inclusive.

Witness Maria Alexandrovna Sashneva, elementary schoolteacher in the village of Zenkovo, told the Special Commission that in August 1941 she gave shelter in her house in Zenkovo to a Polish war prisoner who had escaped from camp.

"The Poles wore Polish military uniform, which I recognised at once, as during 1940 and 1941 I used to see groups of Polish war prisoners working on the road under guard. . . . I took an interest in the Pole because it turned out that, before being called up, he had been an elementary schoolteacher in Poland. He told me that he had completed normal school in Poland and then studied at some military school and was a Junior Lieutenant of the Reserve. At the

ROUND-UPS OF POLISH WAR PRISONERS

The presence of Polish war prisoners in the autumn of 1941 in Smolensk districts is also confirmed by the fact that the Germans made numerous round-ups of those war prisoners who had escaped from the camps.

Witness Kartoshkin, a carpenter, testified: "In the autumn of 1941 the Germans not only scoured the forests for Polish war prisoners, but also used police to make night searches in the villages."

Zakharov, former headman of the village of Novyye Bateki, testified that in the autumn of 1941 the Germans intensively "combed" the villages and forests in search of Polish war prisoners. Witness Danilenko, a peasant of the Krasnaya Zarya collective farm, testified: "Special round-ups were held in our place to catch Polish war prisoners who had escaped."

SHOOTINGS OF POLISH WAR PRISONERS

The above-mentioned "Headquarters of the 537th Engineering Battalion" quartered in the country house at "Kozy Gory" did not engage in any engineering work. Its activities were a closely guarded secret. What this "headquarters" engaged in, in reality, was revealed by numerous witnesses, including Alexeyeva, Mikhailova and Konakhovskaya, residents of the village of Borok of the Katyn Rural Soviet.

On the order of the German Commandant of the Settlement of Katyn, they were detailed by the headman of the village of Borok, Soldatenkov, to serve the personnel of "headquarters" at the above-mentioned country house. On arrival in "Kozy Gory" they were told through an interpreter about a number of restrictions:—

They were absolutely forbidden to go far from the country house or to go to the forest, to enter rooms without being called and without being escorted by German soldiers, to remain in the grounds of the country house at night. They were allowed to come to work and leave after work only by a definite route and only escorted by soldiers. This warning was given to Alexeyeva, Mikhailova and Konakhovskaya, through an interpreter, personally by the Chief of the German

outbreak of war between Poland and Germany he was called up and served in Brest-Litovsk, where he was taken prisoner by Red Army units. . . . He spent over a year in the camp near Smolensk.

"When the Germans arrived they seized the Polish camp and instituted a strict régime in it. The Germans did not regard the Poles as human beings. They oppressed and outraged them in every way. On some occasions Poles were shot without any reason at all. He decided to escape. Speaking of himself, he said that his wife, too, was a teacher and that he had two brothers and two sisters. . . ."

On leaving next day the Pole gave his name, which Sashneva put down in a book. In this book, "Practical Studies in Natural History," by Yagudovsky, which Sashneva handed to the Special Commission, there is a note on the last page: "Juzeph and Sofia Lock. House 25, Ogorodnaya St., town Zamosfye." In the list published by the Germans, under No. 3798 Lt. Juzeph Lock is put down as having been shot at "Kozy Gory" in the Katyn Forest in the spring of 1940. Thus, from the German report, it would appear that Juzeph Lock had been shot one year before the witness Sashneva saw him.

The witness Daniloanok, a peasant of the "Krasnaya Zarya" collective farm of the Katyn Rural Soviet, stated: "In August and September, 1941, when the Germans arrived, I used to meet Poles working on the roads in groups of 15 to 20."

Similar statements were made by the following witnesses: Soldatenkov, former headman of the village of Borok; Kolachev, a Smolensk doctor; Ogioblin, a priest; Sergeyev, track foreman; Smiryagin, engineer; Moskovskaya, resident of Smolensk; Alexeyev, chairman of a collective farm in the village of Borok; Kutseev, waterworks technician; Gorodetsky, a priest; Bazekina, a bookkeeper; Vetrova, a teacher; Savvatyev, stationmaster at the Gnezdovo station, and others.

Some searches took place in my house two or three times. After one such search I asked the headman, Konstantin Sergeyev, whom they were looking for in our village. Sergeyev said that an order had been received from the German Kommandantur according to which searches were to be made in all houses without exception, since Polish war prisoners who had escaped from the camp were hiding in our village. After some time the searches were discontinued."

The witness collective farmer Fatkov testified: "Round-ups and searches for Polish war prisoners took place several times. That was in August and September, 1941. After September, 1941, the round-ups were discontinued and no one saw Polish war prisoners any more."

SHOOTINGS OF POLISH WAR PRISONERS

Institution, Ober-leutnant Arnes, who for this purpose summoned them one at a time.

As to the personnel of the "headquarters," Alexeyeva testified: "In the 'Kozy Gory' country house there were always about thirty Germans. Their chief was Ober-leutnant Arnes, and his aide was Ober-leutnant Rokst. Here were also a Lieutenant Hott, Sergeant-Major Lumert, N.C.O. in charge of supplies; Rose, his assistant; Iikes, Sergeant-Major Grenewski, who was in charge of the power station; the photographer, a corporal whose name I do not remember; the interpreter, a Volga German whose name seems to have been Johann, but I called him Ivan; the cook, a German named Gustav; and a number of others whose names and surnames I do not know."

Soon after beginning their work Alexeyeva, Mikhailova and Konakhovskaya began to notice that "something shady" was going on at the country house.

Alexeyeva testified: "The interpreter warned us several times on behalf of Arnes that we were to hold our tongues and not chatter about what we saw and heard at the country house. Besides, I guessed from

shots were fired from behind with the head bent forward. The bullet channel pierced the vital parts of the brain, or near them, and death was caused by destruction of the brain tissues. The injuries inflicted by a blunt, hard, heavy object found on the parietal bones of the cranium were concurrent with the bullet wounds of the head, and were not in themselves the cause of death.

The medico-legal examination of the bodies carried out between January 16 and January 23, 1944, testifies that there are absolutely no bodies in a condition of decay or disintegration, and that all the 925 bodies are in a state of preservation—in the initial phase of desiccation of the body—which most frequently and clearly was expressed in the region of the thorax and abdomen, sometimes also in the extremities; and in the initial stage of formation of adipocere (in an advanced phase of formation of adipocere in the bodies extracted from the bottom of the graves); in a combination of desiccation of the tissues of the body with the formation of adipocere.

Especially noteworthy is the fact that the muscles of the trunk and extremities absolutely preserved their macroscopic structure and almost normal colour; the internal organs of the thorax and peritoneal cavity preserved their configuration. In many cases sections of heart muscle have a clearly discernible structure and specific colouration, while the brain presented its characteristic structural peculiarities with a distinctly discernible border between the grey and white matter.

Besides the macroscopic examination of the tissues and organs of the bodies, the medico-legal experts removed the necessary material for subsequent microscopic and chemical studies in laboratory conditions.

Properties of the soil in the place of discovery were of a certain significance in the preservation of the tissues and organs of the bodies. After the opening of the graves and exhumation of the bodies and their exposure to the air, the corpses were subject to the action of warmth and moisture in the late summer season of 1943. This could have resulted in a vigorous progress of decay. However, the degree of desiccation of the bodies and formation of adipocere in them, especially the good state of preservation of the muscles and internal organs, as well as of the clothes, give grounds to affirm that the bodies had not remained in the earth for long.

Comparing the condition of bodies in the grave on the territory of "Kozzy Gory" with the condition of the bodies in other burial places in Smolensk and its nearest environs—Gedeonovka, Maglenshchina, Resdovka, Camp No. 128, Krasny Bor, etc. (see protocol of the Commission of Medico-Legal Experts dated October 22, 1943)—it should be admitted that the bodies of the Polish war prisoners were buried on the territory of "Kozzy Gory" about two years ago. This finds its complete corroboration in the documents found in the clothes on the bodies, which preclude the possibility of earlier burial (see point "d" of paragraph 86 and list of documents).

The commission of medico-legal experts, on the basis of the data and results of the investigation, consider as proved the fact of the killing by shooting of the Polish Army officer and private war prisoners; asserts that this shooting dates back to about two years ago, i.e. between September and December of 1941; regards the fact of the discovery by the commission of medico-legal experts, in the clothes on the bodies, of valuable and documents, dated 1941, as proof that the German-Fascist authorities who undertook a search of the bodies in the spring-summer season of 1943 did not do it thoroughly, while the documents discovered testify that the shooting was done after June 1941; notes that in 1943 the Germans had made an extremely small number of post-mortem examinations of the bodies of the shot Polish war prisoners; notes the complete identity of method of the shooting of the Polish war prisoners with that of the shooting of Soviet civilians and war prisoners widely practised by the German-Fascist authorities in the temporarily occupied territory of the U.S.S.R., including the towns of Smolensk, Orel, Kharkov, Krasnodar and Voronezh.

Signed by the Chief Medico-Legal Expert of the People's Commissariat of Health Protection of the U.S.S.R., Director of the State Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine under the People's Commissariat of Health Protection of the U.S.S.R., Prozofovsky; Professor of Forensic Medicine at the Second Moscow State Medical Institute, Doctor of Medicine Smolyaninov; Professor of Pathological Anatomy, Doctor of Medicine Voropaev; Senior Staff Scientist of the Anatomical Dept. of the State Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine under the People's Commissariat of Health Protection of the U.S.S.R., Doctor Smeznovskiy; Senior Staff Scientist of the Forensic Chemistry Dept. of the State Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Medicine under the People's Commissariat of Health Protection of the U.S.S.R., Assistant Professor Shvaikova.

Smolensk, January 24, 1944.

DOCUMENTS FOUND ON THE BODIES

Besides the data recorded in the protocol of the commission of medico-legal experts, the time of the shooting of the Polish officer prisoners by the Germans (autumn 1941, and not spring 1940 as the German assert) is also ascertained by documents found when the graves were opened, dating not only the latter half of 1940 but also the spring and summer (March-June) of 1941. Of the documents discovered by the medico-legal experts, the following deserve special attention:

1. On body No. 92: A letter from Warsaw addressed to the Central War Prisoners' Bureau of the Red Cross, Moscow, Kuibyshev Street, House No. 12. The letter is written in Russian. In this letter Sofia Zigon inquires the whereabouts of her husband Tomasz Zigon. The letter is dated September 12, 1940. The envelope bears the impress of a German rubber stamp "Warsaw Sept. 1940" and a rubber stamp "Moscow, Central Post Office, ninth delivery, Sept. 28, 1940" and an inscription in the Russian language: "Ascertain and forward for delivery, November 15, 1940" (signature illegible).

2. On body No. 4: A postcard registered under the number 0119 from Tarnopol stamped "Tarnopol Nov. 12 1940." The written text and address are discoloured.

3. On body No. 101: A receipt No. 10208 dated Dec. 19, 1939 issued by the Kozelsk Camp testifying receipt of a gold watch from Eduard Adamovich Lewandowski. On the back of the receipt is a note dated March 14, 1941 on the sale of this watch to the Jewellery Trading Trust.

4. On body No. 46: A receipt (number illegible) issued December 16, 1939 by the Starobelsk Camp testifying receipt of a gold watch from Vladimir Rudolfovich Araszkevich. On the back of the receipt is a note dated March 25, 1941 stating that the watch was sold to the Jewellery Trading Trust.

5. On body No. 71: A small paper ikon with the image of Christ, found between pages 144 and 145 of a Catholic prayer book. The inscription, with legible signature, on the back of the ikon reads: "Jadwiga" and bears the date April 4, 1941."

6. On body No. 46: A receipt dated April 6, 1941 issued by the Camp No. 1-ON, showing receipt of a sum in roubles from Araszkevich.

7. On the same body No. 46: A receipt dated May 5, 1941 issued by Camp No. 1-ON, showing receipt of 102 roubles from Araszkevich.

8. On body No. 101: A receipt dated May 15, 1941 issued by Camp No. 1 showing receipt of 175 roubles from Lewandowski.

9. On body No. 53: An unmailed postcard in the Polish language addressed Warsaw Bagatella 15, Flat 47, to Irene Kuczinska, and dated June 20, 1941. The sender is Stanislaw Kuczinski.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION

FROM all the material at the disposal of the Special Commission, namely evidence given by over 100 witnesses questioned, data supplied by the medico-legal experts, documents and material evidence found in the graves in the Katyn Forest, the following conclusions emerge with irrefutable clarity:

1. The Polish prisoners of war who were in the three camps west of Smolensk, and employed on road building before the outbreak of war, remained there after the German invaders reached Smolensk, until September 1941, inclusive.

2. In the Katyn Forest, in the autumn of 1941, the German occupation authorities carried out mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war from the above-named camps.

3. The mass shootings of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn Forest was carried out by a German military organisation hiding behind the conventional name "H.Q. of the 537th Engineering Battalion," which consisted of Ober-leutnant Arnes, his assistant Ober-leutnant Rekest, and Lieutenant Hott.

4. In connection with the deterioration of the general military and political situation for Germany at the beginning of the year 1943, the German occupation authorities, with provocational aims, took a number of steps in order to ascribe their own crimes to the organs of the Soviet Power, calculating on setting Russians and Poles at loggerheads.

5. With this aim, (a) the German - Fascist invaders, using persuasion, attempts at bribery, threats and barbarous torture, tried to find witnesses among Soviet citizens, from whom they tried to extort false evidence alleging that the Polish prisoners of war had been shot by the organs of Soviet Power in the spring of 1940; (b) the German occupation authorities in the spring of 1943 brought in from other districts bodies of Polish war prisoners whom they had shot and put them into the open graves in the Katyn Forest, calculating on covering up the traces of their own crimes, and on increasing the number of "victims of Bolshevik atrocities" in the Katyn Forest; (c) preparing for their provocation, the German occupation authorities started opening the graves in the Katyn Forest in order to take out

documents and material evidence which exposed them, using for this work about 500 Russian prisoners of war who were shot by the Germans after the work was completed.

6. It has been established beyond doubt from the evidence of the medico-legal experts, that (a) the time of the shooting was the autumn of 1941; (b) in shooting the Polish war prisoners the German hangmen applied the same method of pistol shots in the back of the head as they applied in the mass execution of Soviet citizens in other towns, e.g., Orel, Voronezh, Krasnodar and Smolensk itself.

7. The conclusions drawn from the evidence given by witnesses, and from the findings of the medico-legal experts on the shooting of Polish war prisoners by the Germans in the autumn of 1941, are completely confirmed by the material evidence and documents excavated from the Katyn graves.

8. In shooting the Polish war prisoners in the Katyn Forest, the German - Fascist invaders consistently carried out their policy of physical extermination of the Slav peoples.

Signed:

Chairman of the Special Commission, Member of the Extraordinary State Commission, Academician BURDENKO.

Members:

Member of the Extraordinary State Commission, Academician ALEXEI TOLSTOI.

Member of the Extraordinary State Commission, the Metropolitan NIKOLAI.

Chairman of the All-Slav Committee, Lieutenant-General GUNDONOV.

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, KOLESNIKOV.

People's Commissar for Education of the Russian S.F.S.R., Academician POTEMKIN.

Chief of the Central Medical Administration of the Red Army, Colonel-General SMERNOV.

Chairman of the Smolensk Regional Executive Committee, MELNIKOV.

Smolensk, January 24, 1944.

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“Well now, if the Germans want a war of extermination,* they will get it (thunderous, long drawn-out applause). From now on, it will be our task, the task of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the task of all the fighters, commanders, and political officials of our Army and Navy, to exterminate to the last man all Germans having invaded the territory of our homeland as occupiers (thunderous applause; shouts of ‘Quite right!’; cheers). No mercy to the German occupiers! Death to the German occupiers! (Thunderous applause.)”

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin
November 6, 1941

* Stalin’s “war of extermination,” in actual fact, began immediately after June 22, 1941. All political prisoners were shot on Stalin’s orders prior to the withdrawal of the Red Army. For example, over 4,000 Ukrainians and Poles (among whom were also Jews and German prisoners of war) were bestially murdered in the prisons of Lemberg alone, starting on June 22, 1941. Many of these murders were committed by the NKVD (Narodnyj Komissarijat Vnutrennikh Del or People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which was in charge of State security).

Foreword by Dr. Manfred Kehrig

The initiation of the German military campaign against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, was justified in National Socialist propaganda on the grounds that the opening of a new theater of war in the Soviet Union was required for the Wehrmacht to preempt an impending Soviet attack. After the Second World War, German and Western researchers relegated this justification to the realm of fairy tales. They viewed "Operation Barbarossa," the German military's code phrase for the invasion of the Soviet Union, as a long-planned "surprise attack" by fascist Germany upon an unsuspecting, poorly armed Soviet Union that was ready for peaceful coexistence with Germany. Andreas Hillgruber interpreted the struggle against the Soviet Union as being causally rooted in the National Socialist ideology. Within the scope of a far-reaching concept of world power politics, the war was, so Hillgruber, rationally planned by Hitler and a step up the ladder toward the achievement of his goals. Bernd Stegemann, in a much-respected article in the early 1970s, objected to this deterministic definition of National Socialist policies, and characterized Hitler's decision to wage war upon the Soviet Union as primarily a decision arising from contemporary political and military conditions. In 1988, the controversy continued with a study by Hartmut Schustereit about Hitler's motivations for his decision to attack the Soviet Union, which was interpreted as an attempt "to defeat the West by means of victory in the East." He called Hillgruber's assumption of a "step-by-step program" on the part of Hitler a "fiction." The temporary opening of the Soviet archives, and the liberalization of academic life since 1989, has made new sources available permitting a better insight into German-Soviet relations in the period between 1939 and 1941, thus also enabling a more balanced study of the topic.

The debate, which is now years-old, as to the proper share of Soviet guilt for the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1941, naturally has to be conducted on the basic assumption that the war was a fight to the death between two totalitarian systems—both of which used identical methods and measures for the achievement of their political aims. This fact has barely been considered by Western European scholars since 1945; after all, was not the Soviet Union the noble ally of the Western democracies for four

years? Did it not decisively contribute to victory over the German Reich at a huge cost in both blood and treasure?

In the minds of Western intellectuals, the victorious Soviet Union was necessarily, ipso facto, to be considered the representative of a system whose historical viewpoint had to be accepted. Any West German who did critical research relating to the Soviet system in the decades after the end of World War II and who made any mention of the Soviet system's uncompromising contempt for freedom and human dignity and its terror and repression, was almost invariably smeared as a "fascist," suspected "neo-Nazi," and jeopardized in life and wealth. All those who wished to accept nothing but Soviet system gathered under the banner of "anti-fascism." Nevertheless, at the same time, there was no shortage of resistance on all levels and in all fields of scholarly research, in particular, in the field of German historical scholarship. Serious efforts by scholars were made to confront this "anti-fascist" indoctrination in a calm and deliberate manner by means of reliable arguments; the author of the present study was one of those scholars. The author has conducted serious, critical research, based on original sources, relating to Soviet military plans for a military conflict with the German Reich; these sources have only become available since 1991. He has compared the source material with all previously known sources, and supplemented them with a systematic appraisal of the memoirs of Soviet military officers. In so doing, he came to the conclusion that a German-Soviet war was indeed inevitable; that, as a result, both the German Reich and the Soviet Union armed for the approaching conflict, drew up plans of operation, and attempted to preempt their enemy militarily. The military situation—which was clearly shifting in favor of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941, and which could only be imperfectly known to the German leadership—led Hitler to consider June 1941 as the last date upon which it would still be possible to initiate preventive hostilities at all. On the other side, Stalin, early in 1941, apparently moved the planned date of attack forward from 1942 to July-September 1941. He intended to destroy the Wehrmacht, which was concentrated on the western border of the Soviet Union, in several massive blows. To prove this, the author presents a detailed study of Soviet operations in May, offering a graphic image of Stalin's decision to take military action against Germany as early as the summer of 1941.

The principal part of the present study is dedicated to an aspect of the German-Soviet war that has, thus far, escaped the awareness of the Western world: that Stalin considered war with the German Reich as a "war of extermination" and a "war of conquest," and conducted it accordingly. Just as considerations of racial conflict were largely involved in Hitler's

campaign against the Soviet Union. In the process, Stalin's order to exterminate all Germans without discrimination, issued on November 6, 1941, was particularly decisive in this connection. Ilya Ehrenburg, the head of Soviet propaganda, made it his business to see that not only every Soviet soldier would know about the order, but that the order was carried out in practice. Incitement to murder Germans POWs and wounded formed part of the official Soviet program from the very first day of the war. This incitement of the Soviet troops attained hellish proportions when the Red Army penetrated German territory in late 1944, and continued against the German civilian population upon the deliberate instructions of the Soviet leadership and political administration—murdering, raping, plundering, burning, and pillaging—leaving a trail of blood in Soviet-occupied territory, even weeks after May 8, 1945.

The particular fascination of Joachim Hoffmann's book is that he casts light upon many aspects of "Stalin's War of Extermination" against Germany that have not yet been adequately considered by Western historiography.

Dr. Manfred Kehrige



Foreword by Prof. Dr. Ernst Topitsch

Among the endless spectacle of publications about World War Two, only a few tower above the rest as standard works. One of these is "Stalin's War of Extermination" by Joachim Hoffmann. To be sure, such groundbreaking scholarly works must often overcome the tenacious resistance of an establishment with deeply held dogmas and interests. However, Hoffmann's work relies on such thorough knowledge and such conscientious and penetrating analysis, especially of essential Russian source material, that the success of his work cannot be denied for long. Seven editions have appeared in Germany—but the book has also gained much attention outside of Germany. And now, it should also be available to the English-speaking public in order to confront widely held prejudices.

It is now beyond question that Lenin and Stalin had firmly decided already at the end of World War One to bring about a "second imperialist war" between the capitalists, those nations not yet under communist rule, which would be to Moscow's great advantage. For this purpose Stalin built a military-industrial complex to give Russia an unimagined military capability.

It has only come to light recently that as part of this military expansion, Stalin had also decided in 1935/1936 upon a naval fleet construction program which should have made the Soviet Union the strongest naval power in the world by 1947. This plan was clearly directed against the Anglo-American naval powers, the citadels of world capitalism and the strongest obstacles to a world dominated by Moscow. As the base of operations for such a monster armada, one needed the Atlantic coast of Europe. To reach the Atlantic, Germany had to be first used as a battering ram against the western powers and then pushed aside. However, the German Wehrmacht upset the plan and hindered its ultimate, total success.

Professor Dr. Ernst Topitsch
Karl-Franzens-University, Graz, Austria



Preface to the English Edition

It is an honor to me to present a work of twentieth century historiography to the readers of the United States of America and Great Britain which attracted unusual attention immediately upon its publication in Germany in 1995.

Even in the USA, the German version of *Stalin's War of Extermination* (*Stalins Vernichtungskrieg*) was not completely unknown, since Professor Dr. Richard C. Raack of the California State University Hayward drew the attention to its content with a review in *Slavic Review* (Vol. 55, No. 2, Summer 1996). In two ground laying papers published in the renowned journal *World Affairs* (Vol. 158, No. 4, Spring 1996 and Vol. 159, No. 2, Fall 1996), he praised the book as an important contribution in the context of the now worldwide debate on "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II."

Jakob Heilbrunner in *Foreign Affairs* (October-November 1996) had to admit that this book will contribute to a reexamination of our knowledge about the Second World War which was hitherto considered certain. Thanks to the efforts of the U.S. publishing house Theses and Dissertations Press (a subdivision of Loewe Belfort Projects, Inc.), Professor Raack's suggestion to make an "English language version [...] available to the world market" has now been realized with the book at hand.

The intention of this book is to conclude my decades long research into the history of the Red Army and Stalin's methods of warfare. Even though it was written as part of an official assignment by the *Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt der Bundeswehr* (Military Research Office of the German Armed Forces), the head of this office, Brigade General Dr. Günther Roth, preferred not to publish this book as an official document, but to allow me a private publication. Considering the expected "huge public attention" of this book, this decision by Brigade General Dr. Roth was quite understandable. Since its first appearance in 1995, new editions of this

book became necessary in short intervals. As of today, no less than seven German language editions have appeared in two different revisions.

The reception of *Stalin's War of Extermination* was positive. The reading public was simply curious to learn how the term "War of Extermination" as created by Stalin came to be realized in practice. Moreover, my book barely preempted an inflammatory photo exhibition in Germany which, incidentally, used the term "War of Extermination" as its motto, but whose purpose was to malign the German Wehrmacht. This exhibition created an unforeseen outrage and it had to be canceled due to its many forgeries and historical errors. Soon, I received grateful letters from German citizens of all walks of life, some of them secretaries of state and other high German officials, University Professors and personalities from the military, to whom their war experiences had left indelible impressions. After a short while, an increasing amount of positive reviews had been published in domestic and foreign publications. In several cases, my "neck-breaking" courage was praised—namely that I had published such a book in the poisoned atmosphere of the Federal Republic of Germany.

To bring the term "War of Extermination" into its context with its inventor Stalin, caused raging protest within circles of the aggressive "anti-fascism" of left-wing ideologues and Stalin apologists. Under no circumstances could they allow a scientific correction of their distorted world view. In the USA as well as in Great Britain, i.e., in countries with a long tradition of free speech and free scientific research, it might be stunning for the reader to learn which measures were taken—partly even by the authorities—to somehow suppress this unwanted work of history and to ostracize its author in the public.

These methods are even more reprehensible if one considers that the freedom of science is solemnly proclaimed and guaranteed by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. This intolerant tendency to enforce conformity prevailing in Germany toward dissenting opinions appears to be insurmountable. This, too, might explain the persecution of authors and the burning of books which has resurfaced in Germany in recent years to an extent which had been thought to be impossible after 1945.

Hence, *Stalin's War of Extermination* was not spared from the harassments of "political correctness." In the German Parliament, the *Bundestag*, it was labeled by left-wing Representatives a "monstrous publication." In 1996, a scandal arose in the *Bundestag*. With six parliamentary inquiries

and 14 supplementary questions, left-wing representatives demanded on February 28, 1996, that the German government, which—by its Basic Law—is absolutely not responsible for historiographic issues, started disciplinary measures and prosecution against me as a historian and the author of this book, because my book did not agree with the confused opinions of these biased leftists. This parliamentary maneuver was continued on September 13, 1996, when the same circles tried again to drive the German government into a corner with twelve parliamentary inquiries and ten supplementary questions. Involved in this were the members of parliament Buntentbach, Beck, Nachtwei, Fischer, and Müller, from the left-wing radical parliamentary faction “Federation 90/The Greens.”

Even the media paid attention to the attempt of these radical representatives to transform the *Bundestag* into an inquisitorial tribunal against the absent historian they were discussing. The vice president of the *Bundestag*, Herr Klein, even felt obliged to protest against the impertinent tone of these representatives. Of course, the German Federal government is neither competent nor able to decide what is historically correct and what is wrong. Consequently, it did nothing to proceed against me, especially because in the meantime, *Stalin's War of Extermination* had gained huge public attention.

However, the prevailing conditions in Germany, an important liberal state under the rule of law, are characterized distinctively if one considers that its parliament can force the government to promise to thoroughly analyze a book “for any illegal content or statement”, a book, after all, which was written by a professional historian following the strict rules of science and firmly based on documents. On March 7, 1998, former U.S. Army Chaplain (Captain) Robert H. Countess, Ph.D., wrote to the late German Parliamentary Secretary of State Michaela Geiger. He had found appropriate words for those provocateurs in the *Bundestag*:

“In America and other lands at present the BRD suffers unnecessary embarrassment because of the Hoffmann book controversy. The *Bundestag's* discussion of a history book, namely Dr. Joachim Hoffmann's ‘Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945,’ is [...] a cause for great alarm since the *Bundestag's* discussion possesses the aura of an Inquisition with threats of punishment upon author Joachim Hoffmann and upon any Wissenschaftler [scientist] who might publish a work that is politically incorrect.”

After this failure in the *Bundestag*, the attacks focused more intensively on me directly as a historian employed by the federal authorities.

Because of the book at hand, the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz*) in the German State Baden-Württemberg, a provincial authority, whose competence of spying on its citizens can hardly be made understandable to U.S. citizens, started to ostracize me publicly as an "enemy of the constitution." This appeared in a poorly edited mass brochure issued yearly. Of course, this is a severe accusation, which, however, needs to be well-founded. After all, I was appointed to the scientific service of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1960 by a certificate of the Federal President of Germany, and in 1995 I retired with a certificate of the German Minister of Defence, "with Gratitude and Acknowledgment for the loyal service to the German people". Since no misconduct could be found after 35 years of honorable service, they fell back to deceptions. As an excuse, they used an allegation not to be described here in detail, but whose untruthfulness was strikingly obvious. As an aside, the head of this spying office, Herr Bollacher, unintentionally revealed the poor base of his allegations:

"The State Office has a review of 'Stalin's War of Extermination' in its possession."

What a miserable argument, as if a work of history or the existence of a negative review can prove the heavy accusation of being an "enemy of the constitution." And what a deception! At this time, more than 50 positive reviews existed from domestic and foreign publications!

According to the assessment of an experienced old judge and public prosecutor, the actions of this State Office for the Protection of the Constitution Baden-Württemberg border on criminal behavior. However, an official complaint of mine against the Minister of the Interior of the State of Baden-Württemberg was rejected by a subaltern clerk named Maier with impertinent words.

Of course, the respectable and loyal citizen is not totally at the mercy of the arbitrariness of the authorities. There is still the way into the public's mind. Subsequently, the experienced author Bernd Kallina devoted a detailed article to this scandal surrounding the Baden-Württemberg authorities and published it, alongside with contributions by other reputable authors, in an anthology edited by Professor Hans-Helmuth Knütter and Stefan Winkler entitled: "*Der Verfassungsschutz. Auf der Suche nach dem verlorenen Feind*" (The Office for the Protection of the Constitution. On the Search for a Lost Enemy, Munich 2000).

All machinations directed against this book not only failed miserably, but, to the contrary, have even increased the curiosity among the readers. *Stalin's War of Extermination* has become a bestseller. However, it has become pretty obvious to what kind of harassments a historian is exposed to who feels bound to publish nothing but the truth if his research results do not match the requirements of the "political correctness". *Habent sua fata libelli...* (Small books have their fate...)

On this occasion I want to cordially thank the Director of Theses and Dissertations Press, Dr. Robert H. Countess, for his intensive interest in my book and for his decision to make the content of it available in English to the interested reader in the United States, in Great Britain and elsewhere in the English speaking world. My warmest thanks also go to his Assistant Director, Mr. Peter Webber, who is responsible for the entire project, to the translator, Mr. William Deist, to the editorial reviser, Mr. Robert Berkel, and last but not least also to all other persons involved in the publication of this extraordinarily exact English edition.

Perhaps this book will contribute to sharpen the eyes of the readers in the English speaking countries for the methods of their former war ally, Joseph Stalin, a monster who once was thoughtlessly referred to as "good old Uncle Joe".

Freiburg, March 6, 2001

Joachim Hoffmann

Preface

The fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II should be the occasion to look back, and, in contrast to usual custom, to examine the manner and methods used by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the conduct of the fateful German-Soviet conflict. A manipulation of opinion, which has been decades-long and increasingly one-sided, has aroused uncertainty among the German general public and has permitted distortions to arise, which also find expression in truly amazing statements and allegations in the press in relation to the tragic events of those years. The Russian soldiers of today are hardly to blame if the final withdrawal of troops of the former occupation army of the Soviet Union in 1994 was, as usual, accompanied by a propaganda assertion crammed in retrospectively. This assertion was that the Red Army fulfilled a "mission of liberation" in Germany in 1944/1945, and that the soldiers of the Red Army entered Germany and were received as "liberators." Present day Russian soldiers can hardly be expected to know any better, since even Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated on September 1, 1994, during the withdrawal of the former occupation troops in Berlin, that the "Russians" in uniform (he meant the Soviets) did not come to Germany to raze the entire country, to exterminate the German people, or to make them the slaves of the "Russians" (the Soviets). Even during the years of the greatest hardship, it is now alleged that a clear distinction was made at all times between "ordinary" Germans and the "criminal clique" that had come to power in Germany. The true worth of these allegations is revealed by the contents of the present study. On the other hand, there is no excuse for the opinion, gaining ground among the German public—which does, after all, have access to all kinds of information—that the Germans were "liberated" by the Army of the Stalinist Soviet Union. To make such a statement is to stand historical reality on its head. The Red Army did not enter Germany as "liberators," even though the victors' monuments erected in many places might give that impression today; nor, to be sure, were they perceived as liberators by anyone in Germany.

Stalin's soldiers, in their own words, came, not as liberators, but as merciless avengers. All allegations to the contrary by today's utilitarian propagandists belong to the realm of fairy tales and are a flat distortion of his-

torical fact. If proof is required in this regard, simply consider the panic with which the entire population of the eastern provinces of the German Reich reacted to approach of the Red Army. It is not difficult to gather from the present study that the reality of the situation was to exceed even the worst fears.

As can be proven, with certainty, that the German-Soviet war—considered by Hitler to be inevitable following the fateful Molotov mission in November 1940—just barely preempted a war of conquest that was planned and prepared under high-pressure by Stalin, even more historical facts can be demonstrated today. This is confirmed by ever more historical evidence today. Thus, it was not just Hitler, as a certain school of contemporary historiography would continue to have us believe, but Stalin, who, from the very outset, in his political and military leadership of the Red Army, employed methods of outrageous brutality that vastly surpassed anything that had ever previously occurred. A myth was widely disseminated in Germany of the alleged possibility of waging “humane” warfare, and that this possibility only vanished due to Hitler’s alleged refusal to consider humane methods of waging war. This myth is refuted by the fact that practically in the first days of the war, the members of the Red Army were systematically goaded toward violence and were, furthermore, incited to feelings of infernal hatred against all soldiers of the invading enemy armies. The collision between two dictatorially led socialist military powers obviously left little room, from the very beginning of the war, for considerations of humanity. Nor was there even respect for the laws and provisions of the International Conventions—which were, moreover, recognized by the German Reich, while the Soviet Union had strictly refused ratification.

The Germans also committed crimes in the Soviet Union, responsibility for which rests chiefly with the executive bodies lead by Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. These crimes have been described repeatedly and thoroughly, and today the facts are known almost into every detail. The crimes of the Soviets, on the other hand, are consciously and methodically relegated to oblivion, since no “comparison” may be permitted under any circumstances. Yet the drawing of historical comparisons—the showing of connections, relations of cause and effect, and parallels—nevertheless constitute the inescapable duties of truthful historical research; to do otherwise is to pander, consciously and deliberately, to a one-sided picture of historical events.

The present volume, based largely on previously unknown documents and archive sources of German and Soviet origin, therefore—uninfluenced by so-called “taboos and intellectual prohibitions”—deals quite consciously with the methods of waging war on the Soviet side of the East-

ern Front. This description therefore relates chiefly to Soviet crimes, but does not lose sight of, or ignore, crimes committed by Germans in a misuse of the name of the German nation. Distinctions must, however, be made in any case, and propaganda exaggerations must be reduced to their actual kernel of truth. The present publication, taken as a whole, therefore, must be conceded a greater value than that of a contemporary school of historiography that fundamentally consists of ignoring Soviet methods of waging war—either deliberately, or simply out of ignorance. That the findings will not meet with universal approval is to be expected, and also appears quite natural in view of the explosive nature of the contents. An accurate appraisal, however, will be unable to deny that the author has, nevertheless, striven for objectivity; it must also be conceded that it takes courage to express uncomfortable historical truths in the Federal Republic of Germany today. Above all, it will be impossible to doubt the author's feelings of sympathy for the Russian people, a sympathy that totally pervades his other books on the history of the German-Soviet conflict.

The point of departure of the present description is, as stated above, the fact—which is now indisputable—that Hitler, through the initiation of hostilities, just barely preempted a war of aggression prepared by Stalin. This indisputable scholarly fact is the rock upon which the hopes of our ideologues, in the truest sense of the word, are wrecked. Their arguments are null and void, but their doctrinaire blindness, nevertheless, remains. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all authors who have spoken out, regardless of persecution, and, in some cases, vitriolic personal attacks, thus contributing to the final breakthrough of historical truth. These authors include, among others, Dr. Heinz Magenheimer, Lecturer at the National Defense Academy of Vienna; Professor Dr. Werner Maser of Speyer; Viktor Suvorov of Bristol; Dr. Ernst Topitsch, Professor at Graz; Professor Dr. Dr. phil. Alfred Maurice de Zayas at Chicago and Geneva; and, finally, Professor Dr. Dr. Günther Gillessen who, in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, has always given evidence of a balanced appraisal, which is as proper as it is astute, of this historical controversy, thus doing the cause a great service. A far-reaching concurrence of opinion links me to the late, but well-known author of relevant books, Dr. Alexandr Moiseevich Nekrich, who died in 1993; Dr. Nekrich was a political officer in the Red Army during the war (one of the then much-scorned “Jewish Bolshevik Commissars”), who, after his forced emigration from the USSR, was active at Harvard University, not least of all in regard to the “controversy of the preventive war.” The present publication originated during my thirty-five year tenure at the German Military Historical Research Office (then Freiburg, today Potsdam), specializing in the general topic of Stalin and the Red Army. I am indebted

to the head official, Brigadier General Dr. Günter Roth, for the sympathetic liberties he permitted me. In addition, I would like to thank my official colleague, Mrs. Karin Hepp, who successfully carried out negotiations for me in Moscow, as well as Mrs. Elke Selzer, who helped prepare the present manuscript, just as she did with my work on the Caucasus, and completed both with great reliability. In contrast to the spirit and letter of "freedom of research" as proclaimed under the German Basic Law, it is, unfortunately, advisable today to have many passages of a historiographical text revised for "criminal content" prior to publication—an almost disgraceful situation. This awkward task was undertaken, tactfully and amicably, by Court Vice-President Johann Birk of Freiburg; heartfelt thanks in this regard are due to him at this point. Sincere thanks are also due to the head archive director, Colonel Dr. Manfred Kehrig, who kindly wrote the preface.

Freiburg March 1995

Joachim Hoffmann

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**May 5, 1941:
Stalin Proclaims the War of Aggression**

The imperialistic power politics inherent in the Soviet political system from the very beginning—but not given due attention by the public—also found striking external expression in the governmental coat of arms (*gosudarstvennyj gerb*) of the USSR, which was still current in 1991. The symbolism of this state coat of arms consists of a hammer and sickle menacingly and crudely encircling the whole world, surrounded by the following inflammatory words in several languages: "Proletarians of all Countries, Unite!" What is so poignantly made evident here is the goal, openly proclaimed by both Lenin and Stalin, of world domination by Soviet Communist power, or, as they called it, the "victory of Socialism all over the world." It was none other than Lenin who, on December 6, 1920, stated in a speech that what was involved was to exploit the conflicts and contradictions between the capitalist states. To "incite" the capitalist states "against each other," and "of using the knives of scoundrels, like the capitalist thieves, against each other," on the grounds that "when two thieves fall out and fight, the honest man laughs last. As soon as we are strong enough to overthrow capitalism completely, we will immediately grab them by the throat." "Victory of the Communist revolution in all countries is inevitable" he declared on March 6, 1920. "Victory will be ensured in the not-too distant future."¹

Stalin was early devoted to this principle of Bolshevism, which was proven by his well-known speech before the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) in July 1925. At that time, Stalin declared: "Should the war begin, we will not stand by inactively; we will enter the war, but we will enter as the last belligerent. We shall throw a weight on the scales that should be decisive." This "Stalin Doctrine," as Alexandr Nekrich has shown with admirable clarity, and regardless of statements to the contrary, was never abandoned.² It retained its force, and the effort to "incite fascist Germany and the West against each other," as stated by author

1 Topitsch, 1993, *Stalin's Krieg*, pp. 39f.

2 Nekrich, "Past Tense," pp. 14ff. See also: V. L. Doroshenko, "Staliniskaja provokacija."

Viacheslav I. Dashichev, became a genuine *idée fixe* with Stalin.³ In 1939, when the Red Army found itself increasing in strength due to a rapidly growing gigantic armaments program, Stalin believed that the time had come to intervene as a belligerent in the crisis of "world capitalism." Both the British Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps, and the American Ambassador, Laurence F. Steinhardt, warned that Stalin wanted to bring about a war, not only in Europe, but in East Asia as well, as early as 1939. Recently revealed documents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (*Narkomindel*) offer sufficiently clear information in this regard.⁴ "The conclusion of our agreement with Germany," according to the *Narkomindel* on July 1, 1940, to the Soviet Ambassador in Japan, "was dictated by the desire for a war in Europe." In regard to the Far East, a telegram from Moscow to the Soviet Ambassadors in Japan and China on July 14, 1940, accordingly states: "We would agree to any treaty that brought about a collision between Japan and the United States." Undisguised in these diplomatic instructions is the mention of a "Japanese-American war, which we would gladly like to see." M. Nikitin transcribes Moscow's attitude with the following words: "The Soviet Union, for its part, was interested in distracting British and American attention from European problems, and in Japanese neutrality during the period of the destruction of Germany and the 'liberation' of Europe from capitalism."⁵

On August 19, 1939, there was a surprise secret meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, which included the participation of the members of the Russian section of the Communist International. During the meeting Stalin announced, in a programmatic speech, that the time had now come to apply the torch of war to the European powder keg. Stalin declared flatly that "if we accept the German proposal for the conclusion of a Non-Aggression pact with them," it was to be assumed that "they would naturally attack Poland, and the intervention of France and England in this war would be inevitable." The resulting "serious unrest and disorder" would, as he remarked, lead to a destabilization of Western Europe, without "us," *i.e.*, without the Soviet Union, being initially drawn into the conflict. For his closest comrades, he drew the conclusion, already proclaimed in 1925, that, in this way, "we can hope for an advantageous entry into the war." In Stalin's vision, a "broad field of activity" now opened up for the development of the "world revolution." In other words, for the achievement—which had

3 Daschtschew, "Der Pakt der beiden Banditen."

4 Hososya, "The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact," pp. 310ff.

5 Nikitin, "Ocenka sovetskimi rukovodstvom," p. 143.

never been abandoned—of the Sovietization of Europe and Bolshevik domination. He concluded with the call:

“Comrades! In the interests of the USSR—the homeland of the workers—get busy, and work so that war may break out between the Reich and the capitalistic Anglo-French bloc!”

As the first stage for the achievement of imperialist domination, Stalin designated the Bolshevization of Germany and Western Europe. The Non-Aggression pact, with the momentous additional secret protocol, was concluded between the representatives of the Reich's government and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics four days after this secret speech, on August 23, 1939.

The speech by Stalin of August 19, 1939, was obtained by the French Havas agency from Moscow by way of Geneva from an “absolutely reliable source.” It was published as early as 1939 in volume 17 of the *Revue Du Droit International*.⁶ Remarkably, the authenticity of the speech is disputed with extraordinary zeal by Stalinist propagandists and their blind adherents right up to the present day. However, in an interview under the hypocritical headline “A Mendacious Report from the Havas Agency” in the official party newspaper *Pravda* on November 30, 1939, Stalin himself denied the speech. The mere fact that Stalin felt personally and immediately compelled to publish an official denial reveals the extent to which he felt he had tipped his hand.⁷ Only in extraordinary cases did Stalin ever allow himself to consent to personal interviews.

Viktor Suvorov has proved that the authorities of the Soviet Union, such as members of the Central Committee, marshals, generals, professors, academicians, historians, and ideologists, have wracked their brains, and, with truly ardent zeal, have attempted to prove for fifty years that no meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee ever took place on this particular August 19 at all. The whole tissue of lies finally collapsed on January 16, 1993 in a single day, when Stalin's biographer Professor Volkogonov confirmed in *Izvestia* “that a meeting had indeed taken place on the date in question, and that he himself had held the minutes in his hands.”⁸

The historian Ms. T. S. Bushueva, during the course of a scholarly evaluation of Viktor Suvorov's books, which had been distributed in editions of millions of copies, found the text of the speech by Stalin. The speech, which had long been known, was discovered in the secret depths of the former Special Archives of the USSR, apparently prepared by a member of the Comintern. She made it available to the Russian public for the first time in the periodical *Novyi Mir* in December 1994.⁹ This epoch-making speech by Stalin is also contained in the published edition of the minutes of

the conference of the "Memorial" society held on April 16, 1995, in Novosibirsk. It has been analyzed and commented upon in detail by the historians T. S. Bushueva and I. V. Pavlova, as well as by Professor V. L. Doroshenko.

"The question is," as Dr. Pavlova wrote to the author on August 7, 1996, "did Stalin prepare for a war of aggression, and did he accordingly make a speech on August 19, 1939? ... A study of the minutes of the Politburo of 1939-1941 provides additional justification for an affirmative answer to the question." Professor Doroshenko also grasped this point while

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- 6 When on July 16, 1996, in the daily newspaper *Die Welt*, Carl Gustaf Ströhm published a strikingly accurate report on the contents of the speech given by Stalin on August 19, 1939, the international apologists for Stalin immediately considered themselves provoked. It was the task of one of their spokesmen, Gabriel Gorodetsky, to rescue the endangered Stalinist version in the new era. Gorodetsky is the Director of the Cummings-Institute for Russian History at the University of Tel Aviv and was also one of the organizers of the conference held between January 31 and February 3, 1995, in Moscow. In the columns of *Die Welt* on August 31, 1996, Gorodetsky launched a counterattack in which he claimed that the speech by Stalin of August 19, 1939, was a falsification by the French secret service, but in so doing, he became immediately mired in so many contradictions that his arguments were destroyed. For example, he referred to December 23, 1939, as the exact date of the French falsification, forgetting that Stalin published his official denial in *Pravda* on November 30, 1939, i.e., twenty three days before the text of the speech by Stalin would therefore have to have been known to the French secret service at a much earlier time. Another momentous blunder that entirely destroys Gorodetsky's credibility is that he claims that the secret additional protocol was only discussed for the first time at the end of September 1939 during Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow. Whereas a facsimile of the full text of the "Sekretnyj Dopolnitel'nyj Protokol" (Secret Additional Protocol) on territorial annexation, signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23, 1939, had even been printed by Werner Maser in *Der Wortbruch*, pp. 48f. Gorodetsky confuses the Secret Additional Protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, with the Secret Additional Protocol to the Border and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which, for an expert, is rather astonishing and is hardly excusable. The desperate situation of the Stalin apologists today and the methods to which they resort in their confusion were also revealed by H.-E. Volkmann, who appeared in the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* on June 3, 1997 as "Research Director of the Military History Research Office of the Bundeswehr." In this capacity, he published a full-page article on the "Legend of the Preventive War" with an attack on the former Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, General Heinz Tretnner. In doing so, he merely demonstrated that he is not familiar with the very numerous German and Soviet source documents, or with the international research situation. His shabby argumentation is an attempt to show that Hitler planned aggression, which, of course, is no longer a problem in contemporary research. Academically, the real question relates to the war of conquest prepared by Stalin that Hitler preempted rather by accident. Volkmann's rather incompetent article raises the question of whether the article is an attempt to mislead on ideological grounds, or whether it is quite simply the result of ignorance. Volkmann, who trivializes the Lenin-Stalin system of despotism at every opportunity, is also mentioned by Rüdiger Proske, *Wider den Mißbrauch der Geschichte*, pp. 16, 34, 61, as well as Professor Dr. jur. Gerhard Eiselt, "Die historisch-politische Auseinandersetzung."
- 7 "O *Izhivom soobschenie*." The text of Stalin's official denial in *Pravda* of November 30, 1939, and a few other documents were made available to me by Dr. Michael Güterbock of Berlin, to whom sincere thanks are due at this point.
- 8 Suworow, *Der Tag M*, pp. 76f.
- 9 Busueva, "...Proklinaja – poprobujite ponjat..." pp. 232f.

summarizing his research results and said: "Analysis has shown that the text, regardless of any possible distortion, originates from Stalin, and must be considered one of the most important documents in the history of the Second World War."¹⁰ That Stalin, as will be ascertained, will be transformed into the principal warmonger must be conclusively acknowledged on the basis of all the following circumstances, and the whole chain of subsequent events.¹¹ According to Viktor Suvorov, August 19, 1939, was the date upon which Stalin started the Second World War (since this was the day Stalin ordered a surprise attack against the Japanese 6th Army at Khalkhin Gol). Professor Lev Kopelev made a similar statement on December 24, 1994; his phraseology is different, but no less clear: "In 1939, the World War was continued by the Hitlerite and Stalinist realms... on a new and monstrous scale."¹²

Russian historians today have long seen an immediate connection between August 23, 1939, and June 22, 1941. The August 23, 1939, Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler enabled Stalin to achieve his initial goal. Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union, recalled that Stalin was "convinced that the Pact would enable him to wrap Hitler around his little finger." "We have tricked Hitler for the moment," was Stalin's opinion, according to Nikita Khrushchev.¹³ The August 23, 1939, Non-Aggression Pact encouraged Hitler to attack Poland and, as a result—just as Stalin expected—a European war broke out. The Soviet Union participated as an aggressor, beginning on September 17, 1939, without, of course, incurring a declaration of war from the Western powers. The leader responsible for Soviet foreign policy, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, spoke before the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939. He said: "A single blow against Poland, first by the Germans, and then by the Red Army, and nothing remained of this misbegotten child of the Versailles Treaty, which owed its existence to the repression of non-Polish nationalities."¹⁴ It was the express wish of Stalin that nothing should remain of the national existence of Poland.

10 Doroshenko, "Stalinskaja provokacija Vtoroj mirovoj vojny," p. 17.

11 To the author, the contents of the verified speech by Stalin (which was, after all, known since 1939, published in the conferences volumes of Novosibirsk, and confirmed by the entire chain of historical events) was so minor a discovery that when the outworn text was sent to him by Dr. I. M. Pavlova in May 1995, he, at first, even hesitated to disseminate it in Germany but later discovered it was really longed for. That the speech by Stalin circulated by the author in Germany after some delay caused an authentic sensation was a surprise insofar as it shows how deficient people's knowledge of Stalin must be in Germany, even among interested groups of persons.

12 Kopelev, "Freie Dichter und Denker."

13 "Khrushchev's Secret Tapes," p. 44.

14 *Izvestija*, Nov. 1, 1939.

Through the waging of aggressive war against Poland and Finland; through the extortionate annexation of the sovereign republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and through the threat of war against Romania, the Soviet Union, as a result of its treaties with Hitler, expanded its territory by 426,000 sq. km. This territory was approximately equivalent to the surface area of the German Reich in 1919. In so doing, Stalin tore away the protective buffer states on his Western border while significantly improving his base for deployment toward the West. In Stalin's view, it was now time for the next step, and indeed the conditions for it were favorable. Germany's political and strategic situation, regardless of initial German military achievements, was considered in Moscow to be critical. Decisive victory in the war with England was increasingly receding into the distance. Standing behind Great Britain, with growing certainty, was the United States of America. German forces were scattered all over Europe, locked in a single front against Great Britain stretching from Norway to the Pyrenees. On the other hand, Germany's inability to fight a protracted war in terms of economics was very well-known in Moscow. The German Reich was becoming exceedingly vulnerable in regard to the possibility of being cut off from vital petroleum imports from Romania. Detailed studies of the German economic and armaments situation in these circumstances gave rise to a belief in Moscow that Germany was lapsing into a condition of hopeless military inferiority. That the Soviet leadership was "afraid of Germany and its armed forces" has been proven by M. Nikitin to be a fiction of Stalinist historiography.¹⁵

During these circumstances in late 1940, while the strategic military situation for Germany and its Axis partner, Italy, was becoming increasingly more difficult, Stalin—through Molotov in Berlin on November 12-13, 1940—transmitted the delivery of a demand. The demand boiled down to an expansion of the Soviet "sphere of influence" that was to include Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Greece, *i.e.*, all of southeastern Europe, and, in the north, Finland—with which a peace treaty had only been solemnly concluded in March of that year. A so-called "Swedish question" was also raised. The Soviet Union, in other words, was now demanding a dominant position in all of Eastern Europe and the Baltic. Furthermore, it demanded the creation of bases on the outlets of the Black Sea as well as discretionary passage through the outlets of the Baltic (Great Belt, Small Belt, Sund, Kattegat, and Skagerrack). The Reich, engaged in a struggle for its existence, would be hemmed in simultaneously from the north and south.

15 Nikitin, "Ocenka sovetskim rukovodstvom," pp. 128ff.

These demands, delivered in the midst of an increasingly difficult military situation, were so provocative that they left the Germans, as a practical matter, only one alternative: to submit to subjugation or to fight. These demands amounted to a deliberately calculated provocation in which the psychological motive is of principal interest, because it reveals the extent to which Stalin must have believed himself to be utterly safe in terms of his military superiority at that time. If Stalin had really been afraid of Hitler, as he repeatedly allowed the German Embassy in Moscow to believe, he would hardly have provoked the Germans in a manner that, in the view of Ernst Topitsch, amounted to a "summons"—a thinly disguised demand for subjugation. That Molotov, in the days of his mission to Berlin, was in constant, intensive telegraphic contact with Stalin, proves beyond a doubt that he was acting on Stalin's direct instructions.¹⁶

That Molotov's mission to Berlin amounted in fact to a challenge is also obvious from the notes of Wanda Wasilewska, former Chairwoman of the Union of Polish Patriots (Communists), in the Soviet Union. Mrs. Wasilewska, who had enjoyed Stalin's special favor, expressly wished to have these notes recorded before her death in 1964.¹⁷ In them she says:

"I remember that we Communists, regardless of the official position of the Soviet government, were all of the opinion that this [the friendly attitude toward Germany] was only a tactic of the Soviet government. That in reality, however, the situation was entirely different. After all, one should not forget that it was already clear to all of us, even at that time, that a German-Soviet war was approaching... Regardless of the official announcements, we believed that the war was drawing near, and we waited for it every day. Early in 1940, I was in Moscow with Stalin for the first time, and even at that time [when a total of six German divisions were stationed on the eastern border] Stalin told me that there would be war with the Germans sooner or later. This means that, indeed at that time, I already had the assurance of, and confirmation from, the highest authority that we were right in expecting war."

Wanda Wasilewska's notes include an informative report on a conversation with the First Secretary of the Communist Party (b) of White Russia, Panteleimon Ponomarenko, later Chief of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement, in late 1940, during the days of the Molotov mission. Ponomarenko is quoted as saying: "Molotov was in Berlin. He has just returned. There will be war. It will certainly come in February 1941, but we must prepare for it now."

16 *Perepiska V. M. Molotova I. V. Stalinym.*

17 Wasilewska, in: *Archiwum Ruchu Robotniczego*, pp. 339-432.

Stalin's feeling of superiority, as expressed in the revelation of his aggressive intentions, was, of course, entirely justified by the truly gigantic increase in Soviet armaments production, which, at that time was just getting into high gear.¹⁸ Half a year later, on the date of the outbreak of the war, on June 22, 1941, the Red Army possessed no less than 24,000 tanks, including 1,861 type T-34 tanks (a medium tank, perhaps the most effective armored weapon of the entire war) and KV (Klim Voroshilov) tanks (a series of heavy tanks), which had no equal anywhere in the world; 358 units of these were manufactured in 1940, while 1,503 units were manufactured in the first six months of 1941. Since 1938, the Air Forces of the Red Army had received a total of 23,245 military aircraft, including 3,719 aircraft of the latest design. The Red Army also had 148,000 artillery pieces and mortars of all types and systems. The inventory of the Red Navy, in addition to a multiplicity of ships of other types, had 291 or, according to Soviet sources, at least 213 submarines¹⁹—an expressly aggressive weapon. This meant that the Soviet Armed Forces had a larger fleet of submarines than any other country in the world, outnumbering those of the world's leading maritime nation, Great Britain, more than four-fold in terms of the number of submarines.

Soviet armored forces, in the judgment of a competent expert, Marshal of Armored Troops Poluboyarov, were superior to those of any foreign power, both in numbers and in "technical equipment, organizational formations, and combat operation."²⁰ This was true, not only of the unsurpassed T-34 medium tank and the KV-series heavy tank, but also of the so-called older models: the T-26 (light tank for infantry support), BT-7 (lightly armored "fast" tank, originally used for cavalry support), T-28 (medium tank) and T-35 (heavy tank). Of those Soviet tanks enumerated, the T-28 medium tank and the T-35 heavy tank were clearly superior to the German PzKpfw III (Panzerkampfwagen III, a medium tank) and PzKpfw IV (also a medium tank but with slightly more armor and much better armament than the PzKpfw III) in almost all combat qualities and technical specifications. Even the BT-7 Soviet "fast" tank (*bystrochodnyj tank*), mass-produced on the order of 9,000 units, exceeded the German PzKpfw III standard tank in armament, armor, horsepower, speed, and range.²¹ In regard to the armament with which many models of the PzKpfw III medium tank were equipped, it was even inferior to the Soviet T-26 light tank. 3,719 Soviet

18 Hoffmann, "Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs," pp. 62f., 75.

19 Kirshin, "Die sowjetischen Streitkräfte."

20 Poluboyarov, "Krepche broni."

21 Shlykov, "I tanki nashi," p. 122.

airplanes of the most modern design had been delivered since 1940: the MiG-3, LaGG-3, and Yak-1 fighter planes; and the Pe-2 dive-bomber. The Il-2 fighter-bomber—of which 2,650 were manufactured in the first half of 1941 alone—was in no way inferior to comparable German models; on the contrary, they were superior to German models for their speed alone. Even older Soviet models exhibited considerable performance qualities, and could, like the well-known Polikarpov I-16 *Rata* (Rat) fighter plane, be very dangerous to German combat aircraft because of its maneuverability alone. Finally, some of the artillery weapons of the Red Army, including the 132 mm (5.2 inch) BM-13 rocket launcher (which had 16 launching rails and was later nicknamed “Stalin organ” for the sound it made), the 76 mm (3 inch) field gun, the 122 mm (4.8 inch) howitzer, and the 152 mm (6 inch) howitzer (heavy artillery), was partly of a quality that aroused the astonishment of top German officers. All these findings have been confirmed with increased accuracy by new Russian research work.

The personnel and material superiority of the troops of the Red Army on June 22, 1941, is clear from a mere comparison of strength. Thus, their armed strength, as early as May 15, 1941, as the General Staff reported to Stalin, consisted of 303 divisions; of these 303 divisions, 258 divisions and 165 flight regiments were deployed in offensive positions against Germany, Finland, and Romania at that time. Contrary to earlier claims, all these large units were, as a result of quietly manning them with reservists, no longer very far below their authorized strength, according to mobilization figures.²² The total of 303 divisions, as reported by the General Staff of the Red Army to Stalin on May 15, 1941, had, moreover, further increased by the beginning of the war, due to the intensive reactivation of units. For example, until the beginning of August 1941, 330-350 divisions were deployed facing the German and German-allied armies,²³ which would have resulted in a total strength of the Red Army of at least 375 divisions at that time. According to Soviet sources, 3,550 German tanks and assault guns (cannons mounted on tank chassis and used to support armored forces in the field) faced 14,000-15,000 Soviet tanks—an estimate that, out of a total inventory of 24,000 tanks, is, however, too low. Especially when one considers that, of 92 mechanized divisions (according to the figures of May 15), 88 were stationed on the western border alone. There were also numerous independent armored battalions, such as in the cavalry and infantry divisions, which would mean a total inventory of approximately 22,000 Soviet

22 Filippov, in: *Voennyj Vestnik*, p. 16.

23 BA-MA, RH 2/2092, 9. 9. 1943.

tanks. 1,700 of the German tanks, moreover, consisted of the quite insufficient PzKpfw I and PzKpfw II types (both tank types had light armor and armament), as well as the light Czech-built P 38 tank. As a result, only 1,850 of these 3,550 German tanks and assault guns were capable of fighting it out with their Soviet adversaries.

2,500 combat-ready German aircraft—2,121 according to other sources—faced a total of allegedly “only” 10,000 to 15,000 Soviet aircraft of the existing 23,245 machines, which, even though of “older” designs, made their appearance in critical situations, giving the German Air Force no end of trouble, as Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels himself complained in his diaries. 7,146 German artillery pieces faced 37,000 Soviet artillery pieces—out of a total of 148,000 cannons and mortars that the Soviet armaments industry had already produced for the Red Army, according to Soviet data. In view of the fact that, apart from headquarters reserves, of 303 available divisions, 248 divisions, and of 218 available flight regiments, 165 regiments, were concentrated “in the West” as early as May 15, 1941, the proportion of weaponry stationed in the West must have been even greater. Even assuming the admitted order of magnitude, the Red Army, on June 22, 1941, possessed a five- to six-fold superiority in tanks, a five- to six-fold superiority in aircraft, and a five- to ten-fold, and perhaps even greater, superiority in artillery pieces. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the mass production of modern weapons was really just gearing up. A huge increase in production figures was not only scheduled, but was actually achieved during the last six months of 1941, despite huge losses in industrial capacity as a result of the German conquest of Soviet territory.

On the tangible basis of a huge and increasingly rapid development of military arms production, the Red Army had unilaterally generated a bold doctrine based exclusively upon a theory of military aggression.²⁴ It was characteristic of this military doctrine that the concept of a “war of aggression” as well as that of “unjust war,” became obsolete as soon as the Soviet Union entered hostilities as a belligerent. Lenin stated that what counted was not who attacked first or who fired the first shot, but rather, the causes of a war, its aims, and the classes that waged it.²⁵ To Lenin and Stalin, any attack by the Soviet Union, against any country at all, was automatically a purely defensive war from the very outset. In addition, it was also a just and moral war under any circumstances. The distinction between preventive attack and counterattack was, furthermore, abandoned. Soviet military the-

24 Isserson, “Razvitie teorii,” p. 60.

25 Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenij*, vol. 23, p. 189.

ory, moreover, assumed that modern wars were no longer declared, since every attacker naturally strove to ensure the advantage of the element of surprise. "Surprise has a paralyzing effect" stated the 1939 Field Duty Regulations, "therefore, all military action must be carried out with the greatest concealment and the greatest rapidity." The Soviet attacks on Poland and Finland in 1939 were sudden attacks, without legal declaration of war. All tactical operations should be carried into enemy territory by means of immediate surprise attack, thus gaining control of the situation from the very initiation of hostilities.

In regard to the preparations for attack in the spring of 1941, the fundamental thesis of Soviet military doctrine may be summarized as follows:

1. The RKKa (*Raboche-Krestyanskaya Krasnaya Armiya*, the Army of Red Workers and Farmers) is an offensive army, the "most offensive of all armies";
2. The war will always, in all cases, be conducted on enemy territory, with the fewest possible casualties among one's own forces, and will end with the utter destruction of the enemy;
3. The proletariat in the hostile country is a potential ally of Soviet power, and will support the struggle of the Red Army through revolts in the rear of the enemy army;
4. War preparations are preparations for attack; defensive measures serve solely to protect preparations for attack and the execution of an offensive in the facing direction;
5. There is no possibility of the penetration of hostile forces into the territory of the USSR.²⁶

It will have to be shown that all Soviet measures were guided by these principles. The dogma of invincibility and an "easy victory of the Red

26 Hoffmann, "Die Angriffsvorbereitungen der Sowjetunion 1941," p. 370 (Russian: Hoffmann, "Podgotovka Sovetskogo Soyuza k nastupatel'noj vojne 1941 god," pp. 20f.); see also, by the same author, "Stalin wollte den Krieg", in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16. 10. 1986, A. N. and L. A. Mercialov, a married couple, directed a journalistic attack on the author of "Podgotovka Sovetskogo Soyuza k nastupatel'noy vojne," in the Stalinist *Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal* (*Viz*, Journal for Military History), 1994, issue 5, p. 84, an attack motivated by political bias and aversion. The repeated polemical attacks by Colonel of the Guards Dr. A. N. Mercialov and Dr. L. A. Mercialova in the work *Gotovil li Stalin nastupel'nyuyu voynu protiv Gitlera?* ("Mezdu dvumya krainostyami," pp. 43ff.), is explained by the prejudice of the authors, and is generally directed against the recognition of the scholarly position of "Choffmana-Gillessena-Suvorava" (Hoffmann, Professor Dr. Dr. Gillessens, and Viktor Suvorov). These attacks have been sufficiently refuted in the decisive contributions contained in the above named work. A more exact reading of *Stalin's War of Extermination* is urgently recommended to the Mercialovs. As proven by Wolfgang Strauss in his article "Stalins Vernichtungskrieg gegen das eigene Volk," the authors A. and L. Mercialov appear, in fact, to have arrived at new insights and findings in their work *Stalinizm i vojna*, published in Moscow in 1998.

Army in 1941," moreover, possessed the significance of a law and were not subject to theoretical discussion. Deviations from the official doctrine were considered opposition against the general party line (and, therefore, against Stalin) and, to a near-total certainty, would have fatal consequences to the individual concerned.

After the outbreak of the war, the Germans obtained a great deal of information about the extent to which the members of the Red Army and Soviet Navy were indoctrinated with the conviction of the invulnerability of the forces of the Soviet Union. Soviet Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Andrushat (39th Infantry Corps) had taken advantage of an opportunity to switch over to the German side and described the massive propaganda efforts. These had already taken place on April 25, 1941, and made a deep impression on the troops. Andrushat said:

"The political commissars continually stressed that the war would be fought on foreign territory, never our own... the Soviet Union would always win, because it has innumerable allies behind the front of any enemy... Because of the statements of the political commissars, the Red Army believed itself the best in the world. It could therefore never be defeated by anyone. The prevalent mood was one of enormous over-estimation of our own capacities."²⁷

Again and again, other Soviet officers made similar statements even after the outbreak of hostilities. Major Filippov (29th Infantry Corps), for example, reported on June 26, 1941, that the "prevalent opinion among the troops was that the Red Army could not be beaten."²⁸ Colonel Liubimov and Major Mikhailov (both of the 49th Armored Division) made similar statements on August 4, 1941, referring to the "universally prevalent belief" "that the Red Army was the best armed and trained in the world, and was therefore invincible."²⁹ Major Ormushkov (11th Armored Division) was also "firmly convinced that the Russian Army could not be beaten."³⁰ On August 6, 1941, Ormushkov stated:

"According to the propaganda intended for the Red Army, the Russian people could have complete faith in the Red Army. Military periodicals, the press, movies, and radio all constantly stressed the huge expansion of the Armored and Air Forces."

27 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 437, 25. 4. 1941.

28 *Ibid.*, 26. 6. 1941.

29 BA-MA, RH 21-1/472, 4. 8. 1941.

30 *Ibid.*, 6. 8. 1941.

Lieutenant Colonel Liapin (1st Motorized Infantry Division), on September 16, 1941, referred to the very low estimate accorded, by contrast, to the fighting qualities of the German tank.³¹

Another factor, constantly present in the background, was corroborated by Lieutenant Il'in (of the Staff of the 964th Rifle Regiment of the 296th Infantry Division)—a student of philology and described as unusually intelligent—to his German interrogators on January 3, 1942. He stated: "In Russia, during the first months of the war, we still strongly counted upon the outbreak of rebellion inside Germany."³² On October 10, 1941, during the still rapidly advancing German offensive on Moscow, Major General Zerulenkov, Commander of the 51st Infantry Division, in regard to the further prospects of the Soviet Union, stated that the Soviet Union could still deploy 300-400 divisions, even in winter.³³ This was stressed by the Divisional Commissar (and de facto commander) of the 176th Infantry Division, Filev. He stated, on October 11, 1941: "The Red Army was, furthermore, stronger than the German army in every regard, in terms of material and in terms of numbers ... the power of the Red Army is still immeasurable."³⁴ On December 14, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the 19th Army, Lieutenant General Lukin, warned the unbelieving Germans that Soviet industry could equip a tank brigade with sixty of the modern T-34 and KV type tanks almost every single day.³⁵

In such an atmosphere, is it any wonder that Major General Kirpichnikov (43rd Infantry Division) spoke of the "underestimation, even complete contempt, for enemy strengths and capacities"?³⁶ On August 17, 1941, Major General Goltsev, the Inspector of the 96th Infantry Division who was sent from Moscow, reported that "the morale of the troops upon the outbreak of hostilities was very good."³⁷ G.N. Zhilenkov was a prominent Communist Party official. He rose into the hierarchy, at first as an Army Commissar in the Red Army (a powerful position that countersigned all Army Commander's orders), then Commander-in-Chief of the 32nd Army, and finally as Chief of the Main Propaganda Administration of the KONR (*Komitet Osvobodzenija Narodov Rossii*; The Committee to Liberate the Peoples of Russia) as a Lieutenant General in the Vlassov Army. He was

31 BA-MA, RH 24-8/127, 16. 9. 1941.

32 BA-MA, RH 21-1/481, 3. 1., 4. 1. 1942.

33 BA-MA, RH 24-3/136, 10. 10. 1941.

34 BA-MA, RH 21-1/473, 11. 10. 1941.

35 BA-MA, R 6/77, 14. 12. 1941; Hoffmann, "Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion", p. 734.

36 PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 13, 30. 9. 1941.

37 BA-MA, RH 24-48/200, 17. 8. 1941

captured by the Germans at Vjaz'ma in October 1941. The Germans, at that time, were ignorant of his identity and allowed him to work there as a truck driver in the 252nd Infantry Division, until his identity was discovered in May 1942. Zhilenkov described his own experiences in October 1941 and recalled the delusion—still generally widespread in the Kremlin and in Moscow during the initial days of the war—that the Red Army would “fight only on enemy territory,” and that “the war would be fought on foreign territory only.”³⁸ Rumors of the capture of Warsaw, Königsberg, and Bucharest ran through the Red Army in Moscow as early as June 22, 1941. Incoming reports from the front could, accordingly, be nothing less than excellent, as expected.

Since early 1940, Stalin believed that conflict with Germany was inevitable. Aware of the increasing strength of the Red Army and the deteriorating situation of the Reich, he used the graduation ceremony of the Military Academies on May 5, 1941, as his platform. Stalin announced to the Red Army leadership and a large military audience that, in view of the superiority of the Soviet Army, which had recently been attained, that the time had now come, in his words, “to abandon defensive tactics and adopt a military policy of attack operations.” The significance of this speech by Stalin in relation to his aggressive intentions is obvious from the simple fact that his words, in contrast to the usual practice, were concealed from the public, while the text of his speech was hidden in central party archives. Stalinist propagandists, such as the notorious General Golikov and the journalist Lev Bezymensky, quickly circulated misleading versions that found their way, in particular, into West German historiography, and were dished up in West Germany as proof of Stalin’s allegedly “peaceful intentions.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequently altered political conditions in Russia, it was, of course, no longer possible to conceal the facts. In addition to the original version of Stalin’s speech, now stored in the so-called Presidential Archive but still inaccessible to researchers, there is also a short version (*Kratkaja Zapis*) in the Russian Center for the Storage and Research of Documents on Contemporary History (*Rossijskij centr chranenija i izuchenija dokumentov novejshey istorii*), which is accessible to researchers under certain circumstances.

Even the short version of the speech provides sufficient confirmation of our previous knowledge of Stalin’s aggressive intentions, a circumstance that caused the above-mentioned journalist Bezymensky to reintroduce his old versions, so to speak, in newly modernized garb. A detailed article pub-

38 BA-MA, RH 21-3/782; Hoffmann, “Die Geschichte der Wlassow Armee”, p. 360.

lished in the periodical *Novoe Vremja* under the headline: "What Did Stalin Say on May 5, 1941?" cannot be understood in any other way.³⁹ By deleting the decisive passages of Stalin's statements, and accompanying it with verbose commentaries, it was again alleged that Stalin was interested solely in defense and not attack; and that any contrary interpretation was without basis in fact. In Germany, such scatterings immediately fell on fruitful soil. It was reserved to the Bonn historian Alexander Fischer, in an essay in the renowned *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the attack on the Soviet Union, to present Bezymensky's misleading version of the speech as the last insight offered by a Russian historiographical which had just started to move. Yet, at that time, there could no longer be any doubt as to the actual and essential content of Stalin's May 5 speech, in view of the numerous corroborations available. Captured Soviet officers offered the Germans very clear information in this regard shortly after the beginning of the war.

Attempts have been made to question the value of such evidence on the arbitrary grounds that prisoners of war would not tell the truth under interrogation. The circumstances are exactly the opposite; even Soviet military historiography attributes major significance to the "statements of captured soldiers, officers, and generals, as well as deserters" as "primary sources."⁴⁰ The accuracy of this assertion has been confirmed by both Soviet and German command authorities. For example, an order signed by the Commander of the Soviet 6th Infantry Corps Major General Alexeev and Brigade Commissar Shulikov, on July 22, 1941, says: "Prisoners of war are a significant source of obtaining important information on the enemy."⁴¹ In a very similar statement dated August 8, 1941, an order by the Chief of Staff of the 21st Army, Major General Gordov, says: "Prisoners of war are to be viewed as a principal source for intelligence about the enemy."⁴² In September 1941, the Commander of the 27th Infantry Corps, Major General Artemenko, confirmed that these

"statements were the main source of information on the enemy. ... For this reason, German prisoners of war were still the sole reliable means of obtaining information and reconnaissance material. Many military actions were only undertaken to bring in prisoners."⁴³

39 Bezymensky, "Chto zhe skazal Stalin 5 Maja 1941 goda?"

40 Kusnezowa, Selesnjow, "Der politisch-moralisch Zustand," p. 600.

41 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 22. 7. 1941.

42 *Ibid.*, 8. 8. 1941.

43 BA-MA, RH 21-1/473, September 1941.

German experiences were quite similar. In Posen on May 6, 1943, a lecture by the Foreign Armies East Branch of the General Staff of the Army to the I c Service (The I c was the designation for the third (hence "c") staff officer to the chief of staff of a division, corps, army, or army group, and was in charge of intelligence.) stressed that "interrogations of prisoners of war are the most reliable, and often the sole, way to obtain information on a really solid basis."⁴⁴ Anyone who has ever done comparative research on prisoner of war interrogation records is always astonished at the extraordinary testimonial force that must be attributed to these documents.

The first known reference to the contents of the speech by Stalin occurs in documents dated July 17, 1941. During a banquet in the Kremlin on the occasion of the graduation of the students of the military academies (May 5, 1941), the commander of the 53rd Infantry Division, Colonel Bartenev, reported that Stalin immediately rejected a toast by a Major General to the policy of peace and retorted: "No, to war policy!"⁴⁵ On July 20, 1941, six young officers from various divisions (8th and 49th Armored Divisions, the 11th, 32nd, and 240th Motorized Infantry Divisions, and the 290th Infantry Division) stated unanimously:

"During the graduation of General Staff officers from the Military Academy in May of this year, among other things, Stalin said, 'War with Germany is coming whether Germany wants it or not.'⁴⁶

On August 6, 1941, a German record referring to the Artillery Commander of the 49th Armored Division, Colonel Liubimov, stated:

"The prisoner confirmed earlier statements that Stalin, in early May, during the graduation of officers from the Military Academy, said, 'War with Germany is coming in any case.'⁴⁷

On September 15, 1941, the Chief of the Operational Branch of the Staff of the 1st Motorized Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Liapin, stated, that, in the officer corps,

"we had quite generally expected the outbreak of war with Germany, since Stalin, during an officers' reception on May 5, 1941, in the Kremlin, had said that we must constantly expect war and be very well prepared for it."⁴⁸

44 BA-MA, RH 2/2092, 6. 5. 1943.

45 BA-MA, RH 21-2/v, 648, 17. 7. 1941.

46 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 20. 7. 1941

47 BA-MA, RH 21-1/472, 6. 8. 1941.

48 BA-MA, RH 24-8/127, 15. 9. 1941.

In October 1941 in regard to the speech by Stalin, the generally very well informed Commander-in-Chief of the 32nd Army, G.N. Zhilenkov, stated, "shortly before the beginning of the war, during a reception for the graduates of the Military Academy," that Stalin stressed the great technical superiority of the Red Army over the "so-called invincible German Wehrmacht"; Stalin is said to have explained that "it was incorrect to consider the German army invincible. It was indirectly clear from Stalin's words that an attack on Germany was planned." In addition on March 24, 1942, one of the graduates, First Lieutenant Kurilsky, recalled precisely the speech by Stalin on May 5 at 18:00 hours in the Meeting Hall of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin in Moscow, before the graduates of the military academies.⁴⁹ According to him, Stalin said:

"The German Wehrmacht is not invincible. Soviet Russia has better tanks, airplanes, and artillery than Germany, and in greater numbers. We will therefore fight the German Wehrmacht sooner or later."

During the latter part of the evening, Stalin proposed a toast and, among other things, said: "I drink precisely at a time when we are conducting a war policy." Although the testimonies may differ from each other in detail, they, nevertheless, have one thing in common: they no longer permit any doubt as to the true meaning of Stalin's statements.

The main point of Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941, is also confirmed by conversations between the *Botschaftsrat* (Diplomatic Advisor) Gustav Hilger and the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Guards Army, Major General Krupennikov on January 18, 1943, and with the Artillery Commander of the 30th Army, Lieutenant General Masanov, on July 22, 1943. Krupennikov, who, like Masanov, had not personally participated in the event at the Kremlin, was of the opinion that "Stalin was too cautious to betray his plans so openly," but declared emphatically:

"Stalin systematically prepared for war with Germany for years, and would have unleashed it in the spring of 1942, at the latest, with a suitable pretext... Stalin's final goal was the achievement of world domination with the assistance of the old Bolshevik slogans of the 'liberation of the workers.'"⁵⁰

Masanov, on the other hand, proved himself, as Hilger writes, "precisely informed about Stalin's speech at the banquet in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941."

49 BA-MA, RH 21-2/708, 24. 3. 1942.

50 PAAA, Handakten Eitzdorf, vol. 24, 18. 1. 1943.

"Although he personally was not present at the event, he quotes almost word for word from Stalin's statement on the need to prepare for a war of attack, and finally expressed his own belief that Stalin would have started a war with Germany in the fall of 1941."⁵¹

The Germans therefore obtained very early information in this regard. As early as October 18, 1942, the Chief of the Foreign Armies East Branch of the General Staff of the Army, Colonel of the General Staff Gehlen, sent a letter to the Deputy of the Foreign Office at the Army High Command, Cavalry Captain of the Reserves von Eitzdorf.⁵² In it he enclosed the mutually independently drawn up reports of three captured Soviet officers who "unanimously" stated that Stalin "made military threats against Germany" on May 5, 1941, at a banquet in the Kremlin. Gehlen summarized the content of these reports as follows:

- 1.) An appeal to keep ready for a war against Germany.
- 2.) Remarks on military preparations by the Red Army.
- 3.) The era of the peace policy of the Soviet Union is over. Expansion of the Soviet Union by force of arms toward the West is now necessary. Long live the active attack policy of the Soviet State!
- 4.) The beginning of the war is not too far away.
- 5.) Remarks on the great prospects of victory of the Soviet Union in the war against Germany."

Gehlen then added: "One of the three reports contains the remarkable statement that the then existing peace treaty with Germany was 'only a deception, and a curtain behind which we could work openly.'" Colonel Gehlen also referred to statements of captured Soviet officers in another source, according to which Stalin was devising plans against Germany in May 1941, and was said to have stated to a group of officers that the chance to liquidate capitalism had come, it was now or never; the chief enemy in this struggle was to be Germany.

The alarming content of the speech by Stalin was made known long ago to a broader public in the years after the war by Embassy Advisor Hilger.⁵³ Alexander Werth, a British correspondent in Moscow, published a similar report.⁵⁴ There is no reason to doubt the statements of these two authors; they were two entirely different personality types who had no contact with each other, but who, nevertheless, arrived at major unanimity from

51 *Ibid.*, 22. 7. 1943.

52 *Ibid.*, 18. 10., 22. 10. 1942.

53 Hilger, *Wir und der Kreml*, pp. 307f.

54 Werth, *Russia at War*, pp. 122f.

different vantage points. Hilger wrote that he had interrogated three captured high-ranking Soviet officers, participants in the banquet in the Kremlin, whose statements agreed with each other almost word for word, although they had no opportunity to consult with each other. According to the three officers, Stalin reacted very negatively to the mention of the peace policy during a toast to the Director of the Frunze Military Academy, Lieutenant General Khozin, declaring that it was time to put an end to defensive catchwords, because the peace policy was out of date, and was no longer capable of gaining them one inch of additional territory. The Red Army must get used to the idea that the era of the peace policy was at an end, and that the era of violent expansion of the Socialist front had arrived. Anyone who failed to recognize the need for offensive action was a Philistine or a fool. According to the information passed to Werth after the outbreak of the war, Stalin was said to have declared that it was necessary to postpone the war with Germany until the autumn, because then it would be too late for a German attack. The war with Germany, however, would "almost inevitably" take place in 1942, and then under much more favorable conditions. According to the particular international situation, the Red Army "would either await a German attack, or it would have to take the initiative." Werth expressly stressed that all his information agreed in the "basic points, and above all in one of the most important points," *i.e.*, "Stalin's conviction that the war would almost inevitably be fought in 1942, in which case, the Russians might possibly have to take the initiative." It will have to be shown that Stalin apparently changed the date of the beginning of the war from 1942 to 1941.

Finally, Stalin's biographer, Colonel General Professor Volkogonov, accurately reproduced the speech given by Stalin culminating in "military threats against Germany," accusing Bezymensky indirectly of mendacity.⁵⁵ According to Volkogonov, Stalin was "candid as seldom before, and spoke about a great many things that represented state secrets." It was, however, not so much candor as alcohol that had loosened his tongue, according to the Russian proverb "what's on a drunkard's tongue when he's drunk, is what's in his brain when he's sober." Since, as eyewitnesses report, he was already very drunk at that "late hour," Volkogonov summarized the speech of May 5, 1941, as follows:

"The *Vozhd* (Leader) made it unmistakably clear: war is inevitable in the future. One must be ready for the 'unconditional destruction of German

55 Volkogonov, *Triumfi tragedija*, pp. 55-57, 63f., 117, 124-128, 136ff., 54f.

fascism.” “The war will be fought on enemy territory and victory will be achieved with few casualties.”

The speech of May 5, 1941, in which Stalin revealed his aggressive intentions, was, however, only the sequel to a speech by “Comrade Stalin” on January 13, 1941, before high-ranking troop commanders and another speech on January 8, 1941 to high-ranking Air Force commanders, both held in the Central Committee, during which he had revealed quite similar thoughts. A few essential points may be taken from the captured diary of Major Murat of the NKVD (with the rank of Major General) of the staff of the 21st Army, who was killed at Lochvica.⁵⁶ According to this, Stalin had spoken of a “cultivated enemy,” *i.e.*, Germany, after the manner of speech in use among the leadership of the Red Army at that time, and of “attack operations,” which could begin when one possessed double superiority. “Two-fold superiority is a law—greater superiority is even better,” said Stalin on January 13, 1941: “The game is approaching military operations.” “When 5,000 aircraft have destroyed everything, we can attempt to traverse the Carpathians.” The Balkans were the central object of Soviet planning on several occasions in the spring of 1941. The approximate manner in which these operations were imagined was soon revealed by the Soviet plenipotentiary representative in Belgrad.⁵⁷ “The USSR will only react at the proper time,” he stated in a lecture given by him in the spring of 1941:

“The powers are scattering their forces more and more. The USSR is therefore waiting to act unexpectedly against Germany [*vystupit' protiv Germanii neozidanno*], in doing so, the USSR will cross the Carpathians, which will act as the signal for the Revolution in Hungary. Soviet troops will penetrate Yugoslavia from Hungary, advance to the Adriatic Sea, and cut Germany off from the Balkans and the Middle East.”

Stalin and the Soviet leadership had received increasing numbers of reports on the “unwillingness of the German people to wage war,” desertion in the German army, and “the defeatist mood in the Wehrmacht.”⁵⁸ “If Germany gets involved in a war with the USSR,” German soldiers were alleged to be saying: “We will be defeated,” and: “We don’t want to fight, we want to go home.” With the “growing proletarian movements in Germany,” the “revolutionary crisis” appeared to be ripening, which, the “newspapers were writing about, the radio was talking about, and the theoreticians were discouraging upon,” as Stalin’s biographer Volkogonov described the atmo-

56 BA-MA, RH 24-24, 335, 24. 9. 1941.

57 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 889, “SSSR—dejstvitel'nyj podzigitel' vojny i agressor!”

58 Hoffmann, “Die Angriffsvorbereitungen der Sowjetunion”, pp. 372f.

sphere in Moscow. Colonel General Volkogonov mentions *Pervy udar* (The First Blow) by Shpanov, a book distributed in Moscow at that time. He describes the generally prevalent opinion in the Soviet Union that "rebellion against the Nazi regime would break out on the second day after the annihilating blow of the Red Army against fascist Germany."⁵⁹ It is typical of Soviet theory that such an "annihilating blow" did not, for example, assume prior German attack, but could rather take place at any time—at one's own discretion. On April 17, 1941, before the V. I. Lenin Military Political Academy, N. Varga, a particular protégé of Stalin and a member of the Academy, declared in a speech that as soon as a "revolutionary crisis" appeared due to the war, the "power of the bourgeoisie" would be weakened and the "proletariat would take power"; "the Soviet Union would then be obliged—and will fulfill its obligation—to come to the aid of the Proletarian Revolution in other countries." "The Soviet People does not forget its international obligations in regard to the world proletariat, and all workers of the capitalist countries" the *Sovetskaja Ukraina* announced as early as January 21, 1941.⁶⁰ The drive to light the fire of the world revolution was, as will become clear in still other references, linked to the Soviet drive for conquest, disguised in the propaganda pretext of a revolutionary war of liberation.

Comrade Stalin's speech at the graduation of the students of the Red Army academies in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941, as reported in the so-called *Kratkaja Zapis*, should be evaluated against this background.⁶¹ The real message of Stalin's remarks consisted of communicating to the graduates the conviction that the German Wehrmacht was not invincible, but could now be beaten by the Red Army. The Red Army had changed so much in the past three or four years in regard to the military technology of tanks, artillery, and aircraft that when the comrades now returned to their units they would no longer recognize the Army (*teper' vernetes' v eie rjady i ne uznaete armii*).

The passage in the speech by Stalin stressed by Bezymensky that, "the army now consists of three hundred divisions," although it is still important, is not the decisive one; the decisive passage consists of what Stalin then added in confidence and that Bezymensky passed over in silence. Namely, that "of the total number of divisions, one-third are mechanized

59 Choffman, "Podgotovka Sovetskogo Soyuza k nastupatel'noj vojne", p. 22.

60 *Sovetskaja Ukraina*, 21. 1. 1941.

61 Rossijskij Centr Chranenija i Izucenija Dokumentov Novejszej Istorii Moskau, *Kratkaja Zapis' Vystuplenija tov. Stalina na Vypuske Slusatelej Akademii Krasnoj Armii v Kremlje 5 Maja 1941*, g. (Semenev, K.).

divisions," and, that "of those one hundred divisions, two-thirds are armored divisions and one-third are motorized divisions," which, furthermore, matched German armored divisions in both weaponry and equipment.³⁹ The multiple superiority demanded by Stalin on January 13, 1941, had, therefore, clearly been achieved in the armored divisions, which were decisive for attack operations. The Red Army therefore possessed a powerful military force of armored shock units, rendering it capable of far-reaching attack operations. That deficiencies later became obvious—such as, for example, in regard to the leadership of the mechanized corps—is irrelevant to the decision made before June 22, 1941.

Similar conditions prevailed in the air force. Stalin said:

"We have sufficient numbers of aircraft, and are producing them in huge numbers—aircraft that can reach speeds of 600-650 kilometers an hour. These are first-class planes. In the event of war, these aircraft will be used on the front line."

As Stalin remarked, the German army, by comparison, "has nothing in particular to show us, either in tanks, or artillery, or the air force."

"The German army has lost its taste for further improvements in military technology... ostentation, self-satisfaction, and arrogance had, furthermore, become prevalent in the German army. German military doctrine is making no progress, German military technology is not only still behind ours, but, in terms of aviation, Germany is beginning to be overtaken even by America."

Bezymensky kept silent about the most important section of the event in the Kremlin as reported in the *Kratkaja Zapis*, which represented an unusual occurrence. When a Major General of the Armored Forces, proposed a toast to Stalinist peaceful foreign policy late at night during the banquet, something unexpected occurred. Stalin got up for the third time to rebuke the General for his well-intentioned words—proof that the General had touched upon the decisive point. Stalin said:

"Permit me to make a correction. The peace policy protects the peace of our country; peace policy is a good thing. We have until now, until the present moment, followed a defensive policy—until now, as long as our army was not re-armed, as long as our army was not equipped with modern weaponry. But now that we have reconstructed our army, now that we have saturated it with technology for modern combat, now that we have become strong—now we are obliged to move from defense to attack. After ensuring the defense of our country, we will be obliged to act aggressively, to move from the defensive to a military policy of offensive operations. Our education, our propaganda, our agitation, our press, must be adapted to the idea of

attack. The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army—is an army of attack.”

Stalin's military threats against Germany on May 5, 1941, reported by the above-named officers of all ranks, therefore found unmistakable expression in the *Kratkaja Zapis*, just as much as Stalin's will to wage an aggressive war. This is confirmed by the writer V.V. Vishnevsky, who, as Valeri Danilov reported in 1995, “with soldierly openness,” made the following entry about Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941 in his diary on May 13, 1941:

“The speech is of tremendous significance. We are opening the ideological and actual attack... but I remember clearly the prediction contained in the speech, that we were beginning the struggle with Germany—we will conduct a grandiose struggle against fascism, against our dangerous belligerent neighbor, in the name revolutionizing Europe and Asia. Our campaign in the West is impending, the possibility that we have long dreamed about is now approaching.”⁶²

If West German contemporary historiography kept on arguing that there is no proof of Stalin's aggressive intentions, it should be noted that there is even more evidence. Alexandr Nekrich, who recently studied the personal papers of the Stalin's closest confidants—Kalinin, Zhdanov, Shcherbakov, Beria, and others—in Moscow, has made us aware of this evidence. According to him, there was never the slightest doubt in the Politburo that the Soviet Union would initiate an aggressive war against Germany at a suitable point in time. In these circles, the political aim of the Soviet Union was seen to consist of reducing the “capitalist world” and extending the “socialist zone,” which was considered to be equivalent to the Soviet Union. Zhdanov should also be mentioned in this regard; he was a member of the Politburo and Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Supreme Soviet. In November 1940, when Molotov brought his “summons” to Berlin, Zhdanov declared in a secret speech in Leningrad before a select group, referring cynically to Stalin and stating, openly and brutally, that what was important was to “expand the position of Socialism whenever an opportunity arises to do so.”⁶³ In particular, he remarked:

“We have followed this practice in the past year, and as you know, the result was the expansion of socialist territory of the Soviet Union... The lines along which further developments will take place are clear to you (laughter). Our neutrality is unusual: we are not fighting; we are only con-

62 Danilov, “Gotovil li General'nyj Shtab”, p. 91.

63 Nekrich, *Pariahs, Partners, Predators*, pp. 230f.

quering our own territory (laughter in the hall). This neutrality must be maintained by strength... We must be strong enough to defend the position of socialism both diplomatically and militarily."

The intent to conquer was expressed almost openly when Zhdanov appealed to his high-ranking listeners

"to lose, not a day, not an hour, in perfecting military technology, military organization and, at the same time, in studying the experiences of contemporary offensives utilizing all methods and means of attack."

"Zhdanov spoke exclusively of attack actions," writes Alexandr Nekrich, "and not one word about defensive strategy."

It was on May 20, 1941, fifteen days after Stalin's war speech before the graduates of the Military Academy of the Red Army, in which – and was obvious to everybody—Germany was designated as the enemy, and it was five days after Stalin had approved the plan, still to be further discussed, of the General Staff of the Red Army for an aggressive war against the Reich, that Kalinin gave a secret speech before the Party and Young Communist League (*Komsomol*) Officials of the Apparatus of the Supreme Soviet.⁶⁴ Kalinin was the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and, therefore, Head of State of the USSR, one of Stalin's most dedicated accomplices, who, incidentally, also signed the order to shoot 14,700 Polish officers and 11,000 prominent Polish civilians. In this compromising speech, Kalinin revealed a few basic ideas of the policies and strategy of the Soviet Union.

Of course, the concept of the Stalin doctrine of 1925—which boiled down to entering the war with fresh armed forces in the event of the mutual exhaustion of the capitalistic states and, in the end, dictating his own conditions—was temporarily thwarted in 1940 due to the quick German victory in France. Kalinin directed the party cadres on the new course of his lord and master, which was that Communists were not to concern themselves with questions of ensuring peace, but should rather "concern themselves, above all else, in studying the advantages that may arise for the Communist party from events that only occur once in fifty years." Real Marxists must understand, according to Kalinin, and these are his actual words:

"that the fundamental concept of the Marxist doctrine consists of deriving the greatest possible benefits for the Communist party from the tremendous conflicts within humanity."

64 Nekrich, "A Wise Design," pp. 2-7; Nekrich, *Pariahs, Partners, Predators*, pp. 231f.

Hence, communists, according to Kalinin, should encourage conflicts "whenever there is a chance of success"—whenever they promise special advantages and opportunities. "The best way to strengthen Marxism," the speech concluded, "consists of studying military matters; fighting with a weapon in your hand is even better." "War is a very dangerous businesses, bound up with sufferings," he then added, "but consideration should be given to the possibility of war when it is possible to expand Communism." Kalinin expressed satisfaction that the Soviet Union had succeeded in expanding the zone of Communism to some extent, with relatively few sacrifices. He also added that the expansion of the zone of Communism must continue, "even if it demands great efforts." Kretov, the chief of his Secretariat, summarized the main point of the speech by Kalinin, in thesis form.⁶⁵ Thesis No. 10 ran as follows:

"The capitalist world, filled with great atrocities, can only be destroyed by the red hot steel of a holy revolutionary war."

The whole meaning of this speech by the head of state on May 20, 1941, was, according to Alexandr Nekrich, not concerned with national defense, but rather, with conquest, at "strengthening the power of Communism." As Kalinin expressed it, "which will perhaps be decisive to the entire process of historical events that follows." Could aggressive intentions have been any more clearly expressed in the atmosphere of May 1941 than when Kalinin called out in conclusion—"to the thunderous applause" of the auditorium—that "the army must think: the sooner the struggle begins, the better!"? On June 5, 1941, in a speech before students of the V. I. Lenin Military Political Academy he repeated "The war will start when it is possible to expand Communism."⁶⁶

In addition to other members of the Politburo, among them for example Shcherbakov, Zhdanov repeatedly propagated Stalin's aggressive policy in May-June 1941. Thus, he called out in a speech before cinema technicians on May 15, 1941: "The people must be educated in the spirit of active, combative military attacks."⁶⁷ "When the circumstances permit," he added openly, "we will further expand the front of socialism." Expanding the "Front of Socialism" to the West, as Nikitin remarked, would, however, only be possible when Germany was smashed. A conference of the Chief Military Council of the Red Army of June 7, 1941, was headed by Zhdanov and dedicated to a topic chosen by Stalin: "The Task of the Political Propa-

⁶⁵ Nekrich, *Pariahs, Partners, Predators*, p. 233.


⁶⁶ Nikitin, "Ocenka sovetским rukovodstvom", p. 138.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

ganda of the Red Army in the Near Future." Zhdanov once again announced, with complete frankness: "We have become stronger. We can now set more active goals for ourselves. The wars against Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already entered the path of a policy of attack."⁶⁸

The proceedings of May 5, 1941, and, as will be shown, of May 15, 1941, as well, are inseparably related to the speeches of Zhdanov and Kalinin. They bluntly reveal that Stalin had no interest in the maintenance of peace and in the defense of the Soviet State, as Stalinist propaganda and Stalinist apologists continue to allege, even today. On the contrary, they show that he worked militarily, politically, and through propaganda, with all his might, to begin a war of conquest.

68 Kiselev, "Uprjamyje fakty nachala vojny," p. 78; Petrov, "O strategicheskom razvertivanii," p. 68; Nevezhin, "Vystuplenie Stalina 5 maja 1941 g.," p. 158.



**June 22, 1941:
Hitler Preempts Stalin's Attack**

On May 5, 1941, Stalin officially demanded the intellectual and propagandistic conversion of the Red Army to the concept of attack, praising the great superiority of the Red Army. He did not, however, touch upon the actual question of operational preparations for an offensive war against Germany, which was, of course, hardly possible before the audience in the Kremlin. The military preparations had, nevertheless, long been underway. Thus, the Red Army, even in 1940—*i.e.*, long before the German invasion—had already begun offensive deployment in the exposed salients near Białystok and Lemberg, as the future Chief of the General Staff and Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov was compelled to admit.¹ A conference of the highest commanders of the Red Army under the Chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, made the decision in December 1940 to conduct any future war as a war of attack. In January 1941, two large-scale staff war-game planning maneuvers of the top leadership cadres of the Red Army (also under the direction of the People's Commissar of Defense and to some extent in the presence of Stalin and a few members of the Politburo) produced the first study for the execution of an offensive war against Germany.² A strategic map maneuver that was played through included an offensive with the objective of conquering East Prussia and Königsberg by superior Soviet forces from the Baltic region. This offensive was to combine with overwhelmingly superior forces from the region around Brest in an offensive over the Carpathians in a southwestern thrust with the objective of conquering southern Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. These strategic map maneuvers, which took place on January 2-6, 1941, and January 8-11, 1941, are, typically, either not mentioned at all or only marginally in Soviet war historiography and historical memoirs.³ This is an indication that the desired results that stood in the fore-

1 Zhukov, *Vospominaniia*, p. 272.

2 Nekrich, *Pariahs, Partners, Predators*, p. 234.

3 Maser, *Der Wortbruch*, pp. 272ff.

ground of the performance of these exercises were not defensive measures but, rather, offensive operations.

On May 15, 1941, ten days after the utterance of Stalin's military threats, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Zhukov, transmitted to "the President of the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade Stalin," in the presence of the People's Commissar for Defense, Marshal Timoshenko, the plan, signed by all of them, for an offensive war against Germany under the harmless title "*Soobrazenija po planu strategiceskogo razvertyvanija Vooruzennyh Sil Sovetskogo Soyuza...*" (Considerations on the Strategic Mobilization Plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Event of War with Germany and German Allies...). Due to strict secrecy, this document was only available in a single clean handwritten copy. The Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch of the General Staff, Major General Vasilevsky, had transmitted it to Zhukov personally in Stalin's reception hall in the Kremlin. The First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Vatutin, inserted underlining and editorial corrections in pencil.

This plan for an offensive war on Germany is the quintessence of other projects worked out by the Soviet General Staff in the spring of 1941 for an offensive against Germany. This has been published and commented on in detail by the Candidate for the Historical Sciences, Colonel Valeri Danilov,⁴ with the cooperation of university lecturer Dr. Heinz Magenheimer⁵ of the National Defense Academy in Vienna, in the renowned *Österreichischen Militärischen Zeitschrift*. These projects included the following:

1. The strategic deployment plan of March 2, 1941, of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war with Germany;
2. The projected operational plan in the event of war with Germany, referred to in the document of May 15, 1941;

4 Danilov, "Hat der Generalstab der Roten Armee eine Präventivschlag gegen Deutschland vorbereitet?" See, in this regard, Gillessen, "Krieg zwischen zwei Angreifern"; and, by the same author, "Der Krieg der Diktatoren" (1986); and, also by the same author, "Der Krieg der Diktatoren" (1987). The handwritten Russian original text has been published by Maser in *Der Wortbruch*, pp. 406-420. The Colonel and Candidate for Science of History Professor Valeri Danilov has clearly and convincingly defended his findings against ideologically motivated maneuvers of the neo-Stalinist *Voenna - istoricheskij zhurnal*: "Popytka vozrozhdenija global'noj lzhi" (Attempts to Resurrect a Global Lie).

5 Magenheimer, "Neue Erkenntnisse zum 'Unternehmen Barbarossa'"; see also, by the same author: "Zum deutsch-sowjetischen Krieg 1941. Neue Quellen und Erkenntnisse."

3. The "Utočennyj plan razvertyvanija Vooruzennyh Sil Sovetskogo Soyuza na Zapade i na Vostoke" (Specific Deployment Plans of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union toward the West and East) of March 11, 1941, that, according to Colonel General Volkogonov, was also prepared with the participation of Major General Vasilevsky and presented to Stalin by Marshal Timoshenko and General of the Army Zhukov.⁶

Danilov quoted a short summary, a so-called "attack credo," of the General Staff plan of May 15, 1941, which is identical in content with a document of the same name published by Volkogonov (but without the textual supplement "For the Event of a War with Germany and German Allies" dated May 15, 1941). If one follows Volkogonov, this document can, however, only have been a handwritten report (*Zapiska*) from Zhukov to Stalin, i.e., perhaps a short informative accompanying document. The "attack credo" of the General Staff plan of May 15, 1941, in any case agrees in content with the "Considerations" (*Soobrazenija*) on the "Strategic Deployment Plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union," excerpts of which were printed by Colonel Karpov in the newspaper *Kommunist Vooruzennyh Sil* in 1990. Those excerpts were described by the weekly periodical *Der Spiegel* in 1991 as Zhukov's "plan of attack," with the meaningful subtitle "How the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR in May 1941 Wished to Preempt Hitler."⁷

The merit of Colonel Danilov's work is that he published the entire Soviet plan of attack, with thorough comments, thereby disseminating conclusive details of Soviet military preparations. The General Staff Plan of May 15, 1941, incorporated the principles contained in Stalin's speech before the graduates of the Military Academies and, as a practical matter, converted the remarks of May 5, 1941, combined with the resources of the General Staff, into a primer for operational action. The composition of this plan of attack and its presentation on May 15, 1941, to the originator of the demand, that it was now necessary to make the transition to a "military policy of offensive operations," was equivalent to a highly official step of the General Staff, which, in view of the conditions of the Stalin regime, could only be undertaken upon the instructions of Stalin himself. Danilov is fully justified when he stresses that "operational documents of such importance" could only be drawn up "exclusively upon the basis of military-strategic concepts issued by Stalin." Any individual initiative in matters of such

6 Volkogonov, "Etu versiju uzhe oproverglta istorija"; Suvorov, "Vtoruju Mirovujju Vojnu nacal Stalin."

7 "Schlafende Aggressoren: Schukows Angriffsplan."

importance was out of the question, because it could be interpreted as a concerted protest against the "party line," *i.e.*, against Stalin, with all the dire consequences arising therefrom. This, of course, applied first of all to the People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. In particular, it was clear to Zhukov, who was still mindful of the Great Purge, what it would have meant to oppose the Stalinist line and to work out one's own plans.

Stalin, however, took great care not to sign documents of fatefully grave content. Colonel General Volkogonov has, however, left no doubt as to Stalin's knowledge of the General Staff Plan of May 15, 1941, and on July 29, 1990, in the Military History Research Office in Freiburg stated that Stalin "signed with his monograph" (*i.e.*, initialed) the plan.⁸ Alexandr Nekrich says: "Stalin favored execution of the plan, but wanted to keep his own hands clean."⁹ Stalin always acted this way in decisive matters. An extraordinary document has also been found in the "Presidential Archives" (in the former archive of the Politburo of the Central Committee) in Moscow. This is the text of an interview prepared on August 20, 1965 by Marshal Vasilevsky, with a concurring comment by Zhukov, stating that "Stalin fully approves the principal theses of the 'considerations.'" Timoshenko and Zhukov must have received Stalin's approval, since they immediately commenced execution of the plan; in which, according to Valeri Danilov as well, they drew up "extensive preparations" for an offensive war against Germany.

Finally, even Colonel General Gor'kov, in his foreword to an interview of Marshal Vasilevsky, cannot help admitting that the plan of attack of the General Staff of the Red Army very quickly (*i.e.*, within nine days, on May 24, 1941) became the object of a conference of the top leadership levels in Stalin's presence.¹⁰ That this conference in the Kremlin was, in fact, an event of the greatest importance, is also proven by the participation of the First Deputy to the President of the Council of People's Commissars (*i.e.*, Deputy Premier to Stalin) and Foreign Minister Molotov, as well as Timoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin, and Commander of the Air Forces of the Red Army Zhigarev. In addition, the commanders of the five military border regions, Generals Popov, Kuznetsov, Pavlov, Kirponos, and Cherevichenko, the members of their military councils, and other leading officers from their fields were also present.¹¹

⁸ Volkogonov, *Triumfi i tragedija*, pp. 136, 155.

⁹ Nekrich, *Pariahs, Partners, Predators*, p. 237.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 236, with reference to Vasilevsky, "Nakanune vojny."

¹¹ Danilov, "Gotovil li General'nyj Shtab," p. 85.

Due to detailed research, Colonel Kiselev arrives at the conclusion that Stalin, even if he did not expressly approve the plan of attack of May 15, 1941 (in accordance with his style), he, nevertheless, accepted it.¹² "One of the most important references to the accuracy of this assumption," in his view, "is that the measures for which the High Command was searching in the document of May 15, were actually carried out." "The measures listed in the 'Considerations on the Strategic Deployment Plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union' of May 15, 1941," as Kiselev summarizes, "began to take shape, which would not have been possible without the approval of the political leadership, meaning Stalin." Michail Mel'tiukhov has accepted this research finding, and defended it against misleading ideological criticism. He writes:¹³

"It is therefore impossible, insofar as one can pursue it, not to agree with V. Kiselev and V. Danilov that the plan of May 15 was approved by the Soviet leadership, since, as stated above, the measures proposed in the plan were carried out in May-June. Consequently, the opinions of V. Danilov, V. Kiselev and B. Petrov in this regard, that the Red Army created an offensive army, appear entirely justified."

The argument adduced by General Colonel Gor'kov and other Stalin apologists that the plan of attack of the General Staff of the Red Army of May 15, 1941, should be considered "defensive" because it contained no supplementary political plans for the occupation of the territories to be incorporated, is groundless.¹⁴ Thus, for example, the expert American historian Professor Richard C. Raack replies: "There had to have been some other planning somewhere, at some level, for some sort of political result from a successful invasion according to the plan Gor'kov reported."¹⁵ To Raack, the "non-existence of a supplementary Soviet plan is inconceivable." As Viktor Suvorov stresses, the failure to find such a plan is no proof to the contrary; since in Moscow, as the Katyn case teaches (the site of an NKVD massacre of Polish officers), the only documents ever found were those that they wanted to be found. Finally, from 1939 onward, the huge territorial regions of Poland, Finland, the Baltic Republics, and East Romania were also annexed more or less off the cuff.

Suvorov makes it clear that the preparations of the Red Army for the "Campaigns of Liberation" in 1939 and 1941 were conducted according to the same scheme.¹⁶ As in 1939, military councils selected higher party offi-

12 Kiselev, "Uprjamyje fakty nachala vojny," pp. 77f.

13 Mel'tiukhov, "Spory vokrug 1941 goda," p. 99.

14 Gor'kov, "Gotovil li Stalin uprezhdajushchij udar."

15 Raack, "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II," pp. 207f.

cials for Special Applications Groups (“*osobogo naznachenija, osnaz*”), whose existence was later hushed up. These groups came to be formed in regard to the planned “War of Liberation” in 1941 for the purpose of executing the goal of Sovietization. We can infer from an official work of the Institute for the Military History of the 18th Army (which, incidentally, passed all the censors) that, in addition to other party officials, the later General Secretary Brezhnev was assigned to such an Osnaz group prior to the beginning of the war. On page 11 of the work, it says “Until mid-September 1941, Leonid Ilyich belonged to the Special Applications Group of the Military Council for the Southern Front.”¹⁷ Suvorov considers this as an involuntary admission that the Bolshevization of the territory to be conquered in 1941 was indeed planned, and that corresponding political plans must also have existed, in addition to the plan of attack of the General Staff of the Red Army of May 15, 1941.

What were the details of the Soviet General Staff’s plan? The above mentioned short “Credo of Attack” ran as follows:

“When one considers that Germany keeps its army mobile through the installation of rear support services, then it can preempt us [*predupredit*’, with double underlining by General Vatutin] during deployment, and carry out a surprise attack. In order to prevent this, and to crush the German army [the latter is crossed out], I consider it necessary not to leave the initiative to the German command at any time, under any circumstances, and to preempt the enemy during deployment [*upredit*’, with double underlining by General Vatutin], and to attack the German army during the deployment stage, when it is not yet able to build a front and organize the cooperation of its branches of service.”

As a perceptive observer, Pourray, has remarked, if the Soviet General Staff feared that the Germans might “preempt” the Red army, this must have been because the Russians were already doing something that the Germans needed to preempt.

The first strategic objective, according to the Soviet General Staff plan, was the destruction of the chief forces of the German Wehrmacht south of the Brest-Deblin line and the attainment of the Ostroleka-Narew-Łodz-Kreuzburg-Oppeln-Olmütz line within 30 days. A second strategic aim was the continuation of the offensive out of the region around Kattowitz to the north and northwest, to crush the forces of the left wing and take possession of all of Poland and East Prussia as well. The main blow should be led with forces from the Southwest Front out of the Lemberg salient, to

16 Suworow, *Der Tag M*, pp. 101ff.

17 “Vosemnadcataja v srazhenijakh,” p. 11.

cut off the German Army from its southern allies. It was simultaneously planned to encircle and annihilate the German group in the Lublin-Radom region with the right wing of the Southwest Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the Western Front, in an offensive from the Białystok salient in the direction of Warsaw-Deblin. Against Finland and East Prussia—apparently a result of the war-game staff maneuvers of January—and against Romania and Hungary, an active defense was to be organized in the south from the regions around Czernowitz and Kishinev. Romania was then to be attacked to capture Jași and destroy the left wing of the Romanian army.

The General Staff plan of May 15, 1941, meant, in terms of one central point, a deviation from previous doctrine: an enemy offensive was no longer to be answered with a devastating blow. Rather, the Red Army was to preempt enemy attack, which was, at this point, still purely hypothetical, since the armored shock forces of the German Armies East were deployed on the eastern border for the first time only on June 3, 1941. Since the great devastating blow was intended to introduce the "military policy of attack operations" ordered by Stalin on May 5, 1941, and, as Kalinin revealed on May 20, 1941, this really involved a political aim, *i.e.*, of "expanding the zone of Communism," which meant expanding the power of the Soviet Union, it was, therefore, a purely offensive war, a war of conquest, not a preventive war that was being prepared, similar to the manner in which Hitler—although for different reasons—planned an offensive war of his own.

This is true, regardless of whether or not German deployment served as the motivation, and essentially proves that the Soviet preparations for attack by the concentration and deployment of Red Army troops was covered in the guise of local defense. The success of the planned large-scale surprise attack against the troops of the Wehrmacht presupposed a few measures expressly advocated by the General Staff of the Red Army on May 15, 1941.

1. Secret mobilization was to be carried out under the cover of exercises for the soldiers of the Red Army.
2. Troops were to be concentrated in the vicinity of the western border areas under the pretense of the concentration of training camps; as a priority, all the reserve armies of the Soviet High Command were to be concentrated.
3. The Air Forces were to be secretly concentrated on airfields, while the development of the ground organization was to begin immediately.
4. The rear support services were to be organized under the screen of training procedures and exercises.

These demands generally corresponded to the new operational and tactical principles of the Red Army, of which the Germans soon became aware. Beginning in the spring of 1941, the Germans noticed that "extensive studies" of the "initial phase of a new war" were being recorded in Soviet military literature. All these studies, according to a summary of the High Command of the German 18th Army of April 15, 1941, climaxed in the recognition that all modern wars would begin "with a 'sneaking up' into war, without an official declaration of war, and with gradual mobilization that was concealed until the final opening of hostilities."¹⁸ Motorized forces and cavalry would be concentrated "on troop training areas and during maneuvers," and be used "within the shortest time as an army of penetration." The objective of the "surprise opening of hostilities" was to carry the "military operations into enemy territory, and take the initiative from the beginning of the campaign." The question arises: to what extent were these requisitions still in the planning stage, and to what extent had they actually been completed by June 22, 1941?

As for secret mobilization, Soviet troops in the western border regions, in accordance with the new mobilization plan (*Mobilizatsionnyj plan*) *MP-1941 goda*, received orders from the General Staff of the Red Army to prepare for a full mobilization by June 1941.¹⁹ The date indicated for all troops and installations of the western special military districts was June 15, 1941; for that of the Baltic special military districts, June 20, 1941. The mobilization of the troops was to be prepared "down to the last detail" in accordance with the date established in the deployment scheme. The General Staff apparently wished "to take a resolute step forward" in June, and also to actually carry out a general mobilization. In the meantime, Stalin rejected a similar proposal of Timoshenko and Zhukov on June 14, 1941, since mobilization would automatically mean the opening of hostilities, which should, in the opinion at that time, begin with a surprise blow at a point in time chosen by the Soviets. The measures already taken, as Colonel Filippov recently showed, had been so effective that mobilization was no longer even necessary.²⁰ In May 1941, Stalin ordered the call-up of a further 800,000 reservists, so that approximately 300 divisions were now ready. These divisions were only approximately 2,500 men short of wartime strength per division. The German command authorities were, of course, quick to perceive the intent behind this move. They knew that the increasing call-up of specialists and the drafting of all the eligible men born in the

18 BA-MA, RH 20-18/951, 15. 4. 1941.

19 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 329, 6. 6., see also 10. 5., 31. 5./2. 6. 1941.

20 Filippov, in: *Voennyj Vestnik*, pp. 9, 11.

same year meant the systematic strengthening of the Red Army without this being apparent to the outside for the sake of camouflage.²¹ "Due to this procedure," was the conclusion, "a public general mobilization is no longer necessary under certain circumstances."

As with the secret mobilization, the secret concentration of troops under cover of training camps was largely completed. Soviet historians, precisely to prove alleged Soviet peaceful intentions, have adduced a system of "decentralized camp exercises." In reality, however, the General Staff had, once again under the strictest secrecy, shifted four armies from the interior of the country to the border region as early as May 13, 1941, on Stalin's instructions. These armies were followed by others in June. The armies in question were the 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, and 28th, i.e., a total of seven armies, as well as the 21st and 23rd Mechanized Corps and the 41st Infantry Corps. These huge troop movements were conducted under the umbrella of denials inspired by Stalin. Thus, the news agency TASS, on May 15, 1941, attacked the rumors of large troop concentrations with the truly baffling claim that a whole division had been transferred from Irkutsk to Novosibirsk due to better lodging conditions.²² On June 13, 1941, TASS called rumors of war preparations against Germany as "mendacious and provocative," and the call-up of reservists for the forthcoming maneuver was only intended for "training" and to "control the railway apparatus." At this time, according to later German statements, so far "almost the entire available armed might of the Soviet Union was transported out of the interior of Russia to the German eastern front in one month of continuous movement." Otherwise, large units would hardly have appeared before the German army eastern front in numbers that, according to the enemy situation report of Panzer Group 4 of August 10, 1941, amounted to 330 Soviet divisions, but, according to the intelligence report on the enemy of Panzer Group 3 of August 3 to 7, 1941, amounted to as many as 350 Soviet divisions.²³ In the belief of the German General Staff of the Army, such a concentration of troops must have begun quite a long time before the beginning of the war, particularly when one considered the "vast expanse of the regions" and the "difficult transportation conditions" in the Soviet Union.

"That the Soviet Union was preparing to begin an offensive war against the German Reich" is, however, also evident from the type of troop deployment, the actual "battle order," as vigorously stressed in a memorandum undersigned by the Chief of the Foreign Armies East Branch of the

21 BA-MA, RH 19I/128, 22. 5. 1941; BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 435, 15. 5. 1941.

22 Suworow, *Der Eisbrecher*, pp. 228f., 236f.; both cities are located in Siberia.

23 BA-MA, RH 21-4/266, 10. 8. 1941; BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 423, 7. 8. 1941.

German General Staff of the Army, Colonel Gehlen, on September 9, 1943: "Proofs of Russian Offensive Preparations Against Germany (preparedness in terms of personnel and the deployment of personnel)."²⁴ Thus, strong forces, especially "mobile" forces, *i.e.*, mechanized, motorized, and cavalry units, were predominantly concentrated in the salient extending far into German controlled territory at Białystok and Lemberg. The memorandum pointed out:

"These two chief points of emphasis make clear the intention, that through a thrust in the general direction of Lizmannstadt (Łódz), to encircle and destroy the German forces in the projecting part of the General Gouvernement [German occupied Poland] and to cut East Prussia off from the Reich upon suitable development of the situation in the north through a thrust in the direction of Elbing."

But here, the full extent of the Soviet General Staff plan of May 15, 1941, had not even remotely been correctly recognized. It is also characteristic that this "operative configuration" was maintained regardless of the certainty of a German attack, although the troops thus deployed were in immediate danger of profound enclosure, encirclement, and destruction, as Marshal Zhukov also admitted after the war. According to Major General Grigorenko, such concentrations would only have been justified

"if the troops there were intended to be used in a surprise attack. Otherwise, they would have been halfway surrounded right from the start. The enemy only needed to deal two opposing blows at the base of our wedge, and the encirclement would have been complete."²⁵

Documents captured by the German army, moreover, confirm the fact observed by Colonel Filippov, that even before the beginning of the German attack, between June 18 and June 21, 1941, the majority of the Soviet divisions were placed on combat readiness.²⁶ Furthermore, from June 14, 1941, the order was issued to relocate the newly created Front Staffs (formed out of the staffs of the peacetime military districts) to field combat positions, which was understandable only in the event of forthcoming hostilities.

The secret concentration of the Soviet Air Forces, the development of the ground organization, and the organization of the rear support services were already almost entirely finished on June 22, 1941. The General Staff of the Red Army had concentrated "the most combat-ready aviation attack

24 BA-MA, RH 2/2092.

25 Nekritsch/Grigorenko, *Genickschuß*, p. 272.

26 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 437, 18. 6., 21. 6. 1941; as well as a captured order on the combat preparedness of mechanized and non-mechanized units of 15. 6. 1941, BA-MA, RH 20-4/671, 28. 6. 1941.

formations" in all previous air war history, in "the immediate vicinity of its national borders," and, to this end, had installed a dense network of operative airports in the area since early 1941. This was done, consistently and by preference, in the salients extending from Białystok and Lemberg, from which the great surprise blow on the Western and Southwest Front was to be dealt according to the Soviet General Staff plan of May 15, 1941. A map prepared during the war by the German Luftwaffe Operation Staff (*Luftwaffenführungsstab*) clearly shows the concentration of Soviet airports in the intended main direction of thrust.²⁷ At least 142 Soviet airfields were built west of the Wilna-Kovel' line, and at least 260 west of the Łuck-Czernewitz (Chernovicy) line. The concentration of airports in the Baltic region, as well as Romania, was also conspicuous. Between 1937 and 1940, the Soviet Air Forces also worked out exact documentation and descriptions of their objectives in a large number of German cities, at least as far as the Kiel-Celle-Erfurt line.²⁸ To the Luftwaffe Operation Staff, this was "clear proof" of the methodical war preparations of the Red Army even in these early years.

Clear offensive intentions were also revealed by the transfer forward of all material resources of the armed forces that were stationed immediately adjacent to the western national borders. Gigantic depots of ammunition, weapons, equipment, fuel, provisions, and other stores and materiel, in fact all mobilization supplies, were, as Colonel Danilov has also stated, installed practically in the effective range of enemy fire—even railway tracks were ready for use.²⁹ For example, in Brest-Litovsk alone, the Germans captured ten million liters of fuel. This was "an unmistakable indication of plans of aggression," because these quantities of gasoline, immediately on the border, were, furthermore, stored in front of the deployed units of the 14th Mechanized Corps.³⁰ The then Chief of the Administration for Signal Services of the People's Commissariat for Defense, Major General Gapich, writes from a knowledge of his field of expertise: "All steps were thus directed to the creation of bridgeheads, to prepare to deal a blow against the enemy, and to carry the war into enemy territory."³¹ In G. P. Pastukhovsky's opinion, everything was prepared "to ensure profound offensive operations."³²

27 BA-MA, RLD 13/127, "Sowjetunion, Bodenorganisation, Archivmäßig bearbeitete Flugplätze," Stand 1. 2. 1942, Anlage 3 zu ObdL, FüStab 1c/IV, Nr. 1300/42geh; BA-MA, RLD 13/119; BA-MA, Fliegerbo-denorganisation, Stand 1. 4. 1941, map 160 K-4, K-5.

28 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, 22. 4. 1942.

29 Chor'kov, "Die Rote Armee in der Anfangsphase," p. 432.

30 Heydorn, *Der sowjetische Aufmarsch*, pp. 79f.

31 Gapich, "Nekotorye mysli," p. 48.

The maps supplied to Red Army troops are another infallible indication of large-scale offensive plans. At various places near the border, as well as far behind the lines, the Germans captured maps extending far to the west and into Germany territory, as well as equally copious documentation providing other information on Germany. Such map discoveries were made at Kobryn, Dubno, Grodno, and many other places.³³ In October 1941, the German XXIV Panzer Corps captured a map of Lithuania and East Prussia, as well as "an apparent operational study entitled 'Attack on East Prussia.'"³⁴ As the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps reported on July 1, 1941, the citadel of Dubno contained

"warlike-packed supplies of map materials drawn up for divisional tasks. These maps covered territory west of the border regions as far as the region of Cracow [in German occupied Poland]... large quantities of exercises for general staff officers and lecture documentation on Germany were also found."³⁵

At an unidentified military drill location, as the activity report of the XXVIII Army Corps stated on July 16, 1941, "mobilization maps of the Red Army were found showing nothing but southern Lithuania, the former Polish areas, and parts of East Prussia. These maps clearly reveal the intent of the Red Army to attack the German Reich."³⁶

On July 23, 1941, Soviet Captain Bondar, Chief of Staff of the 739th Infantry Regiment of the 213th Infantry Division, stated that "the Red Army had adjusted itself not for defense but rather for an attack against the General Gouvernement."³⁷ "Maps extending as far as Cracow" were made available to his regiment, as to other parts of the Red Army. These maps were "rendered useless by the German surprise advance." Such Red Army map supplies in fact prove even more treacherous as the Soviet troops had a lack of military maps of their own territory when military operations—contrary to expectations—suddenly shifted east of their national borders and into Soviet territory. Reliable witnesses, such as Colonel Liubimov,³⁸ artillery commander of the 49th Armored Division and long-time teacher of tactics at the Artillery Academy in Moscow; Colonel Ovanov,³⁹ Chief of Staff of the 46th Infantry Division; Major Kononov,⁴⁰ Commander of the 436th

32 Pastukhovskiy, "Razvertyvanie operativnogo tyla," p. 19.

33 BA-MA, RH 21-2/v. 646, 25. 6. 1941.

34 BA-MA, RH 24-24/335, 7. 10. 1941.

35 BA-MA, RH 24-48/198, 1. 7. 1941.

36 BA-MA, RH 24-28/10, 16. 7. 1941.

37 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 23. 7. 1941.

38 BA-MA, RH 21-1/472, 6. 8. 1941.

39 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 437, 26. 7. 1941.

Infantry Regiment of the 155th Infantry Division; as well as Stalin's son, as strong in character and as clever as his father, First Lieutenant Dzhugashvili,⁴¹ of the 14th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 14th Armored Division, testified that the lack of maps in the units was, in fact, so serious that combat operations were seriously hindered by it. Professor of Eastern European History at the University of Mainz, Dr. Gotthold Rhode, was at the time an interpreter and *Sonderführer* (K)(special leader K)⁴² in the staff of the 8th Infantry Division. As he made note of it in his diary, on June 23, 1941, in the headquarters building of the Soviet 3rd Army in Grodno, he found, "in a room, stacks of maps of East Prussia, beautifully printed, on a scale of 1:50,000, much better than our own maps, covering all of East Prussia."⁴³ Why, he wondered at that time, did the Red Army "need hundreds of maps of a neighboring country?" "One thing remains incomprehensible," Rhode remarked recently:

"If Stalin did not wish to start his own offensive war no later than late summer 1941, then why did he jam-pack the Białystok pocket full of divisions that were too numerous for defense? Or did Stalin wish to appear to have been attacked, to be the victim of surprise, and then be able to strike back quickly, and only miscalculated the comparison of strengths?"

Soviet aggressive intentions are also indicated by the fact that war-game map maneuvers, staff exercises, and the like were fundamentally offensive and aggressive in nature. Even at the division level, described by the First Ordinance Officer of the 87th Infantry Division, First Lieutenant Filipenko, "attack was practiced almost exclusively, with the support of artillery and combat vehicles"; "defense only rarely, up to company strength at most."⁴⁴ On May 24, 1941, German radio reconnaissance in the border area near Grodek "with certainty" listened in on a Soviet exercise with the participation of tank units called "attack on Land N," meaning Germany.⁴⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Kovalev,⁴⁶ initially the Commander of the 223rd Infantry Division, and, until May 1941 a student at the Military Academy of Moscow, and Captain Pugachev,⁴⁷ First Ordinance Officer on the Staff of the

40 BA-MA, RH 22/271, 6. 9. 1941.

41 BA-MA, RH 20-9/248, 22. 7. 1941.

42 *Sonderführer* were civilian specialists who temporarily had certain military ranks of officers, here of a *Kompanieführer*.

43 Rhode, "Aufzeichnungen zur Frage einer sowjetischen Vorbereitung auf einen Angriffskrieg im Jahre 1941 oder 1942," author's archives.

44 BA-MA, RH-21-1/471, 27. 6. 1941.

45 BA-MA, RH 24-17/158, 24. 5. 1941.

46 BA-MA, RH 20-17/282, 27. 8. 1941.

47 BA-MA, RH 20-4/672, undated.

11th Mechanized Corps, described the war games at the Army level, which exclusively involving the right wing (West Front) of the Soviet offensive front, but that already provide an introduction to the extent of the profound operations that were to be brought about according to the General Staff Plan of May 15, 1941. According to Kovalev, the following map maneuvers for subsequent "counteroffensives" were drawn up at the Moscow Military Academy:

"From Leningrad in the direction of Helsinki; out of the Grodno-Brest-Litovsk line in the direction of East Prussia; in the south, from the Ukraine, in the direction of Warsaw-Lodz, with flank protection through the Pripet swamps and the Carpathians."

Even more revealing was Pugachev's description of a map maneuver of the Commanders of the Western Special Military District with the Army Commander-in-Chiefs and Corps Commanders as early as March 18 through 21, 1941:

"The 3rd Army was ordered to break through to Suwalki by way of Augustow. The 4th and 10th Armies were ordered to break through to Warsaw and Litzmannstadt [Lodz]. This assignment was to be completed in fourteen days. The troops stationed in Lithuania were to hold the borders toward East Prussia and to march into East Prussia as soon as the southern army had completed the above mentioned assignments."

This is an obvious reflection of a fundamental concept of the General Staff Plan of May 15, 1942.

The shifting forward of the principal forces of the Red Army to the West and to the national borders took place under strict secrecy, but it could not, of course, remain entirely concealed. Only the actual extent of the preparations east of the German-Soviet borders remained unknown to the Germans. The German Embassy in Moscow did not prove to be supportive in this regard. The Military attaché, Lieutenant General Köstring, and Naval attaché, Kapitän zur See von Baumbach, in particular, proved to be very poorly informed. For example, in March 1941, Köstring described the Soviet specialist for operations involving large armored units, General of the Army Zhukov, as poorly suited for the job as "Chief of Staff of a modern million-man army," because, in Köstring's view, he "obviously lacked the intellectual capacities" for the position, and, in general, revealed a "relatively low standard."⁴⁸ Baumbach wrote confusing reports to Berlin.⁴⁹ This apparently led the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral

48 BA-MA, RH 20-17/282, 30. 4. 1941.

49 *Ibid.*, 18. 5. 1941.

Raeder, to raise an objection with Hitler against "operation Barbarossa," because he perceived no danger from the Soviet Union. Baumbach was eager to suggest that the military inferiority of the Soviet Army compared to Germany was so great that such inferiority could not be overcome, even with "the most exhaustive efforts," and even over a period of years. It would take at least one decade "until Soviet armaments will become an important factor against the German Wehrmacht." As a result, according to this absurd reasoning, the Soviet Union, even with the "lengthy duration of the present war, would not be able to attack the German war effort from the rear."

Köstring's reporting caused confusion because he drew false conclusions based on false information. In March 1941, when the question of an operative use of Soviet armored units arose, Köstring, who assumed a total number of approximately 6,000 Soviet tanks out of a real total of 24,000, drew up a "Personal Information Report No. 4." He stated that this number of tanks would only suffice to equip 200 infantry divisions in the west, each with only one armored battalion of 30 tanks. Furthermore, the formation of independent armored units would hardly be possible.⁵⁰ Under the influence of such reports, the *Oberkommando des Heeres* (OKH; German Army High Command) did not anticipate the use of strong armored units by the Soviets for intensive aggressive operations.⁵¹ The armored arm was, moreover, viewed primarily as only an auxiliary arm of the infantry, although tank attacks with limited objectives, or counterattacks against an enemy breakthrough, appeared quite conceivable.

Since the Germans did not know about the existence of approximately one hundred armored and motorized divisions before June 22, 1941—rather, they assumed only seven armored divisions and thirty-eight motorized, mechanized brigades⁵²—they were very surprised after the onset of the war by the huge mass of armored divisions that suddenly confronted them.⁵³ It "soon appeared obvious that the Russians had many more divisions available than had been assumed by the OKH before the beginning of the eastern campaign," noted the 1st Panzer Army on December 19, 1941. "Throughout the entire section, the enemy was obviously stronger than had been assumed at the beginning of the operation," stated Panzer Group 3 as early as June 23, 1941.⁵⁴ This astonishment not only related to the numbers

50 BA-MA, RH 191/128, 25. 3. 1941.

51 BA-MA, RH 20-9/247a, 16. 5. 1941.

52 BA-MA, RH 20-6/487, 17. 6. 1941; BA-MA, RH 20-9/247, 17. 6. 1941; BA-MA, RH 20-18/951, 18. 6. 1941; BA-MA, RH 24-5/104, 20. 6. 1941.

53 BA-MA, RH 24-28/10, June 1941; BA-MA, RH 21-4/266, 10. 7. 1941; BA-MA, RH 20-17/282, 11. 7. 1941; BA-MA, RH 21-1/470, 19. 12. 1941.

54 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 423, 23. 6., 8. 7. 1941.

of tanks and aircraft, which exceeded all expectations, but also to the quality of Soviet weapons and equipment. To some extent, the Soviet leadership even received a word of praise, and was described, for example, in the appraisal of the enemy situation of Panzer Group 3 of July 8, 1941, as "extremely skilful, energetically active, and deliberate."

The admission of a crass underestimation of the Red Army is also found in Dr. Goebbels's diaries. Looking back, he noted on August 19, 1941:

"We obviously quite underestimated the Soviet shock power and, above all, the equipment of the Soviet army. We had nowhere near any idea of what the Bolsheviks had available. This led to erroneous decision-making..."⁵⁵

The Reich Minister for Enlightening the People and Propaganda expanded upon how difficult it had been for Hitler to make the decision to attack the Soviet Union to start with, adding:

"But if the worries of the Führer due to our inaccurate estimate of Bolshevik potential were so great as it is... and caused him such nervous strain, it would have been far worse if we had had a clear picture of the real extent of the danger!"

Hitler, Goebbels added, was now very indignant

"that he had allowed himself to be so deceived by the reports from the Soviet Union over the potential of the Bolsheviks. Above all, his underestimation of the enemy armored and air forces caused us extraordinary problems in our military operations. He has suffered a great deal over this. It was a very serious crisis..."

Hitler made statements that fully confirm this testimony. In the Führer main headquarters on April 12, 1942, Hitler frankly admitted that he had been deceived in regard to the strength of the Red Army, when he declared that the Soviets had

"surrounded everything relating to their army with enormous concealment. The whole war with Finland in 1940—just like the Russian invasion of Poland, which was carried out with ancient tanks and weapons, and badly uniformed soldiers—was just one whole gigantic deceptive maneuver, since the Russians already possessed equipment that could only be compared with German and Japanese equipment."⁵⁶

55 Goebbels, *Tagebücher*, vol. 4, pp. 1,655ff.

56 Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier*, p. 277.

The initial successes of the Wehrmacht no longer permitted a true estimate of the situation. Another strength report by the Foreign Armies East Branch of the German General Staff of the Army on August 9, 1941, considered the combat strength of the Red Army as now exhausted; and that no more significant Soviet deployments were to be expected.⁵⁷ "Their total strength is now insufficient either for a large-scale offensive or for the formation of a drastic defensive front." It also stated, "they will have reached the limit in the foreseeable future in terms of men as well."

Since the General Staff Plan of the Red Army of May 15, 1941, assumed 258 Soviet divisions, but since 330-350 divisions had already appeared before the front of the German army by August 8, one would not be wrong in assuming that nearly 300 Soviet divisions must have been concentrated immediately on the national border or not far away, as early as the first day of the war. By June 17, 1941, the High Command of the German Army only recognized the existence of 182 Soviet divisions (including 7 armored divisions) and 38 motorized, mechanized brigades. In a proclamation on June 22, Hitler even spoke of only "160 Soviet divisions on our border," indicating that even that number of divisions was a threat in his eyes.⁵⁸ Although the Germans had only inaccurate notions of the actual extent and striking power of the Soviet attack army, the Soviet deployment, even in the form in which it was merely assumed, had already been the object of careful considerations. Soviet measures generally were evaluated as only defensive, not least of all on political grounds (because of the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939). Nevertheless, the fear of forthcoming Red Army offensives repeatedly arose ever since the spring of 1941 due to the known course of Soviet forces.

As early as March 1941, reports increased of strong troop concentrations in the Baltic States. Statements had been received from Latvian officers, such as Colonel Opitis and Colonel Carlson, that large maneuvers were taking place in the vicinity of the German border, and that the war with Germany would then begin. An initial "attack against the Memel region" could no longer be "completely excluded," but was, on the contrary, "considered possible."⁵⁹ The Chief of the German General Staff of the 18th Army gave a preventive order to "hold the bridgehead at Tilsit," and conferred on the XXVI Army Corps a similar warning.⁶⁰ "It is possible that the Russians will open the struggle, at least to a limited extent, by way of an offensive," the

57 BA-MA, RH 20-9/248, 9. 8. 1941; BA-MA, RH 21-4/266, 10. 8. 1941.

58 BA-MA, RH 20-6/489, "Soldaten der Ostfront!"

59 BA-MA, RH 20-18/951, 13. 3. 1941.

60 BA-MA, RH 20-18/950, 11. 3. 1941.

German High Command of the 16th Army said on May 1.⁶¹ The Commander of the 3rd Panzer Group made a similar statement on May 30, 1941, "Because of Russian rapid units in the immediate vicinity of the border region, it appears that it is not impossible that the Russians intend to penetrate German territory."⁶² From April on, it was quite clear that the Red Army also "had enough forces to begin a surprise-attack operation to the Romanian border."⁶³ In May and June, increasing reports linked the concentration of "strong Soviet mobile forces" in the immediate vicinity of the border near Czernowitz and in southern Bessarabia, as well as the preparation to cross the river Pruth, with Soviet offensive intentions in a southerly direction against Romania.⁶⁴

And what was the situation in the prominent salients around Białystok and Lemberg, out of which the chief attacks were to be carried out? On May 20, 1941, the German High Command of the Army still believed that Soviet partial offensives or counterattacks against the flanks of advancing German units were only probable within the scope of "local defense by means of attack."⁶⁵ "Based on the military deployment" as hitherto established, a "preventive offensive" by the Soviets with relatively limited aims as well was also considered possible in theory, but not in practice: "with a heavy offensive out of the region around Czernowitz-Lemberg toward Romania, Hungary, or toward eastern Galicia, accompanied by another heavy offensive group out of White Russia toward Warsaw or East Prussia." Despite growing concern in the weeks of May and June 1941, a general Soviet offensive from the regions around Lemberg and Białystok outward in a westerly direction to the Oder toward Oppeln, with a subsequent change of course to the north with the declared objective of crushing the entire German eastern army and capturing entire Poland, East Prussia, and other regions, was still beyond the powers of imagination of those in position of leadership in the German High Command of the Army. On June 4, 1941, during a conference of the Chief of the General Staff, General Halder, with the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army Groups and Armies, the First General Staff Officer of the Operations Branch, Colonel Heusinger, expressed an obviously "primitive assessment" of the enemy, which was, furthermore, confirmed by Halder.⁶⁶ "Large offensives were

61 BA-MA, RH 24-28/11, 1. 5. 1941; 1.5.1941; see also BA-MA, RH 20-9/247a, 5. 5. 1941.

62 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 423, 30. 5. 1941.

63 BA-MA, RH 19II/381, 29. 4. 1941.

64 BA-MA, RH 19I/127, 18. 6. 1941.

65 BA-MA, RH 2/1983, 20. 5. 1941.

66 BA-MA, RH 20-18/71, Chefbesprechung, 4. 6. 1941.

nonsense for the Russians," the Chief of the German General Staff believed, neither in a "preventive offensive of the Red Army" that was, nevertheless, still conceivable, nor in a "partial offensive... within the defensive solution." This incorrect assessment on the part of the Chief of the General Staff, which was, furthermore, confirmed by the Chiefs of the Army Groups, betrayed the same thoughtlessness as when, after the beginning of the war, as is well-known, he made truly grotesque statements about the duration of the campaign against the Soviet Union.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht, on the other hand—perhaps because of its wider horizon—had drawn considerably more realistic conclusions from reconnaissance in the spring of 1941 than the competing High Command of the Army. The Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*; High Command of the Armed Forces), Lieutenant General Jodl⁶⁷ and the Chief of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel,⁶⁸ sent several letters to the Foreign Office and to the Reich Government between April and June 1941, in which, with increasing concern, and, finally, in almost imploring tones and with "the strongest emphasis," they drew their attention to the fact that Soviet Russia "was conducting the most gigantic military deployment in its history, directed against Germany" and that "a huge Soviet troop force" to the west could be set in motion "at any moment."

Were these warnings part of an attempt to protect the now completed and planned "Operation Barbarossa" by means of propaganda, in which the German attack was described as a response to an increasing threat from the Soviet Union, or were they motivated by true concern? The usual interpretation by Stalinist-influenced "anti-fascism," particularly in Germany, is that such warnings can only have constituted a preventive propaganda maneuver to justify German attack, stereotypically characterized by these groups as "the treacherous fascist attack on a unsuspecting, peace-loving Soviet Union." If one, however, considers the facts of Soviet preparations for a war of conquest, which are obvious today, these warnings appear in another light, particularly in view of the still incomplete state of knowledge of the OKW. Thus, for example, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, in his letter to Ambassador Ritter on June 20, 1941, could only discern one

67 Jodl to Ritter, 1. 3., 23. 4., 6. 5., 8. 6., 20. 6. 1941 (attached: "Zusammenstellung der Grenzverletzungen durch russische Flugzeuge und russische Soldaten. Grenzzwischenfälle Winter 1939/40"); Reports from OKW to Reich Government, National Archives, Washington.

68 Keitel to Reich Foreign Minister, 11. 5. 1941; Keitel to the Reich Government, 11. 6. 1941; Reports from OKW to Reich Government, 13 January 1941-20 June 1941, National Archives, Washington, German Foreign Ministry, Serial No. 1337, Negative Frame Numbers: 352982-353012.

armored division and five armored brigades in tank forces in the salients projecting far to the west around Białystok. This alone was sufficient cause for concern, however, in reality, no fewer than three mechanized corps, each one numbering a minimum of 1,030 tanks, were concentrated in the semi-circle around Białystok, and another mechanized corps was in service of the salient between Brest and Kobryn. Although the German reconnaissance findings might still have been defective, the situation reports of the OKW, nevertheless, added up to an overall picture of an already menacing nature.

According to the state of knowledge of the OKW, "the Soviet Army leadership had systematically employed all the methods of reconnaissance available to them" in the service of offensive planning. This included the "deliberate use of the Soviet Air Force over the sovereign territory of the Reich," the "almost daily incoming reports of additional border violations by Soviet aircraft," and "deliberate provocations." In the same vein belongs "the methodical surveying of terrain and reconnaissance activities in German territory by Soviet military commissions," "sometimes by top officers with large staffs." Victor Suvorov has drawn attention to these as unmistakable characteristics of a forthcoming offensive.

The constant shifting of Soviet units closer to the border, in fact, all along the front line from the Baltic to southern Bessarabia, was perceived by the OKW as a "serious threat"; yet the scope of these movements was still far underestimated. A matter of entirely justified concern, as we know today, was the rapid progress in the development of the ground organization and the filling up of "air fields near the border containing strong units of the Air Force," as confirmed by the OKW. These measures were accurately interpreted as "preparations for extensive bombing attacks on the German Reich by strong combat aircraft units." This assessment was all the more so reliable as there were numerous known statements of leading Soviet officers that "openly spoke of an forthcoming Russian offensive."

On May 11, 1941, Field Marshal Keitel sent the Reich Foreign Minister a letter in which, for the first time, he spoke of the "constantly increasing concern" of the OKW about the "development of the deployment of Russian forces along the German eastern border." This letter from the Chief of the OKW, who, after all, had cabinet rank, to his Minister colleague could, of course, be interpreted as a mere alibi in regard to the forthcoming Operation "Barbarossa"; yet its contents are fully confirmed by what we know today. Keitel's mention of the OKW's conviction "that the extent of Russian deployment, which is practically equivalent to Russian mobilization along the German eastern border, can only be interpreted as a preparation for Russian offensive measures on the largest scale," is a reflection of one of the basic principles of the General Staff of the Red Army of May 15, 1941. Just

as accurate as it was disturbing was the conclusion that the "deployment, which is approaching conclusion," would enable "the Soviet State leadership to select the attack date at its own discretion," as it was indeed planned.

Fundamental confirmation may also be found in the contents of the memorandum sent by the Chief of the OKW on June 11, 1941, by way of the Reich Foreign Minister directly to the address of the Reich Government. Keitel's repeated warning that Soviet "military measures" had led "to a great deployment of the Red Army from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea," which was "clearly aimed at preparing for an attack on the German Reich," corresponded to the actual situation. From the vantage point of our knowledge today, Keitel was quite correct when he remarked that the "Russian deployment" was shifting increasingly closer to the border, that "the individual units of the Army and Air Force" were moving forward, and that the "air fields near the border are being equipped with strong units of the Air Force... All these facts, linked with a determination to destroy Germany, as cultivated within the Russian army," suggested to Keitel "that the Soviet Union was preparing itself to attack the German Reich at any moment that appears suitable to the Soviet Union."

Unlike the OKH, the OKW had therefore drawn entirely accurate conclusions within the scope of its limited possibilities. Hardly a passage in the letters of Keitel and Jodl contains a factual exaggeration; on the contrary, the danger was minimized from lack of knowledge. In reality, the offensive preparations of the General Staff of the Red Army were no longer very far from completion, as we know today. With similar certainty as for the operational part, this can also be said for the ideological part of the offensive preparations, which were drawn up by the Main Administration for Political Propaganda of the Red Army (GUPPKA) under Army Commissar First Rank Zaporozhets. Stalin issued quite definitive directives, not only to the General Staff, but also to the "political" Main Administration in keeping with his remarks of May 5, 1941. General Colonel Volkogonov summarized this instruction in the following telling statement: "The *Vozd'* [Leader] made it unmistakably clear that war is inevitable in the future. We must be prepared for the complete smashing of German fascism." Stalin demanded the preparation of the directive "On the Tasks of Political Propaganda in the Red Army in the Near Future."⁶⁹ Upon his instructions, this was to incorporate every demand previously made on May 5, 1941:

"The new conditions in our country, the present international situation, which is full of unexpected possibilities, demand a revolutionary power

69 Volkogonov, *Triumf i tragedija*, pp. 154f.

of decision and constant readiness to launch a devastating attack on the enemy... All forms of agitation and propaganda are to be directed to one single goal—to the political, moral, and fighting preparation of all personnel to wage a just offensive and an all-destroying war... all personnel are to be educated in the spirit of active hatred of the enemy, to an eagerness to take up the struggle with him, to a readiness to defend our nation on the territory of the enemy, and to deal him a lethal blow..."

The significance ascribed by Stalin to the adjustment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union to the new "military policy of offensive operations," was also revealed by the fact that the departmentally responsible Main Administration for Political Propaganda was made subordinate to immediate supervision by the powerful Bolshevik propaganda apparatus in this decisive matter.⁷⁰ Controlling officials of the Central Committee of the VKP (b) (*Vsesojuznaja Kommunističeskaja Partija (bol'shevikov)*); All-Union Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks)) were brought into play for this purpose. In the foremost position, once again, was member of the Politburo, member of the Orgburo, and Main Military Councilor Zhdanov; the candidate for the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Shcherbakov was added; as was the leader of the Administration for Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee Alexandrov. All of whom belonged to Stalin's immediate entourage.

At a meeting of the Main Military Council of May 14, 1941, Army Commissar First Rank Zaporozhets was entrusted with the preparation of a suitable draft of the directive given on behalf of Stalin. Zaporozhets informed Zhdanov, Shcherbakov, and Alexandrov on May 26, 1941, of the preparation of further supplementary documentation entitled "Changing Tasks of the Party Political Work in the Red Army," "On the Marxist-Leninist Instructions of the Leadership Resources of the Red Army," and "The Current International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the USSR."⁷¹ All these documents and, of course in particular, the text of the propaganda instructions upon which they were based, "On the Tasks of the Political Propaganda in the Red Army in the Near Future," were drenched with the spirit of the offensive plan of the General Staff that was being worked out at the same time.⁷² For example, the directive "On the Political Education of the Men and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Red Army in the Summer Period of 1941," which was, likewise, issued to the troops. It had been prepared by the Main Administration for Political Propaganda and recalled the

70 Nevezhin, "Vystuplenie Stalina 5 maja 1941 g.," p. 148.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 149.

72 *Ibid.*, p. 159

words of Lenin: "as soon as we are strong enough to smash capitalism completely, we will grab it by the throat."⁷⁴ In it, it was also remarked that "the Red Army will only conduct a defensive war; but the truth is sometimes forgotten that every war waged by the Soviet Union will be a just war."

Such words, expressed at such a time, reveal the true reality of the situation: it was not a question of "preempting" the threat of foreign aggression, but rather achieving "extensive plans based on Communist ambitions." The allegedly necessary preventive blow served merely as an occasion and pretext for the elimination of Germany, "Fascism," and, thereby, the principal obstacle to the expansion of Soviet power. Of course, in view of such lofty political objectives as those of the world revolution, as Valeri Danilov puts it, "the initiation of hostilities by the Soviet Union against any country at all, in Stalin's view, was deemed justified, even a moral affair." The plan of attack of the General Staff and the Directives of the Main Administration for Political Propaganda of the Red Army complemented each other and both served the same purpose. These documents were in accord with Stalin's remarks before the graduates of the Military Academies on May 5, 1941, as well as with the political speeches of Zhdanov, Kalinin, and other leading Bolshevik officials, and were therefore issued upon Stalin's instructions. This is confirmed by two accompanying letters from Army Commissar First Rank Zaporozhets relating to the Propaganda directives of May 26-27, 1941. In these letters he repeatedly and deliberately confirmed that the documents were assembled "based upon the instructions of Comrade Stalin, which he had issued on the occasion of the graduation of the students of the Academies" on May 5, 1941.⁷³ Following a detailed analysis of the propaganda directives prepared at the highest political levels, Vladimir Nevezhin arrives at the same conclusion, *i.e.*, that they were issued "in the spirit of Stalin's appearance before the graduates of the Military Academies" in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941.⁷⁴ "The guiding propaganda documentation of May and June 1941, constantly stresses the view," he writes, "that the USSR, in the situation that was developing, was compelled and duty bound to take the initiative in dealing the first blow, beginning the war of attack with the objective of expanding the borders of Socialism."

As early as May 1941, a large-scale propaganda campaign was initiated with the objective of adapting all human resources of the Red Army to Stalin's demands, both politically and ideologically, in accordance with the

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 166f.

concept of an offensive war. Thus, the Department for Political Propaganda of the 5th Army, in consultation with the Chief of the 7th Department of the GUPPKA, who was sent from Moscow, worked out a "Plan for Politically Securing Military Operations during the Offensive" (*Plan političeskogo obespečenija voennykh operacij pri nastuplenii*) that reveals that Stalin's directives were being immediately implemented. This document was captured by German troops in the headquarters building of the 5th Army of the Kiev Special Military District in Luck, in addition to other important documents.⁷⁵ The document contains detailed instructions by the Chief of Political Propaganda of the 5th Army, apparently Uronov, for the political and propagandistic preparation and implementation of a surprise attack on the German Wehrmacht. This "Plan for Politically Securing Military Operations during the Offensive" was worked out on the directive of the GUPPKA ("On the Tasks of Political Propaganda...") on Stalin's orders, and apparently upon additional instructions from the emissary from Moscow. The plan states: "The German Army has lost the taste for a further improvement in military technology. A significant part of the German Army has become tired of the war."

Accordingly, a report from the Leader for Political Propaganda of the 5th Army from Rovno dated May 4, 1941, on the "Morale of the Population in the General Gouvernement" noted the "first indications of a collapse in morale in the German Wehrmacht."⁷⁶ German soldiers were said to be unsatisfied, and this dissatisfaction was said to find expression in "open and covert opinions against the war and against Hitler's policies," "in hostile statements," in "the distribution of Communist propaganda literature," in "drunkenness," "quarrelsomeness," "suicides," "lack of enjoyment in doing service," and "desertion." In plain language, the "Plan for Politically Securing Military Operations during the Offensive," says:

"It is necessary to deal the enemy a very hard, lightning-like blow, in order to quickly shatter the morale and strength of resistance of the soldiers... a lightning-like blow by the Red Army will undoubtedly have the consequence of a growing and deepening of the phenomena of decomposition already becoming perceptible in the enemy army..."

The "concentration of the army, the capture of lines of departure, and preparation to traverse the Bug [River]" were viewed as the "first" stage, and this formulation alone shows the preparation of an offensive war.

75 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 329, (May) 1941; see also Nevezhin, "Vystuplenie Stalina 5 maja 1941 g.," p. 165.

76 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 325, 4. 5. 1941.

It was believed that "the engagements would take place on enemy territory, naturally, under conditions favorable to the Red Army." These favorable conditions were also due to anticipated support from part of the Polish population and, "with the exception of the great merchants," the Jewish population as well. The Jewish "great merchants" were thought to believe that "it's tough under the Germans, of course, but we can still do business; under the Soviet Russians, we will have to work." A favorable progression of operations was also anticipated, a rejection by German soldiers "of both the war and Hitler's policies" was expected. It was, therefore, necessary to work hard, according to the "Morale" report of May 4, 1941, "so that enemy morale may deteriorate even further and, on this basis, the destruction of the enemy is brought to completion."

The "Plan for the Political Protection..." gave the political workers of the 5th Army exact instructions about their duties during the forthcoming offensive operations. The extensive propaganda preparations even included the publication of newspapers ("number of copies for the first few days, in German: 50,000") as well as leaflets for both German soldiers and the Polish population. Suitable leaflets for "enemy troops," "the content of which is to conceal our intentions while exposing the imperialistic plans of the enemy, and inciting German soldiers to disobedience," were already being prepared in large numbers even before the outbreak of the war. Thus it was not surprising that "leaflets of the Soviet Union for German soldiers" were discovered at Shakiak, Lithuania, in the sector of the German 16th Army, as early as the first day of the war—June 22, 1941.⁷⁷ These leaflets, according to the High Command of the 16th Army, "are decisive proof of Soviet military preparations."

Not a few political workers and officers of the Red Army have testified to the effects of the anti-German war propaganda that was now going into high gear. A paper entitled "*Politkom und Politorg*" states:

"Thus, the aim of Soviet propaganda, shortly before the beginning of the eastern campaign, was unequivocal. Quite unexpectedly, new slogans appeared: Germany is in a bad way. Lack of all necessities... Stalin believes that a second world war is brewing, which will be fought on German territory this time."⁷⁸

The Commissar of the 16th Infantry Division, Goriainov, a deserter, made the following written statement on July 21, 1941, that was transmitted to the Foreign Office:

77 BA-MA, RH 20-16/474a, 27. 6. 1941.

78 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, "Politkom und Politorg."

"On June 15, 1941, in Gagala camp (Zsoland), on a furlough day, Sunday, the Divisional Commissar Mshavandse, in a speech to the Red Army men and the commanders, declared that we would not wait for a German attack, but would rather seek a favorable moment and then attack Germany ourselves."⁷⁹

The Brigade Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade, Nikonov (Timofeev), also a deserter, active in the Political Department of the Staff of the 13th Army until August 8, 1941, reported on August 23, 1941, that the propaganda campaign against Germany was

"officially stopped after conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact. Covertly, however, it continued without letup, and was carried on with particular vehemence among the leadership cadres of the Red Army. There was open incitement everywhere after May 1941."⁸⁰

That a change for the worse set in, starting in May 1941, did not remain unknown to German radio reconnaissance. "The radio messages quite suddenly reveal a hostile mood against German soldiers that had not been hitherto perceivable," stated a radio-interception report of the 44th Infantry Division of May 19, 1941.⁸¹

The hostile mood incited in the Red Army was expressively reflected in a political talk by a decisive authoritative official on June 15, 1941, before an apparently prominent audience.⁸² It was held one week before the beginning of the war, only two days after the famous declaration by the TASS agency which was obviously intended to have a "tranquilizing" effect. The full text of this revealing propaganda speech fell into the hands of the German troops on July 19, 1941, in the Buiuoani barracks before Chişinau. The following are a few key sentences:

"In recent times, Germany has been able to expand by bloating itself up through the conquest of other countries, but this does not mean that it has become capable of survival... the war is dragging on, and is acquiring a form that will be fatally exhausting to Germany... Germany can wage blitzkriegs, but not a long war. England can dare to wage a long war, a war to exhaustion, all the more so because it is supported by the USA... Germany is obviously striding toward its defeat."

79 PAAA, Pol. VI, 1, undated.

80 BA-MA, RH 24-24/333, 23.8.1941.

81 BA-MA, RH 24-17/158, 19.5.1941.

82 BA-MA, RH 24-54/177, 19.7.1941. Nikitin, "Ocenka sovetским rukovodstvom," p. 123, referring to the lecture by the "authoritative official," cited by J. Choffmann (J. Hoffmann), "Podgotovka Sovetskogo Soyuza," pp. 27f., considers it proof of aggressive planning by the Soviet political leadership.

Due to Germany's unfavorable political-strategic situation, this high official, in regard to the Soviet Union, on July 15, 1941, drew a conclusion that was in harmony with Stalin's directives of the previous month. He said:

"The peoples of the USSR are against imperialistic war. We are for revolutionary war. The peoples of the USSR are ready for this war of revolution. They like to fight and are good fighters... We are for the just war. In the interests of accelerating the world revolution, we support the peoples who are fighting for their liberation. The Red Army draws the following conclusions:

1. Utmost vigilance.
2. Constant military preparedness...
4. Readiness to carry out, with honor, the forthcoming orders of our Bolshevik party and the Soviet government, under Comrade Stalin.
5. The Red Army will struggle to achieve the complete annihilation of the enemy..."

In accordance with Stalin's instructions, the Main Administration for Political Propaganda in fact succeeded in creating a mood within the Red Army before June 22, 1941, in which war between the Soviet Union and Germany was believed to be inevitable and that the Red Army would have to deal the first blow. There are many concurrent testimonies in this regard, a few of which should be noted. Thus, *Abschnittsstab* (Section Staff) Gotzmann (German 17th Army) reported on May 22, 1941:

"Russian Commissars, who are active in party work (Politruks), are educating the population to the effect that war with Germany is inevitable, that the Army will have to fight against the Reich, and that the poor must fight against the rich."⁸³

Similarly, even before the outbreak of the war, Panzer Group 4 reported the statement of a deserter:

"Since Molotov's visit to Berlin [Nov. 1940], the prevalent opinion is that war between Germany and Russia is inevitable. The officers say, we will attack when Stalin gives the order."⁸⁴

There are innumerable corresponding testimonies from the initial phase of the war. On June 30, 1941, the IV Army Corps, for example, reported:

"Prisoner of war interrogations repeatedly show that the political Commissars have spoken about forthcoming Russian attacks on Germany.

83 BA-MA, RH 19I/128, 22. 5. 1991; BA-MA, RH 20-6/487, 18. 6. 1941.

84 BA-MA, RH 21-4/265, 8. 5. 1941.

With the mention that Germany has been weakened by its struggle against England.”⁸⁵

According to the testimony of an unnamed Air Force lieutenant on July 17, 1941: “It was considered an open secret that the Red Army would attack Germany.”⁸⁶ At the Military Technical Academy in Leningrad, according to Lieutenant Sasonov (60th Infantry Division) on August 3, 1941: “It was said daily that everything was intended to assist the military preparations for war with Germany. Such a war must come.”⁸⁷ Dr. Kotliar-evsky, a military doctor called up for forty-five days service with the 151st Medical Battalion of the 147th Infantry Division beginning on May 30, 1941, stated on September 24, 1941:

“On June 7, the medical personnel were assembled, and were told in confidence that there would be no more releases after the expiration of the forty-five days, since there would be war with Germany in the very near future.”⁸⁸

Kravchenko (75th Infantry Division) testified on June 25, 1941, that “in the new positions, there was talk of an intended invasion of Germany; the Red Army was to be chosen to defeat the German Army.”⁸⁹ Major Klepikov (255th Infantry Division) stated on August 24, 1941, “there was daily talk about war with Germany, even before the war; of course, not officially, but in constant conversations among the officers.”⁹⁰

High-ranking officers also repeatedly reported the mood of war incited against Germany. The Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army, Major General Ponedelin, and Commander of the 13th Infantry Corps, Major General Kirillov, expressed the opinion on August 7, 1941, that the antagonism between the Soviet Union and Germany must “inevitably lead to conflict.”⁹¹ Everyone was aware that the constant threat of world revolution... could not remain a matter of indifference to Germany.” The Commander-in-Chief of the 32nd Army testified: “It was clear that war against Germany was expected... Apparently, in Stalin’s calculations, Russia was indeed to appear to be the attacker, because the war was to be fought on foreign soil.” The Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Shock Army and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Volkhov Front, Lieutenant General Vlassov, declared to

85 BA-MA, RH 24-4/91, 30. 6. 1941.

86 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 17. 7. 1941.

87 BA-MA, RH 24-48/200, 3. 8. 1941.

88 BA-MA, RH 24-17/172, 24. 9. 1941.

89 BA-MA, RH 24-24/333, 25. 6. 1941.

90 BA-MA, RH 21-1/472, 24. 8. 1941.

91 *Ibid.*, 7. 8. 1941.

Embassy Councilor Hilger on August 7, 1942, that Stalin's aggressive intentions had

"undoubtedly existed in 1941... The troop concentrations in the district of Lemberg clearly showed that a strike against Romania was planned in the direction of the oil wells. The units concentrated in the region of Minsk were intended to parry the inevitable German counterattack."⁹²

Upon the same occasion, the commander of the 41st Infantry Division, Colonel Boiarsky, stated that "the Kremlin... would have struck in the spring of 1942 at the latest. The Red Army would then have moved "to the southwest, i.e., against Romania." Shortly before his extradition to the Soviets in 1946, the Major General of the Vlassov Army (VS KONR; Military Forces of the Committee to Free the Peoples of Russia; ROA Army to Free Russia), Meandrov, former Chief of the Operations Branch of the 6th Red Army, made the following statement: "The policy of the government for the preparation of a big war was completely clear to us... What was described to us as defensive measures proved in reality to be long-prepared and carefully concealed plans of aggression."⁹³ "The policies of the Soviet Union were directed against Germany even after 1939," said a well-informed official of the Central Apparatus of the NKVD, Zhigunov, as early as September 18, 1941.

"The Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 was concluded to drive Germany into war, and to profit from the resulting weakening of Germany... If Germany had not preempted Moscow, the Soviet Union would have attacked Germany, sooner or later."⁹⁴

Such statements are still indefinite as to the possible date of a Soviet attack. On November 20, 1941, Lieutenant General Ershakov, Commander-in-Chief of the 20th Army, referred to an alleged statement by Zhukov in the spring of 1941, according to which war must be avoided in 1941.⁹⁵ While such opinions are supposed to have been expressed in the spring of 1941, Stalin, however, deviated from this, since there is significant proof that he brought the attack date forward. Everything indicates that the date must have lain between July and September, because the Red Army could not have wintered in western territory in such massive numbers. As German command authorities also recognized, a movement to the rear would have

92 *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*, vol. II, 2, p. 1,287.

93 BA-MA, MSg 149/14, Letter from Major General Meandrov, January 1946; BA-MA, MSg 149/46, diary of Major General Borodin.

94 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 889, 18. 9. 1941.

95 PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 16, 20. 11. 1941.

been required in early summer, unless these forces were simply preparing to attack. The fact that Stalin wished to delay war for a bit longer, "even if by only a few weeks" (*chotja by na neskol'ko nedel'*; Volkogonov);⁹⁶ "even if only for a month, a week or a few days" (Danilov)⁹⁷ for tactical reasons, i.e., to complete his preparations, indicates offensive intentions during the summer. What would have been gained by such a short respite, if the intent had not been to attack the German Reich by surprise?

Furthermore, what did the Politburo of the Central Committee mean, according to point 183 of Protocol No. 33 in its meeting of June 4, 1941, when it made the decision to fix July 1 as the date of "the establishment of an Infantry Division consisting of personnel of Polish nationality and Polish language in units of the Red Army." In Boris Sokolov's opinion, the arguments in favor of a "Soviet attack upon Germany on July 6, 1941" thus acquire "the status of a scientific certainty."

Nor is it any accident that Soviet Commanders and Staff Officers who, after all, were not just exposed to a massive propaganda campaign, but were also, at least to some extent, entrusted with the present situation of the war preparations, expected an initiation of hostilities between July and September 1941. Captain Krasko, Adjutant of the 661st Infantry Regiment of the 200th Infantry Division, declared, for example, on July 26, 1941: "In May 1941, among the officers, the opinion was already expressed that the war would begin right after July 1."⁹⁸ Major Koskov, Commander of the 24th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division, testified:

"In the view of the Regimental Commander, the justification—namely the evacuation of the western Ukraine, 'because the Soviets were allegedly attacked without preparation' was in no way true, because Soviet military preparations had been underway for a long time, and, in accordance with the extent and intensity of these military preparations, the Russians would have attacked Germany of their own accord in two to three weeks at the latest."⁹⁹

Colonel Gaevsky, Regimental Commander of the 29th Armored Division, declared to the Germans on August 6, 1941:

"Among the commanders, there has been a lot of talk about a war between Germany and Russia. There was the opinion that the war would

96 Volkogonov, *Triumfi tragedija*, p. 125.

97 Danilov, "Hat der Generalstab der Roten Armee einen Präventivschlag gegen Deutschland vorbereitet?," Sokolov, "Pohkhal'noe slovo."

98 BA-MA, RH 24-17/171, 26. 7. 1941.

99 BA-MA, RH 20-17/282, undated.

break out on approximately July 15, 1941, upon which date Russia would assume the role of the attacker."¹⁰⁰

Lieutenant Kharchenko of the 131st Infantry Division stated on August 21, 1941:

"that large-scale preparations for war with Germany were underway since the spring of 1941. The general opinion was that war would have broken out at the end of August or the beginning of September at the latest, *i.e.*, after the harvest, if Germany had not preempted us. The intent to conduct the war on foreign soil was obvious. All these leadership plans were upset by the outbreak of the war inside Russia."¹⁰¹

Similar statements were made by Major Solov'ev, Chief of Staff of the 445th Infantry Regiment of the 140th Infantry Division:

"Properly speaking, we expected the conflict with Germany only after the harvest, about the end of August or the beginning of September 1941. The over-precipitous troop movements in the last weeks before the outbreak of hostilities toward the western border could only be explained by the assumption that the Soviets had shifted the attack date forward (note: the last statement was made after indicating that we captured documentation clearly showing that the Soviet Union wished to attack Germany in the beginning of July)."¹⁰²

Lieutenant Rutenko, Company Chief in the 125th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division, stated on July 2, 1941, that hostilities would have been initiated by the Russians on September 1, 1941, and that "all preparations were made" with reference to that date.¹⁰³ Also, Lieutenant Colonel Liapin, Chief of the Operations Branch of the 1st Motorized Infantry Division, stated on September 15, 1941, that a Soviet attack had been expected in the "autumn of 1941." Even Lieutenant General Masanov, as mentioned above, declared with certainty "that Stalin would have begun the war with Germany in the autumn of 1941."

The various references to August as the attack date are also remarkable. Thus, an unnamed Lieutenant Colonel and commander of an artillery regiment declared on July 26, 1941, that Germany had "unilaterally broken the Non-Aggression Pact and attacked us," but then added:

"But I admit that the concentration of the Red Army on your eastern border constituted a threat to Germany; after all, it was being said that the Germans could expect us to attack them in August of this year."¹⁰⁴

100 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 6. 8. 1941.

101 BA-MA, RH 20-6/491, 21. 8. 1941.

102 PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 12, part 2, undated.

103 BA-MA, RH 24-24/333, 2. 7. 1941.

On September 11, 1945, Major General Malyshkin, at that time Chief of Staff of the 19th Army, made a similar statement to Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb, remarkably accurate in its indication of numbers: "that Russia would have attacked Germany in mid-August with approximately 350-360 divisions."¹⁰⁵ Note should be taken in this regard of Colonel Tokaev, Chief of the Aerodynamics Laboratory of the Air Force Academy in Moscow who, with reference to the Commissar of War, General Klovov, stated the following at an early date:

"The Politburo expected the Soviet-German war to start in very early August. That was the time that Stalin and Molotov considered most favorable to attack their friends Hitler and Ribbentrop."¹⁰⁶

The key to an understanding of Stalin's offensive preparations in the spring of 1941 lies in the great "overestimation of the strengths of the USSR and the Red Army,"¹⁰⁷ in an "overestimation of the fighting skills of our troops,"¹⁰⁸ in a "huge... overestimation of our capacities."¹⁰⁹ These overestimations were made by Soviet military officers of all ranks, including Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky. Military historians unanimously and repeatedly make similar statements. This feeling of Soviet superiority was, materially speaking, very justified in view of the multiple superiority of the Red Army in tanks, aircraft, and artillery pieces. Furthermore, the industrial capacity of the USSR had increased to an extent where it was able to equip the Soviet armed forces "with a truly inconceivable amount of armaments" within very short periods of time. This superiority related, moreover, not just to equipment and materiel, but to personnel and even leadership cadres. For example, it suffices to mention that, for example, the German Reichswehr had only 4,000 officers in 1935, while the Red Army at that time had over 50,000 "commanders," thus the Germans suffered from a significantly poorer initial situation. Where were the Germans to obtain sufficient numbers of officers during the armaments phase? Soviet superiority extended to the sector of leadership cadres as well, since, as Colonel Filippov has proven, even the gigantic bloodletting of the Great Purge had been to some extent already compensated for by the summer of 1941 through graduates of the numerous military training installations, including the academy of the General Staff and the Frunze Military Academy. Stalin also counted upon

104 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 26. 7. 1941.

105 Leeb, *Tagebuchaufzeichnungen*, 11. 9. 1945.

106 Tokaev, *Stalin Means War*, p. 34.

107 Volkogonov, *Triumf i tragedija*, p. 128.

108 Filippov, in: *Voennyj Vestnik*, p. 10.

109 BA-MA, RH 21-3/4. 437, 25. 4. 1941.

an incipient demoralization of the troops of the Wehrmacht. In addition, the prevalent opinion in Moscow was that the German proletariat would help the Red Army in the event of war with the Soviet Union. This was a delusion, but such delusions gave increased vehemence to the aggressive mood before June 22, 1941, rather than, of course, reducing it.

The consciousness of Soviet strength combined, at the same time, with a knowledge of the difficult political-strategic situation in Germany, which could not, as was well-known, fight a war on two fronts, led to the decision that has been called the "kernel of Bolshevism" ever since the time of Lenin. Namely, that it was important to exploit a unique historical opportunity and bring about a so-called "revolutionary war of liberation," thus vastly expanding the power of the Soviet State, as crudely illustrated by the symbolism of the Soviet governmental coat of arms. Stalin and Kalinin, as well as other high officials such as Zhdanov, openly propagated Soviet imperialism in several of their speeches in the spring of 1941.¹¹⁰ In November 1940, the feeling of a growing superiority had given Stalin the occasion to make demands in Berlin which, at any rate, made one thing quite plain: he saw no danger in Germany at that time. The Red Army had taken up offensive deployment on the Western border with overwhelming forces which were not organized for defensive purposes even as it became evident that, for its part, Germany was also preparing an attack.

It is today proven beyond a doubt that Stalin was very closely informed about the German offensive. As early as 1966, Soviet Defense Minister and Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko made it quite clear that perhaps some front-line troops may have been surprised by the German offensive, but not the Soviet government and Red Army leadership.¹¹¹ Remarkably, Khrushchev, in addition to other military officers, left no doubt in this regard when he declared: "No one who has the most minimal political understanding can believe that we were surprised by an unexpected and treacherous attack."¹¹² One cannot speak of a "German sneak attack," as Colonel Filippov recently put it. Stalin's feelings of superiority was, furthermore, so great that he thought himself capable of defeating "any surprise attack by Germany and its allies at all... and to destroy the attacker."¹¹³ The President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kalinin,

110 Nekrich, "A Wise Design"; see also, Nekrich, "Past Tense;" Volkogonov, *Triumfi Tragedija*, p. 127.

111 Grecko, "25 let," p. 10. See also Petrov, "Memuary," author's archive, p. 14: "Stalin's first question to me was: 'What do you think, will we have a war with the Germans?' I answered: 'We will, and very soon.'" ("Pervym voprosom Stalina ko mne byl, 'Kak Vy cchitaete, budet u nas vojna s nemcami?' Ja otvetil: 'Budet I ocen skoro.'). Author's archives.

112 "Khrushchev's Secret Tapes," p. 44.

113 Filippov, in: *Voennyj Vestnik*, pp. 10, 12; Volkogonov, *Triumfi tragedija*, p. 155

expressed this conviction in a lecture before the V. I. Lenin Military Political Academy on June 5, 1941, openly assuring his listeners:

"The Germans intend to attack us... We are waiting for it! The sooner they do that, the better, since we will then wring their necks once and for all time."¹¹⁴

With such an attitude, neither Stalin nor the Politburo itself, on June 22, 1941, doubted even for a moment that they would be successful in dealing Hitler the defeat that he deserved. General Sudoplatov, Chief of the Reconnaissance Service, even spoke of the "Big Lie of a panic in the Kremlin."¹¹⁵ Stalin was not surprised on June 22, 1941, but, on the contrary, as Colonel General Volkogonov stresses, the shock set in only several days later, *i.e.*, when the illusions evaporated and catastrophe was looming on the front line, a catastrophe in which it finally became clear that the Germans were, nevertheless, superior in combat.¹¹⁶

If Stalin's arrogance applied in the event of defense against enemy attack, then it applied equally to his own general offensive plans. In 1990, Colonel Karpov said with reference to the General Staff Plan of May 15, 1941:¹¹⁷

"In the early grayness of a May or June morning, thousands of our aircraft and tens of thousands of our cannons would have dealt the blow against thickly concentrated German troops, whose location was known to us right down to battalion level—a surprise even more inconceivable than a German attack on us,"

Stalin, the General Staff, and the GUPPKA, in any case, expected an easy victory by the Red Army. They expected that the huge offensive they were planning would end with the complete destruction of the enemy with only a few Soviet casualties. As for Hitler and the Germans, they had only a very incomplete notion of what the Soviets were preparing. When one considers the extent of these preparations, however, it becomes clear that Hitler under high pressure only barely preempted an attack planned by Stalin. June 22, 1941, was therefore pretty much the last date on which it would have been possible to initiate a "preventive war."

Colonel Petrov, a candidate in the historical sciences, expressed this in plain but accurate language on the anniversary of the victory on May 8, 1991, in a leading article of the official party organ *Pravda*:¹¹⁸

114 Khor'kov, "Nachal'nyj period Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny," p. 26, author's archives.

115 Sudoplatov, "Erinnerungen und Nachdenken," "21: Beginn des Krieges," author's archives.

116 Volkogonov, *Triumf i tragedija*, pp. 50, 154.

117 Karpov, in: *Kommunist vooruzennykh sil*, 1990. See also "Schlafende Aggressoren" (note 7)

“As a result of the overestimation of our own possibilities and the underestimation of enemy possibilities, we drew up unrealistic plans of an offensive nature before the war. In keeping with these plans, we began the deployment of the Soviet armed forces on the western border. But the enemy preempted us. [*odnako protivnik upredil nas*]”

Finally, the Russian historian M. Nikitin should be mentioned who made a detailed analysis of the objectives of the Soviet leadership during the decisive months of May and June 1941. He summarized his research findings in the following words:

“We once again repeat that the fundamental objective of the USSR consisted of expanding the ‘Front of Socialism’ to the greatest possible territorial extent, ideally to include all of Europe. In Moscow’s opinion, circumstances favored the realization of this scheme. The occupation of large parts of the continent by Germany, the protracted futile war, the increasing dissatisfaction of the population of the occupied countries, the dispersion of the forces of the Wehrmacht on various fronts, the prospects of a conflict between Japan and the United States—all these factors were thought to give the Soviet leadership a unique chance to smash Germany by surprise attack, and to ‘liberate Europe’ from ‘rotting capitalism.’”¹¹⁹

A study of the guiding documents of the Central Committee of the VKP (b), in Nikitin’s view, “together with the data on the immediate military offensive preparations of the Red Army... unequivocally proves the intention of the Soviet leadership to attack Germany in the summer of 1941.”

118 Petrov, B., “Tragedija i muzestvo. K 50 – letiju nacala Velikoj Otecestvennoj vojny.”

119 Nikitin, “Ocenka sovetskim rukovodstvom,” pp. 142, 146.

Soviet Soldiers Were Driven into Combat by Terror

Soviet historical writing on the German-Soviet war is dominated by a propaganda claim that has been maintained with iron consistency to the present day regardless of all other considerations. This claim, that of so-called "Soviet patriotism," was first publicly made by Stalin on the twenty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1944.¹ Briefly, the claim is that the peoples of the Soviet Union, filled with "fervent and self-sacrificing Soviet patriotism", "ardent love of their Socialist homeland", "limitless dedication to the cause of the Communist Party", and "limitless faith in the ideals of Communism," "rallied around the Communist Party and the Soviet government," and merged together in a "burning hatred for the conqueror."² The "moral-political unity of Soviet society," and the "unshakeable mutual friendship of the peoples of the USSR"—according to the stereotypical formula that was to be unceasingly repeated from that time onward—was alleged to have been "gloriously" confirmed and vindicated during the "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union."

In regard to the Red Army, Stalinist propagandists never tired of asserting that every soldier in the Red Army was a "boundlessly devoted fighter for his Socialist homeland," motivated by "feelings of the highest dedication... to the task entrusted to him of defending the Socialist homeland." He was inspired by "the highest morals, magnificent resistance, courage, and heroism," in fulfillment of "the holy duty to defend the Socialist homeland," "for Party and government, for Comrade Stalin," and, therefore, prepared to fight to the last bullet and the last drop of blood "for our Socialist homeland, for our honor and freedom, for the mighty Stalin." As late as October 1991, regardless of all evidence to the contrary, at a time when Comrade Stalin had long since been unmasked as a criminal against humanity, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Deputy Chief of the Institute for Military History of the Defense Department in Moscow, Major

1 Stalin, *Über den Großen Vaterländischen Krieg*, pp. 171ff.

2 Hoffmann, "Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion," pp. 720ff.; by the same author, *Kaukasien 1942/43*, pp. 372f.

General Dr. Khor'kov, at an International Conference on "Operation Barbarossa" organized by the Military Historical Research Office of the Bundes-wehr in Freiburg, nevertheless, felt entitled to speak of the "will to resistance of the Soviet people and Soviet army" on June 22, 1941, of the "mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers," of the "mass heroism, courage and steadfastness" alleged to have been exhibited by the Red Army from the very outbreak of hostilities, at all times, everywhere, and without exception.³ If such statements are accepted without objection, and even applauded, by audiences with some claim to factual knowledge and professional acumen, what can be expected of the general public, whose historical knowledge is largely based upon the superficial reports dished out by an almost ignorant, but politically clearly committed journalism?

Anyone with any knowledge of Russian military history is aware of the high quality of Russian military spirit, the oft-proven bravery and steadfastness of Russian combatants during attack and, most especially, in the defense of their native country. The Germans in 1941 frequently underestimated the great degree of love of homeland and country always felt by the Russian people and Russian soldiers. German documents prepared after the outbreak of the war mention innumerable examples of the fact that many Soviet soldiers, for whatever reasons, continued their dedicated and self-sacrificing resistance in many localities until they were killed. Such examples are, however, deceptively and unreliably generalized by Soviet propagandists while consciously and deliberately ignoring everything not in accordance with the propaganda image of Soviet heroism. The question, nevertheless, arises: why would Russian soldiers—not to mention other soldiers conscripted from the oppressed peoples of the USSR—fight "to the last bullet and the last drop of blood" for the same terroristic regime that had inflicted the most atrocious sufferings and privations upon its own citizens and peoples?

Stalin himself was initially blinded by illusory misconceptions as to the strength and cohesiveness of the Red Army. Days after the invasion, he was paralyzed by shock but had no illusions in this regard. He accurately attributed the collapse of the front, not only to a failure of leadership, but above all, to a disinclination to fight on the part of the troops of the Red Army. To Stalin, there was only one way to inspire Soviet soldiers with "Soviet patriotism" and to generate the frame of mind that is still referred to, even today, as "mass heroism." This was the same method that had hitherto always proven effective and upon which Stalin's entire system was

3 Chor'kov, "Die Rote Armee in der Anfangsphase," p. 435.

based: the infliction of the greatest possible compulsion and terror, combined with an endless propaganda campaign intended to ensure political sway. On July 3, 1941, Stalin dared for the first time after the German attack to make a radio address to the peoples of the Soviet Union. In manifold repetitions, he skillfully revealed the conclusion at which he had just arrived: "There must be no place in our ranks for grumblers and cowards, panic mongers and deserters."⁴ In this speech, his first of the war, Stalin said:

"We must wage a relentless struggle against all forms of subversion behind the front, against deserters, panic mongers, and rumor mongers; we must annihilate all spies, subversives, and enemy paratroopers. All those that harm the national defense through panic mongering and cowardice must be handed over to courts martial without regard to persons... The Red Army, Red Navy, and all Soviet citizens, must defend every inch of our Soviet territory. We must fight to the last drop of blood for our cities and villages."

The leadership apparatus of the Red Army immediately transposed these desiderata of a general nature into orders intended to give Soviet soldiers only one choice: to fight or die.

The Main Administration for Political Propaganda of the Red Army (GUPPKA), under Army Commissar First Rank Mekhlis, pulled out all the stops to hammer into every "individual soldier" "the speech of the Leader of the Peoples, the President of the State Defense Committee, Comrade Stalin, as well as an awareness of the tasks that lie ahead of us."⁵ The corresponding watchwords were issued in a series of directives and orders, such as Order No. 20 of July 14,⁶ Order No. 081 of July 15, 1941,⁷ and other fundamental orders. All these orders complied with the slogan of defending "every foot of the Soviet homeland," as expressed in the familiar formula, "to the last drop of blood" and "the last breath." Unauthorized "withdrawal from positions," "leaving the battlefield," and "permitting oneself to be captured," were declared "crimes against your people, against the Soviet homeland and government." "Subversives, panic mongers, cowards, deserters, and the spreaders of provocative rumors" among the "soldiers, commanders (officers), and political fellow-workers" were henceforth to be opposed with a "ruthless struggle," the "most brutal and severest countermeasures," and "merciless" persecution.

Just what this was to mean in practice was soon revealed on June 26, 1941, when a soldier in the 131st Mechanized Division of the Red Army was

4 *Soldatenzeitung*, 8. 7. 1941, author's archive.

5 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 12. 7. 1941.

6 BA-MA, RH 21-2/649, 14. 7. 1941.

7 BA-MA, RH 20-18/996, 15. 7. 1941.

bayoneted to death before the assembled troops for his failure to carry out an insignificant order. "May all traitors to the homeland receive similar treatment," stated the writ, prepared in the form of an order.⁸ The command authorities, emulating the Main Administration for Political Propaganda, naturally hastened to announce similar cases. They specified names for the purpose of general deterrence and selected those from the plethora of executions that now became everyday occurrences. Order No. 1 to the troops of the Southwest Front on July 6, 1941, announced the executions of Red Army soldiers Ignatovsky, Vergun, Koliba, and Adamov.⁹ The Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General Kirponos, Member of the Military Council Mikhailov, and Deputy Chief of Staff General Trutko, in a joint proclamation, stated menacingly:

"At times such as these, deserters who betray their comrades, who forget their service oath, deserve only one sentence: the death sentence, accompanied by contempt and expulsion from our ranks."

The West Front was also purged upon (the former People's Commissar for Defense) Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko's assumption of the position of the arrested Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Pavlov at the end of June. On July 6, 1941, order No. 01, jointly signed by Timoshenko and Member of the Military Council, Army Commissar Mekhlis, was announced to the troops of the Western Front, and was intended to serve as a warning to the entire leadership corps, including all officers down to the rank of platoon leaders.¹⁰ It was announced that Captain Sbirannik, Military Doctor 2nd Rank Ovchinnikov, Military Doctor 2nd Rank Belivsky, Major Dykmann, Battalion Commissar Krol, and an adjutant to a departmental chief of the Front Staff, Berkovich, had been handed over to a court martial "for conspicuous cowardice" and "treason."

Prikaz (Order) 02, issued to the troops of the West Front on the following day, July 7, 1941, and, likewise, signed by Timoshenko and Mekhlis, continued the intimidation of the military leadership.¹¹ On this occasion, it was announced that the Inspector of Engineers of the Red Army, Major Umanets, had been handed over to a court martial "for failure to obey a combat order, and for treason." Umanets' crime consisted of a failure to blow up the bridges over the Berezina near Borisov in time to prevent them falling into German hands. This order was brought to the attention of all

8 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 27. 6. 1941.

9 *Ibid.*, 6. 7. 1941.

10 BA-MA, RH 21-2/v. 648, 6. 7. 1941.

11 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 437, 7. 7. 1941.

officers of the West Front down to the rank of platoon leaders, as well as to all officers on the endangered Southwest Front and the troops of the NKVD.¹² On July 8, 1941, Timoshenko, whose Military Council now included the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of White Russia, Ponomarenko, in addition to Mekhlis, issued Order No. 03, which was intended as a cautionary warning for the troops of the West Front. This deterrent order announced the sentences handed down by courts martial against the Commander of the 188th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Colonel Galinsky, and Battalion Commander Cerkovnikov.¹³ The "crime" of these two officers simply was that the Germans had succeeded in capturing part of the military equipment of the anti-aircraft regiment near Minsk during a surprise attack on July 26, 1941.

This ruthless intervention by the former People's Commissar for Defense (Timoshenko) was intended to set an example and was soon emulated by command agencies on all levels, such as, for example, the 20th Army, under Lieutenant General Kurochkin, who announced to all units, by Order No. 04 of July 16, 1941, that he had ordered the Commander of the 34th Armored Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Liapin,¹⁴ the Battalion Commander of the 33rd Armored Regiment, First Lieutenant Piatin, and the Deputy Commander of the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 17th Armored Division, Captain Churakov, handed over to a court martial "for cowardice and for endangering a mood of panic."¹⁵ This was equivalent to a death sentence. Marshals of the Soviet Union Voroshilov and Budenny were, of course, no less zealous than their colleague Timoshenko. The same was true of General of the Army Zhukov, who was feared in the Red Army for his brutality. In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the West Front, Zhukov gave an order on October 13, 1941, that all "cowards and panic mongers" were to be shot on the spot.¹⁶ Soviet military tribunals were there simply to ensure that the sentences were carried out. Order No. 0179 of November 19, 1941, of the Commander-in-Chief of the 43rd Army, Major General Golubev, threatened that all "cowards" would be "killed like dogs."¹⁷

As early as July 10, 1941, Stalin demanded that the "treacherous" commanders of the Northwest Front who had withdrawn before the enemy would be held to account.¹⁸ Holding the entire Front Staff of the Army

12 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 12. 7. 1941.

13 BA-MA, RH 24-23/239, 8. 7. 1941.

14 It is not known whether or not this person is identical with the one mentioned in chapter 1, page 38.

15 BA-MA, RH 20-9/248, 16. 7. 1941.

16 BA-MA, RH 24-23/239, 13. 10. 1941.

17 BA-MA, RH 24-24/336, 10. 11. 1941.

18 Wolkogonow (Volkogonov), *Triumph und Tragödie*, vol. 2/1, p. 157.

Corps and Divisions responsible for this “ignominy,” he issued orders that all “cowards and traitors” were to be dealt with on the spot. Voroshilov, assigned by Stalin as new Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Front, as well as Member of the Military Council, Zhdanov, one of Stalin’s closest confidants in the Politburo, transformed this order into action. Order No. 3 of July 14, 1941, demanded that all “commanders (officers) and soldiers” who withdrew from the front line were to be hauled before a court martial and sentenced to death, or simply “annihilated on the spot.”¹⁹ Continuing in this line of reasoning but further enriched with insults was Order No. 5 of July 16, 1941, issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Budenny.²⁰ On July 13, 1941, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kalinin, placed the lawful sanction for the execution of death sentences passed by courts martial upon a broader basis.²¹ Executions of officers, political workers, and soldiers in the Red Army, in large numbers—both with and without a legal verdict—had long been an everyday occurrence, but Stalin once again intervened to spread the terror even further.

Stalin decided to make an example of the demoted and arrested Commander-in-Chief of the West Front, General of the Army Pavlov and his staff, thus sending a shock through the entire Red Army and distracting attention from Stalin’s own responsibility for the collapse of the West Front. He ordered death sentences against General of the Army Pavlov as well as against the Chief of Staff of the West Front, Major General Klimovskikh, the Chief of Signal Communications of the Front Staff, Major General Grigoriev, and the Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army, Major General Korobkov. The judgement, signed by the President of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the blood-stained army jurist Ul’rikh, was correspondingly drawn up upon Stalin’s instructions, presented to Stalin, and approved without any formal court proceedings.²² Such was the usual practice of Soviet justice as dispensed by Soviet courts martial.

On July 16, 1941, on his own responsibility as President of the State Defense Committee, Stalin issued Order No. 00381 announcing the forthcoming sentencing of the above mentioned generals to the Red Army, as well as the sentencing of the Commander of the 41st Infantry Corps, Major General Kosobutsky, the Commander of the 60th Mountain Infantry Division, Major General Shalikhov, the Regimental Commissar, Kurochkin, the

19 BA-MA, RH 20-18/996, 14. 7. 1941.

20 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 16. 7. 1941.

21 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 13. 7. 1941.

22 Wolkogonow (Volkogonov), *Triumph und Tragödie*, vol. 2/1, pp. 168ff.

Commander of the 30th Infantry Division, Major General Galaktionov, and the Regimental Commissar, Eliseev.²³ The defendants were accused of "cowardice, failure to supervise, incompetence, lack of organization, abandonment of weapons to the enemy, and unauthorized withdrawal from a position." That these accusations were not entirely without justification is clear from Order No. 001919 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, apparently signed on September 12, 1941, by Stalin and the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Shaposhnikov, that contains a revealing passage:

"There are numerous elements on all fronts who desert to the enemy, throwing away their weapons upon the first contact with the enemy and taking others with them... at the same time, the number of decent commanders and commissars is not very great."²⁴

Stalin would hardly have made such an admission if it were not true.

The institution of the military commissars and politruks, reintroduced on the same date, July 16, 1941, for the supervision of the troop leaders of all ranks, is additional proof of just how unreliable the political attitude and morale of the Red Army were in fact believed to be. That the NKVD troops made no exceptions is revealed by the example of the 23rd Motorized Infantry Division of the Operational NKVD troops. On July 12, 1941, the Political Deputy (*Zampolit*) of the Divisional Commander and Chief of the Department for Political Propaganda of the 23rd Motorized Infantry Division of the NKVD, Regimental Commissar Vodiakha, by Order No. 02/0084, drew the attention of all subordinate formations and units to examples of "failure to understand the nature of the Patriotic War of the Peoples of the Soviet Union against the German fascists."²⁵ Regardless of the military program for the "activity of the Soviet peoples and its glorious Red Army," set forth on radio on July 3, 1941, by the "Leader of the Peoples," Comrade Stalin, there were, in Vodiakha's words, "persons among the ranks of our fighters, and even in the leadership, who voice doubt as to our victory, expressing defeatist opinions, praising the alleged power of the German fascist army, repeating fairy tales about the excellent provisions in the German Army, and even expressing doubt as to the veracity of our press." Such talk constituted a "hostile, extremely harmful influence, aiding and encouraging the enemy." The disseminators of such "mendacious rumors" were now to be called to account and handed over to courts martial according to an *Ukaz*

23 BA-MA, RH 24-48/198, 16. 7. 1941.

24 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 329, 15. 9. 1941.

25 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 12. 7. 1941.

(order) published on July 6, 1941, by the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kalinin.

The much famed "ardent Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism" of the Red Army, not to mention, quite simply, its concept of honor, must indeed be open to question if the Commander-in-Chiefs and Military Councils of all Fronts and Armies, the commanders of all military districts, the commanders of all corps, divisions, regiments, and battalions, in addition to the entire officer personnel of the Soviet Army, including company, squadron and battery chiefs, really needed to be "warned" by their Supreme Commander in the coarsest language that "all signs of cowardice and lack of organization" would be "punished with an iron hand," and that the "strictest methods" would be used "without regard to consideration of persons." In the German Wehrmacht, such a degree of mistrust, accompanied by such shameful measures, was totally unknown, even during the concluding phase of the war. Stalin announced to all Soviet officers down to the regimental commanders:

"I hereby inform you that in the future all those who violate their service oath, all those who forget their duty to the homeland and harm the good reputation of the soldiers of the Red Army, as well as all cowards and panic mongers, all those who abandon positions without authorization or who abandon weapons to the enemy without fighting, will be punished without regard to persons: mercilessly, with the greatest severity, according to martial law."

At the same time, a large group of Soviet generals was arrested. On July 28, 1941, the leadership personnel of the Red Army was apprised of the executions of Generals Pavlov, Klimovskikh, Grigoriev, and Korobkov by Order No. 250 of the People's Commissar of Defense.²⁶ The impression was thereby given that the previous farce of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR had constituted a regular legal proceeding. On October 28, 1941, Colonel General Shtern and Lieutenant General of the Air Force Smushkevich were shot; Lieutenant General of the Air Force Pumpur and Major General of the Air Force Shakht and other generals were shot in February 1942.

Similarly, the measures taken so far were only a prelude to Headquarters Order No. 270 of the Supreme High Command of August 16, 1941, signed by Stalin in his capacity as President of the State Defense Committee, as well as by Molotov, in his capacity as Stalin's Deputy, and by Marshals of the Soviet Union Budenny, Voroshilov, Timoshenko,

²⁶ BA-MA, RH 24-3/136, 28. 7. 1941.

Shaposhnikov, and General of the Army Zhukov. This order was read aloud to all soldiers in the Red Army.²⁷ If any further proof is required that the much-famed "Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism" of Soviet soldiers was nothing more than a propaganda myth, then such proof is to be found in this fundamental Order of Stalin, which has no equivalent in military history. Like the order of July 16, 1941, Order 270 of August 16, 1941, once again repeated that there were "inconstant, faint-hearted, cowardly elements in the ranks of the Red Army, not only among soldiers of the Red Army, but among the leadership." The fact that "cowardly elements" were the principal object of such a basic order reveals that these "elements" cannot have been a marginal phenomenon. What did such "cowardice" consist of? The answer is that it consisted of a prevalent inclination among Soviet troops not to fight to "the last bullet and the last drop of blood," but rather, to flee forward to the Germans and be captured, or retreat to the rear. The Order of Stalin No. 270 threatened draconian measures to prevent flight in either direction.

Three generals were once again used to set a deterrent example: the Commander-in-Chief of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General Kachalov (who had, in reality, been killed on August 4, 1941, by a direct hit with an artillery shell near Starinka, and whose soldierly death was exploited for purposes of intimidation); the Commander-in-Chief of the 12th Army, Major General Ponedelin (who had been captured while severely wounded); and the Commander of the 13th Infantry Corps, Major General Kirillov. These three generals were accused of having permitted themselves to be captured by the German fascists "in a cowardly manner," thus committing the crimes of desertion and violating their service oath. This accusation was in fact directed, not at these generals alone, but at all members of the army military councils, all commanders, political officials, members of special operations groups, regimental and battalion commanders, and practically every soldier in the Red Army who failed to allow himself to be killed for "Comrade Stalin" on the foremost front line. "All cowards and deserters must be annihilated," Stalin repeated. He now ordered that all "commanders and political leaders,... who flee from the enemy, or allow themselves to be captured,... are to be considered evil deserters, as violators of their service oath, and traitors to their country," and "must be annihilated on the spot." On August 25, 1950, following five years of investigation after their release from German captivity, the Generals Ponedelin and Kirillov ought to be sentenced to death by the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR and subse-

27 BA-MA, RH 20-17/283, 16. 8. 1941.

quently shot.²⁸ All "superiors and Red Army officers" who allowed themselves to be captured instead of fighting to the death would be annihilated by all "means, both terrestrial and aerial." Overcrowded German prisoner of war camps such as Orel and Novgorod-Severkij were thus attacked and bombed by the Soviet Air Force. That the Soviet government recognized no Soviet prisoners of war, but rather, only traitors to the Soviet homeland, had become general knowledge during the Finnish Winter War at the very latest. Every Soviet citizen was familiar with the reprehensible extension of liability to all members of a family for the crimes of one member. All members of the Red Army were once again expressly warned that the families of all officers and political workers who surrendered would be arrested, while the families of all Red Army soldiers who surrendered would lose "all State support or assistance." The practical application was far worse in most cases.

It was typical of Stalin, and characteristic of conditions in the Red Army, that the dissemination of fear and terror, rather than appeals to much-famed "Soviet patriotism," was now considered the most suitable manner in which to induce members of the Red Army to fight for their "Socialist homeland." This was made even clearer during the crisis of 1942, when Soviet soldiers of all ranks were once again directly addressed in menacing language by Stalin, regardless of the system of terror that had been perfected in the meantime. Following the occurrence of a potential breakthrough by German assault troops into the interior of the country in July 1942, German documents spoke of "panicky" and "uncontrolled retreat" on the part of Soviet troops. On July 28, 1942, Stalin, in his capacity of People's Commissar for Defense, issued Order No. 227, amounting, in practice, to a cruder version of Order No. 270 of August 16, 1941.²⁹ Order 227 unequivocally recalled that "panic mongers and cowards" were to be liquidated on the spot or handed over to military tribunals for sentencing. In the "Red Army of Workers and Farmers"—which was, nevertheless, simultaneously supposed to be inspired by "ardent Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism"—the lower ranking officers, such as platoon leaders and company chiefs, in addition to all battalion and regimental commanders, and especially all generals, divisional and corps commanders, army commanders-in-chief and their military councils, military commissars and political leaders, not to mention the broad mass of soldiers, were suspected of being capable of "treason to the homeland" and threatened with the severest punishment.

28 Kuznetsov, "Generaly 1940 goda."

29 BA-MA, RH 27-3/188, 28. 7. 1942; Hoffmann, *Kaukasien 1942/43*, pp. 476ff.

Stalin, furthermore, ordered the formation of 8,000-man punishment battalions, "according to the situation and strength," filled with all fickle "middle and high-ranking leaders" and "political leaders of equal rank." Punishment battalions were also formed out of all defeatist non-commissioned officers and personnel to afford them an opportunity "to redeem themselves with their blood for their crimes against the homeland." To the members of these punishment battalions—which were ruthlessly assigned to particularly difficult sections of the front line—this meant, in practice, that they could only be amnestied in the event of a severe wound; in the event of a slight wound, they would be immediately sent back into combat as soon as it healed. Well-armed "blocking units" stationed to the rear of all combat troops were ordered to open fire upon all retreating units or soldiers, and "to shoot panic mongers and gossips on the spot."

The degree to which one might justifiably assume a lack of "Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism" among all ranks of the Red Army, even in 1942, was revealed, in particular, during the fighting in the foothills of the Caucasus after a German breakthrough in the Soviet front near Rostov. A summary German report on interrogations of prisoners of war, deserters, officers, and political workers described the degree of political and morale collapse on August 1, 1942, as follows: "The higher commanders fled first, followed by the officers and, finally the leaderless troops."³⁰ There were also reports of mass desertions of Soviet officers and soldiers. In August 1942, the Commander-in-Chief of the North Caucasus Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Budenny, was compelled to remind his troops of Order of Stalin No. 227 with a "sealed letter," jointly signed by Staff Supervisor, Stalin confidant, and Politburo Member Kaganovich, in addition to members of the Military Council Korniets and Delesev (Selesnev), and the Chief of the Political Administration of the Front, Brigade Commissar Emel'ianov.³¹ Stalin's claims, as the author of Order No. 227, about the inner disintegration of the troops was confirmed by the experience of the North Caucasus Front. Budenny was constrained to admit that, following the "disorderly withdrawal" from the Don, the "commanders and political workers of platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, and armies," *i.e.*, the entire military and political leadership personnel, precisely because they were filled with panic, was not in a position to put a stop to defeatism among the rank and file, thus failing to carry out "Comrade Stalin's" order. This document, couched in roundabout phraseology, culminated in the well-known threat

30 BA-MA, 27759/14, 1. 8. 1942.

31 BA-MA, RH 27-3/188 (1942).

“that all commanders and political workers seized by fear, all those who fear the Germans, will be beaten, [and] that... all cowards and panic mongers who run from the front, and all those who help them, will be shot.”

That these were no empty threat was revealed by the indiscriminate executions then reported everywhere, even for unimportant trifles.

Post-Soviet historical literature, which had no choice, so to speak, but to sacrifice Stalin—calling many of his criminal measures by their proper name—continues to rack its brain in support of certain Stalinist historical propaganda allegations. Among those that may not be questioned are: the myth of the “cowardly, treacherous, fascist surprise attack upon the unsuspecting, peaceful Soviet Union”; the formula of the “great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,” which did not exist in that usage; not to mention the unquestioning “Soviet patriotism” and “mass heroism” of the soldiers of the Red Army. Stalin’s terrorization orders, such as, for example, Order nos. 270 and 227, are invariably described as a continuation of the unjustified repression of the 1930s, once again directed against the innocent. These orders are alleged to have resulted in unjustified damage to the Soviet war effort, just as if there had never been any large-scale “treason to the homeland” at all.³²

An analysis of the relevant documents, however, leads to a different conclusion. Stalin was concerned, not only with finding scapegoats for the disasters at the front—for which he himself was, after all, responsible—but also with compelling Soviet soldiers to fight under the threat of ruthless terror. Only through the dissemination of fear and terror did Stalin believe it possible to stabilize the front at a time when all the reports described a collapse in morale among the troops of the Red Army, although examples to the contrary should, of course, also be cited over and over again. A personal directive by Stalin on September 12, 1941 stated that the “infantry divisions of all fronts” contained “numerous panic mongers and regular hostile elements who throw away their rifles upon the first contact with the enemy, screaming ‘we are surrounded!’” “The result of this... is that the division takes flight, and that our equipment is abandoned on the spot.” Stalin, furthermore, admitted that “the number of consistent and steadfast commanders and commissars is not very great.” This was an accurate description of the situation as revealed by the documents of high command authorities from the summer and the fall of 1941.

Reports from the Chief of the Political Administration of the 20th Army to the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Army

32 According to Bonwetsch, “Die Repression des Militärs,” p. 415.

Commissar First Rank Mekhlis, speak of "mass desertions" in the 229th and 233rd Infantry Divisions between July 13 and July 23, 1941, as well as in the 13th Armored Division.³³ Of the 12,000 men in the 229th Infantry Division, approximately 8,000 were said to have "disappeared without a trace." The public prosecutors for the Red Army were said to have handed over dozens of officers to military tribunals, including colonels and battalion commanders, for fleeing in panic at the head of their men. Other officers were

"handed over to courts martial for removing their rank insignia, throwing away their Party books (commissars!), fleeing in civilian clothing, openly reading German leaflets (a Jewish commissar!), praising the German troops, etc."

Nor were conditions in the 6th Army of the South Front much different in October 1941. On October 4, 1941, Commander-in-Chief, Major General Malinovsky, Member of the Military Council, Brigade Commissar Larin, and Chief of Staff, Brigade Commander Batiunia applied Order No. 0014 to the subordinate units in menacing tones.³⁴ The numbers of "missing," and those "absent for other reasons"—especially in the 255th, 270th, and 275th Infantry Divisions—amounted to over 11,000 men, as compared to 167 men, which the units had admitted were taken prisoner between September 1 and October 1, 1941. These categories (missing and absent for other reasons) made up 67% of the total losses, a "scandalous phenomenon" according to Malinovsky, for which the commanders (officers) and military commissars were to be held unflinchingly responsible.

Exact data are available as to the personnel of the armies on the Southwest Front. On September 1, 1941, the Staff of the Southwest Front (Chief of Staff, Major General Tupikov, Military Commissar Solov'ev, and Colonel Kononov) was confronted with the painful task of supplying the Chief of the Main Administration for the Initial Establishment and Replacement of Troops of the Red Army, Army Commander First Rank Shchadenko, with an exact breakdown of all losses having occurred since the beginning of the war from the regions of the 5th, 37th, 26th, 38th, and 40th Armies.³⁵ According to this report, no fewer than 94,648 soldiers, including 3,685 officers, were "missing" or "absent for other reasons," of whom only 720 soldiers, including 31 officers, had allegedly been taken prisoner. The Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Front, Colonel General Kirponos, Member of the Military Council, Burmistenko, and Chief of Staff, Major

33 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 437, 31. 7. 1941.

34 BA-MA, RH 20-17/282, 4. 10. 1941.

35 BA-MA, RH 191/123, 1. 9. 1941.

General Tupikov, furthermore, conceded in Order No. 41 that these “ignominious cases of desertion and the absence of sections of troops” were further aggravated by the fact that, according to a report from the Chief of the NKVD troops, a total of 48,756 officers and soldiers had been arrested in the rear, when the 6th and 12th Armies were taken into consideration as well.³⁶

The Commander-in-Chief of the 26th Army, Major General Kos-tenko, Member of the Military Council, Brigade Commissar Kolesnikov, and Chief of Staff, Colonel Barenikov, informed the Military Council of the Southwest Front of the overwhelming losses in “deserters,” “traitors to the homeland,” and “runaways.” In connection with these losses, serving further notice of another momentous fact in a letter under Reference No. 00134, dated September 16, 1941, that they could not be stopped regardless of reprisals and propaganda measures.³⁷ The Political Administration of the Northwest Front quoted a directive by Stalin, under No. 0116 of July 20, 1941, declaring that members of the Red Army in the “Western regions of the Ukraine, White Russia... Moldavia, Bucovina, and the Baltic States”—the so-called “right-bankers”—had displayed a “mass mood” “in which they do not wish to fight,” but rather, “to run home.”³⁸ Stalin’s suspicions in this regard extended, not only to the broad masses of the Red Army, but to the “commanders (officers) and political leaders” as well—and justly so.

The “ignominious phenomena of desertions and treason to the homeland” repeatedly admitted in Soviet documents must be evaluated against the underlying fact that members of the Red Army could not be prevented from deserting en masse to the Germans, regardless of any threat of punishment. One and a half million Soviet soldiers of all ranks were in German captivity by the middle of August 1941, over 3 million by the middle of October 1941, and 3.8 million by the end of 1941. A total of 5.25 million Soviet soldiers and officers were captured during the course of the war. During the initial phase of hostilities, the German command authorities reported “that large sections of the enemy no longer exhibit any strong will to fight,” however, soon afterward they observed, that “the enemy units are now offering stiffer or more embittered resistance.”³⁹ Nevertheless, the latent tendency of Soviet soldiers to allow themselves to be captured or to run away never entirely vanished at any time during the war. This was true

36 BA-MA, RH 191I/123, undated.

37 *Ibid.*, 16. 9. 1941.

38 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 329, 20. 7. 1941.

39 BA-MA, RH 24-23/239, 30. 7. 1941.

not only in 1941, and during the great crisis of 1942, but during the following years as well, even during the concluding phase of the war.⁴⁰

There is only one answer to the question of how the Soviet leadership attained the objective of inducing the not very enthusiastic and fundamentally indifferent soldiers of the Red Army to offer "resistance at any price" on behalf of the Soviet regime: this effect was produced by the tried and true Stalinist method of the "greatest terror and the most deliberate deception," as the Germans were quick to recognize. Terrorism alone proved effective; the somewhat anti-Stalinist Colonel General Volkogonov in his biography of Stalin has recognized the effectiveness of these methods of necessity. In addition to other draconian measures, mass executions of officers, political workers, and Red Army men, with or without a legal verdict, by means of courts martial and by "blocking units" or executions by those officers, political workers, and Communists loyal to the party line, were the primary tools of terror. According to the data of Russian experts at a German-Russian archive conference in Dresden on July 6, 1997, Soviet courts martial held a million trials against their own soldiers between 1941 and 1945, carrying out no fewer than 157,000 death sentences.⁴¹ Hand in hand with these executions were the prohibition against surrender, the indictment of all captured personnel as deserters and traitors, and the reprisals against relatives that were common in the Soviet Union. Endless atrocity propaganda against the Germans and German allies was also intended, from the very outset, to deprive all Red Army soldiers of their taste for capture by the "fascists."

40 Choffman, *Istorija Vlassovskoj Armii*, p. 125.

41 "Auch die Nichtverurteilten sollen bald rehabilitiert werden". The mere number of death sentences "regularly" executed in the Red Army shows the fundamental distinction between the barbaric practices of the Soviet courts martial and the military jurisprudence of the German Wehrmacht, which was no doubt very strict during the Second World War, but which must, nevertheless, be considered almost moderate.

**“A Fighter in the Red Army Does Not Surrender”
Soviet Soldiers Must Not Allow
Themselves to be Taken Captive.
Prevention of Flight Forward**

The Soviet Union is the only state in the world ever to have declared the captivity of its soldiers to be a serious crime. The military oath (*Voennaja prisjaga*),¹ the article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code (*Ugolovnyj kodeks*) and other regulations, such as the Interior Service Regulation (*Ustav Vnutrennej sluzhby*) and the "Infantry Combat Provisions of the Red Army" left no doubt that allowing oneself to be taken prisoner (*sdacha v plen*) would inevitably be punished by death as "desertion to the enemy," "flight to a foreign country," "treason," and "desertion." "Captivity is treason to the homeland. There is no more reprehensible and more treacherous act," the regulation stated: "But the highest penalty—shooting—awaits the traitor to the homeland." Stalin, Molotov, and other leading officials, such as Madame Kolontay, repeatedly and publicly declared that the Soviet Union only recognized the existence of deserters, traitors to the homeland, and enemies of the people. The concept of "prisoner of war" was unknown.² Since it was impossible for the "Nation of Workers and Farmers" to permit revolutionary soldiers in the Red Army of Workers and Farmers to seek refuge in enemy captivity, the Soviet government, from 1917 onward, no longer considered itself a signatory of the Hague Convention and, in 1929, refused to ratify the Geneva Convention for the protection of prisoners of war. This attitude toward prisoners of war should be borne in mind if one wishes to understand a tactical maneuver engaged in by Moscow starting in July 1941, which has caused fundamental confusion right down to the present day.

In reply to an initiative from the International Committee of the Red Cross of July 27, 1941, Molotov declared himself prepared to accept proposals relating to prisoners of war, as well as to exchange lists of names.³ The Council of the People's Commissars, as early as July 1, 1941, hastened to confirm a "Decree on Prisoners of War" (*Polozhenie o voennoplennych*,

1 BA-MA, RH 2/2411, 3. 1. 1939.

2 Hoffmann, *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee*, pp. 135ff.

3 *Rapport du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge*, p. 435.

Postanovlenie SNK SSSR No. 1798-8000 sekretno, utverzhdeno), the provisions of which were entirely in accordance with the basic principles of the international conventions.⁴ The Chief Quartermaster of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Khrulev, by Circular Letter No. 017 (4488) of July 1941, furthermore, established corresponding standards of supply for captured soldiers of the German Wehrmacht.⁵ The Medical Administration of the Red Army (Chief, Divisional Doctor Smirnov, and Deputy Chief of the Rear Supply Services, Major General Utkin), on July 29, finally disseminated a corresponding proposal relating to adequate hospital care for wounded or sick soldiers of hostile armies.⁶ With this bureaucratic backing, the Reichs Government was then notified on July 19, 1941, in a verbal note from the protecting power, Sweden, with reference to the "*Polozhenie o voennoplennyykh*," that the government of the USSR was prepared to acknowledge the provisions of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907 on prisoners of war on the condition of "reciprocity by the Germans."

Did this indicate a basic change in the Soviet attitude toward prisoners of war? The subsequent train of events shows that the Soviet government was never serious in this regard, and never for an instant considered creating protection and privileges for captured prisoners of the Red Army under the Hague Convention or vice versa, or the acceptance of any obligations relating to German prisoners of war.⁷ This demonstrative demand for reciprocal recognition by the Germans was, in fact, merely a propaganda maneuver directed to the Western powers. It was, as accurately stated by Count Tolstoy, "patently a blind."⁸ This is revealed by various Orders of Stalin from the same period, particularly, Order No. 270 of the State Defense Committee, which threatened surrendering Soviet soldiers with annihilation as deserters "by all means, both terrestrial and aerial."

Only in regard to foreign countries did it appear expedient to provide the Soviet Union with a veneer of civilization in accordance with international law. Shortly afterward, on August 26, 1941, the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, raised the question with the Soviet government of possible Soviet actions relating "to the basis of treatment of prisoners of war."⁹ After still another deceptive declaration by Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky of August 8, 1941, the Soviet government in fact never again

4 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 1. 7. 1941.

5 *Ibid.*, 3. 7. 1941.

6 *Ibid.*, 29. 7. 1941.

7 Hoffmann, *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee*, pp. 136ff.

8 Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta*, pp. 33ff.; see also Hoffmann, "Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion," p. 721.

9 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 26. 8. 1941.

returned to the question of any such agreement. The application of the principal clauses of the Hague Convention, such as the exchange of name lists of prisoners of war, International Red Cross access to the camps, and permitting the circulation of letters and packages, was firmly rejected by the Soviet Government from the very outset. All efforts undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross, relating to an agreement with reference to Soviet approval, or even to discussions in Moscow, were flatly ignored, like comparable efforts during the Soviet wars against Poland in 1939 and Finland in 1939/1940.

As early as July 9, 1941, the International Committee of the Red Cross informed the Soviet government of the readiness of Germany, Finland, Hungary, and Romania, and, on July 22, of Italy and Slovakia as well, to exchange lists of prisoners of war on the basis of reciprocity. On August 20, 1941, an initial German list of Soviet prisoners of war was transmitted. Finnish, Italian, and Romanian lists of prisoners of war were, likewise, transmitted to the International Red Cross and forwarded to the Soviet embassy in Ankara, intended by Molotov to serve as a relay. Reception was never confirmed, to say nothing of Soviet acknowledgement of the necessary principle of reciprocity. In view of the unyielding silence of the Soviet government, the International Committee of the Red Cross, through various channels, such as the Soviet embassies in London and Stockholm, made efforts to obtain approval for the sending of a delegation, or even a single delegate, to Moscow in the hopes of clearing up any presumed misunderstandings through oral negotiations. Applications in this sense were renewed over and over again, but were never answered. The possibility, created by the International Committee of the Red Cross, of mailing assistance to Soviet prisoners of war in Germany also came to naught because the Soviet government never replied to the corresponding requests from Geneva. All parallel efforts undertaken by protecting powers, neutral states, and even allies of the USSR, in relation to an agreement on the question of prisoners of war were similarly met with silence. In the spring of 1943, the International Red Cross felt itself compelled to send a formal reminder to the Soviet government of Molotov's promise, given on June 27, 1941, at the same time remarking resignedly, "*qu'il avait offert ses services sans resultat pratique dès le début des hostilités*" (that it had offered its services without practical result right from the start of the hostilities). There was never any change in this situation, then or later. The true attitude of the Soviet government toward the good services of the Red Cross during the war was revealed in 1945, when the Red Cross delegation in Berlin was robbed of its working possibilities and deported into the Soviet Union without any justification whatever.

Having stated the above, the question arises as to the measures taken by the Soviet government to prevent "flight forward" by members of the Red Army, *i.e.*, surrender to the enemy. As always, there were two methods, mutually supplementing each other: propaganda and terror. In other words, where propaganda did not suffice, terror followed; anyone who did not believe official Soviet propaganda soon experienced official Soviet terror.

A handbook for political agitation under the revealing title "A Fighter in the Red Army Does Not Surrender" (N. Brykin, N. Tolkachev) was published by the Political Administration of the Leningrad Military District in 1940. Even at this early date, it summarized the facts to be borne in mind by members of the Red Army in this matter.¹⁰ All the stops of so-called "Soviet patriotism" were pulled out, based on the Soviet service oath and the axiom that military captivity was "treason to the homeland," the greatest crime and greatest shame that could ever be committed by a Soviet soldier. "Death or Victory" was accordingly said to have been the commandment of every fighter of the Red Army during the Russian Civil War, all of whom were alleged to have preferred "death to shameful captivity." For members of the Red Army, the motto "Bolsheviks Do Not Surrender" was said to have been the watchword during the civil war, the battles with the Japanese (in an undeclared war) at Khasan Lake and Khalkhin Gol River, the "Liberation" of the western White Ukraine and Western White Russia (in other words, during the unprovoked wars of aggression against Poland) and, in particular, the struggle against the Finnish White Guards (*i.e.*, the unprovoked war of aggression against Finland), which was said to have been schemed and organized by "Anglo-French imperialists." "In fulfillment of their holy duty," "the patriots of the Socialist homeland," the "true sons of the Soviet people," were said to have considered it as perfectly natural to commit suicide rather than surrender alive to the class enemy, saving the last bullet for themselves, or if necessary, allowing themselves to be burned alive—all the while singing a Bolshevik party song.

The second method consisted of detailed descriptions of the horrible pangs of torture or of the "horrible deaths by torture" inevitably suffered by Red Army soldiers in capitalist captivity. Drastic examples were set forth, in particular, from the struggles against the "White Finnish bands," the "Finnish cut-throats," the "White Finnish scum of humanity." The Finns were said to have directed all their efforts to "practicing unprecedented torments upon prisoners of war and the wounded, burning the wounded alive, as on the Island of Lassisaari, burning out their eyes, cutting open their stomachs,

¹⁰ PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 10, undated.

and mutilating them with knives." Political agitators Brykin and Tolkahev referred to a speech by the Premier of the Soviet government, Molotov, before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 29, 1940, describing many examples of the "unprecedented barbarity and bestiality" of the "White Finns."¹¹ Molotov claimed:

"In their region north of Lake Ladoga, when the Finns surrounded our medical huts, containing 120 severely wounded Soviet soldiers some of them were found burned, some of them with their heads crushed, and the rest stabbed or shot. Apart from the mortal wounds on other parts of the body, a great many of the dead showed traces of gunshot wounds to the head or killing by bludgeoning; a great many of those shot to death also showed traces of facial stab wounds inflicted by Finnish women. A few corpses were found with the heads hacked off; the heads could not be found. Special torments and incredible acts of brutality occurred in the treatment of prisoners who fell into the hands of female White Finnish nurses. The Finnish White Guards, the protecting corps, already long known to Finnish workers as butchers, revealed their animal nature with particular clarity during the wars against the USSR. Among the Finns, ridicule, derision, torture, and barbaric methods of extermination of prisoners were beloved methods of treatment reserved for Soviet combatants. The enemy spared no one: neither the wounded, nor medical personnel, nor women."

If helplessly wounded prisoners had already been massacred by Finnish nursing personnel, the members of Lotta Svärd, could unwounded prisoners of war expect a better fate, now or in the future?

The Political Administration had another and, this time, truly convincing argument ready for anyone who failed in their eagerness to believe the official presentation of proof. "A disgraceful fate awaits anyone who surrenders out of fear, thereby betraying the homeland," the authorities stated menacingly: "Hate, contempt, curses from family, friends, and the people as a whole, followed by a shameful death." The text of the agitation manual describes the example of two Red Army men who, upon returning from Finnish captivity, were said to deserve and to have received "just retribution" for their "treason" and "violation of their service oath" "before the Soviet people." A court martial was alleged to have sentenced the two soldiers to death by shooting for "treason to the homeland," as "monsters," and "loathsome souls," on the grounds that a "traitor to the Socialist homeland has no right to live on Soviet soil." The circumstances, in reality, were somewhat different. Repatriated Soviet prisoners of war were never individually indicted following the conclusion of peace with Finland on March 12,

¹¹ BA-MA, RH 19III/381, 29. 3. 1940.

1940. Rather, they were indiscriminately and summarily arrested by the NKVD, solely on the grounds of their military captivity, and were never heard from again, having been shot to the last man.¹²

As shown by Stalin's terrorization orders, the criminalization of military captivity could, of course, only be considered a matter of course during the German-Soviet war as well. The Chief of the Administration for Political Propaganda of the Red Army, Army Commissar First Rank Mekhlis, in Instruction No. 20 of July 14, 1941, set forth a corresponding regulation with reference to the text of the agitation manual of 1940.¹³ It begins with an appeal to Soviet patriotism: "You have given your oath to be true to your people, the Soviet homeland and government, until your last breath. Keep your oath during the struggle against the fascists." This is followed by a deterrent argument:

"A fighter in the Red Army does not surrender. The fascist barbarians torture, torment, and kill their prisoners in the most bestial manner. Better death than fascist captivity!"

This was followed by a momentous threat: "Surrender to captivity is treason to the homeland." A political text, "Fascist Atrocities against Prisoners of War According to Data from the Foreign Press, Leningrad, 1941," disseminated for the assistance of propagandists and agitators in the autumn of 1941, shows the manner in which members of the Red Army might be deprived of the desire to be willingly taken prisoner by the Germans. Thus, it was hypocritically stated that the Germans "do not respect the international conventions on prisoners of war"—conventions that were ratified by Germany, but not by the Soviet Union. Prisoners of war were allegedly therefore "deprived of all legal protection. Everyone in fascist Germany may kill them." One witness to the alleged "bestial treatment of prisoners, refugees, and the population in the occupied territories" was the Military Commissar of the Red Army, Mushev, of the 22nd Army, who was mentioned further on.¹⁴ The Main Administration for Political Propaganda of the Red Army constantly reminded Red Army soldiers of the horrors of German captivity:

"All prisoners bitterly regret having fallen alive into the hands of the fascists; death is nothing in comparison to what they endure in captivity... Fascist captivity means a death by slow torture... Fascist captivity—prison, inhuman suffering, worse than death."

12 Pozdnjakov, "Sovetskaja agentura v lagerjach voennoplennych."

13 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 329, 18. 10. 1941; BA-MA, RH 21-2/649, 14. 7. 1941.

14 BA-MA, RH 24-23/239, 14. 10. 1941; BA-MA, RH 24-24/336, *Obrashchenie*.

Propaganda intended to make Red Army soldiers believe that they would inevitably be killed in German captivity¹⁵ began with the outbreak of the war and may be observed as early as June 23, 1941.¹⁶ The central task of the political apparatus was to stimulate and intensify the fears of captivity and was continued onward with iron consistency throughout the war. The emphasis was not upon mere shooting, but rather, continued the propaganda line of the Finnish Winter War. German soldiers were accused of "bestial tortures," "horrible mutilations," "torturing prisoners to death," "cutting off their fingers, ears, and noses, putting out their eyes, and ripping out their spinal columns before shooting their prisoners."¹⁷ Scattered throughout the documents are references to alleged atrocities that no political tract or lecture, no "meeting," no "*obrascenie*" of political workers, no frontline newspapers could fail to feature in 1943. For purposes of enhanced credibility, gross falsification was resorted to. Thus, as early as July 1941, photographs of Poles and Ukrainians shot by the NKVD by the thousands in the prisons of Lemberg were produced as alleged "proof" of atrocities committed against prisoners of war by German soldiers. There were other methods. German prisoners of war were shot and left lying on back roads to provoke reprisals against Soviet prisoners of war, that, in turn, it was hoped, would detract from the "inclination of soldiers in the Red Army to desert."¹⁸ Some German command posts showed signs of falling for such a trap. The High Command of the Wehrmacht, however, put an early stop to this, and prohibited reprisals on the grounds that "it would only unnecessarily increase the bitterness of the struggle."

Members of the Red Army were constantly reminded of the alleged fate of Soviet prisoners of war in German captivity with such penetrating force that such propaganda could not remain entirely without effect. Thus, the German command authorities repeatedly reported that, as a result of systematic repetition by their "officers and commissars," the belief became widespread among soldiers in the Red Army that the Germans "killed all prisoners," that "we shot all Russian prisoners of war, even torturing them beforehand."¹⁹ It was discovered that, for one part, the "simple souls" among Soviet soldiers expected to be shot. The above mentioned Doctor of the Microbiological Chair at the Medical Institute in Dnepropetrovsk, Kot-

15 BA-MA, RH 20-6/489, 25. 6. 1941; BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, 17. 6. 1942.

16 BA-MA, RH 20-9/251, 23. 6. 1941; BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 437, 24. 6. 1941.

17 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 23. 7., 29. 7. 1941; BA-MA, RH 24-23/239, 30. 7. 1941; BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, June 1941.

18 BA-MA, RH 21-1/481, 22. 2. 1942; BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, 23. 2. 1942.

19 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 29. 7. 1941.

liarevsky, then in the 151st Medical Battalion of the 147th Infantry Division, testified on September 24, 1941, that "all the wounded to whom he was assigned as a doctor were firmly convinced that they would be killed by the Germans." This fear was also shared by groups of officers and, to some extent, higher-ranking officers and individual generals.²⁰ Thus, for example, the Commander of the 102nd Infantry Division, Major General Besonov, on August 28, 1941, and a Colonel in the Staff of the 5th Army, Nachkebya, on September 21, 1941,²¹ in addition to other officers, all stated that they were under the impression that they would lose their lives in German captivity. "Many officers and commanders believed that they would be shot in German captivity," Major Elmolaev, commander of the 464th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 151st Infantry Division, admitted on September 20, 1941.

It is widely known today that, under the terms of Hitler's notorious "Commissar Order", political officers of the Red Army were shot as alleged non-combatants by the German Security Police and SD and, at least to some extent, by German troops—although in relatively small numbers, and in the face of increasing reluctance. It, nevertheless, appears necessary to remark in this connection that similar actions were also committed by the Soviets: members of the Wehrmacht known to be members of the NSDAP, particularly officers, were immediately shot. Colonel Gaevsky of the Soviet 29th Armored Division, on August 6, 1941, even testified to the existence of an order from the Superior Army (4th or 10th), commanding that "lower-ranking officers should be shot because these officers must be assumed to be dedicated followers of Hitler."²²

German captivity was naturally characterized by differing methods of treatment, as may be shown by a brief survey. For example, the German army, by decree of the Quartermaster General, Major General Wagner, on July 25, 1941, even released Soviet prisoners of war of Ukrainian nationality and, soon afterward, of White Russian nationality as well, in their homelands in the occupied territories.²³ According to Russian data, 292,702 prisoners were released in the zone of the High Command of the German Army before the action was stopped on November 13, 1941, while 26,068 prisoners were released in the zone of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. At a time when the Panzer Group 3, for example, released the 200,000th prisoner of war, Driuk,²⁴ home with praise, and other units were

20 BA-MA, RH 21-1/472, 16. 8. 1941.

21 BA-MA, RH 21-1/473, 21. 9. 1941.

22 See chapter 2, note 100.

23 *Grif sekretnosti snjat*, pp. 333f.

24 BA-MA, RH 24-3/135, 4. 9. 1941.

acting similarly, the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD were engaged in the physical liquidation of "intolerable elements," particularly, politically and "racially" undesirable persons. Even some members of the peoples of Turkestan and the Caucasus, very often the most irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet regime, fell victim to these liquidations, singled out only for their exotic appearance as the prototypes of an erroneously conceived "Asiatic" or "Mongol" Bolshevism. Tragically, just these same minority groups were considered worthy by the High Command of the German Army since winter of 1941/42 to join the newly formed national legions of Turkestanis, Azerbaijanis, North Caucasians, Volga Tatars, Georgians, Armenians, or Kalmuck Cavalry Corps as fellow combatants and soldiers of equal rights, wearing the German emblem of sovereignty—the swastika in the talons of the eagle—on field gray uniforms.

That the fate of Soviet prisoners of war in German captivity in the winter of 1941/2 was indeed terrible is generally well-known. Hundreds of thousands of them perished from hunger and epidemics during those winter months in what has been justifiably been called a "tragedy of huge proportions." There were, however, many different reasons for this mass mortality. A lack of familiarity with the peoples of the East, human indifference, or even ill will engendered by political resentments, particularly on subordinate levels, may have all played a part. In a greater sense, however, it was not so much ill will as the logistical inability to provide food and housing for millions of often totally exhausted prisoners of war under the harsh conditions of the eastern winter of 1941/2. The German field army, engaged in a life and death defensive struggle, was suffering from severe deficiencies following the near total collapse of the transportation system. Comparatively speaking, it may be said that the mortality rate among Soviet prisoners of war in Finnish captivity amounted to almost one third of the total of men captured.²⁵ It is simply contrary to historical truth to blame the competent Quartermaster General of the German Army General Staff for the conditions of the prisoners of war or to attempt to relate any losses to Hitler's so-called "policy of extermination" in the East. It was the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the German Army that, by the decrees of August 6, October 21, and December 2, 1941, to the Wehrmacht Military District Commanders, established food rations in quantities sufficient to maintain the life and health of all prisoners of war in the occupied territories, including the regions of the Ukraine and the Eastern territories (*Ostland*), as well as Norway and Romania. The question arises as to whether,

²⁵ Hoffmann, *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee*, pp. 141ff.

and to what extent, these decrees were followed, or could be followed, or, if applicable, why they were not followed.

Orders and instructions from the High Command could not in any case simply be ignored. It can also be shown that the responsible commanding officers of the rear army service zones as well as many POW camp commandants, made an effort to improve the conditions of the prisoners of war and to create some kind of assistance within the limits of their restricted possibilities. If only very limited success was achieved, the reasons resided in the increasingly difficult supply situation caused by the huge numbers of prisoners and the total collapse of the transportation system in the winter of 1941/42, which also severely jeopardized the supplies of the German Army of the East. In the spring of 1942, however, when the ice broke, a number of steps were taken to improve the situation of the Soviet prisoners of war—measures intentionally based on the conditions of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which was never ratified by the Soviet Union. From the spring of 1942 onward, conditions were, without delay, consolidated and began to improve, both in the domain of the High Command of the Army and the German High Command of the Wehrmacht, so that the survival of Soviet prisoners of war in the camps was no longer in question.

Atrocity propaganda as a major factor in the Soviet military effort was naturally unaffected by all this and continued unabated in the Red Army.²⁶ Even in the spring of 1943, at a time when the “Russian Welfare Staff” of the ROA (*Russkaja Osvoboditel'naja Armija*, Russian Liberation Army), with a strength of one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and twenty squads, had long since officiated in all military prisoner of war installations and divisions of the German Army of the East for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of their fellow prisoners of war—an institution that made a lasting impression on the members of the Red Army—the Soviets tirelessly repeated that the Germans were “hanging or shooting all prisoners of war, as well as subjecting them to cruel tortures.”²⁷ In the region of Smolensk, allegedly “35,000 prisoners of war were shot,” (a reference to recent events at Katyn, where Polish officers were in fact shot by the Soviet NKVD).²⁸ According to German records, even Red Army soldiers inclined to oppose the Soviet regime began “to grow somewhat suspicious, because they do not know whether or not we will shoot them.”²⁹

26 BA-MA, RH 21-1/481, 21. 3. 1942.

27 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 472, 19. 4. 1943.

28 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 496, 9. 12. 1943.

29 BA-MA, RH 21-2/v. 708, 3. 8. 1942.

On the whole, the Germans were quick to perceive that the systematic dissemination of tales of real or alleged German atrocities against prisoners of war had the automatic effect of stiffening the resistance of the Red Army while diminishing the tendency of Soviet soldiers to surrender. Major Solov'ev, Chief of Staff of the 445th Infantry Regiment of the 140th Infantry Division, expressed this as follows: "The only explanation for the resistance by the Red Army is that Wehrmacht atrocity allegations were made both orally and in writing with an intensity that has no equal."³⁰ As early as June 24, 1941, prisoners stated that the reason for their stubborn resistance was that the following was "drummed" into them:

1. If Soviet troops evacuated a position and withdrew, political commissars immediately shot them.
2. If they deserted, the Germans would immediately shoot them.
3. If they were not shot by the Germans, they would be immediately shot as soon as the Red Army retook the position, in which case, their property would be confiscated and their relatives also shot."

These statements reveal the hopeless situation in which Soviet soldiers found themselves entrapped.

The stiffening resistance of the Red Army may also be a pragmatic explanation for the increasing disinclination of the German command authorities to enforce the Commissar Order, which was finally rescinded on May 6, 1942. To combat Soviet fears of captivity, the Germans simultaneously undertook a massive leaflet action.³¹ In view of the fact that Soviet prisoners of war had had good experiences in addition to bad ones, such as those of the Commander of the 8th Infantry Corps, Major General Snegov, who stated in evidence on August 11, 1941: "The first few days in German captivity made a wonderful impression on us. We felt like different men. I and my comrades felt that we were able to talk to each other for the first time."³² After the winter catastrophe of 1941/42, increasing numbers of positive arguments could be cited in favor of surrender, but the precondition for the success of such counter-propaganda was, and remained, complete truthfulness. The High Command of the 3rd Panzer Army informed the High Command of the Army on August 21, 1942, that promising decent treatment and failing to keep those promises would destroy the credibility of all German front-line propaganda in the long run.³³

30 BA-MA, RH 24-4/91, 24. 6. 1941.

31 BA-MA, RH 24-3/135, 11. 9. 1941.

32 PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 12, part II, 14. 8. 1941.

33 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 782, 21. 8. 1942.

By means of terror, the Red Army leadership attempted to suffocate all doubt as to its atrocity allegations. This was true first of all of German propaganda leaflets that, like Soviet propaganda leaflets, were initially characterized by uncouthness and crudity, becoming rather ineffective during the winter of 1941/42. Only when the leaflets were adapted to the mentality of Soviet soldiers with the help of locals who knew the country, particularly, when they ceased to exclude or threaten officers and political workers, but were rather personally addressed to them, building “golden bridges” to them³⁴ and were made recognizable as passes³⁵ did these leaflets produce their full effect. The Soviet military agencies reacted nervously and took all possible steps to prevent German leaflets from coming into the possession of the highly receptive Soviet soldier.³⁶ “Tighten up on the collection and destruction of fascist leaflets... by Party and Komosol organizations as well as by the divisional political apparatus, and take care to prevent these leaflets from falling into the hands of Soviet soldiers,” was the watchword of the NKVD in September 1941.³⁷ Merely picking up “counterrevolutionary fascist leaflets” was subject to severe punishment. All Soviet soldiers found in possession of a fascist leaflet were to be “immediately arrested” and held responsible based on a directive of the newly assigned NKVD “Special Department” (*Kontrrazvedka* or Counterespionage, previously the 3rd Chief Directorate), such as the Southwest Front of the 26th Army (August 2, 1941), or the 9th Army (September 5, 1941, No. 25165).³⁸ Concerning what happened to the guilty, the reports agree in their particulars: picking up and reading German leaflets was punished by death.³⁹ Red Army soldiers were shot for this, everywhere, without judgement by court martial, and, if possible, in front of the assembled troops.⁴⁰ “Possession of a German leaflet by a Soviet soldier is punished by court martial, in most cases by shooting,” the Commander of the 27th Infantry Corps, Major General Artemenko, bluntly admitted in September 1941.⁴¹

Another source of information turned out to be no less injurious to the credibility of anti-German atrocity propaganda. In a directive of Stalin’s (Northwest Front No. 0116, July 20, 1941), the source was identified as the

34 Hoffmann, *Kaukasien 1942/43*, pp. 116ff.

35 BA-MA, RH 21-3/437, 7. 8. 1941.

36 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 12. 7. 1941.

37 BA-MA, RH 20-17/283, 19. 9. 1941.

38 *Ibid.*, 29. 9. 1941.

39 BA-MA, RH 21-2/v. 648, 12. 7. 1941; BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 4. 8. 1941; BA-MA, RH 20-4/672, 28. 8. 1941.

40 BA-MA, RH 24-17/152, 13. 8. 1941.

41 BA-MA, RH 21-1/473, September 1941.

so-called "traitors," and "spies," the most dangerous of these being the "commanders (officers), political leaders, and Red Army members" returning individually or in groups from the "encirclement in the western territories of the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic," *i.e.*, all Soviet soldiers, regardless of rank, who escaped from German captivity or made it back to their own troops from behind enemy lines. All such returning soldiers automatically fell under suspicion and were indicted in accordance with Stalin's orders. What the Soviet leadership feared most of all, apart from direct agent activity, was the dissemination of "provocative rumors... denying that the commanders of the German army carried out reprisals against prisoners of war, or claiming that prisoners were well-fed, and were afterward released to work on the kolkhozes." The Chief of the 3rd Section of the 12th Army, Colonel Rozin, remarked angrily on July 15, 1941: "provocative rumors as to the invincibility of the German army and the good, kind treatment of captured Red Army soldiers by the Germans."⁴² Although Soviet prisoners of war were sometimes harassed or suffered acts of violence by the Germans and were exposed to increasing distress after the autumn of 1941, the Soviet command posts were suspicious that "counter-revolutionary rumors" of allegedly good treatment of "captured Soviet soldiers and the civilian population" could damage the credibility of Soviet propaganda tales of the "bloody crimes and bestial acts of violence committed by the Hitlerite cannibals," so for example the Kursk Regional Military Commissariat on September 23, 1941.⁴³

From documentary material by the Special Department of the NKVD of the 19th Army captured near Vjaz'ma in May 1942, the Germans derived some gratifying conclusions stating:

"In contrast to the infamous partisans, the peaceful populations of many localities are joyfully greeting the Germans as liberators. The fact, unique in the history of warfare, of a population greeting an ethnically foreign enemy as the liberator from the intolerable yoke of its own government is a devastating condemnation in itself. The all-pervading spirit of mistrust filling the available NKVD records from first to last page, nevertheless, confirms the documentary condemnation. Every civilian, every soldier—even Soviet soldiers who fled from German captivity at the risk of their lives—is suspected of high treason, such suspicions often acquiring truly grotesque forms."⁴⁴

42 BA-MA, RH 21-1/471, 15. 7. 1941.

43 BA-MA, RH 4/v. 330, 23. 9. 1941.

44 *Ibid.*, May 1942.

To enforce the directive by Stalin, severe measures were taken by the NKVD, the political apparatus, and the apparatus of military justice to prevent all enemy influence on the troops from the very outset, and to isolate returning soldiers or render them harmless. The Chief Military Prosecutor of the Red Army, Divisional Military Jurist Kondrat'ev, by Order No. 00120 of September 24, 1941, attempted to make a distinction between "traitors" who had been directly recruited, and "seducers" among "fascist prisoners of war," who merely made claims of "good treatment" in captivity, although in his opinion both categories were obviously "a great danger."⁴⁵ Such subtleties, however, had long since been disregarded by the controlling apparatus of the NKVD. Thus, for example, the Special Department of the 26th Army on August 5, 1941, announced that the Germans were engaged in the "mass recruiting of agents among the civilian population, surrendering Red Army soldiers, and deserters," sending them "into the Soviet territory for purposes of espionage and subversion" and the dissemination of "provocative rumors." This was a blanket accusation that presupposed the obviousness of the dissemination of "provocative rumors" while simultaneously expressing obvious mistrust of every Soviet soldier. Army Commissar First Rank Mekhlis basically expected "spies and White Guards," especially among returning officers.⁴⁶

The "strictest countermeasures" were now threatened. "The arrest of all persons coming from areas occupied by German troops, detailed interrogations with the objective of obtaining a confession, and handing the guilty party over to court martial"—which was the equivalent to shooting him. High-ranking officers in the Soviet 6th and 12th Armies, including Lieutenant General Muzychenko, Lieutenant General Sokolov, Major General Tonkonogov, Major General Ogurtsev (6th Army), Major General Ponedelin, Major General Snegov, Major General Abranidze, and Major General Proshkin (12th Army), testified on August 16, 1941, that "soldiers having escaped from German captivity were immediately shot." According to the testimony of the Commander of the 196th Infantry Division, Major General Kulikov, returning officers only received a minimum of ten years imprisonment in a labor camp for "residence on the territory of the enemy."⁴⁷ In addition, all Soviet soldiers who escaped the collapse of the fronts and the encirclement battles and broke through to their own troops were subjected

45 BA-MA, RH 20-2/1121, 24. 9. 1941.

46 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 329, 15/20. 7. 1941.

47 BA-MA, RH 20-17/283, 1. 10. 1941.

to severe persecution. According to Major General Grigorenko,⁴⁸ encircled troops (*okruzhenci*) were greeted with orders of execution:

"Soldiers and officers, members of supply units, infantrymen, fliers... tank crews... artillerymen... were all shot; the next day, those who had shot them could themselves be encircled by the enemy and might well suffer the same fate as those shot by them yesterday."

Only the absence of a continuous front and the collapse of uniform leadership are believed to have saved literally "hundreds of thousands" of soldiers from a senseless policy of extermination.

The Soviets also used another—psychological—means to prevent flight forward by Red Army soldiers: the principle, well-known to every resident of the Soviet Socialist Republics, of revenge and reprisals against family members (*Ugolovnyj kodeks*, part 2, article 58-1 "V"). German interrogation records unanimously reveal the anxiety with which captured Soviet soldiers contemplated this type of "revenge by their Soviet rulers,"⁴⁹ *i.e.*, that their family members "would be banned to Siberia or shot."⁵⁰ What is more, the "group of relatives subject to the severest reprisals," according to the testimony of a captured First Lieutenant, was "interpreted very broadly."⁵¹ First Lieutenant Filipenko, First Ordinance Officer of the Staff of the 87th Infantry Division, on June 27, 1941, testified to the existence of a Soviet law "according to which the relatives of captured or deserting soldiers would be held responsible, *i.e.*, would be shot." A summary report on prisoner of war interrogations in the German XXIII Army Corps of July 30, 1941, states: "The officers live in constant fear that their relatives will be shot by the GPU [*Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye*; State Political Administration; the Soviet Secret Police] if they are captured." This was also the impression of aircraft crewmembers Lieutenant Anoshkin, Second Lieutenant Nikiforov and Sergeant Smirnov:

"If it is discovered that a flier has been captured by the Germans, his family will answer for it, either through banishment or through the shooting of individual members of the family. This fear of reprisals is what prevents most desertions."

Similarly, Major General Abranidze, Commander of the 72nd Mountain Infantry Division, on August 14, 1941, testified to his great concern for "the fate of his relatives," "when it becomes known that he has been cap-

48 Nekritsch/Grigorenko, *Genickschuß*, p. 280.

49 BA-MA, RH 24-28/10, undated.

50 BA-MA, RH 24-17/152, 2. 7. 1941.

51 BA-MA, RH 20-17/282, 28. 7. 1941.

tured.”⁵² Major Generals Snegov (Commander of the 8th Infantry Corps) and Ogurtsev (Commander of the 49th Infantry Corps), Colonels Loginov (Commander of the 139th Infantry Division), Dubrovsky (Deputy Commander of the 44th Infantry Division) and Meandrov (Deputy Chief of Staff of the 6th Army), on the same date, confirmed the existence of an order, issued in the spring of 1941, according to which the relatives of all deserters “are punished with the full severity of the law, including death by shooting.”

An apprehensive mood was already widespread throughout the Red Army concerning the fate of the relatives of soldiers, when Stalin, by Order No. 270 of August 16, 1941, once again expressly decreed the application of the principle of the liability of all members of a family for the crimes of an individual member.⁵³ According to Order No. 270, signed by Stalin in his capacity as President of the State Defense Committee, as well as by Molotov, Budenny, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Shaposhnikov, and Zhukov, captured commanders (officers), and political leaders were equated with deserters, as stated above. Their families were therefore to be arrested as the “families of persons guilty of violating their service oath as well as of deserters guilty of betraying the homeland.” While the families of arrested Soviet soldiers “were to be deprived of all State assistance and support,” and were therefore subject to death from starvation. That such families would be deported to the barren regions of the Gulag and their property confiscated was considered a matter of course. According to the testimony of the prisoner of war Chief Doctor Varabin and others, the political workers responsible for explaining the Order of Stalin to the units also right away hinted at “a more severe punishment.”⁵⁴

Wherever possible, the Special Departments of the NKVD and the Political Departments in the units felt themselves responsible for transmitting the home address of captured soldiers to the appropriate local NKVD agencies for the purpose of enforcing the threatened reprisals.⁵⁵ This even occurred, for example, in cases when Soviet soldiers were surprised by German reconnaissance troops and captured, as on September 27, 1941, in the 238th Infantry Regiment of the 186th Infantry Division. The Chief Military Prosecutor of the Red Army, Divisional Military Jurist Kondrat'ev, instructed the Military Prosecutors of the Fronts on September 24, 1941, to sentence the captured Soviet soldiers in absentia and take “all steps for the application of reprisals against family members.” The Military Public Pros-

52 PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 12, 14. 8. 1941.

53 BA-MA, RH 2/2425, 16. 8. 1941.

54 BA-MA, RH 2/2411, 16. 4. 1942.

55 *Ibid.*, November 1941.

ecutor's Office of the 286th Infantry Division on December 15, 1941, was even reprimanded by the Deputy Department Chief of the Main Military Public Prosecutor's Office, Military Jurist First Rank Varskoi (No. 08683), for failure to supply the addresses of relatives for purposes of enforcement of legal reprisals against the family of a Soviet soldier named Panstyan who had been shot for attempted "treason to the homeland."⁵⁶

The extreme fragility of phrases like "Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism" in the Red Army is revealed by the representative Order No. 0098 of the Leningrad Front of October 5, 1941, signed by General of the Army Zhukov, Member of the Military Council and Secretary of the Central Committee Zhdanov, Members of the Military Council Admiral Isakov and Kuznetsov, and Major General Semashko.⁵⁷ The occasion was an "unprecedented occurrence" involving the 289th Independent Machine Gun Battalion, assigned to a section of front near Sluck-Kolpino, where German soldiers appeared and struck up a conversation with members of the Red Army to induce them to desert. Such "criminal fraternization" on the battlefield was now the occasion for Zhukov, in his usual brutal manner, to suspect and threaten all the troops on the Leningrad Front. For failing to prevent such negotiations, the immediate superiors and political leaders of the soldiers in question were handed over to a court martial and shot for "aiding and abetting criminals against the homeland," and for "aiding and abetting the fascist monsters." In addition, co-workers of the Political Departments and Special Departments of the NKVD on the level of the battalions in question—the Fortification Zone of the 168th Infantry Division and the 55th Army—were to conduct draconian punishment. Zhukov did not, of course, hesitate to prosecute the family members for the purpose of preventing all future attempted acts of "treason and villainy." He ordered:

"The Special Departments of the NKVD of the Leningrad Front must immediately take steps to ensure that all family members of traitors to the homeland are arrested and handed over to a court martial." If Soviet soldiers very often had no choice than to fight to the death, the real reason for it must be sought in this, and other, similar, criminal orders by the Soviet leadership—not in the alleged ideals of so-called "Soviet patriotism."

56 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 15. 12. 1941.

57 BA-MA, RH 2/2425, 5. 10. 1941.

**Stalin's Terror Apparatus
The Creation of "Mass Heroism"
and "Soviet Patriotism"**

It should be clear by now that the Red Army rested upon two pillars: the military leadership apparatus, and the independent political apparatus. The latter had its own official channels and was subordinate to the Chief of the Main Administration for Political Propaganda (GUPPKA; after July 1941, the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army) under the notorious Commissar First Rank Mekhlis. Another institution, working in secrecy, was all the more dangerous: the NKVD terror apparatus, which had nothing to do with the Red Army in terms of organization, but took its orders from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs under Beria. The ruling system of the Soviet Union was based on the simple principle that anyone who failed to believe Soviet propaganda soon experienced Soviet terror. In the Red Army, terror was institutionally extremely well provided for.

Stalin's mistrust of the "command personnel" *i.e.*, the Red Army leadership personnel and troops generally, was not entirely unjustified; this mistrust in turn had serious organizational consequences upon the Army on July 16, 1941, and upon the Red Navy on July 20, 1941. On that date, the "Institute of Military Commissars" (*Voennye komissary*) was established in all corps, divisions, regiments, staffs of military educational foundations and facilities, technical troops of armored battalions and artillery battalions as well as the infantry battalions starting in December. The "Institute of Political Leaders" (*Politiceskie rukovoditeli, politruki*), with corresponding functions, was established in all companies, batteries, cavalry squadrons, and air squadrons. Both institutes had recourse to the Political Departments in performing their tasks. In regard to the Armies and Fronts, high party officials took over the same tasks as the Members of the Military Councils. In accordance with the "Legal Provisions on Military Commissars in the Red Army," confirmed by a decree of the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kalinin, on July 16, 1941, the military commanders and unit leaders, on the same date, lost the political functions for which they had hitherto been responsible.¹ These political functions were

1 BA-MA, RH 21-2/650, 16. 7. 1941.

now completely taken over by their former representatives in matters involving political propaganda in their new capacity as military commissars or political leaders.

These officials, most of whom had "no military training whatever," were not only entrusted with political responsibilities in the Red Army, but with "responsibility for military work," or responsibility "in a military connection" as well. Although they formally enjoyed only "equal entitlement" in regard to the commanders, in practice, they were superior to them. In reality, they were their supervisors, with the right and duty to ensure strict control of "fulfillment of all orders of higher command personnel," and to "inform the High Command and government of any commanders and political workers unworthy of the name of commander or political worker, and whose leadership is injurious to the honor of the Red Army." A commander, even in the position of a divisional commander, was no longer able to make any decisions, even in operational and tactical matters; rather, he was relegated to the role of an executive consultant, a mere military specialist. The decisions of the commanders were never valid without the signature of the military commissar, who represented the "party and government in the Red Army." However, the orders of the commissar or politruk were valid even without the signature of the commander or unit leader, and had to be obeyed in any case. As the Divisional Commissar of the 280th Infantry Division, Martinov, stated on June 5, 1942, a military order could only be obeyed if it had been stamped by the commissar using the service stamp administered by him alone.

The significance of the political apparatus in the Red Army is revealed, not only by the superior position of the military commissar, but also by the large number of personnel of the political administrations and departments available to the commissars. For example, the personnel of the political department (*politotdel*) of an infantry division was unanimously described by the Commander of the 436th Infantry Regiment, Major Kononov, the Chief of the Operations Branch of the 137th Infantry Division, Captain Nagelmann, and the official of the central apparatus of the NKVD, Zhigunov, as consisting of twenty-five persons: the divisional commissar, the chief of the political department, and twenty-three other persons. In terms of numbers therefore, the political department exceeded the personnel of the military division staff. If, in addition, one considers the political bodies of the regiments, battalions, and companies, Party and Komsomol secretaries and political instructors, including the numerous spies and informers, and ordinary Party and Komsomol members, the result is a total personnel of 559 officials holding these positions as their principal office in just one infantry division.

The field of responsibility of the political apparatus was described in greater detail in a "Program for the Commissars and Political Leaders in Leningrad," published by Army Commissar First Rank Mekhlis and annexed to Order No. 270 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on August 19, 1941.² "Next to the commander," therefore, the military commissar was clearly the "military leader of the unit." His duty was to supervise and inform upon all personnel, including the commanders, unit leaders and officers, while simultaneously "cooperating with the agencies of the military public prosecutors, courts martial, and Special Departments." The military commissars and political leaders were supposed to ensure "unconditional obedience" to all battle orders, and were therefore responsible for ensuring that all soldiers fought "bravely," with "unflinching readiness," "to the last drop of blood, against the enemies of our homeland." The commissars were therefore principally responsible for forcing Soviet soldiers into battle regardless of heavy casualties. The commissars were simultaneously responsible for waging a "ruthless struggle against cowards, panic mongers, and deserters by restoring revolutionary order and military discipline with an iron hand." This meant, in other words, that every soldier, regardless of rank, was "to be shot on the spot" if he attempted to desert (or surrender), or if he became visibly "tired of attacking." This also implied the "pitiless" destruction of all "cowards and panic mongers, those of faint heart, and deserters," *i.e.*, all "who leave positions without authorization and without orders." Cowardly commanders in battle were to be dealt with according to Order of Stalin No. 270. "In the ranks of the Red Army," says Mekhlis's appeal to the military commissars, "there is no place, there must be no place, for the small-minded, for cowards, panic mongers, deserters, and those without courage."

The overwhelming importance of the commissars and political leaders in the Red Army as supervisors and enforcers made them an object of fear and loathing for the broad mass of Soviet soldiers. This was especially the case for the officers, whose leadership position was eroded and who were often threatened personally; nor did they conceal their opinions from the Germans. The commander of the 49th Infantry Corps, Major General Ogurtsev scoured the Soviet regime "as the greatest swindle on the people in the history of the world."³ He also testified, on August 11, 1941, "with great bitterness, as to his cooperation with his political commissar," whose decisions were "decisive in all matters"; the commissar had "no knowledge

2 BA-MA, RH 20-17/282, 19. 8. 1941.

3 PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 12, part II, 11. 8., 14. 8. 1941.

of military matters” but enjoyed “unlimited plenary powers.” The resulting influence upon combat actions was therefore “considerably” “to the detriment of the corps.” The military commissar had constantly threatened to report him to higher authorities.

The Commander of the 139th Infantry Division, Colonel Logionov, on August 14, 1941, indicated that the chasm between officer and commissar would “only be bridged by fear and terror.” The Divisional Commander of the 43rd Infantry Division, Major General Kirpichnikov, on September 30, 1941, described the commanders as tied to the commissars “hand and foot,” totally stifled in their “creativity and operational thinking.”⁴ The “resigned” answer of Air Force Captain (military engineer) Ogrisko on September 19, 1941, was:

“You can imagine the relationship for yourself. When you consider that there is a political commissar or controller for every military leader... In the army, for every two soldiers, there is a third who acts on behalf of the apparatus as a member of the Komsomol, of the Party, or NKVD. In the officer corps, the ratio is 1:1.”⁵

This was confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief of the 19th Army and of the entire group encircled near Vjaz'ma (the 19th, 20th Armies and the nearly depleted 16th Army, 32nd and 24th Armies, as well as the Boldin operational group), Lieutenant General Lukin.⁶ Based on his own experience, he declared: A commander in the Red Army was “no longer permitted to take a single step.” “He is surrounded by commissars, informants, and his Military Council... even the generals have their secret-police agents, the regimental commanders have their informers, and so on.” If this was generally true for the political apparatus, which operated relatively “openly,” what can be said of the true terror apparatus in the Red Army, the NKVD, whose operations were a secret? This apparatus will be subjected to a closer examination below.

So much has been written about the NKVD (*Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del*; People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)—which has been responsible for millions of murders and for the system of concentration camps (GULag), as well as the for continual repression and terrorization of all Soviet citizens, using sub-organizations and special troops to perform its functions—that, generally, commentary at this point would be superfluous. Just one small, but characteristic, report from the early stages

4 PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 13, 30, 9. 1941.

5 BA-MA, RH 21-2/v. 658, 19. 9. 1941.

6 BA, R 677, 14. 12. 1941.

of the war, relating to the working methods of this criminal organization, is in order at this point. The Chief of the Counter Intelligence Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Admiral Canaris, presented a report in July 1941 concerning an inspection of the Soviet Embassy building in Paris, *i.e.*, an extra-territorial diplomatic installation.⁷ According to the report, it was discovered that a GPU headquarters had been installed in a side wing of the Paris Embassy, with facilities for "torture, executions, and for the destruction of corpses," something quite unique in the diplomatic history of civilized states. The report assumes that "the bodies of several white Russian generals who mysteriously disappeared in Paris a few years ago were destroyed here."

On July 16, 1941, Stalin announced the forthcoming sentencing of the arrested Generals of the Staff of the West Front and a few others generals who had been taken prisoner. He also decided to re-institute the apparatus of the NKVD, more exactly known as the Special Department (*Osobyje otdel*) of the NKVD within the Red army, in addition to the "Institute for Military Commissars and Political Leaders." A regulation of the State Security Committee of July 17, 1941, subordinated the Special Departments under the immediate control of the NKVD, although in March 1941, they had just been incorporated into the People's Commissariat of Defense as the 3rd Department (*Otdel 3, Upravlenija NKO*).⁸ This was anything but a purely administrative proceeding, and was discussed in more detail by People's Commissar Beria in a decree on July 18, 1941, who justified it on the basis of the "glorious Chekist traditions," *i.e.*, the perpetuation of their great practical experience in the use of mass terror.

It is characteristic that the existence of the terrorist secret organization (*Osobyje otdel*), which was granted unlimited powers in the Red Army, has remained almost unknown right down to the present day.⁹ West German journalism, for example, only speaks of so-called "political commissars" (meaning military commissars and political leaders). Yet it was precisely this subsidiary of the NKVD that had a task of the greatest importance to perform within the armed forces. It was responsible for waging "merciless struggle against espionage and treason in the units, the liquidation of deserters in sections immediately adjacent to the front," as well as for carrying on a "pitiless struggle against the subversion of cowardly traitors and deserters." Accordingly, the Special Departments received the authorization on all levels, right up to the division level (*Divizionny Osobyje otdel*), to arrest, at

7 PAAA, Handakten Ritter, 29, Rußland, 20. 7. 1941.

8 PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 8, undated.

9 BA-MA, RH 22/271, 12. 7. 1941.

any time, deserters among soldiers and non-commissioned officers and, in urgent cases, officers and, if need be, to shoot them on the spot. Arresting members of the "middle, higher-ranking, and supreme leadership personnel" was abstractly dependent upon prior approval by the Special Department of the NKVD for the section of front in question. This was hardly more than formal obstacle at any rate, since, as Major Kononov testified, such approval was "fundamentally declared to be forthcoming," and was in most cases obtained following the executions of the officers. In practice, therefore, the "divisional commander received a brief notice afterward, stating that one of his officers had been shot."

Special Departments of the NKVD existed on the levels of the Fronts, Armies, Corps, and Divisions; on the regimental staff, there was a "plenipotentiary" of the Chief of the Special Department of the Division with his assistants. To supervise the detainees and carry out the executions, the Special Department of the Division had its own execution squad in platoon strength. The personnel of the Special Departments also had the right to carry out "controls and inspections of all documentation" and to participate in all service conferences. The effectiveness of these Special Departments was based primarily on a system of informants, penetrating all aspects of the Army. Order No. 40 of the Chiefs of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 51st Independent Army, Brigade Commissar Pimenov, on October 25, 1941, provides an idea of the extent to which the "Soviet patriots" of the Red Army were subjected to spying and informing.¹⁰ Pimenov complained menacingly that no "mass secret service," no "large-scale information network," no "thick network of intelligence agents," no "capable cell-agencies" of "operative" informers, spies, and agents had been created in the 276th Infantry Division in compliance with Order of Stalin 270 and additional NKVD orders. While at least eight "agents" (*agenty osvedomiteli*) should have been assigned in every company, in addition to a "resident," he said, only one single informant had been found in a certain company of this front-line division, so that "class enemies," "counter-revolutionary" and "criminal elements" were able to carry on their subversive activity without hindrance.¹¹

Documentary material from the Special Department of the NKVD of the 19th Army under Colonel (of State Security) Korolev provides us with some information on the average daily work of the NKVD, which also supervised the military commissars and political leaders. It consisted,

¹⁰ BA-MA, RH 20-17/283, 25. 10. 1941.

¹¹ BA-MA, RH 24-5/110, 14. 8. 1941.

briefly, of the detection, arrest, and liquidation of "traitors." "Many hundreds of denunciations" by company informants against soldiers had to be constantly evaluated. Between 25 and July 27, 1941, the Special Department of one division and its guard command alone arrested "up to 1,000 persons fleeing from the front." A few individual entries, selected at random, ran as follows:

"7 men were shot before the assembled personnel ... furthermore, 5 men were shot without a verdict: 3 deserters and 2 traitors to the homeland who attempted to desert to the enemy; 16 self-mutilators, 2 deserters, and 2 men were shot, according to the judgement of the military tribunal, for leaving the battlefield without authorization... On August 29, of this year, Yurigin Fedor, Member of the All-Russian Communist Party, was shot before the assembled personnel of the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 400th Infantry Regiment for failing to carry out an attack order of the regimental commander, Major Novikov."

The methods commonly employed are revealed by an accidentally discovered "special communication" from the Special Department of the NKVD of the 264th Infantry Division to the Chief of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 26th Army, Major (of State Security) Valis, on the first combat action of the 1060th Infantry Regiment.¹² When the young soldiers of the 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion failed, heavy machine guns opened fire on them and killed at least 60 of them: "The commander and the political leader shot all who attempted to surrender." A letter from Soviet writer Stavsky written to "Dear Comrade Stalin," states that 480-600 soldiers were shot for "desertion, panic mongering, and other crimes" in the 24th Army in region around El'nja within a few days of August 1941 alone, according to data of the Soviet High Command and the Political Department.¹³

In the face of such orders of magnitude, the records are simply filled with data on individual and mass executions in the units of the Red Army. "The number of daily executions for desertion and self-mutilation is amazingly high," says a German evaluation report. No wonder then that, as stated elsewhere, the mere existence of the Special Department had "a paralyzing effect on officers and soldiers," or, as the captured Generals Snegov and Ogurtsev and other high officers admitted to the Germans: "Fear of the ghostly power of the NKVD was impossible to overcome." "All officers have a great fear of the NKVD."¹⁴ On August 9, 1941, this was also readily admitted by the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General

¹² BA-MA, RH 20-17/283, 21. 9. 1941.

¹³ Wolkogonow, *Triumph und Tragödie*, vol. 2/1, p. 179.

¹⁴ PAAA, Pol. XIII, vol. 12, part II, 30. 8. 1941.

Muzychenko, who must be considered to have been loyal to the system: "The NKVD is a dreadful organization that can exterminate every one of us at any time."¹⁵ One who stood close to the proceedings, the Divisional Commissar of the 176th Infantry Division, Filev, described the functions of the Special Department in the following pithy phrase: "All counter-revolutionary activity is immediately and unmercifully repressed by draconian means."¹⁶

The far-reaching curtailment of the authority of Soviet officers in favor of the reintroduced military commissars and political leaders, in addition to the installation of the secret NKVD apparatus independent of the army, did not yet appear sufficient to Stalin to check the armed forces that he so mistrusted. Based on Order No. 001919 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, signed on September 12, 1941, by Stalin and Marshal Shaposhnikov, so-called "blocking units" (*Zagraditel'nye otrjady*) made up of "reliable fighters," or, as it states in another place, "reliable, resistant, dedicated commanders, political leaders, sub-commanders, and soldiers" were to be formed in battalion strength in each division within five days.¹⁷ These well-armed blocking units, equipped with their own tanks and armored cars, received the authority to prevent any unauthorized withdrawal of front-line troops by armed force, and to shoot down all panicky soldiers attempting to withdraw from combat.

Implementation Order No. 04/00378 of the Command-in-Chief of the 19th Army Lieutenant General Lukin, and Member of the Military Council, Divisional Commissar Shekhanov, of September 15, 1941, shows that the blocking units were not formed on a case by case basis, but consisted rather of permanent, "independent" units. In addition to these permanent blocking units of the divisions, "one company to one regiment," which were deployed at the height of the artillery positions, ad hoc blocking units (*Polkovnye Zagraditel'nye otrjady*) can be proven to have been drawn from the regiments as early as July 1941. According to the testimony of the Regimental Commander, Major Kononov, these units formed of Party and Komsomol members in alternating composition (for the purpose of concealment), received the order, issued in every case prior to any combat action, to shoot all "cowards," *i.e.*, all those "who do not blindly storm forward for whatever reason."¹⁸ Concealed blocking commandos consisting "of military commissars and chiefs of the Special Departments" were also posted to the

15 PAAA, Handakten Eitzdorf, vol. 24, 9. 8. 1941.

16 BA-MA, RH 21-1/473, 11. 10. 1941.

17 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 329, 12. 9. 1941, also for the following.

18 BA-MA, RH 22/271, 6. 9. 1941.

rear of the Soviet armies, especially on the streets and crossroads, to arrest all suspicious-looking soldiers and transfer them to NKVD "Special Camps," where they would be "examined," *i.e.*, most of them were shot.

During the crisis of 1942, the blocking units were granted a renewal. Stalin returned to this tried-and-tested institution in his well-known Order No. 227 of July 28, 1942, and further emphasized his demands by means of an order of July 31, 1942, issued by himself and General Vasilevsky, who at that time was Chief of the General Staff.¹⁹ Under the leadership of the members of the Special Departments, well-equipped blocking units, with a strength of 200 men each, were accordingly to be posted immediately behind every division, subordinated to the Military Councils of the Soviet armies. These units, as well, were to shoot all "panic mongers and cowards on the spot" in the event of unauthorized withdrawal. If, in addition to the political administrations and departments, Special Departments and blocking units, one also considers the justice meted out by the military public prosecutors and military tribunals, as well as the punishment battalions and punishment companies introduced by Order No. 227; if, furthermore, one considers the barbaric methods used by these bodies, then one understands something of the real driving forces behind the so-called "mass heroism" and "Soviet patriotism" of the soldiers of the Red Army during the "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union." The methods employed, however, require more detailed examination.

Generally, it is true to say that the inhumane treatment of the Soviet soldiers differed from the treatment meted out to the Soviet civilian population in the combat zone only in its perfection. Stalin had given the watchword on July 3, 1941, when he demanded that "not one kilo of wheat, not one liter of gasoline" should be left to the enemy, and that "all valuable property... that cannot be transported" should be destroyed, "without exception." This was further intensified in regard to the civilian population by Soviet radio on July 7, 1941.²⁰ All rolling stock, all stocks of raw materials, all stocks of fuel, every kilo of wheat, every head of livestock, were to be destroyed. Implementation of the newly proclaimed principle of destruction meant deliberate, unquestioning destruction of the basic necessities of life for the civilian population. It also meant that the population would be exposed to the foreseeable consequences of the partisan war, which was begun at this same time, and which was illegal under international law—

19 BA-MA, RH 27-3/188, 19. 8. 1942; Wolkogonow, *Triumph und Tragödie*, vol. 2/1, p. 280.

20 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 16. 7. 1941.

i.e., the danger of severe reprisals by the Germans and German-allied troops.

As early as June 29, 1941, the Council of the People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the VKP (b) gave instructions that all forces of the "Soviet" population were to be mobilized in the struggle against the Germans, and that an extensive people's war was to be organized in the enemy hinterland.²¹ The face of this "people's war" is representatively revealed, in addition to many similar worded proclamations,²² by a directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of White Russia of July 1, 1941,²³ communicating the following data relating to the incipient "partisan movement."²⁴

"Every link to the enemy hinterland must be destroyed, bridges and streets must be blown up or damaged, fuel and food warehouses, vehicles and aircraft must be burned, railway catastrophes must be arranged, all enemies must be exterminated: they must receive no rest either day or night; they must be exterminated everywhere, wherever they are surprised, they must be killed by any means that comes to hand: axes, scythes, crowbars, hay forks, knives..., you must not shrink from using any means in the extermination of the enemy: strangle them, hack them to death, burn and poison the fascist scum."

According to the testimony of the captured partisan Kozlov on October 1, 1941, the member of the Central Committee of the Party, Kazalopov from Khol'm, also demanded that German soldiers and wounded be "further tortured by mutilation prior to shooting."²⁵

It was not only the partisan units and partisan groups, some of them recruited by force from among the male population under the threat of being shot, that now began an illegal guerrilla war in crass violation of the letter and spirit of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare.²⁶ The entire civilian population was irresponsibly drawn in, as revealed by a proclamation directed at all residents of "enemy-occupied territory" by the Commander-in-Chief of the West Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, and with him, Member of the Military Council, Bulganin, on August 6, 1941.²⁷ The "workers, farmers, and all Soviet citizens" were ordered to "attack and destroy German rear connections, transports, and columns, burn and destroy

21 Bychkov, *Partizanskoe dvizhenie*, p. 47.

22 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 27. 7. 1941; BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, 1941.

23 *Zarozhdenie i razvitiie*, pp. 53f.

24 BA-MA, RH 22/271, 15. 7. 1941.

25 *Ibid.*, 1. 10. 1941.

26 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 472, 30. 6. 1942.

27 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 437, 6. 8. 1941.

bridges, tear down telegraph and telephone lines, set fire to houses and forests." "Beat the enemy, torture him to death with hunger, burn him with fire, destroy him with bullets and hand grenades... to carry out the destruction of bridges in the rear of the enemy, use mostly local means, use expedients involving explosives... burn warehouses, destroy the fascists like mad dogs." All very easily said by persons who knew that they were in safety; the people would suffer the consequences. No army in the whole world would have tolerated such actions without the severest reprisals.

Many leaflets were directed at Russian women, alleging that German soldiers "kill small children before the eyes of their mothers, cut open the stomachs of pregnant women, cut off the breasts of breast-feeding women, they rape women, mothers, and sisters, and force them into brothels."²⁸ Soviet women, as "beloved citizens," were called upon to commit illegal acts of the greatest danger. For those women, who however, like the majority in the occupied territories, wanted nothing more than the restoration of halfway tolerable life relationships, the Soviets offered a half-concealed threat: "We will see you later, we will see you again soon!" Everyone knew what that meant. Agents were assigned to draw up "precise lists" of all persons in any way associated with the Germans, even if their only crime had been their inability to avoid German troops from being quartered on them.²⁹ First Lieutenant Kovalev of the 223rd Infantry Division testified that the population was also called upon to refuse to work.³⁰ Fields, forests, and buildings were to be set on fire. The rural population was to burn all wheat, destroy agricultural implements, while the workers in the cities were to destroy the machinery and manufacturing installations. "Long live our great Stalin!" shouted Timoshenko and Bulganin to the population, who were called upon to deprive themselves of the last resources needed to survive.³¹

In order to lend force to the "scorched earth policy," proclaimed by Stalin on July 3, 1941, and introduced by the Party and governmental bodies by directive of the Central Committee and the Council of the People's Commissars as early as June 29, 1941, so-called "destruction battalions" (*Istrebitel'nye batal'onny*) were formed of Party and Komsomol members and elements loyal to the system.³² Their task was to carry out destruction on the greatest possible scale in the centers and cities of areas threatened by the enemy. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, oper-

28 BA-MA, RH 24-3/136, 12. 11. 1941.

29 BA-MA, RH 24-3/135, 13. 8. 1941.

30 BA-MA, RH 20-17/282, 26. 8. 1941.

31 BA-MA, RH 20-17/332, 3. 3. 1942.

32 Bilenko, *Istrebitel'nye batal'onny*, Kirsanov.

ational sapper groups were formed under the leadership of the Main Administration for Military Engineering Affairs, in cooperation with the front-line staffs, for example, in Kharkov, Kiev, and in other cities, for the general purpose of blowing up or undermining all important objectives and houses in the region.³³ Colonel General Volkogonov also published Order No. 0428 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of November 17, 1941.³⁴ In this "horrible order," characteristic for its "cruelty," Stalin ordered every regiment to form special arson commandos that, together with partisans and subversives, were to "destroy and burn down completely" all human settlements and houses in the German hinterland, to a depth of 40-60 kilometers, and 20-30 kilometers right and left of the roads, without exception, in the event of forced withdrawal. Concentrated forces of the air force and artillery were to participate in this work of destruction. No consideration was given to the populations who lived there, and who were thus robbed of their last lodgings and chased out into the icy wastes. "Villages and houses were always burned, wherever there were no Germans," writes Volkogonov. "Where there were occupants, it was not so easy to set fires... weathered farm houses blazed brightly, while fear-stricken mothers pressed weeping children to themselves. A pall lay over the villages of the homeland, tried by suffering." That the Order of Stalin communicated to the front and army staffs was obviously carried out before the issue date is shown by documents captured by the Germans, in relation to the "systematic arson action." For example, the Chief of Staff of the 1322nd Infantry Regiment, Major Zharkov, distributed a combat order to the 1st Battalion as early as November 17, 1941, ordering the villages near Barykovo, Lutovinovo, and Krjukovka burned down during the coming night. All persons (soldiers and civilians), attempting to leave the houses, were to be exterminated by hand grenades and firearms.³⁵

Stalin's callousness in regard to the sufferings of the civilian population were also revealed in an order distributed on September 21, 1941, to the Commander of Leningrad, General of the Army Zhukov, Members of the Military Council Zhdanov and Kuznetsov, and NKVD Deputy Merkulov.³⁶ The motive for it is not authenticated; nor is it entirely credible. In any case, the above named persons reported that the German troops were sending "old men and women, and mothers with children ahead" to Leningrad, with

33 Starinov, "Eto bylo tajnoj."

34 Volkogonov, *Triumph und Tragödie*, vol. 2/1, pp. 240f., 260f. (*Prikaz Stavki Verchovnogo Glavnogo Komandovanija No 0428*).

35 BA-MA, RH 24-24/336, 17. 11. 1941; BA-MA, RH 21-1/481, 12. 12. 1941.

36 Volkogonov, *Triumph und Tragödie*, vol. 2/1, p. 238 (*Zhukovu, Zdanovu, Kuznecovu, Merkulovu*).

a request that the Bolsheviks surrender Leningrad and conclude peace. Stalin, in his usual manner, reacted with "extreme cruelty," issuing the threat that all persons "in our ranks" with inhibitions "against opening fire upon this type of delegation," "must be destroyed, since such persons are more dangerous than the German fascists." His "advice," in reality, an order communicated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union Shaposhnikov, read:

"There must be no sentimentality; rather, hit the enemy and his lackeys, both willing and unwilling, in the teeth... hit both the Germans and their delegates with all your strength, wherever they may be. Mow the enemy down, whether willing or unwilling. No mercy to the German cut-throats and their delegates, whoever they may be."

This order by Stalin to open fire upon old men and women, and mothers with children was immediately communicated in detail to the commanders and commissars of the divisions and regiments in Leningrad.

The inhumane attitude of both Stalin and his regime toward their own population was revealed perfectly when the German troops began to withdraw in 1943, with Soviet troops gradually regaining the previously occupied territories. The Red Army troops were everywhere followed by border troops and NKVD troops to secure the hinterland; these were responsible for taking "Chekist measures" to purge "all territories liberated from the occupant," particularly cities and inhabited areas, "from enemy elements and their lackeys," from "enemy agents and other hostile elements," to "normalize" and "restore" the situation and create a "revolutionary order" behind the front line.³⁷ What this meant in practice is revealed with sufficient clarity by the actions of the Soviet security corps: the shooting of all inhabitants and residents, without regard to age or sex, having maintained at least bearable relations with the German occupation authorities or German soldiers. Hundreds of thousands now fell victim to NKVD purges, an order of magnitude that compares, and may even exceed, the victims of the *Einatzgruppen* of the German Security Police and SD.

A terrible fate awaited the Caucasian peoples of Kalmucks, Karachays, Chechens, Ingushs, Balkars, parts of the Karbardinian people, as well as the Tatars of the Crimea for their collaboration with the German occupation authorities.³⁸ Following the initial, far-reaching waves of bloody purges, these people, on the order of Stalin, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP (b), and the State Defense Committee (GKO) of

37 "Pogranichnye vojska," pp. 473, 490.

38 Hoffmann, *Kaukasien 1942/43*, pp. 456ff.

1943/1944, were torn from their ancestral residences and deported to concentration camps in the barren regions of Siberia, and to north of the Polar circle, or to central Asia. They were dispersed, stripped of all national identity, and treated, immediately and practically, like convicts. Tens of thousands fell victim to this "mass crime"—so-called by Khrushchev in 1956, although he was personally involved. This crime was carried out using methods that were as treacherous as they were cruel, with the usual accompanying phenomena of executions and the systematic dispersion of families. These actions clearly constituted the crime of genocide according to the 1948 Genocide Convention, ratified by the USSR (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).

Anyone prepared to act as mercilessly against his own civilian population would naturally show no mercy to one's own soldiers. This is revealed by many characteristics. A common crime in the Red Army, for example, was the self-infliction of wounds by soldiers just prior to serious attacks in order to avoid combat. As a rule, the self-mutilators, who were found in all sections of the army, were shot. This may be seen from the records in all cases, either with or without judgement by a court martial, which was irrelevant under Soviet conditions. The number of sentences handed down for self-mutilation, already considerable as early as June 1941, increased rapidly in 1942, almost doubling on the Kalinin Front, the Southwest Front, and the North Front between January and May 1942, and increased by the factor of nine on the Northwest Front over the same time period. It was not the fact that there were "sometimes hundreds of self-mutilators" in the "etappe," *i.e.*, the field hospitals and military hospitals to the rear, but rather the fact that few such cases were being reported on the furthestmost front line, in the first-aid stations (PPM) and medical battalions (MSB), that motivated the intervention by the Military Public Prosecutor's Office of the Red Army under Corps Jurist Nossov, on July 18, 1942. Nossov's Order No. 0110 instructed the military public prosecutors of the Fronts and Armies not just to take action afterward, as had been done previously, but rather to hand over a few self-mutilators, sentence them to death and shoot them immediately, during the attack preparations or just after the attack began, "in front of all assembled personnel," to achieve the maximum degree of deterrence.³⁹ In this instance as well, the "mass heroism" and "Soviet patriotism" of the Red Army was the result of intimidation. In contrast to conditions in the German Wehrmacht, where soldiers were only

39 BA-MA, H 20/290, 18. 7. 1942; "Methodik für die Untersuchungsführung bei einzelnen Arten von Vergehen während der Kriegzeit, I. Untersuchung bei vorsätzlichen Selbstverstümmelungen," *ibid.*

suspected of so-called self-mutilation in exceptional cases, the broad mass of soldiers in the Red Army was suspected of self-mutilation from the very outset.⁴⁰ According to Order of the People's Commissar of Defence No. 111 of April 12, 1942, signed by Lieutenant General Khrulev, even wounded or sick soldiers lying in medical installations were to be indicted and prosecuted as self-mutilators.

The slaveholder mentality and the system of contempt for human life peculiar to the Soviet Union is clearly demonstrated by the methods of attack commonly practiced by the Red Army, *i.e.*, the tactic of the "human steam roller," guided, according to Major General Grigorenko, by the "inhumane slogan" of "Spare No Human Life."⁴¹ Colonel General Volkogonov has combed thousands of operational documents of the Supreme Commander Stalin; not a single one of them contains any hint that saving lives, achieving the established objective at minimum cost, or avoiding unprepared frontal attacks was of any importance at all. Quite the contrary: Stalin demanded successful assaults "at any price in casualties" (*cenoi ljubych zertv*); for example, in one order, he compelled "even Colonel General Yeremenko and Lieutenant General Gordov to spare no manpower, and to shrink from no casualties." "Casualties, casualties en masse," were indifferent to Stalin, and simply didn't matter if only the desired success could be achieved.⁴² According to Volkogonov, Stalin led his armed forces to victory "at the price of horrendous losses." Why is it, asks Volkogonov, "that our losses were up to three times as high as those of the enemy?"⁴³ This was an underestimate, since, according to Finnish experiences during the Winter War, Soviet losses exceeded Finnish casualties—at a "conservative estimate"—by the factor of five: "Soviet infantry was driven en masse against Finnish positions without any regard for losses."⁴⁴ Authors from the Soviet era, then drawing to a close, confirmed this assertion by stating, very much to the displeasure of the Stalinist *Voенно-istoriceski zhurnal* (4/1991), "that our army suffered losses in the past war that were five times higher, and even more, than those suffered by the army of the Hitlerites."⁴⁵

The Soviet methods of attack employed by the Red Army during the Winter War with Finland differed from those of all other armies, and were repeated in a cruder fashion during the German-Soviet conflict, according

40 BA-MA, H 20/290, undated.

41 Hoffmann, "Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion," pp. 780f.

42 Volkogonov, "Stalin als Oberster Befehlshaber," pp. 491f.

43 Volkogonov, "Verchovnyj, Glavnokomandujuschij," p. 3, archives of the author.

44 BA-MA, RH 19III/381, 1940, undated.

45 Gareev, "O mifach starych i novych," p. 46.

to a slogan attributed to the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Army Commissar First Rank Mekhlis: "They Can't Kill Them All!" A German empirical report from 1941 stated: "If the first attack fails, stubbornly following the order often means that the Russian infantry bleeds to death in our defensive fire." Majors Anikin and Gorachev of the 10th Infantry Corps described this method of attack on March 10, 1943, in the Kuban' bridgehead as follows:

"Once the order is given and compliance with the order proves impossible, Soviet soldiers are invariably driven into combat at the same place, driven over and over again, regardless of heavy losses."⁴⁶

How could it be otherwise in an army in which the leadership corps was personally threatened? During the last ten days of July 1941, Stalin was extremely anxious about the German capture of Smolensk, since he foresaw the danger of a strategic breakthrough to Moscow. On behalf of the Supreme High Command, the Chief of Staff of the High Command of the West, General Malandin, and Member of the Military Council, Bulganin, Stalin ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General Lukin, whose troops were encircled, on July 20, 1941, to recapture the city of Smolensk at any price:

"You have failed to carry out the order from Headquarters... Answer! The order is to be carried out at any price to the last man. If you fail to carry out the order, you will be arrested and handed over to a court martial."⁴⁷

A similar order was received by the Commander-in-Chief of the 20th Army, Colonel General Kurochkin, also encircled at Smolensk.⁴⁸ The severely wounded Lieutenant General Lukin told the Germans how the attack now took place: demoralized soldiers were "driven onward" and sacrificed by the tens of thousands during vain assault attempts, "over and over again." "The troops only attack under the severest compulsion by the political agencies," was the experience of Regimental Commander Major Kononov, mentioned above.

To get an idea of these attacks, a few relevant testimonies should be selected from the incalculable number of similar reports.⁴⁹ "Of the assigned forces, in strengths of approximately 700 men, only 70-80 came back from the first thrust," stated the Chief of Staff of the 46th Infantry Division, a colonel, on July 24, 1941. "During the second thrust, with a newly arrived

46 BA-MA, 34691/2, 10. 3. 1943.

47 BA-MA, RH 21-2/649, 20. 7. 1941.

48 BA-MA, RH 24-5/110, 30. 7. 1941.

49 See also the text of German leaflets, BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 782.

battalion... the losses were just as great."⁵⁰ The German IX Army Corps reported on August 2, 1941, that enemy attacks were "carried out with extraordinary tenacity, despite the heaviest losses... through our own observation and through prisoner testimonies, it was established that Russian infantry was driven into combat by machine gun fire from the rear, and by pistol shots from commissars."⁵¹ "We have been attempting to attack for five days," First Lieutenant of the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Guards Infantry Brigade, Sergeiev, confided to his diary on April 17, 1943, before falling in combat: "The companies only have six to eight men left." And on May 1, 1943: "We are attacking with as much success as ever, it is just that we have lost many men."⁵²

What this kind of perverted combat tactics implied for Soviet soldiers may be seen from the testimony of a few captured survivors of the 105th Infantry Brigade on July 11, 1942.⁵³ "On July 7 the brigade was utilized during the attack against Bashkino for the first time," according to the interrogation record. "During the first attack, the 1st Battalion was almost totally annihilated... The attack terrain must have already been covered with dead from the previous attacks by the 12th Guards Division. When the battalion assembled again after the first attack, the Brigade Commander (a colonel) and Brigade Commissar appeared. They had all the Komsomol and Party members step out, and, from them, they formed the 1st Company, which was to move forward in the second wave during the next attack and shoot all those who withdrew or lay down. On the commissar's order, three Red Army men were shot... During the next attack on July 9, we again had very heavy losses, so that the rest of the brigade were concentrated in a single battalion toward noon, and was again assigned to a new attack on Bashkino. On the evening of July 9, during battalion assembly, only sixty men returned from this attack. The attack terrain was a terrible sight because of the great numbers of corpses there. As the result of a direct hit, parts of human bodies lay everywhere, especially in the depressions, so that no Soviet soldier could avoid this horrible sight."

A few other practices from Soviet assault procedures are worthy of mention, such as the distribution, whenever possible, of alcoholic spirits before attacking.⁵⁴ As a result, Soviet soldiers stormed forward in thick agglomerations and suffered high losses. In contrast to the German army,

50 BA-MA, RH 21-3/437, 24. 7. 1941.

51 BA-MA, RH 21-2/650, 2. 8. 1941.

52 BA-MA, RH 20-17/487, 26. 7. 1943.

53 BA-MA, RH 21-2/707, 11. 7. 1942.

54 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 329, 3. 8. 1941; BA-MA 27759/15, 21. 12. 1942.

the Soviet infantry often were not even equipped with steel helmets, and were therefore exposed to the risk of severe head wounds. While fighting the Japanese at Khasan Lake or the Finns during the Winter War, tank crews were temporarily locked inside their combat vehicles.⁵⁵ Soviet soldiers were also locked inside their bunkers, as observed in 1941 by the Germans.⁵⁶ The Soviet Air Force was prohibited from bailing out over German-occupied territory.⁵⁷ According to an order from the 322nd Infantry Division to the Commander of the 1087th Infantry Regiment, Major Romanenko, on January 16, 1942, houses were to continue to be defended even if they were on fire.⁵⁸ That Soviet soldiers died in the flames was irrelevant. As Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov revealingly remarked to the speechless American General Eisenhower in this regard, in particular: "If we came to a mine field, our infantry attacked just the same, as if it weren't there."⁵⁹ The resulting casualties were accepted as a matter of course.

The whole system of Soviet contempt for human life also found expression in the manner in which the personnel was treated, which was compulsorily conscripted from the recaptured territories starting in 1943. It must be recalled in this regard that the population of the Caucasus, the Cossack regions at Terek, Kuban, and the Don, as well as in the southern Ukraine, had generally maintained good relationships with the Germans⁶⁰—from the Soviet point of view this was an attitude of treason and hostility. The compulsory conscription of all men of military age immediately after the recapture of this region therefore formed part of a mass punishment campaign, undertaken collectively against the population, as well as an act of revenge. As revealed by Order No. 052 from the 3rd Guards Army of February 23, 1943,⁶¹ as well as by the statements of Major Genshtaba Zhilov of the staff of the 58th Army,⁶² the mobilization of the male population after the first uncontrolled recruitments was left to the front-line units of the corps and divisional commanders, who were thus given an easy opportunity to make up for the heavy losses suffered by their units. In practice, local commanders were assigned to summon the local male population under threat of severe punishment. They then systematically began to comb the cities and localities with the help of the Special Departments of the NKVD and other

55 BA-MA, RH 19111/380, 15. 1. 1940.

56 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 23. 6. 1941; BA-MA, RH 24-17/152, June 1941, no day given.

57 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 16. 7. 1941.

58 BA-MA, RH 24-24/336, 16. 1. 1942.

59 Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 467.

60 Hoffmann, *Kaukasien 1942/43*, pp. 430ff.

61 BA-MA, RH 24-3/146, 5. 3. 1943.

62 BA-MA, RH 20-17/457, 12. 2. 1943.

NKVD agencies for "military age" male personnel.⁶³ All persons caught were ruthlessly drafted "the same night."⁶⁴ All males up to the age of fifty, and in some cases, sixty, were considered able-bodied and liable for military service.⁶⁵ Basically, all youths born as late as 1927, and in some cases, 1928, *i.e.*, sixteen year olds, and, in some cases, fifteen year olds, were drafted, in various divisions by falsification of their birthdates.⁶⁶ In accordance with the Stalinist principle that no one was unfit for military service, only the "obviously sick and cripples" were rejected; the handicapped were, nevertheless, drafted as "fit for service" in many cases. Depending upon their classification, the young people were immediately assigned to the front units or to punishment units, so that, according to one source, "the punishment companies consist mostly of young people, and the youngest age groups."⁶⁷

Usually poorly trained, or not trained at all, sometimes still wearing civilian clothing, poorly armed and insufficiently provisioned, these men were immediately thrown into the struggle at the foremost front lines and driven into German machine gun fire. The German command posts repeatedly described the manner in which the Soviets—for example, on the Taman' peninsula and elsewhere—drove their units forward against fully fortified and defended German positions, without reconnaissance or preparation, wave after wave, with "extraordinarily high losses." An unnamed Soviet political officer with the rank of captain also very accurately remarked in his diary on March 4, 1943: "In the region... the young people... are mobilized and immediately sent into combat as cannon fodder."⁶⁸ In the unanimous opinion of Soviet deserters and prisoners of war:

"The extremely high losses naturally suffered by these untrained replacement troops who had no interest in fighting for the Soviet Union, and were trapped between the front line and the blocking commandos, were deliberately accepted, since the Soviet Union had no desire to keep these fascist-contaminated elements that therefore constituted a danger to the morale of the Red Army."

The German troops took account of this inhumane and illegal method, at least, insofar as armed civilians were treated as prisoners of war

63 *Ibid.*, 19. 6. 1943.

64 BA-MA, RH 24-3/146, 2. 2. 1943.

65 BA-MA, RH 24-3/147, 12. 3. 1943.

66 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 496, 19. 10., 29. 10., 22. 12. 1943.

67 *Ibid.*, 14. 10. 1943.

68 BA-MA, RH 24-3/147, 21. 3. 1943.

rather than guerrillas if they were captured in fighting formation next to regular soldiers of the Red Army.

In reply to Churchill's well-known "Iron Curtain" speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, Stalin, in a foreign interview published in the party newspaper *Pravda* on March 14, 1946, stated that the Soviet Union, "in the struggle against the Germans, and, additionally, as a result of the German occupation and the conscription of the Soviet population for forced labor, irretrievably lost approximately (*okolo*) seven million people," *i.e.*, both military and civilian personnel.⁶⁹ The seven million figure was later further inflated for propaganda purposes—several times during the following time period. Thus, Member of the Politburo and Stalin Party doctrinaire Suslov, in 1965, increased the figure to 20 million,⁷⁰ a figure that was obligatory throughout the Brezhnev era, while the total number of military and civilian deaths in the USSR was increased to 27 million by Soviet State President Gorbachev on May 9, 1990. Of these, 8,668,000 were members of the armed forces, including members of the Interior Troops, the Border Troops, and Security Agencies (*gosbezopasnosti*).⁷¹ One year later, on the evening before the anniversary celebrations, on June 21, 1991, a Soviet historian, Professor Dr. Kozlov, ventured to assert: "The USSR suffered 54 million war dead."⁷² A comparison of obviously speculative casualty figures will hardly produce reliable results. Furthermore, as the Austrian military historian, University Lecturer Dr. Magenheimer, accurately stated:

"The suspicion arises that many of the civilian losses must be attributed to the reprisals, liquidations, and deportations of the Stalinist system, not least of all to the compulsory repatriations during and after the end of the war in 1945, all of which took place at the express will of Stalin."⁷³

It was Stalin who—at the end of the war, by order to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the 1st and 2nd White Russian Fronts, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, as well as to "Comrade Beria, Comrade Merkulov, Comrade Abakumov, Comrade Golikov, Comrade Khrulev, Comrade Golubev"—personally demanded the creation of gigantic NKVD camps with a capacity of one million persons for "former prisoners of war and repatriated Soviet citizens." Regarding the number of military dead in particular, it should be recalled that the Soviet Union was at war with, or had attacked,

69 "Interv'ju tov," J.V. Stalina.

70 Magenheimer, "Massenrepressalien, Bevölkerungsverluste und Deportationen," p. 540.

71 *Grif sekretnosti snjat*, p. 129.

72 Kozlov.

73 Tepjakov, "Tragedija plena."

not only the German Reich between 1939 and 1945, but the following states as well: Poland, Finland, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Iran, Bulgaria, and Japan. Although Colonel General Volkogonov estimates Soviet losses at two or three times higher than those of the enemy, these same losses, "at a conservative estimate," were in fact five times higher than those of the enemy during the Winter War with Finland alone. If the ratio rose even higher between 1941 and 1945, then the reasons for it must be ascribed primarily to the Soviets.

The Soviet Union did not recognize the Hague Convention, and never ratified the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, in order to prevent Soviet soldiers from saving their lives by permitting themselves to be captured. Prisoners of war were fundamentally considered "traitors" and "deserters," and were to be annihilated by all means, both aerial and terrestrial; they were therefore deliberately subjected to bombing attacks by the Soviet Air Force against German prisoner of war camps. In terms of cause and effect, therefore, the Soviet Union was itself responsible for the casualties among prisoners of war; this is, furthermore, the opinion of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Of course, this only exculpates the Germans insofar as German treatment of prisoners of war did not result from indifference or ill will, but was rather dictated by the force of circumstances. The individual and mass executions, which were common in the Red Army throughout the war, also caused heavy losses among Soviet soldiers. The numbers are difficult to determine, but generally they must have been enormous. Finally, the barbarism of Soviet methods of attack cost huge numbers of human lives. These massacres, coldly calculated by the Soviet leadership, set the Red Army apart from all other armies in the world, including the German army. One need only recall, for example, the seriousness with which theories relating to the most economical methods of infantry attack in terms of human life were discussed in the German army, even before the First World War, and that blind frontal assaults against enemy positions prepared for defense were considered to be almost prohibited at that time.

Regardless of all countermeasures, over 3.8 million Soviet soldiers surrendered to the Germans by the end of 1941, and a total of 5,245,000 during the entire war. According to the official Soviet definition, all these men were "traitors," and "deserters." Two million of them perished primarily during the first winter of the war from hunger and epidemics. Large numbers were also shot by totally deluded German Security Police and the SD.⁷⁴ A million Soviet soldiers, nevertheless, did volunteer for military service on the German side, permitting themselves to be armed for combat against the Soviet regime by the Germans. Under the circumstances, the question arises: how can one possibly speak seriously of a "Great Patriotic

War of the Soviet Union”? Furthermore, what is the justification for the stereotypical allegations of “mass heroism” and “Soviet patriotism” of the Red Army when the most reprehensible methods of compulsion were required to drive Soviet soldiers into combat? “I repeat that the military defeat was the result of the unwillingness of the Red Army to fight,” wrote former Lieutenant Oleg Krasovsky of the 16th “Kikvidze” Infantry Division in regard to the events of 1941.⁷⁵ Krasovsky was later adjutant to Major General of the ROA, Blagoveshchensky, and until his death in 1993, he was Editor in Chief of the almanac *Veche*, published by the Russian National Association. According to Lieutenant General Professor Pavlenko, the basic questions of the German-Soviet war continue to be “unscrupulously falsified” by Soviet historiography. It appears that these falsifications include, first and foremost, the propaganda myth of “Soviet patriotism” that continues to be a feature of historical literature on the German-Soviet war to this very day.

74 Hoffmann, “Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion,” p. 730; by the same author, *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee*, pp. 140f.

75 Krasovsky, “22 ijunja 1941 goda,” p. 7.

**The "Great Patriotic War"
Soviet Propaganda and its Tools**

The German invasion of June 22, 1941, resulted in a total transformation of the international situation of the Soviet Union, freeing it at a single blow from the odium of its past partnership with Germany. The Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, which the author Dashichev called "amoral and criminal in the highest degree," had made Stalin the "accomplice of fascist aggression." "The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939"—which the well-known Socialist André Rossi considered lofty beyond all doubt¹—"was an agreement to attack Poland... The secret agreement proved... legally, that this crime was committed jointly by Germany and Russia... The German-Soviet agreement of August-September 1939 was based on the division of Eastern Europe."² From the very first day of the German-Polish war on September 1, the Soviet Union had, moreover, provided immediate military assistance to help crush the Republic of Poland, by readily acceding to a request from the Chief of the General Staff of the German Luftwaffe to provide German combat aircraft operating in Poland with their positions by means of a direction-finding signal from a radio transmitter at Minsk. On September 3, 1939, the Soviet government had indicated its "unconditional" agreement to the incorporation of the "spheres of interest" promised to the Soviets in Moscow, agreeing upon the technical details of such incorporation with the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, on September 10. On September 17, the Soviet Union had begun an unprovoked war of aggression in violation of treaties, attacking Poland from the rear which, at that moment, was fighting for its existence.

The German-Soviet military talks of September 20, 1939, in Moscow had culminated in an agreement according to which the German Wehrmacht was to take all "necessary measures" to prevent "any provocation or acts of sabotage by Polish bands or the like" in the cities and localities to be handed over to the Red Army. The Red Army, for its part, had agreed to provide "all

1 See Rossi, *Zwei Jahre deutsch-sowjetisches Bündnis*.

2 Hoffmann, "Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs," pp. 76ff.

available forces necessary for the destruction of Polish units and bands” during the withdrawal of German troops. President of the Council of People’s Commissars Molotov, the leader responsible for the Soviet policy, had declared in a speech before the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939:

“A single blow against Poland, first by the Germans, then by the Red Army, and nothing remained of this monster of the Versailles Treaty, which owed its existence to the oppression of non-Polish nationalities.”³

It had been the express wish of Stalin that nothing should remain of the national existence of Poland, and that all Polish national resistance should be stifled by amicable German-Soviet mutual agreement. In a telegram to Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on December 27, 1939, Stalin had spoken of a “friendship between the peoples of Germany and the Soviet Union,” a friendship sealed “in blood.” The German-Soviet Border and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, concluded at the expense of Poland and other sovereign states, had sealed the dangerous cooperation between the two great powers.

Following the “settlement”—naturally assumed to be “final”—of the “Polish question” from the Soviet point of view, the Soviet regime, in Stalin’s words, had wished to proceed with a solution of the “problem” of the Baltic States, by way of the agreement of August 23, 1939. That is, it began to put massive pressure upon the sovereign republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, regardless of any existing treaties, to throttle their independence through the relentless application of political terror and threats of military force.

According to the German-Soviet Treaty of August 23, 1939, Finland was also deemed to lie within the Soviet “sphere of interest,” doubtlessly destined for a fate similar to that of Poland and the Baltic States.⁴ However, the unprovoked Soviet attack upon Finland, in violation of international law, had taken an unexpected turn as a result of stubborn Finnish resistance. The Soviet government, to avoid the threat of involvement by the Western powers, had abandoned its objectives in regard to Finland and had been—temporarily—satisfied with the annexation of large chunks of territory in the Karelian peninsula. On the basis of the German-Soviet agreement of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union had adopted a similarly hostile attitude to Romania in the spring of 1940. The High Command of the Soviet 12th Army, which was concentrated on the Soviet-Romania border, and the Mechanized Cavalry Group under Lieutenant General Cherevichenko had

3 *Izvestija*, 1. 11. 1939; *Istorija Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny*, vol. 1, p. 249.

4 Myllyniemi, *Die baltische Krise*, p. 153.

been ordered to initiate a surprise attack against Romania on July 26, 1940. Upon the urgent advice of Germany, the Bukarest government submitted to the Soviet ultimatum demanding the relinquishment of the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina to the Soviet Union, thus avoiding the outbreak of military conflict.

The immediate result of Stalin's agreement with Hitler, therefore, had been that the Soviet Union had waged aggressive wars against Poland and Finland; that, in partnership with Germany, the Soviet Union had destroyed the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation; that Romania had been forced to relinquish enormous territories under threat of war; and that the Soviet Union had destroyed the independence of the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania under the direct or indirect use of force, and had incorporated these nations into the Soviet empire. Poland had been described by the Soviet government as a matter of exclusive concern to the Soviet Union and Germany, fundamentally rejecting the right of the Western powers and Great Britain to intervene in Polish affairs. According to Moscow, Britain and France had been alleged to enjoy "undivided rule over hundreds of millions colonial slaves," thus forfeiting the moral right to speak of the "freedom of peoples." The traditional justification for the declaration of war upon Germany by the Western powers, therefore, had been merely a pretext intended to conceal true motives and objectives. The latter, in turn, had consisted of nothing more than the mere desire to maintain the antiquated balance of power in Europe, created at Versailles and of advantage to the Western powers alone, the elimination of which had been the true intent of the German-Soviet treaty—according to Stalin. The only concern of the Western powers had been to eliminate Germany as the most dangerous competitor on international markets.

Britain and France had been branded by the Soviet Union as the instigators of an imperialistic war, and had been alleged to be responsible for its continuation and expansion. Molotov, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, had called the alleged motive of the Western powers for continuing the war against Germany (the struggle against "fascism," which was by all possible means also actively engaged in by the Soviet Union until 1939, then stopped, and then suddenly recommenced in 1941) a meaningless and criminal piece of stupidity and cruelty. According to *Pravda* on September 30, 1939, it was "a crime against the peoples, committed by provocateurs and politicians without honor." Stalin, summarizing the official opinion, had told *Pravda* in an interview on November 29, 1939:

"1. It was not Germany that attacked France and Britain; rather, it was France and Britain that attacked Germany, therefore assuming the responsibility for the present war;

2. Following the outbreak of hostilities, Germany made peace proposals to France and Britain; the Soviet Union publicly supported the German peace proposals, because it believed, and still believes, that a rapid end to the war would radically alleviate the situation of all countries and peoples;
3. The ruling classes in France and Britain insultingly rejected Germany's peace proposals and all Soviet efforts for a rapid end to the war. These are the facts."⁵

The partnership and complicity between Hitler and Stalin had been revealed, not only by the fact that the Soviet Union had acted as an active partner in the violent transformation of territorial conditions in Eastern Europe, but by the provision of Soviet political, economic, and military support to the German Reich in its struggle against the Western powers. Soviet maritime assistance to the German naval war effort against Britain; the sabotaging of the French war effort by the French Communist Party at the bidding of Moscow;⁶ uninhibited Soviet efforts to sanction the situation created in Europe by the German success at arms under the terms of international law; and, finally, huge Soviet strategic economic deliveries to the German Reich—all of this is sufficiently well-known so that it doesn't require repetition. A few remarks are, nonetheless, called for at this point simply to typify the attitude of the Soviet regime.

From the Soviet point of view, the Western powers alone had desired a continuation of the war. The occupation of Denmark and Norway by German troops in the spring of 1940 had therefore been considered a justified countermeasure against the expansion of the war into northern Europe desired by Great Britain and France. On April 9, 1940, Molotov had formally advised the Reich Government of the Soviet understanding of what Molotov called the "defensive measures... forced upon Germany," simultaneously wishing the Germans "complete success." The official Communist Party publication and largest-circulation newspaper in the USSR, *Pravda*, as well as the government newspaper *Izvestia*, and the trade union newspaper *Trud*, had commented upon German actions in Scandinavia by stating that Britain and France had "invaded" the neutral waters of the Scandinavian countries to undermine Germany's military position. In view of the fact that the Western powers were said to be "violating the sovereignty of the Scandinavian countries," and were expanding "the war to Scandinavia," any discussion of the legality of the actions forced upon Germany was said to be "laughable." Britain and France were said to "assume the full weight of

5 *Pravda*, 30. 11. 1939; Suworow, *Der Eisbrecher*, pp. 63f.

6 Topitsch, *Stalins Krieg*, pp. 92ff.

responsibility for expanding the war to Scandinavia." In his speech before the Supreme Soviet on July 31, 1940, Molotov had publicly declared that Germany would never have been able to expand its sphere of influence to Scandinavia and Western Europe without indirect assistance from the USSR.

As for the German attacks on the neutral countries of Holland and Belgium, the Soviet government had expressed only understanding and sympathy. *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, on Stalin's personal instructions, referred thereupon to the plans of the Anglo-French bloc, which had long been to "drag Holland and Belgium into the imperialist war as well." Germany, consequently, was said to have been faced with the need to deal a counterblow against the invasion of Reich territory planned by the Western powers. It was not Germany, but rather, Britain and France that were said to have impelled "two additional smaller countries into the flames of imperialist war." Similarly, the 1940 German offensive against France had not been criticized in Moscow as a "fascist invasion"; on the contrary, it had been celebrated in Moscow as a masterpiece of planning and strategic execution. Upon the fall of France, Molotov had extended "the warmest congratulations of the Soviet government upon this brilliant success of the German Wehrmacht" to the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg. The Soviet Union was alleged to have understood itself to be acting for Germany in the capacity of an "valuable second." Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg had informed Berlin that the Soviet press coverage and statements of the propaganda machinery during the operations in France were in accordance with the "highest expectations" of the German Reich. Molotov, in his speech of July 31, 1940, and his talks with Hitler in November 1940, had recalled several times that the German-Soviet agreement of 1939 had "not been without influence on the great German victories."

The complicity between Hitler and Stalin on the eve of the Second World War and during the opening phases of the war, as set forth above, ended abruptly on June 22, 1941. Without lifting a finger, the Soviet Union, once again, unexpectedly found itself on the side of the nations compelled to defend themselves against Germany and that were at war with Germany. This was a highly favorable position, as Stalin remarked in a speech on July 3, 1941, "a serious long-term factor on the basis of which the military successes of the Red Army in the war with fascist Germany must now be achieved." Germany, in Stalin's words, "has been revealed in the eyes of the entire world as a bloody aggressor," on the basis of which, once again according to Stalin, "the best men in Europe, America, and Asia... extend their sympathy to the Soviet Union, approving Soviet actions and recognizing that our cause is just...." From now on, there were just two, clearly dis-

tinct, warring sides: the aggressors, led by Germany, and the victims. The most prominent victim now, ironically, was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union now successfully exploited this favorable political situation with an unprecedented lack of shame, using propaganda as a weapon fully in the service of the war effort.

Soviet journalists and literary hacks, artists and historians, were now called upon to assist in the victory of the Soviet Union, each in his own way. They were to devote all their talents and abilities to design in a black-and-white manner an image of the German enemy and to establish it as true. This depiction would be justified, by even the most reprehensible methods, as long as it served the purpose of filling the Soviet Union and Soviet soldiers with hatred of everything German. The “unsuspecting, peaceful Soviet Union”—according to the historical legend, which endures to the present day and which appears impossible to eradicate—was now alleged to have been “treacherously attacked by the fascists in violation of treaties.” According to the legend, the Soviet Union was shocked by this unexpected breach of faith on the part of its former contractual friend, accomplice, and partner. Shock, however, normally causes paralysis—not deliberate clear-headed action. The Soviet war propaganda machine, nevertheless, anticipated the attack, which came on June 22, 1941, and set to work with an apparently pre-established program. As early as the first day of the war, the Soviet Union’s most famous writers were convened under the chairmanship of the leading officials of the Writer’s Association and Stalinist favorite Fadeev, to receive their instructions—astonishingly pre-prepared—for a radical 180-degree turn in the Soviet propaganda treatment of Germany.⁷ With “surprising haste,” as was noted, they were now instructed to place all their talents in the service of the “Holy War” (*Svjascennaja vojna*) that was now just beginning. This “Holy War” was promised by Lebedev-Kumach, a writer of songs for the Soviet masses, in his hymn of the same name, published a few days later on June 24, 1941.⁸ An unprecedented, but well-controlled, propaganda avalanche then broke loose that penetrated the entire Soviet empire and exerted a profound influence on non-Soviet countries as well. The Germans had little notion of what was being brewed up against them.

Of the numbers of Soviet writers who participated in the huge anti-German war propaganda effort, most of whom now departed for the front or were assigned to the staffs of the Red Army as newspaper correspondents, a

7 *Bol'saja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, vol. 27, p. 180; Sterzel, “Dichter sangen Stalin zum Siege” (Poets Sang Stalin to Victory).

8 *Bol'saja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, vol. 14, p. 229.

few in particular should be mentioned by name. These included the already named Fadeev, official writer and outspoken Party literary hack who committed suicide in 1956, and who owed his notoriety in the Soviet Union to the partisan novel *Razгром* (Destruction), published in 1927, followed by the novel *Molodaja Gvardija* (Young Guard), published in 1945, glorifying the struggle of the "Soviet people" against the fascist conquerors. Mention should also be made of the later Nobel Prize Winner Sholokhov, who, in his well-known novel *Tichij Don* (The Quiet Don), published in four volumes between 1928 and 1940, describes the struggle between two worlds, one good and the other evil, the Bolshevik world naturally being portrayed as the "good" one. Sholokhov's chief contribution to the propaganda battle of the German-Soviet war effort consisted, in addition to innumerable articles published in the party newspaper *Pravda* and the army newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda*, of a tale published in 1942 under the revealing title *Nauka Nenavisti* (School of Hate).⁹ Another person who wrote just as advantageously for *Krasnaya zvezda* was Simonov, author of a number of books as well as articles, film scripts, sketches, and the like, who turned his hand to the theme of Soviet human beings in the war.¹⁰ His war poem "Zdi menja" (Wait for Me), popularized by the entire Soviet media, became a commonplace in the Soviet Union, enjoying considerable popularity among the masses. Also not to be forgotten, is Professor Tarle, a well-known historian chiefly of the Napoleonic period, author of the two-volume work *Krymskaja Vojna* (The Crimean War, 1941-1943), whose journalistic and propagandistic effectiveness during the war was a masterpiece of intellectual abuse and corruption of the historical sciences for political purposes as practiced by the Soviet regime.¹¹

Alexei Tolstoy, descended from Count Tolstoy on his father's side and Turgenev on his mother's side, a gifted, if somewhat woolly writer fully in the service of Stalinism, should also be mentioned in this connection.¹² When the delirium of the "Great Purge" raged over the entire country in 1937, it was Tolstoy who made his appearance at so-called "anti-fascist congresses" in foreign countries as the representative of the Soviet Union for the purpose of influencing Western intellectuals. That he was also a leading member of the "Extraordinary State Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes of the German Fascist Invaders and their Allies," a creation of war propaganda, the objective of which will be discussed in more

9 *Ibid.*, vol. 29, p. 451.

10 *Ibid.*, vol. 23, pp. 400f.

11 *Ibid.*, vol. 25, p. 279.

12 *Ibid.*, vol. 26, p. 50.

detail below, was certainly due to his compliance as much as his name. Tolstoy deservedly received the Stalin Prize for the novel *Petr Pervyj* (Peter I), which has remained unfinished. His publications include *Rasskazakh Ivana Sudareva* (Tales of Ivan Sudarev, 1942-1944), *Ivan Groznyj* (*Ivan the Terrible*), and *Trudnye Gody* (Difficult Years). However, above all, his numerous emotional propaganda articles were to contribute in no lesser degree to the awakening of unholy passions among Soviet soldiers.

The most important of these men, however, was Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg (Erenburg), the principal war propagandist of the Soviet Union.¹³ Ehrenburg cannot simply be dismissed as a man of "great criminal energy," an "instigator of homicide," or even a "psychopath," or as a man of pathological talent. Criminal or psychopathic tendencies in no way exclude literary and journalistic talent. These gifts, linked with a deficient love of truth and a lack of all moral scruples, in any event, permitted him to become the most important instrument of anti-German hate propaganda. The political agitation and opportunistic refinement with which, for many years, he skillfully adapted to changing circumstances while concealing the past, including his own past actions, after the death of his lord and master Stalin, as revealed in his novel *The Thaw* and his memoirs *Goda, Lyudi, Zhizn* (Years, People, Life), have gained him a degree of credit that is not to be underestimated, and that has endured down to the present day in the nations of the West. The Federal Republic of Germany is no exception to this rule. It is disturbing to witness the degree to which Western intellectuals misjudged the world of the Soviets—or, perhaps, how little they wished to understand it—apart from the frivolity with which they abandoned all standards of decency and morals.

For example, the publisher of the West German edition of Ehrenburg's memoirs, Kindler, undertook it upon himself to suggest, in regard to the publication of certain passages, that Ehrenburg's hate propaganda was simply a repetition of the "Goebbels-Lie."¹⁴ Similarly, as late as 1991, for example, the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) Faction of the District Representative Assembly in Berlin-Schöneberg filed an application to pay respects to Ehrenburg's "creativity," cultivating the memory of the great writer and journalist within the scope of an exhibition on "Russians in Schöneberg." On the occasion of Ehrenburg's one hundredth birthday in 1991, leading German newspapers never tired of commemorating his honor,

13 *Ibid.*, vol. 30, p. 233.

14 Ehrenburg, *Menschen, Jahre, Leben*, p. 33. Kindler was the politically unstable former editor in chief of the military magazine *Erika*, published by the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

stressing his effervescent literary spirit, describing him as a master of satire, a "seeker for the origins of evil," while admiring his "grandiose, panoramic depictions." One searches in vain for a single word relating to Ehrenburg's criminal effectiveness during the war, an effectiveness that had such terrifying consequences for countless German men, women, and children. Walter, the author of a commemorative article in the arts section of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, glossed over this aspect of Ehrenburg's activity in a single, dry sentence, asserting that Ehrenburg was "one of the most active" and—somewhat deceptively—"most remarkable war propagandists,"¹⁵ a trivialization that drew a sharp rebuke in the same newspaper by a noted expert, Heinz Nawratil, author of the work *Vertreibungsverbrechen an Deutschen* (Expulsion Crimes against Germans).¹⁶ Who Was Ehrenburg?

Born in Kiev in 1891 as the son of a Jewish beer brewer, Ehrenburg acknowledged his Jewish origins all his life and, as he himself wrote: "I am a Jew and proud of it."¹⁷ Averse to regular training, he dedicated himself, even as a schoolboy, not so much to his homework assignments of his humanities oriented secondary school, but rather, to roaming around in the political underworld of his native Russia. As a so-called "sixteen-year-old Bolshevik revolutionary," he emigrated to Paris to lead the unsteady existence of a homeless, rootless intellectual from that time onward. He was a man with a profound and lifelong aversion for all men with an honorable calling and an ordered bourgeois existence.¹⁸ As a café literary hack in Paris until 1917, he was a regular guest of the *Closerie des Lilas*, where he "sat and wrote, all day, every day." Attracted by the Russian revolution, he traveled to Moscow in 1917, where he fell out with the new Soviet rulers, and once again attempted to settle down in Paris. Expelled by the French police, he took up lodgings in the disordered atmosphere of Berlin until 1924, where, having entered Soviet service in 1921, he apparently earned his living as an employee of the Soviet press and, in particular, as an informer and agent for the notorious GPU (*Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye*; State Political Administration), the Soviet secret police. Returning to Moscow and then again returning to Paris, he was assigned to Spain during the Spanish Civil War as a correspondent and agitator from 1936-1939. He stayed once again in Paris in 1939-1940, then, after the German invasion of

15 Walter, "Slalom eines Lebens."

16 Nawratil, "Mörderische Propaganda."

17 Ehrenburg, "To the Jews, 24. 8. 1941", in *Russia at War*, pp. 209f.

18 The biographical data of Ehrenburg in the following has been critically sketched out on the basis of his autobiography, *Ljudi, Gody, Zizn*, 5 volumes, Moscow 1966/67.

France, he traveled to Berlin, where the nature of his assignment remains unclear, and finally took up residence in Moscow.

Ehrenburg first attracted international attention through various publications in the 1920s, including the political novel *Neobychajnye pochozhdenija Khulio Khurenito i ego uchennikov* (The Unusual Adventure of Julio Juarenito and his Pupils), dealing with the defeat of the bourgeoisie by revolution during the First World War. The book contains an axiom of Bolshevik wisdom, summed up in the sentence: "Murders must be committed for the well-being of mankind." In his work *Padenie Parizha* (The Fall of Paris), published in 1941, Ehrenburg once again gave free rein to his lifelong "hatred for the well-tempered French bourgeoisie," describing, under the impression of his experiences in Spain, the causes for the defeat of France in 1940, from the point of view of the Soviet class conflict.¹⁹ As the well-deserved reward for this welcome propaganda hack job, Ehrenburg was granted the highest literary distinction that the Soviet Union had to offer: the Stalin Prize First Class. Hardly inferior to the last-named production in its "effectiveness upon the masses in terms of contemporary history" was the political novel *Burja* (The Storm), published in 1946, also honored with the Stalin prize. Ehrenburg's talents, his unscrupulousness, his knowledge of foreign countries, and not least his proven compliance, predestined him, as no other, to handle the principal propaganda challenges facing Stalin in 1941.

With the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Soviet propaganda, in a sense, was caught in its own trap. It was not very difficult to awaken feelings of hostility against "fascists"—anti-fascist agitation had never really stopped since 1939, and was being carried on covertly. In addition, there was the outdated doctrine that "German workers and farmers" were the natural enemies of "fascism," which had, moreover, only succeeded in seizing power in Germany "with the help of the magnates of the Ruhr and the social traitors." According to this theory, Hitlerite Germany confronted "yet another Germany." According to this theory, the "workers and farmers" in the Wehrmacht would refuse to fight against the "homeland of the Workers," the Soviet Union, as soon as they "learned the truth." This explains the crudity of Soviet propaganda on the front line during the opening phase of the war—propaganda that was absolutely not understood by German soldiers, filled as it was with phrases resembling those of the first Soviet leaflets: "German soldiers! Who profits from the war against the Soviet Union? The capitalists and the lords of the manor!"²⁰ This produced no effect at all.

¹⁹ See in general Ehrenburg, *Padenie Parizha*, Moscow 1941.

“True hatred of the Wehrmacht” as Ehrenburg admitted, was “unknown” in the Red Army “at the beginning” of the war.²¹ Clear-cut conditions needed to be created if “criminal fraternization” on the battlefield was to be avoided or, even worse, Red Army soldiers were to be prevented from surrendering to the Germans en masse. What Stalin wanted was “hate, hate, and more hate”—not only against “fascism,” but against everything German, according to Lieutenant General Vlassov, who was present when Stalin directed a request in this sense to Beria in the Kremlin after the battle of Kiev.²² The propagandistic preconditions for such hatred had long since been created. One need only recall inflammatory productions such as the 1938 Moscow film production of *Alexander Nevsky*, with the screenplay written by Pyotr Pavlenko, directed by Sergei Eisenstein, and music by Sergei Prokofiev. The challenge, however, was much broader than this.

During the opening days of the war, Ehrenburg was informed by Deputy Foreign Commissar Losovsky of the decisive significance accorded by Stalin to foreign propaganda in Great Britain and the USA. The member of the Politburo responsible for these matters, Shcherbakov, now gave him the major official assignment of writing for the Western Allies “on a daily basis.” Guided by Stalin’s definitive instructions as much as by the hate feelings emanating from his depraved mind and warped psychology, Ehrenburg began an activity that, as he said himself, no longer had anything to do with literature, even in the Socialist interpretation of the term. In fact, from now on, he wrote one or more, and often up to five articles per day, every day, for the government newspaper *Izvestia*, the party newspaper *Pravda*, and, in particular, the Army newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda*, but also wrote for other Soviet newspapers, and—under various guises—pro-Soviet newspapers in foreign countries. *Krasnaya zvezda* formed the principal active basis for the excessive degree of political propaganda required for the Red Army. Articles from this newspaper were hammered into the heads of Soviet soldiers with stifling monotony: “We went to bed with Ehrenburg’s articles at night, and woke up with them in the morning.” Ehrenburg’s name, as stated on September 21, 1944, was known to every Red Army soldier: “The Soviet people regard him as one of their best writers and their greatest patriot.”²³

The Soviet troops, often before attacks, to enhance their fighting spirit were given, not liquor right away, but “Ehrenburg’s articles were read to them before the start of battle.” These articles repeated the same basic

20 Leaflet “Deutsche Soldaten!”, archive of the author.

21 Ehrenburg, *Menschen, Jahre, Leben*, p. 25.

22 Pozdnjakov, *Andrej Andreevich Vlassov*, p. 293.

23 *Soviet War News*, 21. 9. 1944.

theme in innumerable variants, *i.e.*, the Germans were not human beings and needed to be pitilessly exterminated. The generalization of this stereotype, though naturally corresponding to the desires of the Soviet government, apparently raised doubts on several occasions, even in the Soviet Union. Ehrenburg was sometimes asked how he could constantly write about one and the same thing, the non-humanity of the Germans. "Can they really be such butchers?" asked the people of Moscow in the summer of 1944. The novelist Grossman, himself a committed spokesman of Soviet war propaganda, reproached Ehrenburg, to say the least, for failure to distinguish between Germans, "fascists," and "Hitlerites."²⁴ Objections were also raised in Western countries. When, for example, the pro-Soviet Swedish newspaper *Göteborgs Handelstidningen* began to print Ehrenburg's articles in 1942, not only did the German government intervene, but other Swedish newspapers, such as *Stockholms Tidningen*, *Göteborgs Morgonpost* and *Aftonbladet*, protested as well. *Dagposten* wrote: "Ehrenburg beats all records for intellectual sadism. Why should we refute these filthy lies and prove that Ehrenburg accuses the Germans of things that are everyday occurrences in the Red Army?"

It is not true that Ehrenburg's articles, some of which were translated into the English language, were received with approval everywhere in Great Britain and the USA. In 1945, for example, a well-known New York magazine called for a protest against the "cruelty of Soviet writers such as Alexei Tolstoy and Ilya Ehrenburg." On October 26 and November 23, 1944, Ehrenburg was publicly compelled to reply to a Lady Gibb, of Great Britain, who had written to him as follows:

"You call forth a very, very old evil in the hearts of the Russian people, *i.e.*, the desire for revenge after the victory has been won. This old, old, evil...brings the victors no blessings... We are very anxious to see you place your great talents in the service of Russia on behalf of a just and lasting peace, which can never be based on self-righteousness and the lust for revenge."²⁵

Soviet propaganda, which at this time was already quite busy defending enormous Soviet territorial acquisitions, began to put massive pressure upon Lady Gibb, in an attempt to nip any impulse of justice and humanity in the bud. Ehrenburg answered in the hate-filled tones of an "un-human," quoting from the alleged letter of a Lieutenant Zinchenko, who was said to have written in shock: "My mother is religious too, and in the name of reli-

²⁴ This and the following from *Ljudi, Gody, Zizn*, see note 18.

²⁵ *Soviet War News*, 1. 2. 1945, 26. 10. 1944, 23. 11. 1944.

gion she asks, 'kill the Germans with my blessings.'" "One must not pity a wild beast," said Ehrenburg, "rather, one must destroy it... that is the opinion of our people, dear Lady."

Ehrenburg could be quite assured of his job in any case. Even the alleged reprimand from an ideologue in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Alexandrov, published in a leading article entitled "Comrade Ehrenburg Is Oversimplifying," in the party newspaper *Pravda* on April 14, 1945, shortly before the end of the war, was nothing but a tactical subterfuge undertaken upon Stalin's direct instructions, and not directly against Ehrenburg personally, as he was immediately given to understand, but rather, simply to take propagandistic account of the changing political situation.²⁶ Enjoying the unrestricted trust of Stalin—with a short hiatus in 1949—Ehrenburg was assigned to the countries of East and Central Eastern Europe as a sort of traveling salesman after the end of the war, with the important assignment of preparing for and solidifying a Communist takeover through agitation. The high value placed upon Ehrenburg's services by Stalin personally at this time, was revealed when the American Secretary of State, Byrnes, threatened to publish American correspondence reports relating to Soviet acts of violence and encroachment in Romania in 1945. Stalin is said to have dismissed these threats "with a contemptuous wave of the hand, 'Then I will send Ilya Ehrenburg to Romania and have him report what he sees. His word will carry more weight than the word of your man.'"²⁷ As the Deputy—*i.e.*, in reality the President, in the secret Soviet Communist ranking system—of the worldwide Soviet "World Peace Council," Ehrenburg was engaged in intensive international subversion in the following years. His many personal acquaintances and connections now revealed the extent to which left-wing intellectuals, and well-known personalities in the intellectual and political life of many countries, were prepared to degrade themselves, deliberately or foolishly, as lackeys of the Soviet regime. Even the former left-wing Center Party politician and German Chancellor Dr. Wirth did not disdain to have amicable dealings with Ehrenburg in Switzerland. Where Stalin prize winner Dr. Wirth is concerned, this comes as no surprise, since a "voluminous" CIA file entitled "The Background of Joseph Wirth" has traced his activities as a Soviet agent all the way back to the early 1920s.²⁸

26 Alexandrov, "Ehrenburg is Over-Simplifying. Soviet Public Opinion and the Situation in Germany," in: *Soviet War News*, 14. 4. 1945.

27 Kogelfranz, "So weit die Armeen kommen..."

28 Schlie, "Diener vieler Herren."

To Ehrenburg, who was always a prolific writer, his output during the "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," in his own words, had nothing to do with literature, even as the word is interpreted in the Soviet Union; rather, it consisted of political agitation, *i.e.*, incitement. Nearly three thousand of his leading articles and proclamations were collected in a three-volume anthology called *Vojna* (The War) between 1942 and 1944. Ehrenburg, however, did not appear to wish to be reminded of these writings at a later time. His memoirs, *Goda, Lyudi, Zhizn*, partly intended to conceal the past, discourse verbosely upon the personal legacy of those fateful years. Of his wartime articles, he said briefly: "What remains to me of those years? Thousands of articles of the same type, which, at best, may be of interest to a conscientious historian." The reasons for this modesty will soon be obvious to anyone who actually penetrates this material with the spirit of "a conscientious historian."

An analysis of this tidal flood of articles is also likely to awaken memories of another writer of somewhat similar articles, Julius Streicher, the Gauleiter of Franconia deprived of his offices for personal failings in 1940, and publisher of the inflammatory anti-Semitic newspaper *Der Stürmer*, which was, one might add, broadly rejected even within the NSDAP for its low cultural level.²⁹ Indicted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945-1946, Streicher was convicted and sentenced to death because, as stated in the grounds for the judgement: "Week after week, month after month, he infected the German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism and incited the German people to active persecution." "A leading article in September 1938 was typical of his teachings, which termed the Jew a germ and a pest, not a human being, but 'a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of mankind.'" Streicher was alleged to have unmistakably called for an extermination of the Jews.

If Streicher was sentenced to death by hanging under Article 4 of the indictment (crimes against humanity) at Nuremberg—what can one say of Ehrenburg, who polluted the minds of the peoples of the Soviet Union (and the Western countries as well) with the poison of anti-Germanism, inciting people to active persecution and extermination of Germans—for years, "week after week, month after month," even day after day—not just in a remote local rag, but in the leading newspapers of the Soviet Union, under the highest official orders? If Streicher was "Jew Baiter No. 1," then it seems not only justified, but even necessary, to call Ehrenburg "German

29 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. I, pp. 340, 343; vol. V, p. 136; vol. XVIII, p. 223.

Baiter No. 1." "Streicher was responsible for the deaths of millions of Jews," wrote Ehrenburg in the capacity of trial observer at Nuremberg on December 13, 1945.³⁰ As will be seen, and in more detail, Ehrenburg was in no way inferior to Streicher, but perhaps in many occasions even exceeded him in evil.

On June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union, without lifting a finger, was suddenly freed from the camp of the aggressors, and was now numbered among the attacked, making her propaganda machinery available in order to cause former Soviet complicity with National Socialist Germany to be forgotten. This enabled the Soviet Union to be depicted as the defender of the "peace-loving peoples." The above mentioned Soviet complicity had included the following: on September 17, 1939, by prior agreement with the German Government, the Soviets attacked Poland; "bombarded," the regions east of Lemberg during the night; "dealt with" or "annihilated" "Polish troops"; "annihilated" "Polish infantry divisions and cavalry brigades"; "shot down" Polish planes; "captured" or "destroyed" war material and artillery; captured prisoners; took cities; "purged" or "mopped up" the battlefields, forests, terrain, and countryside "of the Polish army"; and "solemnly" accepted the transfer of the fortresses of Osowiec and Brest, as well as the city of Białystok and other localities, from German troops.³¹ At Lemberg, 8,500 Polish soldiers, including 100 officers, fled toward the Germans to avoid capture by the Soviets—a wise decision—since they were treated according to the principles of the Geneva Convention instead of being shot in the back of the neck. The 15,000 Polish officers who fell into the hands of the Soviets and, in addition to these professional soldiers, thousands of "university professors, doctors, scientists, artists, secondary school teachers," "the flower of Polish society," "doing their duty as reservists," were shot by the NKVD near Katyn, at Kharkov, and other places on the orders, as is well-known, of Stalin, Kalinin, and other Soviet leaders. Of 250,000 Polish prisoners of war, 148,000 perished in the Soviet Union; of 1.6 to 1.8 million Polish civilian deportees, 600,000 perished in the Soviet Union; of 600,000 Polish Jews deported into the Soviet Union, 450,000 disappeared without a trace.³²

30 *Soviet Weekly*, 13. 12. 1945.

31 BA-MA, RW 6/v. 98, part 1, 18. 9. 1939; BA-MA, RW 6/v. 98, part 2, 22. 9., 23. 9., 24. 9., 25. 9. 1939.

32 *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, vol. 1, pp. 573, 607f.; Rhode, "Polen," vol. 7, p. 1.028; "Polen erinnern Moskau an Völkermord;" Hoffmann, "Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs," pp. 83f. Even if these figures have not entirely withstood recent critical inquiries, they are still shocking enough.

The Soviet government had accused the Western powers of starting an imperialistic war under the pretext of defending Poland; then accused them of expanding the war to Scandinavia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The Soviets had provided propagandistic, diplomatic and, at least to some extent, military support to the German military campaigns, ostentatiously taking account of the changing facts of the situation to lull the Reich into security. As early as 1939, Moscow had severed relations with Czechoslovakia despite treaty obligations requiring Soviet assistance, then recognized the independence of the secessionist Republic of Slovakia. In May 1941, Moscow had withdrawn recognition from the exile governments of Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, on the grounds that they no longer exercised sovereignty over their countries. Shortly afterward came the break with Greece, and then—in a manner that must have amazed “even the most experienced and callused observer of Soviet methods”—the break with Yugoslavia, whose integrity and independence had been recognized by Moscow hardly a month before, “even before the Germans had had a chance to open their mouths.”³³ Now, from one day to the next, this was all to be forgotten. Stalin, wrote Ehrenburg on February 8, 1942, “had no intention of attacking other countries... We built cities, we worked and studied... We educated human beings... while the Germans were building tanks”³⁴—this despite the six or eight-fold superiority in tanks enjoyed by the Red Army on June 22, 1941.

On January 4, 1945, Ehrenburg, Stalin's propaganda mouthpiece, wrote in regard to the policies of the Western powers of that time (but not, of course, the Soviet Union): “Europe and the world now recognize the lessons of this immoral policy in the ruins of Warsaw, the sufferings of Paris, and the wounds of London.” During the Polish campaign, the Soviets had provided German aircraft with their positions in order to enable them to reach their objectives. Now the Germans were the sole “arsonists.” “They dropped bombs on Warsaw and laughed themselves sick.” The Soviet Union had treacherously attacked Poland from the rear on September 17, 1939. “We greet our Sister Poland,” wrote Ehrenburg hypocritically on November 7, 1941, and on December 14, 1941: “The spirit of Chopin still lives in the cities of tortured Poland... The Poles say one to another: ‘Beauty still lives. Poland still lives.’”³⁵ “We want freedom for ourselves and for all nations,” wrote Ehrenburg on January 1, 1942. “We do not want Poland to be a land of German galley slaves.” In 1939-40, Moscow

33 Gafencu, *Vorspiel zum Krieg im Osten*, p. 257.

34 *Russia at War*, p. 252.

35 *Ibid.*, pp. 185, 189.

instructed the Communist party of France to sabotage the French war effort. After the capitulation of Compiègne, the Soviet government had congratulated the Reich Government and hastened to extend diplomatic recognition to the "French State of Vichy." Now, at a single stroke, Marshal Pétain was called a paid traitor, the Judas of France.³⁶ Ehrenburg now insulted Premier Paul Reynaud and Generals Weygand, Georges, and Gamelin as "capitulationists," referring to the Popular Front and the (treasonous) French communists, in particular, as the only true patriots. "The victories of Rostov and Kalinin were a death sentence to those who signed the cease-fire at Compiègne," wrote Ehrenburg on March 21, 1942.

German troops in France, as is well-known, were subject to the strictest discipline, as André Malraux admitted by his own accord. Malraux, a member of the French Communist Party until 1939, later a member of the Résistance, writer, and Minister under de Gaulle, stated that he had had "only good experiences with the German army, and only bad experiences with the Gestapo." Ehrenburg, nevertheless, wrote on July 14, 1941: "The Nazi murderers and gangsters marched on the boulevards" to plunder and rob the nation of France, murdering children and starving the population to death with rations of only fifty grams (two ounces) of bread per day.³⁷ Soviet revenge was threatened for a trivial instance of property damage: "For the four spoiled jackets, you will exterminate 4,000 Germans who have trampled France." Ehrenburg summed up his attitude toward the Germans—whose Border Treaty and Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union had been valid until that very same date—in the following words, on June 22, 1941:

"They plundered happy peace-loving France. They enslaved our brother nations, the highly cultivated Czechs, the valiant Yugoslavs, and talented Poles. They raped the Norwegians, Danes, and Belgians."³⁸

"German troops stagger like drunkards all over Europe: from Boulogne to Odessa, from Poland to Belgium, from Norway to Bulgaria," he wrote, turning up the heat, on May 2, 1942. And, just a few days later, on March 5: "They entered Russia drunk on the blood of the Poles, French, and Serbs, the blood of old people, maidens, and small children."³⁹

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 143ff., 162ff., 195ff.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

³⁹ Ehrenburg, "Hatred," *ibid.*, p. 131.

Ehrenburg was assigned to give propaganda effect to Stalin's war speech of July 3, 1941, and to proclaim the new program.⁴⁰ "We have millions and millions of faithful allies," he wrote on July 4, 1941:

"All those who have lost their freedom and their country stand by our side: Czechs, Norwegians, French, Dutch, Poles and Serbs... Stalin's words will reach the city of trampled freedom, the subjected, but irreconcilable Paris. They will reach the farmers of Yugoslavia, the students of Oxford, the fishermen of Norway, and the workers of Pilsen. They will call forth new hope in the hearts of all peoples suffering under fascist barbarism. Stalin's speech will be heard by the people of London, who have experienced hundreds of barbaric air raids, by the miners of Wales and the weavers of Manchester... our Patriotic War will be a war for the liberation of Europe from Hitler's yoke."

At the cost of few propaganda phrases, the Soviet Union—which had been expelled from the League of Nations for attacking Finland, and had come close to a collision with the Western powers—now placed itself at the head of the countries drawn into the war, making herself their spokesperson. "All democratic countries" (naturally including the Soviet Union) "stand by us, all of progressive humanity is with us," stated a proclamation of August 10-11, 1941, issued at an "All-Slavic Meeting" (*Obrashchenie Veseslavjenskogo mitinga*) of so-called intellectual workers, held in Moscow.⁴¹ "All of humanity is now fighting Germany," echoed Ehrenburg on August 24, 1941, without a side glance at the German military allies at war with the Soviet Union—Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia. "We want freedom for us and for all nations," he claimed on January 1, 1945. And to ensure that his protector and employer would not be forgotten among the flood of phrases, he added the following: "Long live the Soviet Union! May thy peoples live, thy gardens, thy children, thy Stalin!"

On November 6, 1941, the anniversary of the "victory of the Great Socialistic October Revolution" Ehrenburg took it upon himself to instruct the Allies in the style of Communist Party agitators, calling upon them to join the common struggle.⁴² "The defenders of Moscow contemplate with pride the firm fortress of London. Fame for Britain! ... We greet you, pioneers of freedom, the invincible people of France, we greet the Czechs... We greet the people of warriors, the Serbs... We greet the brave Greeks... We greet the untiring Norwegians... we greet the patient Dutch... we greet the hard-working Belgians... We greet our sister Poland... We greet the

40 *Ibid.*, p. 204.

41 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 10/11. 8. 1941.

42 *Russia at War*, pp. 184ff.

arsenal of freedom—America.” To avoid all possible doubt that these peoples and countries were now to be indebted to the Soviets from that time on, he added: “Moscow is fighting... for you, distant friends, for humanity, for the entire world.”

In 1930, no less a personage than Winston Churchill had written of the “plague bacillus” Lenin, compared to whom “... no Asiatic conqueror, no Tamerlane or Ghenghis Khan” could be a match “in the destruction of men and women.”⁴³ To Churchill, the victories of Bolshevism had shifted “the borders of Asia for the conditions of the dark ages... from the Urals to the Pripet swamps.” Russia was said to be frozen “in an endless winter of inhuman doctrines and inhuman barbarity.” On January 29, 1941, Ehrenburg informed the peoples of the world that the “reprehensible scandal of Bolshevism”—in Churchill’s words—had now raised a torch:⁴⁴

“We have raised the torch to the sky... the torch of our culture, and the culture that we rightly believe to be the possession of all of humanity. It is the torch of ancient Greece, the Renaissance, the Eighteenth Century [*i.e.*, the Enlightenment]—all that in humanity that has opposed slavery, stagnation, and atavism. Our struggle against Germany is guided by an illuminating moral principle... the principle of reason, spiritual purity, freedom, and dignity.”

Such phraseology should be judged in light of the fact that, at the head of the Soviet Union, stood Stalin, “the greatest criminal of all peoples and times.” Stalin with the help of creatures placed in power by him—Yagoda, Ezhov, Beria, Kruglov, Abakumov, Kobulov, Serov, Dekanozov, Merkulov, Canava and others—had erected a system of tyranny that could decide the “fate of any citizen in the country, without exception, at Stalin’s own bloody whim.”⁴⁵

Since July 3, 1941, at the latest, the Soviet Union claimed for propaganda purposes that it had been unprepared for the German attack, of which it had had no inkling. It was, therefore, waging a purely defensive war, pursuing no expansionist goals. The historical legend of the “treacherous fascist surprise attack on the unsuspecting, peace-loving Soviet Union” is demonstrably untrue, and has no basis in fact. Of the many Ehrenburg propaganda lies, only a few need be cited by way of example. November 23, 1944: “We do not need any ‘living space.’” November 30, 1944: “The world looks upon the Red Army as a liberator... [the Soviet Union] does not force its ideas on anyone.” January 11, 1945: “We do not want to force

43 Churchill, *Nach dem Kriege*, pp. 70ff., 99, 157, 261f., 265.

44 *Russia at War*, p. 112.

45 Volkogonov, *Triumph und Tragödie*, vol. 2/2, p. 197.

our ideas or customs on anyone." May 24, 1945, after the victory: "We won the war because we hate wars of conquest."⁴⁶

As the end of the war approached, and the Red Army penetrated deep into the heart of Europe, the purely defensive protestations came to be increasingly admixed with offensive overtones. The Soviets, conscious of their enormous power, began to make political demands in the form of the propaganda phrase, drummed into the ears of the world, of the Red Army's great "Mission of Liberation."⁴⁷ The first vaguely expansionist passages appeared in Ehrenburg's writings in October 1944, as Soviet troops crossed the German border into East Prussia. On October 12, 1944, Ehrenburg wrote: "We rescued European culture... our people is positively concerned with the fate of European culture. The Soviet land produces no isolationists." On April 12, 1945, Ehrenburg was even more overt: "It is time to say that the victories of the Red Army are victories of the Soviet system. We draw attention to the fact that it was our people which rescued Europe and the world from fascism." Or on May 17, 1945, he stated rather inartfully:

"We rescued human culture, the ancient stones of Europe, its cradle, its working people, its museums and books. If Britain is destined to produce a new Shakespeare, if new Encyclopaedists appear in France... if the dream of a Golden Age is ever to become a reality, then this will happen because the soldiers of freedom marched thousands of miles to plant the banner of freedom, fraternity, and light. That is why Stalin's name is linked to the end of the night and the first dawn of happiness, not only in our country, but all over the world."⁴⁸

And on July 12, 1945, continuing in the same vein: "The Soviet Union rescued the peoples of Europe. Stalin shook everyone's conscience awake... we love Stalin."⁴⁹

According to Ehrenburg on January 10, 1946, the Soviet Union—which was even said to have decided the fate of Prague, Paris, and Rome—was "no longer a geographical and political concept, but rather, a moral concept" in the mind of the nations.⁵⁰ In other words, therefore, it had become an ideal for all nations by virtue of its military victories, automatically deriving the right to intervene in the affairs of other countries as well. Stalin had no thought of "attacking other countries"; instead, he thought about "creating a new world," as Ehrenburg alleged on February 8, 1942.⁵¹

⁴⁶ *Soviet War News*, 23. 11., 30. 11. 1944; 11. 1., 24. 5. 1945.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 12. 10. 1944, 12. 4. 1945.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 17. 5. 1945.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 12. 7. 1945.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 10. 1. 1946.

Now that victory had been achieved, Stalin could begin to realize his dreams of a "new world," "a new Europe," a Europe—as Ehrenburg immediately claimed—in which "all the microbes of fascism" would be eliminated. Who, now, were the "microbes of fascism"? Henceforth, the "fascists" were no longer to be understood as merely German, the disciples of Hitler, but rather, all those who opposed Soviet designs for conquest and Bolshevization on any grounds whatever. This included all those whose understanding of the concepts of "government, reform, and progress" differed from that of the Communists—in particular, the hated bourgeoisie of all nations, the advocates of a State of Law according to Western traditions, the whole "spiritual underground of apparently normal people." Stalin had revealed the political objective; Ehrenburg and his ilk set to work to propagate it in their usual way.

On May 17, 1945, a few days after the unconditional German surrender, Ermashev wrote:

"The collapse of the Hitler Reich does not automatically liberate mankind from all the dangers with which the dark powers of fascism and reaction are still capable of threatening the world"

Ominous words as far as the future was concerned.⁵² Thus was announced a principal inclination of the Soviet regime: the urgent desire to see the "fascist criminals," "the war criminals," punished as severely as possible. An international show trial, organized on the tried and true Soviet model with the leading participation of the Soviet Union, was to exert a deterrent effect on all powers of "reaction," *i.e.*, the potential opponents of Stalinist claims to domination, all of whom were described as "followers of Hitler and Mussolini."

In defiant language, speaking on February 8, 1945, Professor Tarle, the above mentioned Soviet historian, justified Stalin's claim to the right to shape "the future of the peace-loving and freedom-loving nations" on the grounds of alleged past experiences, stating:

"But the great role of the Soviet people is not yet over, even if it has freed humanity from the deadly German nightmare. The fifth column, although temporarily relegated to the shadows, is still alive in the world. Nazis and Nazi sympathizers still exist and are preparing to resume the task in which they were engaged for so long and, furthermore, so successfully in Europe. The European democracies—and not only the European democracies—will face a highly extraordinary struggle in the coming years, because

51 *Russia at War*, pp. 253f.

52 *Soviet War News*, 17. 5. 1945.

fascism has not the slightest intention of abdicating... it will, however, once again face the same invincible obstacle: the Soviet Union, the Soviet people. The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War has created a firm basis for the triumph of the world democracy. The immortal service of Stalin's strategy and of the fighters of the Russian army is that they have rescued world civilization. Those who understand that the struggle for freedom and democracy must continue, pending the complete moral and political defeat of fascism, even after the defeat of the Hitlerite war machine, look upon the USSR with profound confidence."⁵³

Stalin's expansionist intentions need hardly be expressed more clearly. This implied a continuation of the pattern of aggression that had begun with the pact of August 23, 1939, and that was now taking on a new shape—for the third time. Stéphane Courtois, editor of the *Black Book of Communism*, has stated with unequivocal clarity:

"As appears from numerous statements by Stalin, it was Stalin's firm determination and intention to thrust forward to the Atlantic Ocean. As early as 1947, Stalin told Maurice Thorez, at that time the General Secretary of the French Communist Party, that he would have preferred to see the Red Army in Paris than Berlin."⁵⁴

Thus he brilliantly confirmed the conclusion drawn by Professor Ernst Topitsch in his book *Stalins Krieg*, published in 1985.⁵⁵ Thrusting through to the Atlantic, however, implied the imposition of Leninist-Stalinist domination as well. "Anyone who occupies a territory imposes his own social system as well," Stalin told Tito, a close confidant, and Dilas, a partisan leader, in 1945. "Everyone introduces his own system as far as his armies get. It cannot be otherwise." The invasion of the Anglo-American expedition forces temporarily put a stop to Stalin's ambitions in 1944. The following motto, considered valid until very recent times by "socialist" activists and the spiritual accomplices of "socialism" must be understood as implying a propagandistic preparation for an expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence that had never been abandoned: struggle against "fascism" as understood by the Soviets. According to this definition, anyone who opposes the aggressive designs of Soviet imperialism, is ipso facto a "fascist" or "Nazi," to be destroyed by any means possible, no matter how reprehensible. The Stalinist concept of "fascism" has even survived the Soviet

53 *Ibid.*, 8. 2. 1945.

54 Courtois, "Stalin wollte bis nach Paris marchieren;" by the same author, "Menschenopfer ungeheuerlich..."

55 In this regard, see, basically, Raack, *Stalin's Drive to the West*; Topitsch, *Stalins Krieg*, 3rd revised and expanded edition, pp. 176, 291.

Union itself; it is now generally used, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, as a defamatory smear word applied to political dissenters. Anyone attempting to use the Bolshevik "anti-fascist" fighting word in any way differing from the concepts of the Stalinists and their apologists and heirs in Germany, no longer need wonder at the repression that inevitably follows.

In reality, of course, Soviet propaganda began as early as spring 1945 to produce its effects far beyond the territories occupied by the Red Army. Hardly anyone saw this more clearly than Winston Churchill, who in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946 warned that "far from the Russian frontier ... Communist Fifth Columns are established" representing a "growing peril" to peace and to "Christian civilization" as a whole.

**Responsibility and Those Responsible
The Atrocities on Both Sides**

A major element of Soviet war propaganda consists of the atrocities actually or allegedly committed by the Germans. Endlessly increasing numbers of accusations have been made, both with and without justification. If an accurate sense of proportion is to be maintained, these accusations must be considered in the context of extensive Soviet crimes against humanity. An effort must be made to separate the wheat from the chaff in any examination of the possible grounds for the Soviet accusations selected from among the multiplicity of examples cited, while simultaneously examining the political motivations that lie concealed behind the propaganda. The fact is that the Bolsheviks had themselves already killed many millions of innocent people long before the Germans ever had a chance to commit any crimes in the Soviet Union or German-annexed territories. Terror was a constant feature of the Soviet system, and was established immediately after the October Revolution. A terror intended to accomplish, not only the social, but often, the physical liquidation of entire classes: the extermination of the nobility, priests, and bourgeoisie, as well as the followers of non-Bolshevik socialist parties, such as the Menshevik and Social Revolutionaries, and the followers of the bourgeois parties such as, for example, the much-labeled Constitutional Democrats ("Cadets"). "Workers!" the party newspaper *Pravda* proclaimed on August 31, 1918: "The time has come to destroy the bourgeoisie!"¹ The slogan was duly put into effect: the People's Commissar for the Interior, Petrovsky, quoted by the governmental newspaper *Izvestia* on September 4, 1918, called for "mass executions... at the slightest resistance... No weakness or hesitation may be tolerated in the introduction of mass terror."² On November 1, 1918, Latsis, deputy head of the Cheka, gave orders to his organization for the elimination of "the bourgeoisie as a class."³ As stressed by Nicolas Werth in the *Black Book of Communism*, the merciless class warfare against whole sections of the population

1 Werth, "Ein Staat gegen sein Volk," p. 88, quoted from the newspaper *Pravda*, 31. 8. 1918.

2 *Ibid.*, quoted from the newspaper *Izvestia*, 4. 9. 1918.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 20.

and entire professions acquired the features of true genocide.⁴ Both the extermination of the Cossacks—or “de-cossackization”—which began in 1920, and the extermination of the peasantry—or “de-kulakization”—which began later, met the definition of genocide in terms of both objectives and implementation.

In a letter addressed to and intended only for the members of the Politburo, years after the revolution, on March 19, 1922, Lenin remarked to Molotov: “The more representatives of the reactionary clergy and reactionary bourgeoisie we can shoot in this regard, the better.” Winston Churchill’s book *Nach dem Kriege* (After the War), published in 1930, quotes a statistical study by Professor Sarolea showing that the Bolshevik dictators had already murdered the following number of persons by 1924:

“28 bishops, 1,219 priests, 6,000 professors and teachers, 9,000 doctors, 12,950 landowners, 54,000 officers, 70,000 policemen, 193,290 workers, 260,000 soldiers, 355,250 intellectuals and tradesmen, and 815,000 farmers.”

Churchill continued:

“These figures have been confirmed by Mr. Hearnshaw, of King’s College, London, in his brilliant introduction to *A Survey of Socialism*. They do not, of course include the monstrous losses of human life among the Russian population having perished from starvation.”⁵

If this were possible even under Lenin—who was described by Churchill as a “plague bacillus”—then what was it like under Stalin, described by his biographer, Colonel General Professor Volkogonov, as a “monster” without equal in world history? Only a few of the principal phases of the Stalinist reign of terror need be recalled at this point. According to unanimously accepted opinions and demographic studies, between seven and ten million people died during the forced collectivization of agriculture that began in 1929 and the related, carefully planned and implemented “Holocaust by Hunger,” or genocide of the Ukrainian people, which took place in silence between 1932 and 1933.⁶ The mass executions of so-called “Enemies of the People,” which began in the very early 1930s, culminated in the delirium of the “Great Purge” of 1937-1939, with another five to seven million deaths either from execution by shooting or following deportation to GULags.⁷ According to data supplied by President Jakovlev

4 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

5 Churchill, *Nach dem Kriege*, pp. 157, 261, 265.

6 Zlepko, *Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust*, pp. 15ff.

7 Katell, “Sowjet-Presse gibt zu: 40 Millionen Stalin-Opfer.”

of the Russian Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression, approximately two hundred thousand priests and members of the religious orders of various faiths were "shot, hanged, crucified, or died of exposure or froze to death" during the Stalinist period.⁸ Approximately one million more people died after the annexation of Eastern Poland and the Baltic Republics between 1939 and 1941. The number of persons suspected of espionage and shot on Stalin's orders, beginning immediately after the outbreak of the war in 1941, as well as the murder of political prisoners by the NKVD prior to the Soviet withdrawal, once again on Stalin's orders, are incalculable. According to the findings of a U.S. congressional investigative committee under the chairmanship of Representative Charles J. Kersten, eighty thousand to one hundred thousand people died in the Ukraine alone.⁹ The bodies of execution victims were found in the Ukrainian cities listed below, in addition to other locations in all parts of the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic Republics.¹⁰ Similar massacres were committed in cities such as Brest, Minsk, Kaunas, Wilna, and Riga, to name only a few cities cited solely for purposes of example. Mass executions also took place in the hinterland of the Soviet Union, in Smolensk, Berdichev, Uman, Stalino, Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov, Odessa, Zaporozhe, Simferopol, Yalta, the Caucasus, and elsewhere.

Nor should one forget the heavy losses in human life as a result of the deportations of the Volga Germans and the other ethnic Germans from the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the Caucasus organized by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP (b) and the Council of the People's Commissars in 1941. These deportations were carried out under inhumane conditions and constituted the international crime of genocide just as much as the deportations of the peoples of the Kalmucks, Karachayes, Chechens, Ingushs, Balkars, certain segments of the Karbardinian people, as well as the Tatars of the Crimea, all of which occurred in 1943-44.¹¹ Mention has already been made of the executive instruments of the Border Troops and Special Troops of the NKVD—comparable to the German Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and SD—which followed in the footsteps of the regular troops of the Red Army, carrying out "mass purges" of the populations in the reincorporated territories.¹² As stated above, hundreds of thousands of people were shot by the NKVD in the wake of the reprisals and purges that

8 Press agency release KNA, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30. 11. 1995.

9 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 347f.

10 Hoffmann, "Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion," p. 781.

11 Hoffmann, *Kaukasien 1942/43*, pp. 458f.

12 *Pogranichnye vojska*, pp. 473, 490.

then began.¹³ According to detailed German investigations, no fewer than four thousand people, without regard to age or sex, were shot in the city of Kharkov in March 1943 alone, following the brief Soviet capture of the city.¹⁴

Socialism left its murderous traces all over the national territory of the Soviet Union. "There are more than 100,000 unmarked mass graves, scattered all over the Soviet Union," says the Ukrainian researcher Carynyk, "the whole country is built on skeletons." Every individual city, every individual stretch of land, had "its own mass graves."¹⁵ The remains of 200,000 to 300,000 men, women, and children were found in the Ukraine alone—at Bykovnia (Bykivinia), in the Darnica Forest, and Bielhorodka, not far from Kiev; while the city cemeteries of Kiev itself were filled with shooting victims. Mass graves were also found at Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov (Pjatichatka, map grid 6, Jewish cemetery), Zhitomir, Odessa, Poltava, Vinica, and Doneck, to mention only a few principal locations.¹⁶ In White Russia, 102,000 people are presumed to have been buried in mass graves near Kuropaty, not far from Minsk, as well as a total of 270,000 victims in the vicinity of Minsk itself. In Greater Russia, mention should be made of Smolensk and Katyn (the forest of Kozy Gory) where the bodies of 50,000 shooting victims were transported on conveyor belts beginning in 1935.¹⁷ In the Urals, mention should be made of Sverdlovsk and Gori. Nobel Prize winner Andrei Sakharov maintains that not a single district city in the Urals is without its own mass graves—and not just in the Urals. At Lyssaja Gora, near Cheljabinsk, in the 1930s, 300,000 men, women, and children were shot and the bodies dumped in abandoned mine shafts.¹⁸ The butchers of Bolshevism also practiced their murderous handiwork in Central Asia, in the Altai Mountains, and, in the Far East, as far as Sachalin.

The soil in the vicinity of the Soviet Union's eighty "concentration camp systems," with their hundreds of individual camps under the authority of the GULag—for example, at Vorkuta and Karaganda—was literally fertilized with the bodies of slaughtered "Enemies of the People." At least three million people died from atrocious living conditions in the concentration camps near Kolyma alone, at temperatures down to minus 60 degrees Centigrade (minus 76 degrees Fahrenheit). The discovery of new mass mur-

13 Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta*, p. 400.

14 BA, R 6/52, 31. 3. 1943.

15 Carynyk, "The Killing Fields of Kiev."

16 Schaworonkow, "Charkow ein zweites Katyn."

17 Schaworonkow, "Nach den Hinrichtungen gab es Alkohol."

18 "300,000 Tote im Goldbergwerk."

der sites is a constant phenomenon in Russia—for example, in 1997 at the mass graves near Sandormokh in the Karelian peninsula, nine thousand victims were found. Priests, public figures as well as common people, and surviving labor slaves from the White Sea canal were shot there in October–November 1937.¹⁹

Almost unknown is the exacerbating circumstance that Soviet agencies of the NKVD also used toxic gas for the extermination of human beings, years before the agencies of the Reichsführer SS. The technical basis for the manufacture and utilization of toxic gases on a large scale—a corresponding chemical industry—was in fact quickly created in the USSR, beginning in the 1920s.²⁰ The manufacturing centers for the production of poison gas and local schools for training in the technology of poison gas warfare under the cover name “Tomka” (Torskij) built by the German-Russian “Bersol” company at Trock, near Samara (Kuibyshev), during the phase of cooperation with the Reichswehr in the 1920s and early 1930s, should also be mentioned in this regard. The Soviet Union produced no less than 140,000 metric tons of substances for chemical warfare between 1933 and 1945, while the Germans produced 67,000 metric tons over the same time period, including 12,000 metric tons of the highly toxic Tabun and small quantities of Sarin, which was six times more toxic.

The Soviet Union had already used various toxic gases in the subjugation of unruly ethnic groups and rebellious peasants, as in the forests of Tambov. “Gas chambers similar to those of Auschwitz were in operation at Vorkuta as early as 1938,” according to the British Count Tolstoy in his book *Victims of Yalta*.²¹ A fact that, in itself, was, therefore, no longer any secret was once again confirmed by a former KGB officer in 1997 in the context of the controversy in France relating to the *Black Book of Communism*, edited by Stéphane Courtois.²² To the limitless surprise of the French television viewing public, the former KGB officer reported “that trucks with gas chambers were used in the GULag.” “Gas Chambers in the GULag,” read the headlines of innumerable French newspapers. “The statements of the first dissidents in the 1930s were obviously in accord with the truth,” was *Le Figaro*'s reaction. Jürg Altwegg, writing in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on December 20, 1997, inferred that the existence of gas chambers proved the existence of extermination camps in the Soviet Union as well, a fact that the informed had, of course, never doubted. To appraise

19 Brüggmann, “Massengräber von Stalin-Opfern entdeckt.”

20 Posdnjakov, “Die chemische Waffe,” pp. 408ff.

21 Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta*, p. 398.

22 Altwegg, “Das Schwarzbuch des roten Führers.”

the significance of this information, in Altwegg's view, it was necessary to recall "that the [German] gas chambers made possible the repression of the GULag."

The *Black Book of Communism* is of inestimable value in the intellectual situation of the year 1997: not that it provides fundamentally new information, or arrives at estimated numbers of victims equaling the estimates of earlier researchers. The estimate of "at least twenty five million victims" of Leninism-Stalinism, calculated by editor Stéphane Courtois in his masterly introduction and accompanying comments, is only equal to the lower limits of past estimates.²³ But the *Black Book of Communism* is a true compendium of Communist crimes against humanity, casting light on the spiritual darkness of the twentieth century. In this regard, it is comparable to the *Gulag Archipelago* by Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, and, like the latter work, has achieved an unexpectedly widespread distribution in a short time.

The findings of Stéphane Courtois, like those of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn in past years, are in accordance with the basic theme of the present book, which may be summarized as follows:

1. Soviet domination was only made possible by mass crimes. Any analysis of the Soviet system must consider mass crimes—methodical mass murder and other crimes against humanity—to have been a central feature of the Soviet system.²⁴
2. Both Lenin and Stalin were guilty of the social and physical elimination of all persons thought to represent open or covert opposition to Leninist-Stalinist rule.²⁵
3. Lenin and Stalin were guilty of creating the concentration camp system.²⁶
4. Lenin and Stalin were guilty of the deaths of at least 25 million people. In practice, mass murder was a constituent element of Bolshevik rule.²⁷
5. Hitler started the world war, but proof of Stalin's responsibility is overwhelming.²⁵
6. Stalin was an even greater criminal than Hitler, and was, in fact, the greatest criminal of the century.²⁸

23 Leuschner, "Einhundert Millionen."

24 Courtois, "Hundert Millionen Tote."

25 Altwegg, "Das Rote und das Braune."

26 "Der rote Holocaust."

27 "Erste Bilanz der Massenverbrechen des Weltkommunismus."

28 *Ibid.*; Altwegg, "Einhundert Millionen."

The *Black Book of Communism* therefore strikes at the very heart of the Leninists-Stalinists. The physical extinction of a total of 100 million people—25 million by the socialist Soviet power structure alone—cannot simply be palliated on the pretext that Communism, in theory, consisted of an “ideology of liberation.” The merest knowledge of the revolutionary figures who usurped absolute power in Russia by an act of violence in October 1917, simply to reduce their subjugated peoples to the condition of rightless helots, reveals the infamy of those who parrot the “anti-fascist” propaganda phrase still current today—that “Communism was initially based on a love of the people.” One reason why the findings of the *Black Book of Communism* weigh so heavily is because the authors were personally sympathetic with Communism to some degree in the past, and perhaps still are today, and because editor Stéphane Courtois is a “proven expert on Communism and a serious historian” who cannot be refuted with the usual hair-splitting and deceptive dialectics; he can only be personally defamed.

How humiliating it must be for the ideologues and demagogues—the so-called “anti-fascists,” who presume to determine what free citizens shall or shall not be allowed to think²⁹—to see Courtois drawing historical parallels, making comparisons, and drawing up estimated calculations relating to both Communism and National Socialism, *i.e.*, performing the natural duty

29 Schirmacher, “Ein Schwarzbuch.” For example, the editors of the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* gave Rudolf Walther an opportunity to “relativize” the qualified introduction of Stéphane Courtois and, simultaneously, the *Black Book* itself—since they did not dare to attack it directly—by insultingly denying the editor’s qualifications, which is not customary in a scientific controversy. Walther, whose anti-fascist attitude is not to be doubted, nevertheless, excludes himself from civilized debate by the claim that the “economic function” of the GULag in “modernizing the country” was still “unclear,” but was “probable, in view of the documentary situation.” This was alleged to be a problem “of future research,” unless it was desired to dismiss “the creation of the concentration camp system [by Stalin] as due simply to the atavism or irrationality of one person.” Although Walther has no knowledge of the documentary situation, such a statement necessarily opens the door to a comparable discussion of the “economic functions” of the SS concentration camps in “modernizing the country,” although the grounds for the judgement of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg on 30. 9. and 1. 10. 1946, clearly state, “After 1942, when the concentration camps were subordinated to the supervision of the Economic Administration Main Office (WVHA), they were used as a source of slave labor.” Today no one can doubt that the concentration camps of the GULags—fully as much as the concentration camps of the WVHA of the SS—supported the war economy and armaments economy through a murderous exploitation of the subjugated labor slaves. Walther’s phrase in defense of Leninism-Stalinism, “Applying the legal-moral criteria of ‘crime’ and ‘guilt’ to historical events sheds more darkness than light” is of significance in regard to the intellectual confusion prevalent in Germany. And the following phrase in defense of Communism as such, “‘Ideas’ do not act, and commit no crimes,” naturally applies, by the same right, to ideas advanced by the protagonists of other beliefs as well. If political ideas “commit no crimes,” then they must accordingly be set forth in harmony with everyone’s principles, in a uniform manner, regardless of origin; see Walther, “Nolte läßt grüßen,” see also *Das Urteil von Nürnberg*, p. 111.

of a historian without regard to “anti-fascist” taboos and distortions. Like Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, Ernst Nolte, and François Furet before him,³⁰ Stéphane Courtois holds the opinion that the presumed prohibition against “historical comparison” no longer applies: after all, to compare is to think. Not only is the comparison legitimate, but Courtois considers it the elementary precondition to historical understanding, in a manner similar to Albert Camus’ postulation of the comparability of Communism and National Socialism in 1954. The pretexts offered by the “anti-fascist” opponents of all comparison between “racial genocide” and “class genocide,” a comparison rightly undertaken by Courtois, have, in fact, always been truly disgraceful. This last taboo, this last desperate argument, is rendered obsolete by the proof that Lenin and Stalin not only committed gigantic acts of class murder, but also of racial mass murder—falling under the definition of “genocide” according to the “United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948.” Even the left-wing ideological German weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* could not help featuring its several-page discussion of the *Black Book of Communism* under the devastating headline: “The Red Holocaust.” Courtois believes that the concept of “uniqueness” and “singularity” doesn’t apply, on the grounds that the Bolsheviks, in his view, committed the same, or very similar crimes as the “fascists”—almost the only ones whose crimes, in the absence of justification, continue to be harped upon today.³¹ The “fascist” method of procedure may have been different, but, as stressed by Courtois, there is no specificity for genocide. The *Black Book of Communism* makes it unmistakably clear that the crimes against humanity committed by Lenin and Stalin not only preceded those of Hitler by decades in terms of time, but exceeded them many times over in terms of scope, and, to some extent, in horror of execution. “The facts regarding Leninist and Stalinist Russia,” writes Courtois, “make one’s blood run cold.”

As for the total number of victims of Soviet domination, the concurrence of opinion is that there was a true hecatomb, even if the data varies considerably and the real number of victims can perhaps never be determined. The Russian historian Medvedev, a former dissident of Jewish origin who drew closer to the Communists again in 1992, attempted, in 1989, to establish a total of 40 million victims of repression, nevertheless, arrived at a number of fifteen million victims based on his own research. The American historian Robert Conquest, after detailed analysis, suggested a total of

30 According to Altwegg, “Teufisches Paar.”

31 “Auschwitz, der Gulag und die Nachwelt.” See also the introductory speech by Alain Besançon upon his admission into the Académie française in December 1996; Besançon, “Forgotten Communism.”

20 million victims under the Stalinist terror alone, but considers 10 million additional deaths to be probable.³² In Courtois's view, as stated above, Lenin and Stalin were the murderers of 25 million people. Soviet historian Professor I. A. Kurganov, in number 7 of the Moscow periodical *Novyj Mir* in 1994, on the other hand, proposed a total number of 66 million victims of Lenin-Stalin between 1917 and 1947, including "20 million deaths during the Second World War," a research finding confirmed in issue 63 of the Petersburg periodical *Nashe Otechestvo* in 1996 and mentioned by the historian V. V. Isaev. Nobel Prize winner Alexandr Solzhenitsyn speaks of 40 million victims of "the constant interior war of the Soviet government against its own people." The number of 40 million people killed by the socialism of the Soviet Socialist Republics, has been mentioned several times,³³ for example, in the *Welt-Nachrichtendienst* on June 30, 1993: "According to careful estimates, approximately 40 million victims fell victim to the dictator J. V. Stalin";³⁴ this naturally leaves open the question of the total number of murder victims falling under Lenin's responsibility.

It should be recalled that the mass crimes of the Soviet Republic, unprecedented in scope, were committed long before the German Wehrmacht and the German-allied armies followed by the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD ever even appeared on the scene in 1941, the latter, for their part, left a trail of blood in the East. An extensive literature about the German crimes, even though they were of a different quality, has already been published. These crimes have already been scrutinized from nearly every point of view, so that only a brief discussion of the principal types of procedures used by the apparatus of the Reichsführer SS for the elimination of the racially, ethnically, or politically undesirable persons in the Eastern territory must suffice at this point. These procedures were the methods of killing of the Security Police and SD behind the army lines and the extermination operations or mass deaths in the concentration camps in the territory of the former Polish State, i.e., Treblinka, Sobibor, Belzec, Majdanek, and Auschwitz. Auschwitz, in particular, was burned deep in the public consciousness after the war as the image of National Socialist atrocities, although it never acquired its present-day symbolic character until long after the war—not even during the Nuremberg trial before the International Military Tribunal against the (German) "Major War Criminals." "Auschwitz was not characteristic of the murder of the Jews," Stéphane Courtois

32 Conquest, *The Great Terror*, pp. 525ff.

33 Katell, "Sowjet-Presse gibt zu: 40 million Stalin-Opfer;" Ströhm, "Wie viele Million Opfer?"; Fuhr, "Waren die Bolschevisten Konterrevolutionäre?"

34 "Die Opfer des Stählernen: 40 Millionen in 30 Jahren."

remarks, parrying one of the questions still lurking in 1997, and raised by a spokesman for the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*. The name of the "Auschwitz extermination camp" is no doubt primarily linked to the image of the existence of the gas chambers; it is solely this "industrial killing method" that Courtois believes to be valid in regard to the question of "uniqueness." Since "Auschwitz" began to play an important role in Soviet war propaganda in 1945, the topic necessarily requires a brief discussion in connection with the present work.

On November 25, 1942, in the wake of prior press conferences, the *New York Herald Tribune* published a report entitled: "Wise Says Hitler Ordered the Murder of 4,000,000 Jews in 1942." Regardless of the sensational nature of this report—put into circulation by the President of the American Jewish Congress, Dr. Wise—the State Department gave it little credence, and the American government and even President Roosevelt refused to draw any conclusions in regard to it.³⁵ The Soviet Union however, already fully engaged in a hate campaign against Germany, greedily grasped at the news and attempted to provide it with an official veneer. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs issued a declaration on December 19, 1942, on the "execution of a plan of the Hitlerite authorities to exterminate the Jewish population in the occupied territories of Europe."³⁶ A few American newspapers are said to have mentioned "over two million gassed Jews" as early as 1942, but this cannot be confirmed. In any case, an inconspicuous notice, nevertheless, appeared in the British newspaper *The People* (Sunday, October 17, 1943) in reference to a statement by the Institute of Jewish Affairs in the United States, stating that Hitler was suppose to have already murdered over three million European Jews by that time.³⁷

As of yet, there was still no mention of poison gas—merely extermination by "planned starvation, pogroms, forced labor, and deportations." The use of poison gas for killing purposes was only brought to the awareness of the general public in the Soviet Union in connection with the Kharkov show trial in December 1943, the first "war crimes trial" ever held against German defendants, after earlier allegations had failed to achieve their full effect.³⁸ The use of so-called "murder vans by the Germans for the extermination of Soviet citizens" was mentioned, and definitively introduced into Soviet war propaganda in the trial of German prisoners of war Captain Langheld, SS Second Lieutenant Ritz, and Sergeant Rezlav before

35 Lacqueur, Breitman, *Der Mann, der das Schweigen brach*, pp. 131 ff.

36 *Soviet War News*, 10. 5. 1945.

37 According to Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies*, facsimile.

38 "The Kharkov Trial," in: *Soviet War News*, 23. 12., 30. 12. 1943.

the Military Tribunal of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which opened on December 15, 1943, in Kharkov.³⁹ The Soviet writer and propagandist Alexei Tolstoy, Member of the "Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders," who was present as special trial reporter, disseminated several mendacious commentaries intended for foreign propaganda, stating that the "murder vans" (soul-killers, *Dushegubki*) were used on "order of the High Command of the German Army for the mass extermination of peaceful inhabitants of the German-occupied territory." This attempt to bring the German Wehrmacht into connection with these matters, was, of course, absurd, and in no way corresponded to the facts. However, the "murder vans" already mentioned in the communiqué of the "Extraordinary State Commission" of August 7, 1943, in the Stavropol case now became an established element of Soviet propaganda.⁴⁰ For purposes of increased credibility, an SS Lieutenant Colonel Heinisch even appeared during trial as a witness, pretending to know from hearsay that "the killings by gas were painless and humanitarian."

The existence of so-called "murder vans" was immediately assumed to be a "proven fact," repeatedly mentioned in the numerous investigation reports of the "Extraordinary State Commission." For example, a communiqué of March 23, 1944, under the headline "They Murdered 2,000,000 People," in which it was claimed, apparently referring to the slogan coined in the USA, that the Germans had murdered more than two million people in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, in particular, prisoners of war, as well as civilians, "by means of gas in 'murder vans' or by mistreatments."⁴¹ Discussion in this regard gained renewed momentum after Soviet troops crossed the border of the former General Gouvernement of Poland and captured the Majdanek concentration camp in August 1944. The Soviet writer and propagandist Simonov, who devoted elaborate coverage to this event in an official report, as early as August 17, 1944, for the first time stated in one of his articles that fixed gas chambers, disguised as disinfecting chambers, also existed in the extermination camp of Lublin, in addition to murder vans of the usual type for killing purposes—which Ehrenburg called the "gas-van method."⁴² Simonov wrote a detailed report on the gassing of people allegedly having occurred in Majdanek in an article under the headline "Nazi gas chambers" on August 24, 1944, but without solid proof;

39 Wilhelm, "Die Einsatzgruppe A," pp. 546ff.

40 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. VII, p. 628. The so-called "Murder gas vans" were mentioned in the Krasnodar Trial of 14. 7. 1943, see *Soviet War News*, 22. 7. 1943.

41 *Soviet War News*, 23. 3. 1944.

42 *Ibid.*, 17. 8. 1944.

in so doing, he unreservedly admitted, or at any rate made no effort to conceal the following: "By the way, Cyclon [sic; Zyklon] (the killing gas) is, in reality, a disinfection agent."⁴³

The report of the "Extraordinary State Commission" on the concentration camps of Majdanek, *The Majdanek Inferno*, published on September 28, 1944, claimed that mass shootings were in first place as the principal killing method—apart from mistreatment—and beside that mentioned "murder vans," and likewise the existence of "gas cells," which allegedly had been technically examined by the Soviets in regard to their functional efficiency.⁴⁴ The ultimate source of information appears to have been the testimony of NKVD witnesses; on this basis, the official Soviet communiqué then reached contradictory conclusions, and inevitably so. One is first given to believe that the killing of people by poison gas was rather more the exception than the rule, and was used, in particular, in cases of illness and physical exhaustion—and, moreover, used to a relatively limited extent. On the other hand, the "Extraordinary State Commission" assumed that hundreds of thousands of people had been exterminated by poison gas during the almost three years of the existence of the Majdanek concentration camp. This contradiction was never explained, but still applies: for example, the historian Helmut Krausnick considered it proper, as early as 1956, to state that Majdanek was "not a camp of immediate extermination." Thus the communist Polish Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in Majdanek claimed a total number of 200,000 victims.⁴⁵

Still greater significance than Majdanek concentration camp was understandably attributed to Auschwitz concentration camp by Soviet propaganda. If a comparison is now made between the reporting on Auschwitz concentration camp and the reporting on Majdanek, it, likewise, becomes clear that shootings and mistreatments played the chief role as the method of killing in Soviet propaganda until the end of the war, while gassing played a subordinate role only. The report sent to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Malenkov, in Moscow, by the Member of the Military Council for the 1st Ukrainian Front, (political) Lieutenant General Krainikov, on January 30, 1945, three days after the capture of the camp, merely says, for example: "According to preliminary inmate testimonies, hundreds of thousands of people were tortured to death, burned, or shot in Auschwitz."⁴⁶ There is no mention of gassing, which would have been sensa-

43 *Ibid.*, 24. 8. 1944.

44 *Ibid.*, 28. 9. 1944.

45 Krausnick, *Zur Zahl der jüdischen Opfer*, p. 18.

46 "Protokolle des Todes."

tional enough. The final communiqué of the "Extraordinary State Commission" on Auschwitz also contains a remarkable deviation from the text in this regard.⁴⁷ The Russian edition of the official Soviet communiqué, published in the party newspaper *Pravda* on May 7, spoke of killing by "shooting, hunger, poisoning, and monstrous mistreatment," while the propaganda newspaper *Soviet War News*, published by the Soviet Embassy in London on May 24, 1945, *i.e.*, the English edition, spoke of "shootings and monstrous mistreatments," *i.e.*, there is no longer any mention of "poisoning," although the Auschwitz case was being thoroughly exploited by Soviet propaganda, and Auschwitz concentration camp was being appropriately described as even more horrible than Majdanek. Certainly the report (*soobshchenie*) of the "Extraordinary State Commission" of May 7, 1945, on Auschwitz, analogous to the report on Majdanek, mentioned the existence of gas chambers (*gazovye kamery*), in the vicinity of the crematoria. Thus, a total of four crematoria were said to have existed in connection with such gas chambers in Auschwitz beginning in the summer of 1943. However, these gas chambers, astonishingly enough, were not the central point of emphasis of Soviet propaganda. Their existence was assumed to be so little known that the Germans were alleged to have been able to disguise them from the unsuspecting victims as "baths of special designation" (*banjami osobogo naznachienija*).⁴⁶

As for methods of killing, the Soviet communiqué on Auschwitz therefore mentioned, primarily, "shootings and monstrous mistreatments." Although gassings, as in Majdanek, were mentioned in the Soviet propaganda of that time, poison gassings ranked behind vivisection, medical experiments on living human beings, and similar crimes. It was even enumerated that allegedly 5,121,000 corpse cremations could have theoretically been performed in the four—later five—crematoria, during the entire duration of the camp. In this context, the recently published records of the interrogations of the "Auschwitz engineers" Prüfer, Sander, and Schultze by NKVD authorities during 1946 are interesting as well. According to these records, the gassings apparently involved only relatively small groups of persons after all—in the order of a few hundred on each occasion. The communiqué of May 7, 1945, moreover, contains no mention of the destruction of Jews, but rather, of citizens of the Soviet Union and those of many other European countries. The investigation findings of the "Extraordinary State Commissions" on Majdanek and Auschwitz were presented to the Interna-

47 "More terrible than Maidanek," in: *Soviet War News*, 1. 3. 1945; "Oswiecim (Auschwitz). The Camp where the Nazis murdered over 4,000,000 people," *ibid.*, 24. 5. 1945.

tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on the basis of article 21 of the London Agreement, as well as the investigation results of Katyn, and accepted without reservation as officially probative governmental material of the Soviet Union. They were introduced into evidence by the Soviet prosecutor, Chief Justice Counselor Smirnov, in the session of February 19, 1946.⁴⁸ The International Military Tribunal, nevertheless, proved itself remarkably reticent in relation to the question of the gassings; the grounds for the judgment of September 30, 1946, merely stated tersely:

“Some of them [namely of the gas chambers with ovens for the burning of corpses] were in fact used for the extermination of Jews as part of the ‘final solution’ of the Jewish problem.”⁴⁹

The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, whose questionable competence, composition, and practices cannot be discussed at this point, also based its findings in this regard upon the testimony, which is generally considered credible, of SS Major and Judge, Dr. Morgen, and Deputy Bureau Chief of the Main Office of the SS Court and Chief Justice of the Supreme SS and Police Court, SS Colonel Dr. Reinecke, on August 7 and 8, 1946. The above named SS judges and others had drawn up lengthy reports against the commandants and guard personnel of seven to ten concentration camps on behalf of Himmler in 1943-44, but only for “irregularities” having occurred in the camps in question.⁵⁰ In the course of these investigations, they accidentally stumbled across clues of the systematic extermination action. In Lublin in 1943, Morgen became aware of the existence of a related “Secret Special Mission of the Führer of the Highest Importance” in Auschwitz in 1944, and, in connection with the same, the existence of gas chambers (camouflaged as “large bath installations”) in connection with crematoria for the extermination of human beings in a place called by Morgen the “Monowitz extermination camp.” The fact that, according to Morgen’s testimony offered under oath, leading groups of the SS obviously had no knowledge of the extermination actions was, moreover, one of the reasons why the prosecutors refrained from cross-examining the witness, who had been called by the defense. The blanket accusation against all members of the SS had to be maintained at any price.

The Auschwitz problem has recently become the object of intensive journalistic debate, generally conducted both knowledgeably and intelligently in all its aspects, both in Germany and abroad, even if many groups

48 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. VII, p. 641.

49 *Ibid.*, vol., XXII, p. 43.

50 *Ibid.*, vol. XX, pp. 524, 545ff., 555ff., 562f; see also Lippe, *Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen*, pp. 428ff.

zealously exceed the proper limitations of this debate due to their political motivations. This controversy is being conducted less in the "official" literature than in rather remote publications, and is not a little influenced by official prohibitions against certain forms of thought and speech, suspiciously watched over by a system of political denunciation. The related prevention of free discussion of an important problem of contemporary history, no matter how unfortunate it may be today, will, of course, be ineffective in the long run. Experience shows that free historical research can only be temporarily hindered by criminal law as it exists in many European countries. Historical truths usually continue to exert their effects behind the scenes, only to emerge triumphantly at a later time. In regard to the problem of Auschwitz, moreover, it is not a question of "obvious" facts relating to the cruel persecution and extermination of members of the Jewish people, which is beyond discussion; rather, it is solely and merely the question of the killing mechanism utilized and the question of how many people fell victim to persecution. Major discoveries are emerging in this regard, to such an extent that many current preconceptions must inevitably be corrected.

Although, for example, a total number of six million death victims is still believed to represent the expression of an indisputable historical fact—a established axiom today—the question then arises as to when, and where, the six million figure originated and on what it is based. Courts in the Federal Republic of Germany regularly indict and prosecute the expression of doubt as to the accuracy of this number on the grounds of "denial," which is a misconception. What is involved is a clear inability to believe. If asked about the origin of these figures, however, these courts are unable to give an answer.⁵¹ A few remarks in this regard are therefore called for.

After the troops of the Soviet 60th Army occupied the territory of the Auschwitz concentration camp on January 27, 1945, it was not until March 1, 1945—ignoring a few reports considered rather vague—before any official Soviet declaration was forthcoming. That, based on dubious investigations, stated "at least five million people had been exterminated" in Auschwitz concentration camp. The number of victims first mentioned by Lieutenant General Krainiukov to Malenkov on January 30, 1945 (hundreds

51 "The very idea of liberal Bundestag representatives making it punishable by law to state that the crimes associated with Auschwitz are lies in whole or in part, is so absurd, that at first one shrinks from even discussing the matter. Is there a single example of the crime of denying a historical fact, anywhere in the civilized world? How can one understand the functionings of a state that can even consider threatening to punish the nonsense of a malicious lack of historical education?" so Jürgen Busche, "So treibt man Schindluder. Die beabsichtigte Strafnorm gegen das Leugnen von nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen." Yet such a punishment norm actually became a reality in the Federal Republic of Germany; see *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*. See also Conclusions, note 3.

of thousands), now underwent a huge increase and became so large that even Soviet propaganda considered it necessary to cut it down a little. The communiqué of the "Extraordinary State Commission" published in the party newspaper *Pravda* on May 7, 1945, only speaks of "over four million citizens" having died at Auschwitz. This figure of four million remained the number to be defended in the immediate Soviet bloc (Soviet Union and Republic of Poland) until 1990. In its grounds for the judgement of August 1946, even the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, under the impression of the "probative material" of Soviet "Document 008-USSR," had only acknowledged three million victims in Auschwitz.⁵² "The disgrace of the determination of the number of murder victims should have been sufficient warning," Professor for Economic and Social History and Curator for Research Inquires at the Memorial Auschwitz-Birkenau, Waclaw Długoborski, wrote on September 4, 1998.⁵³

"The figure was established by a Soviet Investigative Commission, without further investigation, at four million, shortly after the end of the war. Regardless of the existence of doubt as to the accuracy of the estimate, it became a dogma from the beginning. It was against the law to doubt the number of four million murder victims in Eastern Europe until 1989; employees of the Auschwitz Memorial Museum who doubted the accuracy of the estimate were threatened with disciplinary proceedings."

Conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany were hardly better. The Soviet propaganda number of four million was considered "obvious" in Germany until 1990, although no one knew exactly how it was calculated. An ignorant political judiciary prosecuted doubters, simply for not believing—and therefore "denying"—the Stalinist propaganda figure.

In the meantime, the Director of the State Museum of Auschwitz, Dr. Franciszek Piper—who sometimes seems to know more than he would have it appear—caused the memorial inscriptions to the four million Jews in Auschwitz, which had been carved on nineteen memorial tablets in nineteen languages, to be secretly removed in April 1990. Remarkably, the new number of 1 to 1.2 million, alleged in turn, was to have a short life span as well, and would soon be reduced to 800,000.⁵⁴ 74,000 dead victims are confirmed in the registers of the *Sterbebücher* (Death Registers) released from Soviet archives, but this includes only victims of those deportees who were registered at their arrival in Auschwitz. These registers naturally refer to a partial number of victims only; the true total remains in the dark. The difference of

52 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. XXII p. 563.

53 Długoborski, "Da war noch mehr als die Toten."

54 Maiello, "Neue Erkenntnisse über Auschwitz."

726,000, according to the most recent reports, was rather summarily estimated based on an evaluation of "available technical data," and, therefore, in a manner rather similar to the Soviet communiqué of May 7, 1945, based on speculating about the capacity of the crematoria in Auschwitz. These numbers could not, therefore, be considered definitively proven either. Jean-Claude Pressac now states a total figure of 631,000-711,000 deaths at Auschwitz.

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which was methodically deceived by the falsifications of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission, nevertheless, agreed with the Soviet war propagandists as to the total number of Jewish victims. The International Military Tribunal calculated the number of Jewish death victims in its grounds for the judgement at six million. Although even the British prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, showed signs of doubt as to the credibility of the Soviet figures in speaking hypothetically of three million Jewish death victims on March 21, 1946,⁵⁵ and although, shortly before, on January 3, 1946, former SS Captain Wisliceny from the Jewish Office of the Reichs Security Main Office had testified that SS Lieutenant Colonel Eichmann (Department Head of Office IV) had spoken to him of four to five million in February 1945,⁵⁶ the Tribunal based its findings on another declaration from the Reichs Security Main Office: the affidavit of former SS Major Dr. Höttl (document PS-2738 of November 26, 1945).⁵⁷ Höttl is the one to whom Eichmann, the expert adviser on Jewish affairs, is supposed to have spoken of a total of six million Jews killed during a conversation in Budapest at the end of August 1944, "after he poured the Barack, a Hungarian apricot brandy." Höttl alleged that he had provided more detailed information in this regard to an American agency in a neutral country (Allen Dulles in Switzerland), "even before the German collapse" (*i.e.*, in the spring of 1945).⁵⁸ So that it is at least explicable if the six million number was already current in September 1945 in the US prisoner camp at Freising, but was not believed by the shocked inmates. When Höttl, who was imprisoned there, once more repeated what he had heard from Eichmann in August 1944, his testimony was immediately deposed by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). The number given by Eichmann was in the meantime "clearly considered to be too high" "in view of the knowledge of historical science"; Dr. Höttl today,

55 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. IX, p. 675.

56 Lippe, *Nürnberg Tagebuchnotizen*, p. 84.

57 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. XXXI, p. 86.

58 Kaufmann, "'Auschwitz-Lüge' - Auschwitz-Wahrheit", pp. 16ff.

who had known Eichmann since 1938, also speaks of Eichmann's tendency to exaggerate.

Even if we assume that the six million figure, which was to acquire imperishable historical political symbolic power, only reached the Americans in the spring of 1945, it is in any event strange that the Soviet foreign propaganda was already using the six million figure months before. Exactly five weeks before the liberation of Auschwitz concentration camp with its alleged five million victims, the weekly newspaper *Soviet War News*, published by the Soviet embassy in London on December 22, 1944, headlined in an article by leading Soviet propagandist Ilya Ehrenburg: "Remember, Remember, Remember." In it, the following was reported, apparently with the greatest naturalness:⁵⁹

"In regions they seized, the Germans killed all the Jews, from the old folks to infants in arms. Ask any German prisoner why his fellow countrymen annihilated six million innocent people, and he will reply quite simply 'Why, they were Jews.'"

This article by Ehrenburg was reprinted on January 4, 1945, *i.e.*, twenty-three days before the liberation of Auschwitz, under the headline "Once Again—Remember!" in the *Soviet War News* weekly, with the same passage word for word.

As early as October 5, 1944, Ehrenburg inserted his claims into another article in *Soviet War News*: "They [the Germans]" he wrote, "made no attempt to disguise their acts in Poland, as they installed 'extermination camps' in Maidanek (sic), Sabibur (sic), Bolzyce (sic), and Treblinka and slaughtered millions, I repeat, millions of defenseless people."⁶⁰ In using the related propaganda claim that remains commonplace to the present day, he added significantly: "If the Germans killed millions of Jews, then the fact that these were Jews is only of importance to 'racists.' For human beings, it is of importance that these victims were human beings." The slanderous conclusion then ran: "Hundreds of thousands (of Germans) are guilty of crimes and millions of complicity."

The six-million figure, stated exactly for the first time by Ehrenburg in the *Soviet War News* on December 22, 1944, at first inconspicuously, and

59 Ehrenburg, "Remember, Remember, Remember," in: *Soviet War News*, 22. 12. 1944; Ehrenburg, "Once Again—Remember!," *ibid.*, 4. 1. 1945. Prof. Robert Faurisson of Vichy, in verifying the Ehrenburg quotation of 4. 1. 1945, in the Reference Library of the Imperial War Museum, London, discovered that the quoted sentence of 4. 1. 1945, was merely a reprinting of an article already published in *Soviet War News* on 22. 12. 1944, under another title. I wish to extend my warm thanks to Prof. Faurisson for his assistance in providing the reference and for sending me a copy.

60 Ehrenburg, "They shall all be Tried. We guarantee that," in: *Soviet War News*, 5. 10. 1944.

then repeated by him once again on January 4, 1945, in the same Soviet propaganda newspaper, then appeared on March 15, 1945, in another article by Ehrenburg in the *Soviet War News* weekly under the headline "Wolves They Were - Wolves They Remain"—in bold print, as a fact no longer to be disputed by anyone. Although the total number of victims, according to the Soviet Press on March 1, 1945, had been increased by another 5 million to a new total of eleven million, Ehrenburg, unmoved by this, wrote on March 15, 1945: "The world now knows that Germany has killed six million Jews," a claim of which the world knew absolutely nothing at that time.

The stereotypical repetition of a total figure of six million murder victims, already claimed with precise clarity on December 22, 1944—and this in the propaganda newspaper *Soviet War News*, intended for English-speaking readers—gives rise to the conclusion that the six-million figure, just like the Auschwitz figure of May 7, 1945, is a product of Soviet propaganda, intended to influence and indoctrinate public opinion, particularly, the thinking of the Anglo-Saxon countries. The evidence, from *Soviet War News* of December 22, 1944, January 4, 1945, and March 15, 1945, that it was Ehrenburg who introduced the six-million figure in the Soviet war propaganda, is not without importance to scientific discussion of this emotionally charged topic.

We now know that the reports of National Socialist atrocities were published in the Western world, but were not immediately believed. In Great Britain, the word "Auschwitz," was unknown until June 1944, as shown by Martin Gilbert. When two escaping inmates, Vrba and Wetzler, reported gassings at this time, they were not believed.⁶¹ The Allies rejected related Jewish demands on the grounds that the Jewish organizations involved had been "tricked by a deliberate Nazi deception." Still in November 1945, the discouraged President of the Jewish World Congress, Chaim Weizmann, wrote in his memoirs: "The English government did not wish to adopt the attitude that six million Jews in Europe have been killed."⁶²

For Soviet propaganda—which had previously been concerned with distracting attention from Soviet crimes—a rich field of related activity now opened up. Ehrenburg, as has been stated, was very soon entrusted with the assignment of enhancing the receptiveness of public opinion in the USA and in Great Britain to Soviet whisperings. As a prominent Soviet Jew, he also appeared especially predestined to act as a link between the Soviet Union and the very influential Jews in the USA, although he had himself

61 Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies*, pp. 272, 397, 399f.

62 Weizmann, *Memoiren*, p. 642.

once seemed to be rather “anti-Semitic.” Still on October 12, 1941, for example, he disputed that National Socialism was theoretically opposed to all Jews, writing, at that time:

“They say: We are against the Jews. That is a lie. They have their own Jews, which they favor. These Jews have passports, marked with the letters W.J., which means ‘Worthy Jews’ [perhaps: *Geltungsjuden*, Declared Jews].”⁶³

As early as August 24, 1941, he had therefore appealed very influentially, “as a Russian writer and a Jew,” to the Jews of a still-neutral United States, in an article entitled “To the Jews”:

“Jews! The wild beasts have oppressed us... We will not forgive those that are indifferent. We will curse those that wash their hands. Come and help England! Come and help the Soviet Union!”⁶⁴

In his memoirs, Ehrenburg reports that he had received the assignment in the summer of 1943 of sending “a letter to the American Jews on the bestialities of the German Fascists,” to stress the “urgent necessity” of smashing Germany quickly, which meant—since this was what was at stake in concrete terms—an early opening of the second front.⁶⁵

In these same memoirs, Ehrenburg, in an attempt to justify his anti-German hatred orgies, argued: “I have held soap in my hand made of the corpses of shot Jews. ‘Pure Jewish Soap’ was stamped on it.”⁶⁶ And then he says quite casually: “But why remember it? Thousands of books have been written about it.” It is not true that thousands of books have been written about it; rather, what is true is that the Soviet prosecutor, Chief Justice Counselor Smirnov, made the accusation, before the International Military Tribunal on February 19, 1946, based on fabricated material (USSR-196, USSR-197, USSR-393) that the Germans had manufactured soap out of the bodies of murdered Jews on an industrial basis.⁶⁷ This Soviet propaganda claim, carried on and believed, right down to the present day, is without any basis in fact; even the Israeli documentation center Yad Vashem in Jerusalem felt itself compelled to issue an official denial in 1990, stating: “There is no documentary evidence that the Nazis made soap out of human fat”⁶⁸—proving how persistent legends can be, and how carefully and critically one

63 Werth, *Russia at War*, p. 220.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

65 Ehrenburg, *Ljudi, Gody, Zizn*, vol. 5, p. 126.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

67 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. VII, pp. 656ff. See also Zaslavskij, “The Human Soap Factory,” in: *Soviet Weekly*, 19. 7. 1945.

68 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24. 4. 1990, archives of the author.

must deal with accusations having their origins in the dark recesses of Soviet propaganda, and the writings of Ilya Ehrenburg to boot.

The adjustment of political historical statements to truly verifiable facts, which is inevitable in the long run, is a process that has only just begun. This must not, of course, distract attention from the fact that frightful atrocities were committed against the Jewish people in the occupied territories by the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD, as stated above, as well as by related groups of the camp personnel of the SS assigned to the concentration camps of the then General Gouvernement. The Soviet prosecutor at Nuremberg, Chief Justice Counselor Smirnov, who, with his colleagues, attempted to introduce the Soviet war propaganda claims into the procedures of the International Military Tribunal, in speaking of "hundreds of thousands and millions of criminals" among the Germans on February 19, 1946, was making a blanket accusations against the entire German people.⁶⁹ In truth, however, the genocide against the Jews was carried out behind a veil of strict secrecy. If even the British government failed to believe the related reports that, moreover, were only received in 1944; if the otherwise not exactly squeamish Western Allied war propagandists wasted not one word in this respect; if even leading circles of the SS were unaware of what was going on—for example, the investigative committees of the Main Office of the SS Court only stumbled across clues of a systematic mass extermination of human beings in Lublin and Auschwitz by accident after lengthy investigations—then some credence should be given to the oft-claimed ignorance of representatives of the other agencies in the complex power apparatus of Hitler's Germany. It would otherwise be almost impossible to understand, for example, how the notorious SS Brigadier General Ohlendorf, who, according to his own confession, murdered at least 90,000 Jews as chief of the Einsatzgruppe D of the Security Police and SD in the Ukraine could find employment in 1945 as Ministerial Director with the executive Reich Government under Grand Admiral Dönitz, a government that was very concerned with its own reputation under the victorious powers.⁷⁰

In April 1943, Himmler is said to have described the group of those immediately responsible for the "Final Solution" as being restricted to 200 SS leaders.⁷¹ Dr. Höttl, in his affidavit, alleged that Eichmann had told him that the whole action was a "great Reich secret." The American expert on international law, Professor Dr. Dr. de Zayas, and a few American and Brit-

69 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. VII, p. 660.

70 *Ibid.*, XXXI, p. 40.

71 Lippe, *Nürnberger Tagebuchnotizen*, p. 217.

ish authors, make no secret today of their belief that the “number of persons who knew of the Holocaust during the war was extremely restricted.”⁷² De Zayas writes:

“More and more historians are coming to the conclusion that knowledge of the Holocaust during the war was much more restricted than we had previously believed.”

This is particularly true of the mass of German people. It was urgently necessary to conceal the genocide because, for example, in the words of Ministerial Director Dr. Fritzsche, who was acquitted at Nuremberg on all counts:

“the German people would have refused to follow Hitler if they had known of the murder of the Jews; their trust of him would have been very badly shaken at the very least.”⁷³

An informative confidential informational circular letter from the Party Chancellery to the Gauleiters and Kreisleiters of October 9, 1942, quoted by the International Military Tribunal in the grounds for the judgment against the “corps of Political Leaders of the Nazi Party” at Nuremberg in 1946, shows clearly that even the leading officials of the NSDAP were left in the dark as to the real fate of the Jews.⁷⁴ In view of the rumors circulating in Germany on the “conditions among the Jews in the East,” which, it was openly admitted, “some Germans perhaps would not understand,” the Party apparatus was now asked “to keep German public opinion from rebelling against the measures being taken against the Jews in the East.” However, even this confidential circular letter, intended for the information of the Gauleiters and Kreisleiters, contained, in the belief of the International Military Tribunal, “no express statement that the Jews were being murdered; rather, it was indicated that they were being confined to work camps...”

Hitler, moreover, expressed himself accordingly during the continuing deportations, when he stated in the Führer Main Headquarters on May 12, 1942, that the Jews were “the most climate-resistant people in the world...” followed by the admission “... naturally, no individual here crying crocodile tears about Jews transported to the East takes this into consideration,” “our so-called bourgeoisie lament about the self-same Jews who stabbed Germany in the back over the war loan in 1917, when they are transported to the East today.”⁷⁵ Even Hitler, in the circle of his closest con-

72 Zayas, “The Wehrmacht Bureau on War Crimes,” pp. 397ff.

73 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. XVII, pp. 200f.

74 *Das Urteil von Nürnberg*, p. 99.

fidants, therefore, only spoke of transporting Jews to the East, not of exterminating them.

In accordance with the above, the well-known female political journalist and editor of the left-wing *Zeit*, Dr. Gräfin Dönhoff, who can hardly be suspected of "trivialization," also credibly testified that she only heard "of the name of Auschwitz after the war for the first time." As she told her portrait artist Alice Schwarzer: "We knew that people were being transported to the East. But I only learned after the war that the camps were not work camps, but extermination camps. No one could imagine that they were being killed..."⁷⁶

The confidential circular letter of the Party Chancellery of October 9, 1942, not only indicates that the planned murder of the Jews was being concealed or shielded even from the Gauleiters and Kreisleiters assigned to influence public opinion, but that the German population, to a significant extent at least, cannot have been in agreement with the deportation of the German Jews. According to Fritzsche, the Reich Propaganda Minister Goebbels, who must be considered to always have remained a sober judge of the situation, was said to have been "extremely embittered" over the sympathy of many Germans for the Jews. This statement is also confirmed by the diaries of Dr. Goebbels in relation to the deportation of the Berlin Jews. That the Germans could not have been in agreement with purely anti-Jewish persecution is also clear from the Himmler speech in Posen quoted by the American prosecutor Thomas J. Dodd on December 13, 1945, in which Himmler admitted the following in his profligate speech: "And then there come 80 million upright Germans and each one has his decent Jew. Of course, the others are swines, but this one is an A-1 Jew."⁷⁷

If the Germans did not even know of the cruel events occurring behind their backs, events of which they would never have approved, then they cannot be held responsible. The main thing is that even if citizens of the Greater German Reich were involved in these crimes, it is no proof to the contrary; the Russian people, by the same logic, would have to bear responsibility for the mass murder of millions of people under the Soviets; the Georgian people could also be held responsible on the grounds that, in addition to Dzhugashvili (Stalin)—a Georgian—Beria, Dekanozov, Canava, Goglidze, Rukhadze, Karanadze, and other Georgians headed the murder apparatus as leading NKVD officials. To stretch the analogy a bit further,

75 Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier*, p. 310.

76 Schwarzer, Marion Dönhoff, p. 135; see also Hoffmann, "Auf keiner Funkwelle von den ermordeten Juden die Rede."

77 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. III, p. 559.

the Jewish people could also be held responsible because—as Sonja Margolina, an author of Jewish origin from the Soviet Union, stressed in her book *Das Ende der Lügen* (The End of Lies)—Jews in Bolshevism appeared, not only as victims, but as criminals, for the first time in history.⁷⁸ That Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Yoffe, Krestinsky, Radek and innumerable other leading Bolshevik officials were Jews, is very well-known. The Central Committee that met in Smol'nyj in 1918 was popularly known as the “Jewish Central Committee”; according to Sonja Margolina, Bolshevik rule in the 1920s actually bore “certain Jewish features.” “The fact that a significant proportion of the known Bolshevik party leaders were Jews...” as Nicolas Werth writes in the *Black Book of Communism*, “justified the equation of Jew = Bolshevik in the eyes of the masses.”⁷⁹ After all, Wolfgang Strauss, a Slavist and political journalist, refers to the ethnic breakdown of the principal Communist Party leaders during the period from 1918-19, in the appendix to the new edition of the well-known work by Robert Wilton, *The Last Days of the Romanovs*, first published in New York in 1920, which shows the following:

“17 Russians, two Ukrainians, eleven Armenians, 35 Letts [Latvians], 15 Germans, one Hungarian, ten Georgians, three Poles, three Finns, one Czech, one Karaim, and 457 Jews.”⁸⁰

Less well-known is the relatively high proportion of Jews in the unleashing and organization of the Bolshevik terror (Cheka, GPU, NKVD). As stressed by Nicolas Werth in the *Black Book of Communism*, Trotsky, the People’s Commissar for Military Affairs [and de facto head of the Red Army], speaking before the Delegates of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets as early as December 1, 1917, (new calendar: December 13) announced: “In less than one month, the terror will acquire extremely violent forms, just as it did during the great French Revolution.”⁸¹ Nicolas Werth also quotes Grigori Zinoviev, “one of the most important Bolshevik party leaders,” who on September 19, 1918, writing in the newspaper *Sevennaja Kommuna*, demanded that, of the one hundred million residents of Soviet Russia, ten million “must be annihilated” through “our own socialist terror.”⁸²

Trotsky (Lev Bronshtein) and Zinoviev (Hirsh Apfelbaum), in addition to other Jews, were also decisively involved in the murder of the family

78 Margolina, *Das Ende der Lügen*, pp. 47, 143.

79 Werth, “Ein Staat gegen sein Volk,” p. 100.

80 Strauss, *Unternehmen Barbarossa und der russische Historikerstreit*, p. 85; here quoted acc. to Robert Wilton, *The Last Days of the Romanovs*, reprint, IHR, Newport Beach, CA, 1999, p. 185.

81 Werth, “Ein Staat gegen sein Volk,” pp. 73f., quoting from the newspaper *Delo Naroda*, 3. 12. 1917.

of the Czar and their retinue.⁸³ Zinoviev advocated the shooting and forwarded the telegram to Lenin, accompanied by a request for confirmation; together with Lenin, Trotsky issued the order. Lenin's order for the murder was drawn up by Sverdlov, President of the Central Executive Committee in Ekaterinburg (later Sverdlovsk); the murder record (*rasstreleni bili*) was signed by Beloborodov (Vaisbart), President of the "Regional Workers' Soviet of Farmer and Soldier Delegates from the Urals." The murder squad was led by the Jewish Yakov Yurovsky, who is supposed to have killed Czar Nicholas II, Czarina Alexandra Feodorovna, and Crown Prince Alexis in the Ipatiev-House with his own hands on July 17, 1918—a claim that two of his accomplices, nevertheless, later made for themselves. According to the register of names of the "Squad for Special Duty" of the "Extraordinary Commission" (*Chrezvychnaja Komissija*), signed by Yurovsky at Ekaterinburg on July 18, 1918,⁸⁴ at least two other members of the ten-man squad were also Jews: Izidor Edelstein and Viktor Grinfeld. The others were either Russians or German-Austrian prisoners of war: A. Fisher, E. Feketi, Nikulin, P. Medvedev, S. Vaganov, V. Vergaesh, and L. Gorvat. Among the murderers listed in this Spisok (list) was a Hungarian, Imre Nagy (Imre Nad), later Minister President during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, who continued to work closely with the secret police of the GPU-NKVD until fate finally caught up with him.⁸⁵

Although Stalin gradually restricted the influence of the Jews, and subjected many of them to severe persecution as "Trotskyites," or, later, as "cosmopolitans," they were still to be found in leading positions everywhere during the Second World War. An important propaganda role in regard to the United States, for example, was played by the "Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee," which was expressly founded for this purpose, but liquidated in 1948 by Stalin.⁸⁶ One of Stalin's closest collaborators, to the end of his life, was Lazar Moisseevich Kaganovich, chiefly responsible, in addition to other persons, for "an unprecedented act of genocide"—the carefully

82 Werth, "Ein Staat gegen sein Volk," pp. 89f., quoting from the newspaper *Severjanja Kommuna*, 19. 9. 1918. Maetzke, "Tausend Jahre Glückseligkeit," considers this quote important enough to include in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

83 *Imperator Nikolaj i ego Sem'ja*; Diterichs, *Ubjstvo Carskoj Sem'i*; Radsinski, *Nikolaus II*, pp. 356, 373.

84 *Chrezvychnaja Komissija*, archives of the author; "Raboche-Krest'janskoe Pravitel'stvo," *ibid*.

85 See also Heresch, *Nikolaus II, Feigheit, Lüge und Verrat*.

86 Werth, "Ein Staat gegen sein Volk," pp. 268ff. Salomon Mikhoels, the President of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, on 20. 4. 1944, was still calling upon his "Brothers in America, Canada, Mexico, and Britain," in an accusatory tone for active assistance "to the Soviet homeland, Leninist-Stalinist Truth and Friendship, and Soviet freedom." *Soviet War News*, 20. 4. 1944. He was murdered in Minsk by the MGB in 1948.

planned murder of seven to nine million Ukrainian farmers during the 1932-33 famine.⁸⁷ Kaganovich was “responsible for the death of an entire generation of intellectuals,” and personally signed execution orders for 36,000 people. According to Medvedev, a historian of Jewish origins, Kaganovich had “his hand in the murder of millions,” and had more crimes on his conscience “than the men hanged at Nuremberg in 1946.” The order to shoot the 15,000 Polish officers at Katyn and elsewhere—a crime that, in itself, would have sufficed for the imposition of a death sentence according to Nuremberg standards—was signed by Voroshilov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kalinin and Lazar Kaganovich, in addition to Stalin.

Genrikh Grigorevich Yagoda—a “scoundrel and common criminal,” according to Colonel General Volkogonov—was for years the head of the Bolshevik mass terror apparatus and was responsible for the murder of millions as the head of the GULag Archipelago and People’s Commissar of the Interior.

The terror in the Red Army was organized by the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Army Commissar First Rank Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis.⁸⁸ NKVD Colonel General Abakumov, who surrounded himself with a whole group of Jewish collaborators, was a close confidant of Beria. Beria, who was in turn called a “Jew from birth” by NKVD General Sudoplatov, was one of the chief persons responsible for the monstrous crimes under the authority of the NKVD-MVD.⁸⁹ NKVD General Raikhmann, head of the regional administration of the NKVD in Kharkov, which was praised by Ezhov for its particular brutality during the 1930s, played a decisive role in the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war at Katyn in 1940. General of the Army Chernyakhovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd White Russian Front, was responsible for atrocities against the civilian population and against prisoners of war in East Prussia. The list could be extended indefinitely.

Even if, in Margolina’s opinion, the active cooperation of many Jews in the Soviet terror organizations truly requires a chapter of its own, responsibility for crimes committed by the Bolsheviks can never be attributed to the Jewish people as a whole. It was not peoples as a whole—Germans, Russians, Georgians, Latvians, or even Jews and others—who were responsible for the atrocities, but rather, individual persons in all cases. As for Germans in particular, no one can say that the persecution and murder of peaceful populations form any part of the traditions of the German people.

87 Carynyk, “The Killing Fields of Kiev,” p. 25.

88 Wolkogonov, *Triumph and Tragödie*, vol. 1-2, pp. 69, 253f., 258, 278.

89 Sudoplatov, “Erinnerungen und Nachdenken,” archives of the author.

Where tradition is concerned, the tradition is a political one—dating back to the recent era of Jacobinism during the French Revolution. It is the tradition of a *des Convent*, who demanded and carried out the total extermination of the Vendée, the extermination of the population by guillotine, mass drownings, “vertical deportation,” “Republican marriages,” and similar achievements of the glorious Revolution during the delirium of 1793-94. It was not the French people as such who massacred 250,000 people, but rather “Republican citizens”; it was not the German people, but rather National Socialists, followers of Hitler and Himmler, who committed the relevant crimes of our era; it was not the Russian, Georgian, Latvian, or Jewish people who were the scourge of Soviet socialism, but rather Communists, followers of Lenin and Stalin.

It should be added that the guilty parties, insofar as they were German instead of Soviet, were strictly called to account whenever they were apprehended. President Gorbachev permitted some crimes to be called by their proper names in the Soviet Union, but never the criminals; nor were they ever brought to court. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former security advisor to the President of the United States Jimmy Carter, recently wrote the following, speaking of his increasing anger:

“Hitler’s crimes continue to be justly punished. But there are literally thousands of former killers and former torturers in the Soviet Union, who live off official pensions and attend the various revolutionary celebrations, decked out with their medals.”⁹⁰

Some of them are even said to continue to brag of their crimes. Brzezinski stressed that the Gestapo and SS were declared criminal organizations at Nuremberg, adding that it was high time for the NKVD-KGB, and perhaps the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to be declared criminal organizations as well.

90 Brzezinski, “Crime, But No Punishment.”

**“Hitlerite Villains”
Soviet Crimes Are Attributed to the Germans**

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In examining the manner in which German atrocities have been exploited for the purposes of Soviet war propaganda, particularly in view of the general context already described, it should be recalled that all enemies of the Soviet Union have been accused of committing atrocities. This was true during the unprovoked Soviet war of aggression against the Poles—the “White Poles,” in September 1939—as well as during the unprovoked Soviet war of aggression against the Finns—the “White Finnish gangs,” the “Finnish cut-throats,” the “White Finnish scum of humanity,” in November 1939. The manner in which Soviet soldiers were indoctrinated to believe that captivity in these countries was equivalent to a “dreadful death by torture” by a dehumanized enemy has already been described. Nor was any distinction made between Germans and German allies in 1941. The official propaganda slogan “Death to the German invaders!” was accompanied by another slogan, “Death to the Finnish invaders!”¹ The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “Regarding Measures for the Punishment of the German-Fascist Criminals,” published on April 19, 1943, included the Italian, Romanian, Hungarian (naturally, including the Slovaks), and Finnish “Fascist violent criminals.”² The decrees signed by Kalinin and Secretary of the Presidium Gorkin applied, not only to the Germans, but to the “Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, and Finnish villains,” “Hitlerite agents,” the “spies and traitors to the homeland among the Soviet citizens,” and their “tools among the local population” as well, all being threatened with death by public hanging “in the presence of the people,” for their alleged “monstrous acts of violence.” With the further stipulation that:

“The bodies of the hanged guilty parties shall remain on the gallows for several days so that all may know the nature of the punishment and reckoning that awaits all those who commit acts of violence or crimes against the civil population and the homeland.”

1 Winters, “Schuld und Rache.”

2 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Moscow, Kremlin, 19. 4. 1943 (M. Kalinin, A. Gorkin), Soviet War news, 21.4.1943.

What caused the Head of State of the Soviet Union to resort to such revolting threats of reprisals? Kalinin's decree was intended to accomplish a two-fold purpose: first, to distract attention all over the world from the devastating propaganda effect of the mass graves of thousands of Polish officers murdered by the Bolsheviks and discovered at Katyn in February 1943, and secondly—a motive that was perhaps even more pressing—to deter Soviet subjects in the German-occupied territories from joining the Russian Army of Liberation under General Vlassov, which, prior to being hobbled by Hitler, was just beginning to exert an influence in the spring of 1943, a factor of great concern to the Soviet Union.³

For a communiqué of the "Extraordinary State Commission" of August 24, 1944, entitled "Finland Unmasked" to accuse the "Finnish-fascist invaders" of most severe crimes in the "territory of the Karelo-Finnish Socialist Soviet Republic" was, therefore, at least thoroughly consistent.⁴ The "Government and Supreme Military Command of Finland" was said to have deported the entire "Soviet" population of the occupied Soviet territories—"men, women, old people, and children"—to concentration camps, where 40 percent of the inmates were alleged to have died from "monstrous tortures inflicted by the Finnish butchers"—7,000 in Petrozavodsk alone—after which they were said to have been buried in mass graves. In the German-Soviet war—viewed as a continuation of the Winter War with Finland—Soviet prisoners of war were said to have been massacred by "Finnish White Guard bandits," just as they had been during the preceding Winter War. Finland's political objective was alleged to consist of the "deliberate extermination of the Soviet population." Annexed to the communiqué was a list of names of Finnish war criminals of all ranks, from generals on down, including many Finnish civilians.

Accusations similar to those hurled against Finland were also made by the Extraordinary State Commission on June 22, 1944, against Romania, where the government was said to have attempted the extermination of the populations—Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldavians—in the regions between the Bug and the Dniester Rivers ("Transdinstria"), while plundering the countryside.⁵ Twenty-five thousand civilians were alleged to have been burned alive by the "Romanian butchers" in powder magazines in Odessa alone on October 19, 1941, while a total of 200,000 people were alleged to have been "shot, tortured to death, or burned" in Odessa and in the concentration camps of the region. Ehrenburg acted as the spokesman of

3 Hoffmann, *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee*, pp. 328ff.

4 *Soviet War News*, 24. 8. 1944.

5 *Ibid.*, 22. 6. 1944, 11. 11. 1943.

slander in this instance as well, referring to the Royal Romanian army on September 7, 1941, as a band of "lousy soldiers and syphilitic officers," and an "underworld." On October 11, 1945, in an article regarding the fate of the Romanian Jews, entitled "Meeting with Romania: Rebirth of a people," Ehrenburg claimed that Romanian "fascists" had slaughtered 500,000 out of 800,000 Romanian Jews.⁶ To Ehrenburg, of course, the Royal Italian Army fighting in the Soviet Union was, similarly, nothing but a "gang of robbers and murders." "In the coming century," he wrote on November 7, 1941, in an article entitled "Love and Hatred," "the Italians will be unable to look eastward without trembling in their boots."⁷ Even neutral Switzerland—the "little fossil" in the heart of Europe, in Ehrenburg's words—would receive the same sort of treatment after the end of the war. On June 21, 1945, the official news agency TASS claimed that 9,000 Soviet citizens interned in Switzerland (refugees from Germany) had been subjected to "intolerable conditions," being treated "in the same brutal manner as under the Hitlerites," including fatal shootings.⁸

The Soviet Union has always described the blockade of the city and fortress of Leningrad, which began in September 1941, as one of the "most frightful crimes of the German-fascist conquerors," the "methodical murder of the peaceful residents of the city." Leningrad—"the majestic Saint Petersburg," "the most beautiful city in the world," "in which every stone is holy"—in Ehrenburg's words, on October 8, 1941, was being oppressed by Berlin, the city of "vulgarity, barracks, and beer halls," "the ugliest" of all German cities.⁹ The hypocrisy of all these ever-shifting accusations is revealed by the incontrovertible fact that the blockade, bombardment, and starvation of fortified, defended cities and fortresses are permitted by the laws of war, being entirely in compliance with all applicable international law relating to the laws and customs of war. Soviet troops also resorted to such methods of blockade without any hesitation at all, attempting to bring about the capitulation of enemy cities such as Königsberg, Breslau, and Berlin in 1945, through encirclement and bombardment by all available methods. The former defender of Leningrad, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, considered it an honor to have fired no fewer than 1,800,000 heavy artillery shells at the defended city of Berlin between April 21, and May 2, 1945. "Smoke the rats out of Königsberg" was the official Soviet slogan on February 15, 1945.¹⁰

6 *Soviet Weekly*, 11. 10. 1945.

7 *Russia at War*, pp. 134, 186.

8 *Soviet War News*, 30. 11. 1944, *Soviet Weekly*, 21. 6. 1945.

9 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, pp. 73, 85.

The cost in human life to the blockaded city of Leningrad was in fact high, and no one familiar with the frightful details will be unable to sympathize with the victims of the blockade. It was, however, war; and blockade is a permissible method of waging war under international law. As Yuri Ivanov, writer and President of the Kaliningrad section of the Russian Cultural Fund and Joint Publisher of the *Kenigsbergskij Kur'er* (Königsberg Courier) remarked in 1992: "When I was starving and eating rat meat in Leningrad, Zhdanov, the fat official, had his schnitzel flown into the city every day."¹¹ There is another notable difference as to the victims of the blockade. Books are written about the victims of Leningrad; solemn wreath laying ceremonies and memorial commemorations are regularly held in Leningrad cemetery (*Piskarevskoe Memorial'noe Kladbisce*), while the victims of Königsberg—mostly old people, women and children—lie buried and forgotten. At the same time, according to the detailed studies by the Königsberg professors of medicine Schuberth and Starlinger, 90,000 of the 120,000 civilians captured by the Soviets in April 1945 either died of starvation or from epidemics—not during the blockade, but rather, after the end of the fighting, and even after the end of the war, under Soviet administration, for which there is no justification under international law.¹²

Soviet propaganda describes the blockade and bombardment of the city of Leningrad as criminal, while totally suppressing the fact that the Soviet Union never paid the slightest attention to civilian populations whenever it suited their political or military purposes. Thus the attack on tiny Finland on November 30, 1939, began with surprise bombing attacks by Soviet combat aircraft units on the residential districts of the cities of Helsinki, Hangö, Kotka, Lahti, and Wiborg, to achieve the immediate destruction of the morale of the unprepared civilian population and paralyze all resistance.¹³ According to a Finnish empirical report of February 13, 1940, the Finnish "industrial centers (in the cities of Yymi and Vuokseniska) and transport junctions (Antrea, Kouvola)" were only "secondary" objectives of Soviet aircraft. On August 17, 1941, Ehrenburg gloated over the appearance of a few Soviet Stöer aircraft over Berlin. On April 30, 1942, he called the destruction of the cities of Lübeck and Rostock by the Royal Air Force "a good start," simultaneously stating: "We shall strike the beast wherever we can."¹⁴

10 *Soviet War News*, 15. 2. 1945.

11 *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, 12. 6. 1992.

12 See in this regard Deichelmann, *Ich sah Königsberg sterben*; see also Wieck, *Zeugnis vom Untergang Königsberg*, pp. 264f.

13 BA-MA, RH 19111/381, 13. 2. 1940.

The Germans continue to be held solely responsible for the "crime" of blockading and bombarding the city of Leningrad, right down to the present day; yet contemporary Soviet war propaganda invariably mentioned the Finns as well—in the same breath, as it were. According to reports from the Soviet information bureau, Finnish officers had always been "the chief instigators of the bombardments." "Now the Finns are bombarding Leningrad," wrote Tikhonov in an article on January 27, 1944, piling up insult after insult against the Finns, calling them "assassins," "vile stepsons of nature," "lunatics," and "crazy creatures."¹⁵ Tikhonov also accused the Finns of rejoicing over the sufferings of Leningrad during the hunger blockade, claiming that it was their wish to "wipe Leningrad from the face of the earth." Since the Finns failed to do so, they were accused of committing atrocities against the peaceful Russian population in the Finnish-occupied section of the Karelian peninsula, in a manner overshadowing "even the most sadistic Gestapo agents in baseness, cruelty, and terror."

The same Soviet war propaganda apparatus that accused the Germans and German allies of committing atrocities from the very outbreak of the war, nevertheless, fell into a certain disarray when it came to the production of truly convincing evidence. The rage of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD against the Jewish population appear to have become known, if not in terms of the systematic nature of such actions, at least as far as their general outlines were concerned. As early as December 18, 1941, Ehrenburg himself quoted a captured German army order, which is revealing insofar as it prohibited soldiers from even witnessing the measures of the Einsatzgruppen, which were described as "inevitable."¹⁶ Against his will, and perhaps unintentionally, Ehrenburg therefore felt himself compelled to admit that the machine-gunning of "thousands of citizens" was, perhaps, not the act of the Wehrmacht, but, rather, the responsibility of the Einsatzgruppen. "It is a victory of the Gestapo over the German generals," Ehrenburg claimed: "Himmler obtained a monopoly over the gallows, while the Gestapo was granted the privilege of burning down villages, shooting women with machine guns, and murdering Russian children." On the whole, these accusations, nevertheless, remained vague; even Ehrenburg was unable to produce truly solid evidence in the early years. Where atrocities were concerned, the Soviet Union felt itself placed on the defensive during the first half of the war. Even the Lemberg case shows that it was not

14 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, pp. 39, 275.

15 *Soviet War News*, 27. 1. 1944.

16 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, pp. 93f.

so easy to accuse the Germans of committing atrocities when the mass murdering was in fact started by the Soviets.

In execution of an Order of Stalin to prevent the capture of Soviet political prisoners by the Germans, approximately 4,000 Ukrainian and Polish political prisoners and other civilians of all ages and both sexes, as well as a number of German prisoners of war, were systematically shot by the NKVD in the prisons of Lemberg, such as Brigidki Prison, Zamarstynow Prison, and the NKVD prison in the days preceding June 30, 1941. In some cases, the prisoners were horribly mutilated and showed signs of severe torture.¹⁷ This atrocity was exploited by Einsatzgruppe C of the Security Police and SD as providing a suitable opportunity for the shooting of up to 7,000 residents of Jewish origin, who had taken no part in the crimes at Lemberg or the surrounding regions, in a so-called "reprisal for the inhumane atrocities" before July 17. The fact, nevertheless, remains that it was the Soviets who left behind the 4,000 corpses of murdered civilians, some of them mutilated, a fact immediately seized upon by the Germans.

German press reports on Soviet atrocities in Lemberg were confirmed by Polish reports reaching Great Britain through unofficial pathways and not doubted by official circles in London. The British Foreign Office, immediately convinced of Soviet guilt as in the later Katyn case, sent the Moscow Foreign Commissariat a note requesting clarification, to which Molotov hastily issued a categorical Soviet official denial on July 12, 1941.¹⁸ Soviet propaganda immediately busied itself with concealing the Soviet crimes at Lemberg by blaming the prison massacres on the Germans. Lemberg thus set the precedent for the Soviet propaganda tactic of covering up Soviet crimes by attributing them to the Germans.

The Soviet authorities next occupied themselves with the preparation of so-called "witnesses," a tried-and-true procedure; after all, the NKVD, in view of its experiences during the "Great Purge" of the 1930s, was well able to obtain any kind of statement it liked, from any kind of witness to any crime. On the basis of such falsifications, the Soviet news agency TASS published a report on August 8, 1941,¹⁹ immediately disseminated by the Associated Press agency, alleging that German "storm troops" had killed 40,000 people in Lemberg.²⁰ The eyewitness statements in question were described as "irrefutable," and as proof that the "fantastic inventions of Hitler propaganda relating to the so-called Bolshevik crimes at Lemberg [were]

17 Raschofer, *Der Fall Oberländer*, p. 40.

18 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 343f.

19 According to *Soviet War News*, 29. 4. 1943.

20 Nikiforuk, *Babi Yar*.

in fact a crude attempt to conceal the unprecedented bestialities and cruelties of the German bandits themselves against the Lemberg population." When the Soviets found themselves driven into a corner following the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn in 1943, they immediately adopted the same tactic as in the case of the Lemberg accusations. On April 29, 1943, the party newspaper *Pravda*, in an article printed under the absurd headline "Hitler's Polish collaborators," claimed that the "German bandits" and "Hitlerite liars" "[were] now acting in exactly the same manner as they did in 1941, in regard to so-called victims of the Bolshevik terror in Lemberg." Exactly as in the Lemberg case, the Germans were then alleged to be trying to accuse Soviet agencies of atrocities committed at Katyn by the Germans themselves, thus slandering "the Soviet people." These attempts at justification continued with the publication, on January 4, 1945, of the investigative findings ("The Lvov Evidence") of the "Extraordinary State Commission."²¹ These were then presented to the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg as an official governmental document of the Soviet Union possessing "probative value," of which judicial notice was taken after being accepted into evidence as true and proven on the basis of Article 21 of the London Agreement which established the International Military Tribunal.²²

Only the Germans could, therefore, be deemed guilty. There was no mention of mass murders previously committed by the Soviets. While it is true that Einsatzgruppe C killed 7,000 people at Lemberg, this figure was now inflated to 700,000, one hundred times as many. To enhance the credibility of this claim, the following allegation was made:

"The Hitlerite murderers used the same methods in concealing their crimes at Lemberg as in concealing the killing of the Polish officers in the forest of Katyn. The Expert Commission has established that the methods used to conceal the graves were the same as were used to conceal the graves of the Polish officers killed by the Germans at Katyn."

The value of this official Soviet governmental document, sanctioned by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, may be judged from the claim, presented both orally and in writing at Nuremberg, that the children of Jewish residents of Lemberg were made available, "as usually," to the Hitler Youth—which is well-known only to have existed in the territory of the Reich and which were, moreover, unarmed—as "living targets."²³ Or the claim, for example, that, every week, 1,000 runaway French prisoners of

21 *The Truth About Katyn*, author's archives.

22 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. VII, pp. 500, 540.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 493.

war having refused to work for the Germans (for which purpose they were, after all, obliged by the Geneva Convention) were transported to a concentration camp near Lemberg, where they were allegedly tortured or shot, together with Soviet, British, and American prisoners of war and Italian military internees.

Lemberg was the first occasion upon which the Soviets found themselves compelled to conceal their own crimes. The Lemberg case was then dished up as an alibi when the Germans found the mass graves of the Polish officers in the forest of Kozy Gory near Katyn, west of Smolensk, in February 1943. There the bodies of 50,000 other victims of the NKVD are known today to have lain buried in addition to the bodies of the Polish officers. When the mass graves at Vinica were discovered shortly afterward, in May 1943, Katyn had to take the rap in order to distract from Soviet guilt at Vinica. Three years earlier, on March 5, 1940, the People's Commissar of the Interior, Beria, in a letter to "Comrade Stalin," had mentioned that 14,736 "former" Polish officers and civilians were interned in "NKVD prisoner of war camps of the USSR" (*i.e.*, the officers' camps at Starobelsk and Kozelsk and the special camp of Ostaskov), while 10,685 more Poles believed to be dangerous were interned in the prisons of the western Ukraine and western White Russia.²⁴ In view of the fact that all these Polish internees were "embittered and irreconcilable enemies of Soviet rule," Beria requested that "the highest penalty: death by shooting" be passed against 14,700 "former" officers and civilians, as well as against more than 11,000 other persons, by a three-man NKVD board. Lists containing the names of the Poles to be shot were to be drawn up for Beria by his Deputy, Chief of the 1st Special Department of the NKVD, Merkulov. The other two members of the troika were Kobulov and Bashtakov. In a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP (b) held on the same day, Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and other leading Soviet officials, approved the application and signed the corresponding Report No. 13.²⁵ 4,404 Polish officers from Kozelsk were shot a few weeks later in Katyn; 3,891 officers from Starobelsk were shot at Kharkov; while 6,287 state prisoners from Ostaskov were shot at Kalinin (Tver). The remaining 10,685 Poles were shot at an unknown location.

When the Polish government in London requested an investigation of the case by the International Committee of the Red Cross after the discovery

24 Werth, "Ein Staat gegen sein Volk," pp. 233ff. (Letter from L. Beria, People's Commissar of the Interior, to Stalin, March 5, 1940, marked "top secret"); Paczkowski, "Polen, der 'Erbfeind,'" pp. 402ff. (Katyn, die Gefängnisse und die Deportationen 1939-1941).

25 Kilian, "Die 'Mühlberg-Akten,'" pp. 1141f.

of the mass graves at Katyn, the Soviet government broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile on April 29, 1943, on the monstrous pretext of Polish complicity with Hitler. Foreign Minister Molotov justified this step in a note to the Polish ambassador with the allegation that both the Polish government and the Hitler government had simultaneously invited the International Red Cross to the "investigative farce invented by Hitler," thus initiating an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign "simultaneously, in the German and Polish press." On the same day, the party newspaper *Pravda* pilloried the Polish government in insulting terms for its alleged collaboration with the "Hitler cannibals," and its "direct and open support to the Hitlerite butchers of the Polish people," a version that, incidentally, was immediately repeated by the left-wing circles of other countries as well, such as, for example, Willy Brandt, who described "Katyn" in 1945 as proving "that openly fascist elements might work their evil among Polish troops and groups in foreign countries."²⁶

The allegation made by Molotov in his note of April 29, 1943, and repeated by Soviet propaganda in a thousand different variations—that the German "fascists" were themselves guilty of the brutal murders of the Polish officers—continued to constitute the official Soviet position long after the truth about the shootings had been established by a Committee of the American Congress, long after the war, and long after the incident had been described in detail in numerous international publications. For example, as late as 1977, a "respected Soviet legal scholar," Professor Dr. Minasjan, in his book *Mezhdunarodnye prestuplenija tret'ego rejkha* (International Crimes of the Third Reich), expatiated upon the "blood bath of the Hitlerite butchers against the Polish officers in the Katyn forest," adding that "the peoples of the world will never forget, and will never pardon, the Nazi crimes."²⁷ In 1969, during the Stalinist Brezhnev period, a concrete monument bearing a pathetic Soviet propaganda text was even erected in the previously unknown White Russian village of Chatyn, whose 149 residents had apparently fallen victim to reprisals by the punishment units of the infamous SS Colonel Dr. Dirlwanger during the partisan war.²⁸ The more gullible groups of foreign visitors were then crudely led to believe that the historical Katyn, near Smolensk, was in fact identical with the village of Chatyn, in White Russia—a village that, prior to that time, could not "even be found on detailed maps."

²⁶ Brandt, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg*, p. 42.

²⁷ Minasjan, "Mezhdunarodnye prestuplenija," p. 16.

²⁸ *Chatyn*.

It was not until 1990 that the Soviet government, under the crushing weight of evidence, considered it proper, at long last, to admit Soviet guilt for the crime. Once again, however, the admission was associated with a lie. Although all previous party leaders and heads of state, including the incumbent, Gorbachev, had known "the whole truth about this crime,"²⁹ the Soviet news agency TASS published an explanation as late as April 13, 1990, alleging that the organization and execution of the "tragedy of Katyn"—allegedly "one of the worst crimes of Stalinism"—had been the responsibility of the "People's Commissariat for Interior Affairs" under "Beria, Merkulov and their lackeys" alone,³⁰ but under no circumstances the responsibility of the Soviet government as such. It was only under the Presidency of Yeltsin, on October 14, 1992, that the Polish government was provided with documents containing the names of the true guilty parties: in addition to Stalin, the entire governmental and party leadership of the Soviet Union. Even Gorbachev's semi-confession was not acknowledged by the Stalinists, who, then as before, continued to set the tone in the Soviet Union. They published a series of articles as late as 1990-1991 in the *Voennno-istoricheskij zhurnal* (Journal of Military History; an official publication of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, infamous even in the Soviet Union for its falsifications of history), that continued to disseminate the claim that the Germans were guilty of this heinous crime against the Polish people.³¹

To mislead the conscience of the world in 1943, therefore, the Extraordinary State Commission set to work once again. After a remarkably long period of gestation during which a mantle of snow rendered any local investigation impossible, on January 24, 1944, it issued a communiqué with the expressive headline:

"The Truth About Katyn: Report of the Extraordinary Commission for the Investigation and Examination of the Circumstances of the Shooting of the POW Polish Officers by the German-Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest."²¹

This extensive Soviet official document, a tissue of lies from the beginning to the end, claimed to have arrived, with "irrefutable certainty," at the conclusion that the mass executions of the Polish officers at the forest of "Kozy Gory" near Katyn had taken place in the fall of 1941, during the German occupation, and had been committed by the Germans, utilizing a "German military organization disguised under the conventional designa-

29 *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 15. 10. 1992.

30 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31. 10. 1992.

31 Prokopenko, Suchinin, "Babij jar pod Katyn'ju?"

tion of the 'Headquarters of the 537th Engineer Battalion'" for that specific purpose. The communiqué was signed by the Academician Burdenko, the Academician and writer Tolstoy, the Metropolitan of Kiev and Galich, Nicolay, the President of the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Kolesnikov, as well as by well-known Soviet doctors of forensic medicine and other personalities, and was accepted into evidence by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in the same manner as all other investigative reports of the Extraordinary State Commissions.

The theoretical basis for all of this originated with Professor Trainin, a leading Soviet authority on international law, whose attitudes are best illustrated by the fact that, on May 24, 1945, he declared it permissible and imperative for millions of German citizens to be deported to the Soviet Union for purposes of slave labor.³² It is to Trainin—who signed the London Four Power Agreement on the "prosecution and punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis" on behalf of the Soviet Union together with Chief Soviet Judge, Major General Nikichenko on August 8, 1945—that Article 21 of the Statutes of the International Military Tribunal is to be attributed. This is the article that stipulated that all official governmental reports of member states of the United Nations—which, therefore, included the falsifications of the Extraordinary State Commissions of the U.S.S.R., including the Soviet Katyn report of January 24, 1944, (ironically) entitled "The Truth About Katyn"—were to be introduced and accepted into evidence at Nuremberg as officially probative material, in the absence of any examination whatever. It was on this basis that the deputy chief Soviet prosecutor, Colonel Pokrovsky, stated at Nuremberg on February 14, 1946, that "one of the most important criminal acts for which the major war criminals are responsible, is the mass annihilation of the Polish officers, which was undertaken in the forests of Katyn near Smolensk by the German-fascist invaders."³³ While Soviet attempts to pin the blame for Katyn on the Germans were an ultimate failure, it should be recalled that the Soviets at Nuremberg deliberately besmirched the honor of an innocent man, Lieutenant Colonel Ahrens, Commander of 537th Signals Regiment of the German Army Group, in their efforts to distract attention from an atrocity committed by the Soviets themselves.³⁴

One aspect of this Soviet forgery, which, as probative document USSR-54, was intended to deceive the non-Soviet judges of the Interna-

32 *Soviet War News*, 24. 5. 1945.

33 *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. VII, p. 469.

34 *Ibid.*, vol. XVII, pp. 301 ff.; see also Schaworonkow, "Nach den Hinrichtungen gab es Alkohol."

tional Military Tribunal, merits particular attention: the claim that the "forensic medical experts" of the Commission had established "beyond any doubt" that "the German executioners, in shooting the Polish prisoners of war, used the same method of pistol shots in the back of the neck as in the mass execution of Soviet citizens in other cities." In other words, when the Extraordinary State Commission claimed to have established that the method of killing used at Katyn was identical to the method used elsewhere, the suspicion naturally arises—since Katyn was a proven Soviet crime—that the crimes committed elsewhere were Soviet crimes as well, and not German crimes. Thus it appears that the Extraordinary State Commission was concerned, once again, not with the elucidation of German crimes, but with blaming Soviet crimes on the Germans for purposes of propaganda. The cases of Vinica, Kharkov, Kiev, and Minsk are sufficiently clear examples of this tactic.

A few weeks after the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn, in May 1943, the Germans discovered other mass graves at Vinica, containing approximately 10,000 Ukrainian victims of the NKVD. An International Commission of Forensic Experts, convened by the Germans from eleven European countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Italy, Croatia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia and Hungary), as well as an independently constituted commission of German experts in forensic medicine and criminology, arrived at the unanimous conclusion, after detailed investigations, that the killings were committed between 1936 and 1938, using a method typical of the NKVD, *i.e.*, bullet wounds to the back of the head and neck.³⁵ These findings were fully confirmed after the war by a sub-committee of the American Congress under the chairmanship of Representative Charles J. Kersten, who presented his findings to the U.S. Congress on December 31, 1954. Following publication of the findings of the German forensic medical experts on August 9, 1943, the Soviet government once again exerted itself to destroy the credibility of the forensic medical authorities from Germany, as well as from all the other countries involved, at all costs, libeling them as "gangs of Gestapo agents" and "paid provocateurs." On August 19, 1943, the Soviet information bureau published a report characteristically entitled "Katyn No. 2," in which the "German butchers," "cut-throats," "blood-thirsty beasts," "Hitlerite villains," "Hitlerite cannibals," "fascist wolves," "murderers," "bandits," "swindlers," and "marauders" were accused of committing the crimes at Vinica, just as in they had previ-

35 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 362ff.

ously been accused of the crimes at Katyn, in an alleged attempt to blame "the Soviet people for their own—German—crimes."³⁶

The verbal attacks and propaganda smokescreen betrayed only too clearly the disarray of the Soviets, once again publicly revealed as mass murderers. As much as possible, Vinica was passed over in silence ever since; but the Soviet regime was, nonetheless, alarmed, and attempted to preempt their German enemies by seizing the propaganda initiative. On April 19, 1943, a few days after the German announcement of the discovery of the mass graves of Katyn, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as already stated, issued a decree "Relating to Measures for the Punishment of German-Fascist Criminals..."—initially, at least, simply an impotent gesture. The decree was then utilized in staging the Kharkov show trial, the precursor of all "war crimes trials." The fact is that the NKVD had committed unprecedented atrocities at Kharkov, "many thousands" of people were liquidated by the regional administration of the NKVD under Raikhhmann and Seleny between 1937 and 1941 alone; in the spring of 1940, the victims included 3,891 Polish officers, buried, among others, at "map grid 6" of a wooded expanse. Following the brief Soviet recapture of Kharkov in the spring of 1943, NKVD border troops, according to detailed German investigations, as described above, shot no fewer than 4,000 people, nearly four percent of the remaining population, in a few weeks, under the pretext of collaboration with the German occupation authorities, "including girls who had relations with German soldiers." Kharkov now became the showplace for a "war crimes trial" held there between December 15 and 18, 1943. It was suited for the purpose precisely because it had been a center of Soviet mass executions in the Ukraine, as well as of the mass murders of thousands of members of the Jewish population during the winter of 1941-1942 by Einsatzgruppe C of the German Security Police and the SD, more specific by Einsatzkommando (Special Action Squad) 4a under SS Colonel Blobel.³⁷

The renewed necessity to besmirch the German enemy, was of course, only a legal problem in part; basically, it was a propaganda problem, duly assigned to a proven expert, Tolstoy, in his capacity as a writer and member of the Extraordinary State Commission. In several articles published in chiefly Western foreign countries under headlines such as "We Demand Vengeance," "Why We Call Them Monsters," and "Nazi Gangsters Stand Before Soviet Judges," Tolstoy used the crimes of Ein-

³⁶ *Soviet War News*, 19. 8. 1943.

³⁷ Krausnick, "Die Einsatzgruppen," p. 193.

satzgruppe C being tried at Kharkov as an occasion to pillory, not only the German Wehrmacht, but the German people as a whole, with many hateful allegations.³⁸ Tolstoy, of course, produced no proof of Wehrmacht responsibility, but, nevertheless, considered himself justified in writing sentences like the following:

“The German armies invaded our country like monsters from another planet. We are constrained to speak of these Germans as monsters, even when we merely state the facts investigated by the Extraordinary State Commission. In the present case, the facts concern the city of Kharkov.”

He added: “We had to kill millions of Germans.” “The Nazis did not deceive Germany,” thus he finally attempted to accuse the entire German people:

“They said quite openly: raise your sons to be unscrupulous murderers and thieves, and your daughters to be merciless overseers of those who will be your slaves. Prepare for the conquest of the world! Germany approved this action.”

This was a statement that was as mendacious as it was nonsensical, leading, in Tolstoy’s view, to the following conclusion:

“German civilization, the entire German nation, is responsible for the crimes committed by them... I accuse the German nation, German civilization, of endless crimes committed by Germans in cold blood, in full possession of their faculties; I demand vengeance!”

This was just a foretaste, in crude form, of a propaganda theme, the far-reaching effectiveness of which remains unfortunately perceptible to the present day.

The Soviet tactic of using German crimes to cover up Soviet atrocities was later resorted to at Kiev, and repeated at Minsk. 200,000 to 300,000 corpses, a small fraction of the victims of Soviet terror in the Ukraine—the exact numbers may perhaps be impossible to determine—were buried in the Darnica Forest, in the vicinity of Kiev, and near Bykovnia (Bikivnia), in the 1930s.³⁹ According to the estimates of many historians, a million people were liquidated between 1939 and 1941 in the western Ukraine, *i.e.*, eastern Poland, alone, an estimate that, in this case, is perhaps too high. In any case, seven to eight million inhabitants of the Ukraine died during a catastrophic famine deliberately organized by Stalin and his henchmen in the 1930s.

38 *Soviet War News*, 7. 10., 18. 11., 23. 12. 1943.

39 Krushelnycky, “The largest mass graves of Bykovnia, near Kiev, 300,000 victims”; “Stalin-Opfer in Massengrab bei Kiev;” “Wer zuckt, dem geben wir den Rest.”

The fact that Kiev has, on the other hand, also come to be viewed as a symbol of the crimes of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and SD, i.e., German crimes, must be viewed against the above described background of Soviet crimes. Like the German army in 1918, during its withdrawal to the "Siegfried Line," the Red Army resorted to demolition and arson in Kiev, but more brutally and on a larger scale, causing heavy loss of life after the German capture of the city, even within the Ukrainian population, in addition to serious and widespread destruction of property. As a reprisal for these provocative occurrences, 33,771 Jewish residents, who did not participate in the sabotage, were shot by Special Action Squad 4a of Einsatzgruppe C between September 29 and 30, 1941.⁴⁰ The remarkably exact figure of 33,771 executed civilians is taken from data originating with Einsatzgruppe C, and was apparently communicated to superiors by this same group on several occasions, for example, in Event Report No. 101 of October 2, 1941, even if only very concisely and, rather remarkably, "failing to make any mention of the method of execution and location of the massacre of the Jews at Kiev."

The number of victims of these reprisal killings remained disputed throughout the following period; in fact, the most widely varying estimates were current. The American High Commissioner John J. McCloy, in his decision on the petition for clemency filed by the leader of the Special Action Squad 4a of Einsatzgruppe C, SS Colonel Blobel, following the latter's death sentence in the Einsatzgruppen Trial (Case 9), considered it proper to remark on January 31, 1951 "that in his (Blobel's) opinion, the number of people shot near Kiev only amounted to half the indicated figure."⁴¹ Thus, even this American document, published by the "Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany," left open the possibility of a much lower number of victims. That "the data relating to the number of victims of the Kiev massacre contains riddles" was Friedrich's opinion as well, in his book *Das Gesetz des Krieges*, published in 1993.⁴² In one of the studies published by the Polish Historical Society in Stamford Connecticut in 1991, Wolski, the Polish expert, made a comparative study of the various numbers of victims at Kiev; in so doing, he made some remarkable discoveries.⁴³ He established that the estimated figures contain margins of error ranging from 3,000 to 300,000. The lowest figure—3,000—is from the *Encyclopedia of the Ukraine* (published in Toronto, 1988), while the highest figure—

40 Krausnick, "Die Einsatzgruppen," p. 190.

41 Landsberg, p. 19.

42 Friedrich, *Das Gesetz des Krieges*, pp. 807f., 810.

43 Wolski, "Le Massacre de Baby Yar."

300,000—was published by Korotkyh, characteristically, a member of the NKVD/KGB, and a close collaborator of Gorbachev, on April 23, 1990, also in Toronto. The other figures are: 10,000 victims, in the *Grand Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Larousse* (published in Paris in 1982); 50,000-70,000 victims in the *Bol'shaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija* (published in Moscow in 1970); and 100,000 victims in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (published in Jerusalem in 1971).

There are also discrepancies in the accounts, not only of the numbers of victims, but in the circumstances of the shooting of the Jews remaining after the evacuation in Kiev in September 1941, as well as relating to the shooting and burial locations. According to Wolski, the name of the "Ravine of the Old Woman," "Babi Yar," northwest of Kiev, so heavily charged with symbolism today, does not appear in the following major reference works: *Bol'shaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija* (1950 and 1955 editions, Moscow); the *Grand Larousse Encyclopédique* (1960 edition, Paris); the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1972 edition, Chicago); the *Enciclopedia Europea* (1977 edition, Rome), *Enciclopedia Universal Nauta* (1977 edition, Madrid), and the *Academic American Encyclopedia* (1991 edition, Danbury Connecticut). The heading "Babi Yar" (Babij jar) appears for the first time in the *Bol'shaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija* (1970 edition, Moscow), and in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (1971 edition, Jerusalem). The *Encyclopaedia Judaica's* highly exaggerated figure of 100,000 victims, however, was derived from the NKVD, and was mentioned for the first time in a report of the *New York Times* from Moscow on December 4, 1943. It is quoted again below.

The NKVD introduced the previously unknown Ravine of the Old Woman into Soviet war propaganda in November 1943 for the first time in connection with the desperate attempts at concealment in the Katyn case. Soon after the recapture of the Ukrainian capital, a party of Western press correspondents was invited by the Soviets to inspect the ravine of Babi Yar, now alleged to be the location of the massacre.²⁰ Material proof, however, seems to have been a bit scanty. An evaluation of the numerous air photos in recent years apparently leads to the conclusion that, in contrast to the clearly visible, extensive mass graves dug by the NKVD at Bykovnia (Bykivnia), Darnica, and Bielhorodka, and in contrast to the clearly visible mass graves at Katyn—final proof, incidentally, of Soviet guilt, according to an article in the *New York Times* on May 6, 1989—the terrain of the ravine of Babi Yar remained undisturbed between 1939 and 1944, *i.e.*, including the years of German occupation. To shore up the allegation that the Germans shot "between 50,000 and 80,000 Jewish men, women, and children with machine guns," in the ravine of Babi Yar, the NKVD rehearsed three so-

called witnesses in 1943, whose tales, however, merely aroused the skepticism of news correspondents, particularly Lawrence, the experienced representative of the *New York Times*. On November 29, 1943, the *New York Times* published an article, purged of the crudest Soviet untruths relating to "Soviet partisans" and "gas vans," entitled "50,000 Jews Reported Killed," nevertheless, accompanied by the remarkable subtitle, "Remaining Evidence is Scanty," indicating that the NKVD efforts to convince the world had been something of a failure.⁴⁴ The presentation of so-called "eyewitnesses" in the case of the previously unknown Ravine of the Old Woman was, according to writer Michael Nikiforuk, however, considered a "test case," a kind of "general test of the mendacious eyewitness accounts extorted by the NKVD in regard to the Katyn forest massacre."^{20,43} For this reason, the NKVD hastened to restore its injured credibility by calling up further reserves.

As early as December 4, 1943, the *New York Times*, in a later article entitled "Kiev Lists More Victims," reported that, according to the title page of Moscow newspapers, 40,000 residents had allegedly sent "a letter to Premier Stalin," in which "the estimated number of persons killed and burned in the Ravine of Babi Yar had been increased to over 100,000."⁴⁵ This was, of course, simply an NKVD stage production, since only the NKVD could have organized a letter writing campaign to Comrade Stalin. However, the figure of 100,000 victims, claimed by the NKVD, henceforth became a standard property of Soviet propaganda, just like the shooting and burial location itself, in the Ravine of the Old Woman. They are already mentioned in the spring of 1944 in the report of a Special Commission headed by Khrushchev, who, as is well-known, was himself guilty of serious crimes against the lives and property of the Ukrainian people in the 1930s.⁴⁶ The report alleges: "Over 100,000 men, women, children and old people (were) murdered in Babi Yar," and 25,000 more in the German labor camps of Syrets near Kiev, where, in reality, however, according to Ukrainian estimates, only 1,000 victims died from acts of violence, illness, or hunger.

The report of the Khrushchev Commission, with the participation of leading officials of the Party, government, and scientific circles, merits particular attention insofar as it mentions Darnica, in addition to Babi Yar, Syrets, and a few other, unknown locations: Darnica was where the Germans—it was now claimed—murdered "over 68,000 Soviet prisoners of war and civilian residents." The stated total of 195,000 victims of the Ger-

44 *The New York Times*, 29. 11. 1943.

45 *The New York Times*, 4. 12. 1943.

46 *Soviet War News*, 9. 3. 1944.

man occupation forces in Kiev, alleged by Khrushchev's Special Commission, therefore nearly approximates the total figure of 200,000-300,000 victims of the NKVD, believed to lie buried in mass graves in the Darnica Forest, as well as at Bykovnia and Bielhoradka. This figure also formed the central assertion of the communiqué of the Extraordinary State Commission about Kiev of March 9, 1944. Since this investigative report, like the investigative report on the Katyn case, was accepted into evidence as Soviet probative material on the basis of Article 21 of the London Agreement of the International Military Tribunal (Document USSR-9), the assistant Soviet prosecutor, Chief Justice Counselor Smirnov, was then able to state, at Nuremberg on February 14, 1946:

"From the report of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet Union about the city of Kiev, which will later be submitted to the Tribunal, it is evident that during the terrible so-called action in Babi-Yar not 52,000, but 100,000 were shot."

And on February 18:

"In Kiev, over 195,000 Soviet citizens were tortured to death, shot, and poisoned in the gas vans, as follows: (1) In Babi-Yar, over 100,000 men, women, children, and old people. ..."⁴⁷

No proof was forthcoming; the Soviet prosecutors simply took as precedent, as in the Katyn case, the alleged testimonies of witnesses produced by the NKVD.

The Soviets were, of course, unsuccessful in their accusations in the Katyn case at Nuremberg; it was due, not least of all, to the association between Katyn and Babi Yar that the latter case was forgotten for many years. Ehrenburg, for example, attempted to rehash the story of the Ravine of the Old Woman in his novel *The Storm*, published in 1947, but in vain. It was only after the NKVD/KGB caused a carefully instructed "eyewitness" to appear in a court case in Darmstadt in 1968—the *New York Times* article in this regard, on February 14, 1968, was entitled: "At Babi Yar Only Four Spectators"⁴⁸—and only after the publication of an "inflammatory" poem on Babi Yar by Soviet poet Yevchushenko and an orchestral piece by Shostakovich on the same topic—that the affair acquired noticeably greater symbolic power, which was immediately exploited by Soviet propaganda.

The Soviet authorities exploited the favorable atmosphere thus created to erect a monument, at long last, in commemoration of the victims who allegedly, according to a Kiev newspaper in 1971, "were cruelly tor-

⁴⁷ *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. VII, pp. 504, 612.

⁴⁸ *The New York Times*, 14. 2. 1968.

tured to death" and buried by the "fascist invaders of 1941-43." The monument was erected on NKVD terrain at Bykovnia (KOU NKVD), which is also in the vicinity of other extensive mass graves from the Stalin era—such as the mass graves at Darnica and Bielhorodka, in the region of Kiev. The deceptive inscription was, nevertheless, removed under the mounting pressure of publicity in March 1989. On March 17, 1989, the Soviet news agency TASS reported that, according to the findings of a "State Commission"—the fourth of its kind—mass graves containing the remains of 200,000-300,000 so-called "enemies of the people" murdered during the Stalin era had been discovered at Bykovnia, as well as in the Darnica Forest. At the same time, the journal of the Soviet Writer's Association, *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, in April 1989, considered it proper to stress that the massacres had been committed, not by "the Germans," but the Stalinists—"our own people." Frightful details of these mass murders committed by the NKVD, which began in 1937 and continued until immediately prior to the occupation of the city by German troops in September 1941, were provided by Carynyk in an article entitled "The Killing Fields of Kiev," in the October 1990 edition of the magazine *Commentary*, published in New York by the American Jewish Committee.⁴⁹

In Germany, of course, such findings were only grudgingly acknowledged, if at all. In Germany, the Soviet propaganda figure of 100,000 victims in the Ravine of Babi Yar, which was not even accepted at Nuremberg, has penetrated deeply into the public mind, as was proven by related newspaper articles from the commemorative year, 1991. On September 14, 1991, a certain Wolfram Vogel, in a memorial article published in the regional newspaper *Südkurier*, succeeded in outdoing the claims of Stalinist war propaganda by alleging that "the mass grave of Babi Yar on the edge of Kiev" must have been capable of "concealing the bodies of 200,000 people murdered during the occupation."⁵⁰ The female President of the German Bundestag, Süßmuth, turned a memorial speech on the Ravine of the Old Woman on October 5, 1991, into an occasion for an unjustified attack upon the entire German people,⁵¹ which had nothing to do with the executions of 33,771 Jews, or perhaps only half that number—which would have been bad enough—by Special Action Squad 4a of the Security Police and the SD. Executions that were committed without the knowledge or approval of the German people, and for which the German people cannot therefore be held responsible. Süßmuth's speech also caused a scandal in Kiev because of her

49 Carynyk, "The Killing Fields of Kiev."

50 Vogel, "Wo der Genozid begann."

51 Gedenkworte der Präsidentin, 5. 10. 1991, author's archives.

failure to mention the Ukrainian victims of Stalinist terror, consisting of up to 300,000 people buried in mass graves at nearby Bykovnia—which, for the Ukrainians, at the present time, is almost a point of national honor (“The mass graves have become a point of national honor for Ukrainians”).⁵² In the Soviet Union, Babi Yar must be maintained to shore up Katyn, and Katyn must be maintained to shore up the credibility of Babi Yar. The tardy success of Soviet propaganda in the Babi Yar case even encouraged the Stalinists to have another go at pinning the executions of the Polish officers at Katyn (and other locations) on the Germans, through the publication, this time in 1990-1991, of a series of articles under the characteristic title “Babi Yar pod Katyn’ju?” (Babi Yar at Katyn?) in *Voenno-istoricheskij zhurnal*, as described above.

Minsk was the last locality on Soviet territory where attempts were made to cover up the mass murders of the NKVD by concealing them among the crimes of the Einsatzgruppen. Exactly as at Kiev, murders were in fact committed on a huge scale in the capital city of the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic between 1937 and 1941. The operational administration of the NKVD in Minsk buried some of their victims in an area near Kuropaty, not far away, where extensive fields of graves were discovered in 1988. As many as 102,000 estimated victims, out of a total of 270,000 estimated victims of the NKVD in Minsk and the surrounding regions, are believed to lie buried in these mass graves at Kuropaty.⁵³ Cheljuskin Park, in the midst of the city of Minsk, even contained a mass grave over which a dance floor was erected during the Stalinist Brezhnev era. Significantly, Minsk was also an operational center of the German Security Police and the SD, whose primary objective, after the beginning of the German occupation in the late autumn of 1941, consisted of the extermination of the Jews. Within a year, thousands of local Jews of all ages and both sexes, as well as Jews deported from the territory of the Reich, were shot at Maly Trostinets, a village near Minsk, and perhaps a few other locations as well; in some cases, they were poisoned in four gas vans that also appear to have been in use here.⁵⁴

As in the Kiev case, the Soviet authorities created a Special Commission after the recapture of Minsk in 1944, this time under the President of the Council of the People’s Commissars of the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ponomarenko, who, as leader of the Central Staff of the Partisan movement, had been one of the persons chiefly responsible for the

52 Carynyk, “The Killing Fields of Kiev,” p. 25.

53 *Die Welt*, 6. 2. 1989; “300,000 Tote in Goldbergwerk.”

54 Wilhelm, “Die Einsatzgruppe A,” pp. 547, 556.

waging of partisan warfare, which was illegal under international law. The communiqué of the Extraordinary State Commission entitled "Minsk Accuses Hitler," published on October 12, 1944, alleged, with reference to the findings of the Ponomarenko Commission—once again, of course, based mostly on the dubious testimony of NKVD witnesses—that the "Hitlerites" and "German villains" had exterminated approximately 300,000 Soviet citizens through hunger, exhaustion caused by inhumane forced labor, as well as through gassings and shootings in Minsk and its suburbs.⁵⁵ Soviet mass graves, such as those in the "Park for Culture and Relaxation," were once again attributed to the Germans, in Minsk as elsewhere. The indicated total figure of 300,000 victims nearly approximates the estimated figure of about 270,000 NKVD victims rather than the number of the Jews murdered by the Security Police and SD, which must, nevertheless, also have been high in the region around Minsk. According to incomplete data contained in activity reports of the German "Gruppe Arlt," which have accidentally survived, over 17,000 local Jews, or German Jews from Berlin or Vienna, were murdered near Minsk during the summer of 1942.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ *Soviet War News*, 12. 10. 1944.

⁵⁶ *Unsere Ehre heißt Treue*.

**Criminalization of the Wehrmacht
Racial and National Anti-German Incitement**

From the very outbreak of the conflict, neither Hitler nor Stalin considered the German-Soviet conflict an "ordinary European war" waged between two armies in the ordinary way, but rather, as a war of annihilation between two totalitarian systems that could only end with the destruction of one or the other. Although Stalin's radio speech of July 3, 1941, depicted the war as the Soviet Union's struggle, in alliance with the German people, to defeat "fascism," Soviet propagandists lost no time in raising the specter of a distinctly new and mortal enemy: not merely "fascism"—National Socialism—but the German nation as such. The German nation was in effect described as criminal almost from the first day of the war, along with the German Wehrmacht, all German military personnel, and, ultimately, the entire German people. Ehrenburg, in particular, was responsible for whipping up Soviet soldiers and workers to blind, raging fanaticism against everything German, through constant incitement to anti-German racial and national hatred.

An exact examination must now be made of the image of the German nation and people, as depicted by Soviet propagandists like Ehrenburg, Tolstoy, Simonov, and Zaslavsky, to mention only a few, as well as by historians and military men like Tarle, Bruevich, Velichka, and countless others. Ehrenburg, the principal spokesman for Soviet propaganda, never described the Germans as having advanced beyond "barbarism." "They clothe themselves in the skins of wild beasts and offer bloody sacrifices to their god Wotan."¹ Even during the brilliance of the early Middle Ages, when the German Realm was governed by the Ottonian und Hohenstaufen Emperors, the Germans—according to Ehrenburg—still "roamed the forests, covered in the skins of wild beasts." Apart from the well-known historical fact that Russia and Poland derived enormous benefits from the heritage of their powerful expansions to the East, it was precisely the German colonization

1 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, p. 189. The sources for every individual quotation have not been indicated in this chapter due to lack of space. Generally, reference should be made to the English-language edition of *Russia at War*, and, likewise, to the English-language newspapers *Soviet War News Weekly* and *Soviet Weekly*, which contain all the information mentioned.

of the East during the Middle Ages—the “glorious traditions of the Teutonic Knights” as even Ehrenburg admitted—which was now vilified by Soviet propagandists in the context of the German-Soviet war through a series of misconceptions. “We are familiar with these traditions,” wrote Ehrenburg on February 20, 1942: “The Germans were robbers, and robbers they have remained. They used to be bandits with spears and swords. Now they are bandits with machine pistols.” Ehrenburg saw no difference between the various German tribes, past and present. To him, the Germans were always the “same.” “There is something frightful about the Germans themselves,” he wrote on January 14, 1942. “The Teutonic hordes plundered Rome,” and in the ancient Hanseatic city of Novgorod, the German peddlers attempted “to swindle the Russians.” “Cunning and intrigue are the German style”—allegedly a Russian proverb, according to Ehrenburg.

Ehrenburg’s particular hatred was directed at the historical development of Brandenburg-Prussia, regardless of Prussia’s ancient, and very close, dynastic and political links with Czarist Russia, to which Soviet propagandists drew all too frequent attention when it suited their purposes. In this distorted view, Brandenburg was a “cancerous growth,” a “robbers’ cave,” from which the bandits sallied forth to terrorize “the Slavic and Lithuanian tribes in Pomerania and Prussia,” whose lord and protector, in 1945, was now the Soviet Union headed by Stalin—in truth, of course, the largest slave state in the history of the world. In Ehrenburg’s view, the sole purpose of the royal city of residence, Berlin, consisted of “the slaughter of human beings.” Berlin, this “evil growth,” had become “a deadly danger” “to all of Europe, and all civilized humanity” (naturally including the Soviet Union). “It is lucky for the world,” Ehrenburg added that “Stalin is cauterizing this growth with fire and sword.” “Stalin is saving the world by trampling to pieces the cradle in which the cruel Prussian monster was born 250 years ago.” Proof of Prussia’s alleged monstrosity included its “piratical attacks” upon Denmark in 1864, the Prussian-Austrian federal execution in the matter of Schleswig-Holstein, Austria in 1866, *i.e.*, the Prussian-Austrian battle for the dominant position in Germany, and France in 1870-1871, although Prussia-Germany was, at that time, well assured of Russian benevolent neutrality, and despite the fact that both Marx and Engels referred to the Franco-Prussian war as a justifiable war of Prussian-German national defense against the imperialistic ambitions of Napoleon III’s France.

On May 17, 1945, a Soviet propagandist, Professor Tarle, published a revealing paper entitled “Berlin: The Cancerous Growth of Europe.”² Tarle,

2 *Soviet War News*, 17. 5. 1945.

a prominent Soviet historian, claimed that Prussia had been "a powerful gangster camp in the heart of Europe" for more than two hundred years, and that the plan "to conquer" Europe, Russia, two continents, and "the entire world," had been accordingly drawn up in Berlin. Robbery and plunder were alleged to be the "principal aim of Germany's political existence." In Tarle's view, the long line of historical figures alleged to have hatched the "plans of Germanic imperialism and plunder," included Frederick the Great, regardless of his alliance with Czar Peter III and, for a time, with Czarina Catherine II; the generals of the Napoleonic Wars of Liberation, such as, for example, Scharnhorst, specifically mentioned by Tarle, all of whom were, nonetheless, allied with Czarist generals still highly respected in the Soviet Union; Bismarck and Moltke, also highly respected in Russia; and, finally, General von Seeckt, under whose military leadership close and amicable collaboration had existed between the Reichswehr and the Red Army. The "German General Staff," which had, as such, only existed since 1870-1871, was alleged to have stood immovably firm by its imperialistic objectives throughout the entire historical period in question, busily forging the instruments "for the extermination of millions of human lives, the complete enslavement of peoples, and the achievement of German domination of the world." What a contrast between these claims and the statements of Lenin, who, in regard to the history preceding the First World War, once spoke of the "three great thieves," Russia, England, and France, which had been preparing for centuries "to attack and plunder Germany"!

Against this distorted background of the history of Brandenburg-Prussia as depicted by this well-known Soviet historian—an interpretation simultaneously and deliberately aimed at a planned annexation of German territory, even at that time—a centrally-controlled hate campaign was deliberately initiated, early in 1945, against the ancient Prussian commercial and university city of Königsberg. This city, the site of the coronation of Prussian kings, had, nevertheless, remained completely isolated from the German centers of political and military decision-making as the mere capital city of an agrarian province. On February 8, 1945, Radio Moscow claimed that East Prussia, "the cave of reactionary Prussianism, the vanguard of bestial German chauvinism," was no more German territory than "any of the rest of the so-called German territory east of the Elbe."³ The Red Army—such was the depiction of Soviet intentions of conquest—was said to be on the march "to rectify an ancient historical injustice." It was irrelevant to the Soviets that the Prussian-Slavic tribes had never been "exterminated" in the

3 *Ibid.*, 8. 2. 1945.

Prussian provinces, but had, rather, long since merged with the Germans into a unified body of peoples over the centuries. The fact that the Soviet Union, moreover, possessed not the slightest territorial claims on East Prussia, was irrelevant, too. The slogan of Soviet propaganda on February 15, 1945—the same Soviet propaganda that waxed sentimental and indignant when describing German and Finnish barbarism in blockading and bombarding the defended city of Leningrad—was, as stated: “Smoke the Rats Out of Königsberg.”

The ideological justification for all this, as expostulated in the Soviet press, was provided by an official specifically assigned for the purpose, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Velichka.⁴ “Königsberg was a threat to the entire world,” he claimed on March 22, 1945, in an article entitled “Woe to Thee, Germany!”, he gloated:

“Königsberg was said to have been the strong point of German barbarism... for 150 years ...day by day, decade by decade, plans for campaigns, invasions, and revenge were worked out in Königsberg. The German plan to enslave the world was drawn up in Königsberg... The stupid Königsbergers grew fat off their blood-drenched wealth... We have Königsberg by the throat!... The blockade of Königsberg has now begun... like toads, the Germans are huddling in cellars, catacombs, under the rubble, and in primitive drains... Königsberg is like a criminal with a weight around his neck... the weight of its crimes is pressing the city to the ground.”

Alluding to Soviet atrocities in the suburb of Metgethen, as described below, he added menacingly: “Königsberg has looked the Red Army in the face and sees its fate written in the features of the Red Army... The city is moaning and stumbling about.” Thus were the soldiers of the Red Army prepared for the forthcoming capture of the city of Königsberg. The aftermath of the city’s capture was in accordance with the propaganda build-up. Murder, rape, robbery, persecution, and utter anarchy raged throughout the ruined city. Entire rows of houses were deliberately burned down, sometimes with the residents still inside.⁵ The Soviet occupation authority, as stated, permitted 90,000 of the surviving 120,000 residents to simply starve to death in the months following the city’s capture.

Anti-German hate propaganda, after 1945, served the dual purpose of announcing as well as paving the way for the Soviet policy of expansion into Germany. Beginning in February 1945, Soviet propaganda exhibited an increasingly virulent shift of opinion against the alleged indulgent tenden-

⁴ *Ibid.*, 22. 3. 1945.

⁵ Oral statement of an eyewitness, former political officer (“Commissar”) of the Red Army Dr. Alexandr Nekrich, to the author in Freiburg, January 1991.

cies of Anglo-Saxon occupation policy, and the "hypocritical protectors" of the "poor Germans" in the Western countries, which, as a matter of fact, did hardly exist at all. Ehrenburg particularly despised the Catholic Church, the Pope, and the Holy See, whom he referred to as the "founders of the Inquisition, the protectors of the Jesuits, cunning souls who traveled the long road from Torquemada to Himmler, and from Loyola to Il Duce." This, of course, was a statement that more accurately described himself rather than the historical facts. The repeated and massive propaganda attacks, in any case, revealed a Soviet anxiety about the stabilization of economic conditions in the non-Soviet zones of occupation. It was openly feared that the former (Catholic) Center Party politician and Chancellor Dr. Brüning who had emigrated to the United States and was employed as a highly respected secondary-school teacher, might attempt to become "Hitler's successor" with the backing of certain American and British groups and the assistance of the Catholic Church. Thus, as Chancellor, he would encourage the "rehabilitation of Germany" and save "German imperialism" (*i.e.*, Germany as an industrialized country) from destruction.

That the Soviet Union had very different objectives at this point⁶ was revealed by a brief but informative announcement of June 21, 1945, relating to the appointment of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany.⁷ By Order No.1 of that authority, Colonel General Serov of the NKGB—in Colonel General Professor Volkogonov's opinion, "one of the wickedest members of Beria's entourage"—was now appointed Deputy of the General Director of the Soviet Military Administration (SMA) Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Occupation Troops in Germany. Serov was also simultaneously the plenary Deputy of the NKGB (*Narodnyj Komissarijat Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti*; People's Commissariat of State Security, *i.e.*, the secret police of the now bifurcated NKVD) of the USSR within the group of Soviet Occupation Troops in Germany. Serov had, since the outbreak of the war, acted as Stalin's chief tool in the practical implementation of mass deportations and other acts of violence, all falling under the legal definition of genocide and crimes against humanity. It was Serov who deported 1-2 million Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, and Jews from the annexed Polish territory in 1939-1940 to the barren regions of the Soviet Union, followed by tens of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians from the annexed Baltic republics in 1940-1941. Usually the family units were torn apart, and the head of the family was

6 Raack, "Stalin Plans his Post-War Germany."

7 *Soviet Weekly*, 21. 6. 1945.

often liquidated, as in the case of the Baltic States. Tens of thousands of residents of the annexed Romanian national territories of Bucovina and Bessarabia suffered the same fate. Serov then implemented the deportation of 1,209,400 Russian ethnic Germans under inhumane conditions to Central Asia and Siberia, as ordered by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on August 28, 1941.⁸ In 1943-1944, it was again Colonel General Serov of the NKGB who carried out the mass deportation and destruction of the Kalmuck, Chechen, Ingush, Kabardinian, and Karachay peoples, and, finally, the Crimean Tatars, upon the decision and order of Stalin, the Politburo of the Central Committee, and the State Defense Committee.⁹ Based on Order No. 00315 of People's Commissar Beria of April 18, 1945, Serov now made immediate mass arrests among the civilian population in the occupied parts of Germany, through the operational group of the NKVD/NKGB, which he commanded.¹⁰ The arrested persons, including women and young people (according to recent Russian data, a maximum of 260,000 people), were transferred to ten captured or newly built concentration camps (*Special'nye lageri NKVD SSR*), where tens of thousands of them perished from inhumane living conditions.¹¹ Serov's appointment to the politically decisive position of head of the Soviet occupation zone and the immediately implemented, brutal elimination of all persons in any way considered hostile, in any event left no doubt as to the type of future policy the Soviet Union intended to apply in Germany.

If the German-Soviet conflict, as a collision between two opposing socialist systems, could end only with the complete annihilation of one of the two systems, then the methods of waging war employed were entirely in accordance, in their pitilessness, with the totalitarian nature of both ideologies. "The Soviet-German war was an exceptionally cruel war on both sides," Yakushevsky remarked in the periodical *Novoe Vremja* in 1993: "Both totalitarian systems waged war using similar methods."¹² Interpretations of history intended to give the impression in Germany that the German-Soviet conflict could have been conducted in a more humane manner had Hitler and the leadership of the Wehrmacht not unscrupulously abrogated the usual rules and customs of war, even in the planning of "Operation

8 Werth, "Ein Staat gegen sein Volk," pp. 240ff.

9 Hoffmann, *Kaukasien 1943/43*, pp. 458f.

10 Kilian, "Die 'Mühlberg-Akten,'" pp. 1144ff.

11 Neubert, "Politische Verbrechen in der DDR," p. 863; Radtke, "In Güstrows sowjetischem Speziallager;" Range, *Das Konzentrationslager Fünfeichen*; Sothen, "Aufdecken und ausrotten;" Stadler, "Geschichte im Turn;" Wehner, "Von Stalin zum Faustpfand gemacht;" Wienkopp, "Mit fünfzehn Jahren in Buchenwald."

12 Yakushevskij, "Rasstrel v klevernompole."

Barbarossa," ignore the central reality of the situation, since these interpreters fail to consider corresponding realities on the Soviet side. This does not, of course, imply that unnecessary German severity could not have been avoided. Hitler's cardinal error was certainly his failure to respect Russian honor and patriotism, as well as Russian bravery, thus squandering a unique opportunity to gain the sympathy of the Russian people—an act of blindness that made loss of the war inevitable.

The principle established by Hitler in his address to the military leaders on March 30, 1941, passed on by the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, General Halder, and repeated by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, in his letter to Admiral Canaris of September 15, 1941, was: "We must deviate from the principle of soldierly comradeship. A Communist is no comrade to start with, and no comrade later on. This is a war of annihilation."¹³ This was an exact mirror image of Stalin's views from the very outset. To quote Stalin's key radio speech of July 3, 1941, yet again, Stalin made it immediately clear that "the war against fascist Germany... must not be viewed as an ordinary war"; "it is not a war between two armies." "This is no ordinary war," Ehrenburg, his interpreter, immediately echoed, "and it is no ordinary army that is fighting against us"—a statement that was, of course, just as true of the Red Army itself.

The manner in which the war was to be waged by the Soviets was made immediately clear by innumerable examples from all sections of the front, beginning on the first day of the war. The British newspaper *News Chronicle* quoted Ehrenburg in this regard on March 9, 1943, writing mockingly in an article that, in "a certain country," fallen German pilots were buried with full military honors. He naturally did not wish to interfere in the customs and uses of foreign countries, Ehrenburg gloated hypocritically, but he would like to tell the English something about the Russian way of dealing with the Germans:

"We cannot view the Germans as honorable fighters. In our eyes they are repugnant, plundering beasts. One does not negotiate for very long with such beasts: one destroys them!"¹⁴

In this regard, Ehrenburg wrote on August 17, 1941, about a German air-force non-commissioned officer killed near Moscow: "When a man like Karle [naturally alleged by Ehrenburg to have killed English children near

13 Halder, *Kriegstagebuch*, vol. II, p. 336; *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. XXXVI, pp. 317f.; vol. VII, pp. 461f.; vol. X, pp. 624f.

14 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 285f.

Swansea] is dashed to pieces on the ground, then one experiences not only joy, but moral satisfaction." The manner in which German soldiers were criminalized and deprived of all human dignity from the very first day of the war is obvious from the merest selection of quotations from this leading Soviet propagandist. The delusion that the war in the East could have been waged in a humane, "chivalrous" manner collapses under the weight of evidence.

So what was the typical Ehrenburg description of German soldiers? As early as the first day of the war, on June 22, 1941, German soldiers—the soldiers of a nation with which a Friendship Treaty had existed until that very day—were described as "robbers," plundering other countries, murdering children, and destroying the "culture, language, and traditions of other peoples."¹⁵ The question therefore arises: if these facts were known prior to the outbreak of hostilities, how could a Friendship Treaty ever have been signed with such a country? The same soldiers were "murderers, excelling in torture, which they now inflict on our wounded," Ehrenburg wrote on July 18, 1941, and, shortly thereafter: "These creatures are not human beings. They are horrible parasites. They are harmful vermin." Ehrenburg made many other, similar accusations, from the very first summer of the war, in 1941,¹⁶ describing the German Wehrmacht as a "gigantic band of gangsters," with the proviso that "gangsters and lawbreakers are never brave"; and that German soldiers were "worse than wild beasts." "No," wrote Ehrenburg, "they are worse than predators: predators do not torture for pleasure" (September 5, 1941). "One feels ashamed for the earth trodden upon by such people. How basely they lived! How basely they died!" "Compared with the Germans, the Kaffirs and Zulus are cultivated" (September 14, 1941). On October 12, 1941, Ehrenburg wrote:

"They are perverses, sodomites, addicted to all forms of bestiality... They grab Russian girls and drag them into brothels... they hang priests... they wear belts with the motto 'God with us' but beat dying prisoners in the face with their belts... Culture, to them, means fountain pens and safety razors. They use the fountain pens to jot down how many girls they have raped; they shave with safety razors, then use straight razors to cut off the noses, ears, and breasts of their victims."¹⁷

In the exceptionally severe cold of the winter of 1941-1942, Ehrenburg's hatred found a new source of satisfaction. At this time, on November 17, 1941, Stalin had ordered the arson and destruction of all villages and

¹⁵ Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, p. 202.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 49ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 220f.

settlements to the German rear, without regard for the Russian populations thus exposed to utter ruin. Human life, comments Stalin's biographer, Colonel General Professor Volkogonov, "never mattered a jot to him. Not one jot! Hundreds, thousands, even millions of deaths among his fellow citizens had long since become a habit with him."¹⁸ Ehrenburg immediately became the most vociferous spokesman for Stalin's inhumane new measures and orders, directed, as they were, not only against the Germans, but against the Russian civilian population as well. On November 11, 1941, he wrote:

"These bandits are totally accustomed to plundering under conditions of comfort. They expect central heating. The wild beasts must not warm themselves in our houses. Let them winter in the snowdrifts, these trade representatives from Düsseldorf and students from Heidelberg... We will turn their campaign for winter quarters into a campaign for graves."

"Fighters, spies, guerrillas!" he wrote, in a proclamation on November 30, 1941: "If there is a single house left in which the Germans are warming themselves, smoke them out!"¹⁹

Such was the tenor of Ehrenburg's articles after Stalin's proclamation to the country on July 3, 1941, to leave the enemy "not one liter of fuel, not one kilo of grain," but, rather, to turn the countryside into a desert. "Shops, fields of grain, and villages" are being set on fire by the "inhabitants," meaning, in reality, by Soviet "destruction battalions" (*Istrebitel'nye batal'ony*), Ehrenburg claimed on July 20, 1941: "Even children are to be found among the guerrillas." School children were, by preference, utilized by the Soviet commando as spies along the front, as Ehrenburg put it, to reconnoiter "the airfields and columns" of the enemy. "Russian children have learned to throw hand grenades," he gloated triumphantly on November 18, 1941, knowing full well what this might imply in terms of consequences to the children. "The German soldiers found only empty stalls, blown-up warehouses, and burned-out factories. Instead of houses, they conquered rubble and snowdrifts."²⁰

The abandonment of almost totally devastated territory to the enemy formed part of the Russian customs of war as early as the French-Russian war of 1812. "To the dumbfounded horror" of the Grand Armée, the Russian Gouverneur Rostopchin burned Moscow with most of its buildings prior to the Russian withdrawal. "So that's the way they make war!" exclaimed Napoleon's Cabinet Secretary, Baron Fain: "We were deceived

18 Volkogonov, *Triumph und Tragödie*, vol. 2/1, pp. 240f., 260f.

19 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, pp. 75, 83.

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 77f., 207f., 213.

by the civilization of St. Petersburg; they are still just Scythians!"²¹ Napoleon prohibited all reprisals against private individuals, since they "have already suffered enough." During the French withdrawal, however, on October 20, 1812, Napoleon ordered all public buildings and barracks in Moscow to be burned, and the Kremlin destroyed. This was actually done during the night of October 23: "The most magnificent towers of the Kremlin were blown up with 1.8 million pounds of gunpowder." The commanding artillery officer involved was rewarded with the Légion d'Honneur, "the only honor commensurate with such an act." During the German-Soviet conflict, it was Stalin who, from the outset, immediately ordered that only a devastated country be abandoned to the Germans—and, vice versa, since the Germans attempted to destroy all objects of military value during their withdrawal from the evacuated territories. Hitler even issued a comparable order relating to the territory of the Reich on March 19, 1945. Ehrenburg, praised the work of destruction of the Red Army—particularly, the forms it acquired in Kiev—as true acts of heroism, while indignantly attacking similar actions taken by the Germans. "The arsonists themselves will burn," he announced on January 20, 1942, referring to soldiers who had carried out destruction orders.²²

"The half-roasted body of a German lies under the rubble of the farmhouse. The face has been gnawed away by the fire, while the naked sole of a foot is tinted red by the cold, and seems alive... He now lies there like a mass of roasted flesh, an example of crime and punishment."

The hatred of this Stalin-appointed master teacher to the Red Army was uninhibited and free from all moral scruples. It was a hatred characterized by "barbaric savagery" and, ultimately, the expression of a pathological deviant psychological condition. Ehrenburg himself made the following admission on March 16, 1944: "If I did not have enough hatred in myself, I should despise myself. But I have enough hatred in me for both them [the German soldiers] and my own life." Such were the inner feelings of Ehrenburg himself, who applied every conceivable insult to the soldiers of the enemy army, from the first to the last day of the war, comparing them to dangerous animals and microbes in order to suggest the necessity of their extermination. To him, German soldiers, without exception, were "creatures born of the women of Germany," "robbers on a huge scale," "not soldiers,

21 *Manuscript of the Year Thousand Eight Hundred and Twelve. Description of the Circumstances of this Year, as a Contribution to the History of Emperor Napoleon*, by Baron Fain, former Cabinet-Secretary and Archivist. Official German Edition of E. Klein and Belmont, vol. 2, Leipzig 1827, pp. 71, 136, 168.

22 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, p. 105.

but unprincipled robbers," "primitive creatures with automatic weapons," "cruel, ruthless creatures," "cursed butchers," "the mass murderers of peaceful citizens," "butchers, who courageously slaughter the defenseless," "child murderers," "the murderers of Russian children," and "the murderers of women." Ehrenburg described German military service as follows:

"They defile women and hang men, they get drunk and sleep off their orgies like pigs." "Murder is a commonplace for Germans." "They torture children, hang old men, and rape girls." "They torture children and torment the wounded." "If a fascist soldier finds no booty in a house, he kills the housewife." "The women-killers know how to murder." "He strangles girls. He sets fire to villages. He erects gallows." "The Germans buried the men alive." "They buried children alive." "They killed millions of innocent people." "Hundreds of thousands of children have been killed by the Germans (and this in the Ukraine alone)." "They killed infants and branded prisoners, they tortured and hanged."

"Blood clings to the hands of every German," he told the soldiers of the Red Army on December 9, 1943: "Millions have become criminals." "There are many different types of Germans," he wrote on another occasion: "There are generals and non-commissioned officers, Prussians and Bavarians, fat ones and thin ones. But to me, they are one and the same: Germans. They have fishy eyes and long greedy hands." "Mass murderers of peaceful citizens, with shameless, empty eyes," was another description, written on February 3, 1942. Ehrenburg's vocabulary also contained a wide variety of other, similar insults. Two years later, on March 16, 1944, he wrote: "These villains, large or squat, goggle-eyed, stupid and soulless, marched a thousand leagues eastward to trample the life out of our children."²³ The baser instincts were further whipped up on March 16, 1944: "The Germans stuffed our mouths with frozen earth. The Germans slaughter us off. The Germans, large or small, the cruel, the shallow-eyed, with empty hearts." "Hitler's soldiers slaughtered millions of innocents," we read on March 23, 1944: "They torture our children," he claimed, adding: "They have slaughtered millions of good people for no reason, and again for no reason, out of greed, stupidity, and in-born savagery alone." "Thus the miserable idiot, the ignorant, the exploiter, the 'super human' systematically began to hang, strangle, bury alive, and burn." "Among millions of Germans, there is not a handful of conscientious men, to cry 'Halt!'" "The Germans murder coolly and deliberately." "They strangle, hang, and poison, and they do so without shame or pangs of conscience."²⁴ Ehrenburg invari-

²³ *Soviet War News*, 16. 3. 1944.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 23. 3. 1944.

ably referred to the members of the well-disciplined German Wehrmacht as “wild animals,” “beasts with eyeglasses,” “trained beasts,” “wild animals,” “two legged beasts,” “Aryan beasts,” “young pigs,” “pigs from Schweinfurt and Swinemünde,” “doubtlessly similar to wild beasts,” “predators,” “rabid wolves,” “carriers of venereal diseases,” “dying scorpions,” “German monsters,” “starving rats who will devour each other,” and “poisonous snakes.” “These creatures are not human beings,” Ehrenburg warned Soviet soldiers: “They are horrible parasites. They are dangerous vermin... they must be exterminated.” The German soldiers of the 6th Army in Stalingrad in 1943 were described as follows: “Rats carrying the plague,” “They behave everywhere like beasts,” and “A wild beast must not be pitted, it must be exterminated.”

What then was the typical propaganda view of German soldiers presented by Ehrenburg? The German Wehrmacht was described as a “gigantic horde of gangsters,” “cruel primitive creatures,” “millions of murderers.” German field marshals were described as “rabid wolves,” “rats carrying plague,” “frightful villainous gangsters.” Field Marshal von Witzleben for example, a participant in the conspiracy against Hitler on July 20, 1944, was solely concerned with “shooting hostages, and beheading, torturing, and hanging women.” German generals were “cannibals.” German majors were “evil-smelling skunks in a Major’s uniform.” German officers were “two legged beasts, who torture imprisoned men.” German soldiers were described as “digging up corpses and tearing the flesh off the bones. They are corpse-eating demons and vampires.” Every individual soldier in the Waffen SS, it went without saying, “has the blood of hundreds of Poles on his conscience.” German medics were “butchers, there is no other name for them.”²⁵ A German Luftwaffe soldier, apparently clean and courteous, was typical of them all, since he “has shot and burned over 1,200 Soviet human beings.” To the German infantry itself, Ehrenburg applied on May 5, 1942, the watchword: “We regard them not as human beings, but as murderers, hangmen, morally perverted, cruel fanatics, and that is why we hate them.” An average German, a billeted non-commissioned officer, was described by him as follows on July 8, 1943: “One evening, he came in drunk and grabbed Nina (fifteen years)... he then began to torture Hima, the little son of the family...he took the little boy in the forest, cut his hands off, put out his eyes, and broke his legs.”²⁶

25 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, pp. 12ff., 53ff., 61f., 80.

26 *Soviet War News*, 8. 7. 1943.

An army that committed such deeds could not, of course, be courageous. U-boat crews, in Ehrenburg's view, were mere "pirates," while the "exhibitionism" of German paratroopers "has nothing to do with human bravery," but was mere "perversion." If one were to believe the propaganda put about in the Federal Republic of Germany today, the Soviet Union allegedly desired humane treatment of prisoners of war in accordance with international law and "desperately" advocated the recognition of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, which it always refused to recognize. According to today's German propaganda, Ehrenburg, the leading propagandist of selfsame Soviet Union, described German prisoners of war as follows on various occasions, such as, for example, on December 9, 1941, and January 14, 1942:

"When they are captured, they moan and whine. They swear that they are innocent... The butchers pretend to be lambs." "They sit and cry, not because they have any feelings—what kind of feelings could these beasts have?—but because it is cold."

"A defeated German is wild and inhuman," he wrote on February 17, 1942: "In the summer he murdered women. Now he murders children." On August 17, 1944, Ehrenburg incited the soldiers of the Red Army as follows: "In a single day, sometimes only an hour before they surrender, they torture defenseless people to death." On November 23, 1944, he wrote: "Every prisoner of war knows that he is a criminal... every time they lose a battle, they hang women or torture children."²⁷

Ehrenburg passed blanket judgements on German soldiers, citing individual cases that were so atypical that they must have been invented, while alleging them to be typical of the millions of members of the German Wehrmacht. Apart from "not even a handful" of decent German soldiers, there were, he claimed, no exceptions. Innumerable passages in his libelous writings disseminated during the war reveal his view as to what was at stake: Soviet soldiers were to be incited to a merciless war of extermination against all Germans. "Our business consists of killing Germans—it does not matter how," he wrote on September 20, 1941, and therein lies the secret of all his endeavors. "They were born in Magdeburg, Swinemünde, Schweinfurt [to Ehrenburg, both city names belonged together], Kaiserslautern, Lüdenscheid," he wrote on February 20, 1942: "Their country is there. But they will die in Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk, Smolensk, and Novgorod. Their graves are here."²⁸ "We will find room for them all in our country," Ehren-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 17. 8., 23. 11. 1944.

²⁸ Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, pp. 113f.

burg wrote on January 29, 1942, "for soldiers and civilians... the ground of the Ukraine will take them all. They will be buried."

"Shoot to kill, Comrade!" he incited Red Army members on July 31, 1941, and on February 20, 1942: "You are ordered to kill them—put them under the ground!" Similarly, on March 16, 1944: "Kill the Germans!" Ehrenburg claimed on January 14, 1942: "A farmer's wife with a friendly Russian face told me [about a German soldier]: 'They are afraid to go to the front. One of them cried. He said to me: 'Pray for me, little Mother!' and pointed to the icon. And I really prayed for him. 'May you be killed, you devil!'"²⁹ "Even the old people," said Ehrenburg, "have just a single wish: 'Kill the whole heap of them!'" On March 11, 1942, he praised a young tank crewman who could no longer even say how many Germans he had killed: "His words," in Ehrenburg's opinion, "are typical of the modesty and strength of an artist who has just completed a great painting." Ehrenburg reiterated on March 30, 1942: "Our answer is the blood of the invaders! In winter, it melts the eternal snow. In summer, it will drench the dry ground." Ehrenburg found innumerable new ways in which to propagate his murder lust:

"The Germans must be killed. One must kill them... Do you feel sick? Do you feel a nightmare in your breast? Kill a German! Do you want to get back home faster? Kill a German! If you are a righteous and conscientious man—kill a German! ... Kill!"

A colonel described to him what happened to the German defenders when Soviet troops reached the fortress installations at Brest: "Inside the installations, we killed them, stabbed them, and slaughtered them (...*bili, kololi, rezali!*)" Another Ehrenburg quote:

"The viper's nest must be trampled! We wish to march through Germany with swords...and when it is intolerably hard for me, as it is for you, I think of the beautiful word: Stalin!"

"We are exterminating this tribe [the Germans]... [*etu porodu my unictozaem*]," wrote Ehrenburg on October 25, 1942. "The Germans are not human beings," he claimed in his notorious proclamation "*Ubej!*" (Kill!), written during the same period, widely distributed among Soviet troops, and repeatedly hammered into the heads of all Soviet soldiers:

"From now on, the word 'German' is the worst curse. From now on, the word 'German' will only cause us to empty the magazine of our weapon. We have nothing to discuss. We will not get excited. We will kill. If you

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 241f.

have not killed at least one German in the course of a day, then that day has been wasted for you. If you believe your neighbor will kill the German instead of you, then you have not recognized the danger. If you fail to kill a German, he will kill you. He will arrest your family, and torture them in his cursed Germany. If you cannot kill a German with a bullet, then kill him with your bayonet. If your section is quiet and there is no fighting, then kill a German before battle. If you permit the Germans to live, the Germans will hang the Russian men and rape the Russian women. If you have already killed a German, then kill a second one—to us, there is nothing more joyous than German corpses. Don't count the days. Don't count the kilometers. Count only one thing: the Germans you have killed! Kill the Germans! Your aged mother begs this of you. Kill the Germans! Your children beg this of you. Kill the Germans! The earth of your homeland calls out to you. Don't fail! Don't make a mistake! Kill!"³⁰

Ehrenburg's hatred pursued the German soldiers beyond the grave; his writings are filled with unmistakable symptoms of moral insanity. It must, however, be kept in mind that Ehrenburg's words were the words of the Soviet Union: it was Ehrenburg who stamped Stalin's will, the will of the Soviet leadership, upon the troops of the Red Army. In the introduction to the British edition of his book *Russia at War*, published in 1943 (with an enthusiastic commentary by the writer J. B. Priestley), he waxed rhapsodically:

"The moon casts its poisonous green light on the snow, Germans, thousands and thousands of them, some of them torn apart by grenades, some of them crushed by tanks, others frozen like waxworks... a colonel shows his old yellow rat-incisors... Germans lie crushed, blown to pieces, hacked to bits... here lie the beer brewers, swine butchers, chemists, hangmen, here lie the Germans... lumps of flesh that look like ruined pieces of machinery... mouth organs... shreds of human bodies... hands without torsos... naked, pink soles of feet, protruding from the snow like ghostly plants."

"Not many of the German soldiers who crossed the border on June 22," he triumphed, "have survived... where are they now? They are rotting in the earth." "It is as if the rivers were vomiting up their rotting bodies and the earth were spewing out their remains."³¹ On several occasions, he even objected to burying the dead as it was practiced by the Soviet troops in eastern Germany in 1945, drawing conclusions in keeping with his depravity. "The Germans," he says on January 14 and January 31, 1942, "prefer to be

30 Ehrenburg, "Ubej!", 1942, author's archive; see also Buchbender, *Das tönende Erz*, Document 8; Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, p. 434.

31 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, Preface, p. xi.

buried in town squares, next to schools or hospitals. Even in death, the Germans want to disturb sleeping children." "They want to deprive us of our courage, even from the grave... the Germans, the lousy Fritzes, gangsters and criminals, want to lie next to Leo Tolstoy...." He added: "There is no place for German graves in the squares of Russian cities." Depicting the effects of Ehrenburg's perversities upon the Red Army, and the consequent atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers, is a central task of the present work. However, the hate-filled expressions applied by Ehrenburg to Germans not affiliated with the Wehrmacht, German men, women, and children, require more detailed discussion before it is possible to continue.

Ehrenburg never concealed the fact that he made no distinction between German military personnel and civilians. To him, Germany was "a huge criminal organization," the German people were "a gang of gangsters, consisting of many millions of people," "a horde of nomadic pirates."³² In effect, therefore, he recognized only a division of labor between soldiers and civilians: "The men take off in search of loot. The women wait for them to return carrying Dutch cheeses, Paris stockings, and Ukrainian bacon." On November 2, 1944, he called the Germans "a cursed tribe"; on April 12, 1945, he counted the reasons why all Soviet human beings should be filled with a "great, righteous, passionate hate," "not merely hate, but a profound contempt for the Germans as well."³³ To Ehrenburg, hatred and contempt were admittedly one and the same. Even the briefest samplings of Ehrenburg's stated reasons for such hatred would undoubtedly be sufficient to constitute the crime of "incitement to racial and national hatred," if one were to replace the ethical designation of "German" with that of some other racial, religious, or ethnic group—such as, for example, the group to which Ehrenburg himself belonged. Posing as the spokesman of all Russians, he wrote:

"We despise the Germans, because they are morally and physically shameless." "We despise the Germans for their stupidity." "We despise the Germans for their lack of elementary human dignity." "We despise the Germans for their greed." "We despise the Germans for... their bloodthirstiness, which is related to sexual perversion." "We despise the Germans for their cruelty—the cruelty of the weasel, which throttles the defenseless." "We despise the Germans for their crimes, for their thoughts and feelings, for their malignant sores." "We despise them, because we are human beings, and Soviet human beings to boot." "The sight of German men and women turns one's stomach."

32 *Ibid.*, p. 108.

33 *Soviet War News*, 12. 4. 1945.

Ehrenburg, for his own part, deliberately refused to participate in any of the “re-education” programs of 1945, or in any other attempt “to elevate the Germans, these humanoid beings, to the lowest level of development of retarded human beings,” or to “teach them become human beings, or at least resemble human beings.”³⁴

And how were German women depicted by Ehrenburg for the “education” of Soviet soldiers? For the women, as for the soldiers, Ehrenburg had only blanket judgements: “The women of the Germanic tribe are waiting in their caves for their loot.” According to Ehrenburg, all German women were either “bloodthirsty” or “absolutely shameless.” On December 7, 1944, Ehrenburg wrote:

“German women arouse only feelings of abhorrence in us. We despise them because they are the mothers, wives, and sisters of butchers. We despise them because they wrote to their sons, husbands, and brothers, ‘Send us a beautiful fur coat!’ We despise them because they are thieves and temptresses. We need none of these flaxen-haired hyenas. We are coming to Germany for something else—for Germany. And these particular flaxen-haired witches will not easily escape us.”³⁵

The real concern of German women was not, as Ehrenburg so wickedly claimed, the wish for packages of any kind—quite apart from the fact that Soviet population, oppressed, exploited, and exhausted by socialism, had nothing to surrender or sell, or that the mailing of packages from the Eastern Front was in any case prohibited and impossible. In reality, German women were profoundly concerned with the survival and well being of their men fighting in the Soviet theater of war. Ehrenburg was very well aware of this, and exploited this fact in a manner that was as infamous as it was characteristic: “Hundreds of thousands of German dead rot in Russian earth,” he gloated on October 7, 1941. “Every evening” he wrote on December 7, 1941, “millions of German women are tortured by fear. Thousands of new widows wake up in Germany every morning. The stink of human flesh seems to float over the East.”³⁶ “Your Gustav has been killed,” he announced sarcastically to a Mrs. Gertrud Holmann on November 26, 1941: “He lies buried in a snowdrift in Volkhov... Here, there is nothing but white, pitiless snow, and Gustav lies dead in it, face downward... The bodies will lie there until spring, like meat in cold storage.”

34 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, pp. 56ff., 107.

35 *Soviet War News*, 7. 12. 1944.

36 Ehrenburg, *Russia at War*, pp. 81, 89, 97, 186f.

The mourning of wives and mothers was Ehrenburg's particular delight and the object of his mockery. On December 25, 1941, Ehrenburg wrote:

"We see the greedy German hyenas licking their lips; and we say briefly, 'My lady, you are waiting for presents. You have already gotten what you deserve... Weep, German woman! ... and when you get sick of weeping, then dance and be merry... in spring, the snow will melt, and you will smell the stink of the bodies!'"

"We will make these women cry their eyes out," he published on November 7, 1941. Over and over again, Ehrenburg delighted in the sufferings of women having lost members of their families, particularly, and most shockingly, on December 10, 1941, in reference to the son of a Frau Frieda Behl, whose son, a German soldier, had been shot, apparently from ambush. "Now she weeps," Ehrenburg gloated, "and other German women are weeping, too. Weep, my ladies..." In Paris, three German officers were shot in the back, allegedly in reprisal for ratification of the cease-fire of Compiègne in 1940, which was, nevertheless, legal and in compliance with all provisions of international law. "Frau Müller," Ehrenburg mocked, "does your son still drink champagne in the bars of Paris? Keep your mourning clothes ready, my lady..." In Norway, under the cover of darkness, four German soldiers were done away with by "brave fishermen" via a trap: "The sea washes up a body. Frau Rascal, is your first-born still drinking aquavit in Oslo? Keep a pile of handkerchiefs ready, and forget about thinking of a grave with flowers on it... people hate even dead Germans." In Piraeus, partisans blew up a military depot, killing eighteen German soldiers: "Frau Schuller, is your beloved son still drinking muscatel in Athens? ... The Germans will certainly bury him with honors. But the Greek women ... will spit on the grave of your son." "Weep louder, women of Germany!" called Ehrenburg gleefully: "You will not see your sons again, nor find their graves."

As long as German troops occupied Soviet soil, the Soviets could only mistreat prisoners of war, the anti-Soviet population, or residents of recaptured territories, who perhaps only maintained bearable relationships with German occupation troops. When Soviet troops first crossed the borders of the Reich in September 1944, however, the Red Army came into contact with the German civilian population for the first time. Ehrenburg did everything in his power to steep Soviet soldiers in his notions as to the way to deal with Germans. "Woe to thee, Germany!" he had written on January 20, 1942.³⁷ "Woe to thee, Germany!" he now repeated. "Woe to the land of assassins!" "Woe to the land of the villains!" According to his program in an article published on August 24, 1944, in relation to the forth-

coming Soviet crossing of the German border, Ehrenburg placed great store upon the stipulation that the Red Army should no longer act as an army of liberators upon reaching German soil.³⁸ "Now we shall be judges," he proclaimed; but judgement, in his eyes, was synonymous with vengeance.

"Let us once again swear a holy oath, on the German border, to forget nothing... It is Stalin who led us to the German border, Stalin, who knows the meaning of mothers' tears. Stalin knows that the Germans buried children alive and, in the darkest hour, vowed that he would defeat the German villains. We say this with the calm of a long-ripened and irreconcilable hatred. We say this yet again on the enemy border: 'Woe to thee, Germany!'"

On January 25, 1945, during the Soviet winter offensive he wrote: "We have grabbed the witch by the hair, and she will no longer escape us; now we are in Prussian and Silesian cities."

"There must be no mercy, no indulgence," was Ehrenburg's message, hammered into the heads of Soviet soldiers on February 8, 1945.³⁹

"We are marching through Pomerania. Vengeance has overwhelmed the Germans... But Germans remain Germans, wherever they are... The 30 of January... found the male and female Germans howling, whining, crying out. They stumble about, they whimper under the grenades and snowstorms, the witches and vampires of Germany. They run, but there is nowhere to escape... Run, burn, howl thy death cry!"

Ehrenburg then continued in the same vein: "It is not gloating over other's misfortune, but rather, pure joy that fills my heart, when I behold the biggest pirate province in Germany [*i.e.*, the peaceful agrarian province of East Prussia] in flames and confusion...." "Why am I so joyful, when I walk through the streets of German cities?" he asked on March 1, 1945, in an article under the headline "The Rats Are Shedding Their Tiger Skin."⁴⁰ On March 15, 1945, he reverted to another favorite simile: "Wolves they Were, and Wolves they Remain."

And Ehrenburg, the man who rendered the official Soviet propaganda line of hatred, was not alone in this opinion. "They are captured predators," wrote Gorbатов and Kurganov on March 8, 1945, in reference to the Germans. "Their predator incisors have been broken out of their mouths, but their evil remains."⁴¹ Polevoy asked a Soviet soldier on February 1, 1945:

37 *Ibid.*, p. 105.

38 *Soviet War News*, 24. 8. 1944.

39 *Ibid.*, 8. 2. 1945.

40 *Ibid.*, 1. 3. 1945.

41 *Ibid.*, 8. 3. 1945.

"What are they like, these Germans?"—"Nothing but beasts!" was the response, as if it were self-evident.⁴² "Let them howl in the dark, moonless nights just before the end," wrote Ehrenburg on March 22, 1945, in reference to German women: "Germany will weep so many tears that the horrid river Spree will form a broad river... We have come to Germany to crush them completely."⁴³ "We shall put an end to Germany," Ehrenburg said on November 16, 1944.⁴⁴ Over and over again, he reverted to the same destructive impulses: "It is not a question of defeating Germany. Germany must be obliterated," was Ehrenburg's message, reappearing in constantly newfound turns of phrase.

Ehrenburg, in his desire to witness the deaths of millions of German soldiers, justified his blood lust by claiming that the Germans were not human beings, but, rather, a lower form of life, like vermin and microbes. He was thus being at least logically consistent in his statement of December 16, 1943: "Among themselves, the microbes probably thought Pasteur was a murderer. But we well know that anyone who kills rabies or plague microbes is a true benefactor of humanity."⁴⁵ When the Red Army crossed the German border on November 30, 1944, Ehrenburg, impudently assured of what appeared to be his readers' short memories, including his readers in foreign countries, alleged: "We have never preached racial hatred. We do not intend to exterminate *all* Germans...⁴⁶ Zaslavsky, another Soviet propagandist, made a similar allegation: "The Red Army in no way intends to kill *all* Germans, since racial and national hatred is foreign to us." Of course, the extermination of all Germans was technically impossible. The possibility of extermination on a smaller scale, unmistakably expressed by Ehrenburg on March 8, 1945, nevertheless, remained: "The only historical mission that I see, in all modesty and candor, consists of reducing the population of Germany."⁴⁷

In the fall and winter days of the years 1944-1945, the British occupation powers in the western zones had a hard time to prevent acts of revenge against the German population by Russians or Poles deported for compulsory labor and to bring incipient looting and disorder under control. This was a problem that was to cause the British military governor, Field Marshal Montgomery, to take draconian measures. Ehrenburg, however,

42 *Ibid.*, 1. 2. 1945.

43 *Ibid.*, 22. 3. 1945.

44 *Ibid.*, 16. 11. 1944.

45 *Ibid.*, 16. 12. 1943.

46 *Ibid.*, 30. 11. 1944.

47 *Ibid.*, 8. 3. 1945.

expressed his desire in this regard in a persistent and conclusive manner. On October 19, 1944, one day before Soviet troops cruelly slaughtered the residents of Nemmersdorf and the surrounding regions in the governmental district of Gumbinnen, Ehrenburg published an article (but which was, perhaps, a reprint of a previously published article). He wrote:

“They [the foreign workers] are not concerned with what happens to the Germans, whether we should teach morals to what remains of them or feed them oatmeal broth. No. This young Europe has long known that the best Germans are the dead Germans... the problem that the Russians and Poles are presumably attempting to solve is whether it is better to kill the Germans with axes or clubs. They are not interested in reforming the inhabitants... they are only interested in reducing their numbers.”⁴⁸

Then Ehrenburg, with whom retired Chancellor Dr. Wirth conversed on friendly terms in Switzerland after the war, and the same Ehrenburg, who was subsequently considered as at least a candidate for the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, added: “And it is my modest opinion that the Russians and Poles... are right.”

Millions of copies of Ehrenburg's inflammatory writings were distributed to soldiers of the Red Army in the context of the political education that formed a central part of the preparation for combat in the Soviet Union; again and again these are called to mind.⁴⁹ The incitement of hatred against the Germans and against German soldiers, however, did not remain restricted to Ehrenburg and the Soviet writers and journalists assigned to propaganda hack work. The military and political leadership apparatus of the Red Army was deliberately engaged in the generation of the anti-German racial and national hatred that was a major factor in the Soviet war effort. The consequences of this incitement to racial and national hatred among the soldiers of the Red Army will have to be shown.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 19. 10. 1944.

⁴⁹ Hoffmann, “Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion” (12. Methoden des Vernichtungskrieges), pp. 783f., 787f.

**All Along the Front,
the First Prisoners of War
Are Murdered as Early as June 22, 1941**

The criminalization of the German Wehrmacht began immediately after the outbreak of the war and became the true field of activity of the Main Administration for Political Propaganda of the Red Army (GUPPKA, soon to be the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army) and its subordinate agencies. "Death to Fascist Vermin" was the leitmotif of Regulation No. 20, issued to the "Divisional Chiefs for Political Propaganda among the Units and Armies" on July 14, 1941. This was published by the Chief of the Main Administration, Army Commissar First Rank Mekhlis, as well as Guideline No. 081 of the GUPPKA, issued on July 15, 1941, to the "Politruks of the Companies and Batteries" "for unconditional implementation." German soldiers were accordingly described to the Red Army as "Hitlerite fascist trash," "fascist barbarians," "fascist predators," and "fascist reptiles." Slogans included "Smash the Fascist Vermin From the Sky," "Smash the Enemy's Viper Nests," "Grind the Enemy Hordes to Dust," "Smash the Hitlerite Gang with Rifle Butts, Crush Them with Steel, Eliminate Them with Fire," and "May the Fascist Vermin Perish from Starvation."

These, and other, similar proclamations issued by the Main Administration, were immediately seized upon and repeated, as illustrated by a speech held on October 14, 1941, by Mushev, the newly-appointed official of the Political Administration of the 22nd Army, before the staff of an infantry division. Mushev criminalized the German army as a dissolute gang of robbers, as thieves and drunkards dedicated to "plundering with impunity, murdering the defenseless population, raping women, and destroying and burning cities and villages." Where criminalization of the Germans was concerned, the military command was in no way far behind the political organizations of the Red Army. Marshal of the Soviet Union Budenny, Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Front, in his Order No. 5 of July 16, 1941, referred to German troops as "Hitler's gangs of cannibals," "fascist beasts," and "fascist carrion."¹ Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov,

1 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 16. 7. 1941.

Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Army (Member of the Military Council Zhdanov), in Order No. 3 of July 14, 1941, referred to the Germans as "beastly fascists," "fascist vultures," and "fascist bandits."² Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, former People's Commissar of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front (Member of the Military Council Bulganin), in a proclamation to the inhabitants of the occupied territories of August 6, 1941, scourged the German soldiers as "Hitler gangs," "Hitler hordes," "fascist monsters," "German robbers," whose extermination by any method was justified.³ "German officers and soldiers are not human beings in green greatcoats, but wild animals," a leaflet from the Political Administration of the Northwest Front stated on March 25, 1942: "German officers and soldiers must be exterminated, as one strikes down mad dogs."⁴

The indiscriminate vilification of all German soldiers, as revealed by these, and other similar, statements by the highest military and political leadership agencies, were clearly intended to prevent Soviet soldiers from surrendering to the enemy. The claim that Soviet soldiers could expect only certain death in captivity was constantly made in the Red Army. For example, on March 29, 1940, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR following the Finish Winter War, President of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, had formerly attacked the alleged "unprecedented barbarity and bestialities of the White Finns against the wounded and captured members of the Red Army." Such accusations could, of course, only be held to be doubly true of the German Wehrmacht. In this sense, Mekhlis, on July 14, 1941, and on the days following, similarly proclaimed that the Germans would "mistreat, torture, and murder" their prisoners "in a bestial manner." To the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, it was now a question of inspiring Soviet soldiers with an "irreconcilable, raging hatred against the enemy" while instilling the Red Army with an "insatiable thirst for vengeance for [German] atrocities." This was also the intended purpose of a propaganda text "Fascist Atrocities Against Prisoners of War," published in Leningrad in 1941. This, in conjunction with a corresponding speech and note on alleged crimes against prisoners of war by Molotov on November 6, 1941,⁵ practically established the Soviet propaganda line to be applicable in this regard from that date until 1943, and thereafter until the end of the war.⁶

2 Order No. 3 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Northwest Army, 14.7.1941, author's archives.

3 BA-MA, RH 21-3/437, 6. 8. 1941.

4 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, p. 285.

5 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, 18. 1. 1942.

In view of the above, it is not surprising that, as early as the third day of the war—*i.e.*, June 24, 1941—Pochinko, a Soviet prisoner of war, testified that members of the Red Army were being encouraged “to show no mercy to German soldiers, since one [the Germans] will pay no heed to us [the Soviets] either and will torture us,” and will, as it reads, “cut off our fingers, noses, ears, and heads, or will cut open our backs and remove the spinal column, before shooting us.” High-ranking officers of the Soviet 6th and 12th Armies subjected to thorough interrogation were found to be aware of these conditions as well by readily admitting, on August 16, that “the murder of German prisoners of war might be possibly due to inflammatory anti-German propaganda.” After all, what else could one expect if members of the Red Army were constantly filled with atrocity stories, as in the leaflet mentioned above? “Every day, drunken Nazi officers were depicted as mistreating prisoners, putting out eyes, breaking or chopping off arms, tearing flesh off bones, and burying many prisoners alive.”⁷

Characteristically, the murder of captured German soldiers and wounded began even before the inflammatory proclamations of the Soviet leadership agencies in regard to the German invaders had even had time to become effective. To be sure, these murders began without warning, on the first day of the war, on June 22, 1941, along the entire front. According to the record of the military court investigation, Lieutenant Hundrieser, a forestry teaching trainee in civilian life, on the morning of June 22, 1941, followed in the wave of the attack. A few kilometers from the German-Soviet border he witnessed the murder of ten wounded members of the 311th German Infantry Regiment who had remained behind.⁸ Other testimony relates to the murder of a helplessly wounded member of the 188th German Infantry Regiment at Javorov on June 22, 1941,⁹ as well as to the murder and robbery of large numbers of wounded and captured soldiers of the 192nd German Infantry Regiment near Jagodzín on the same date.¹⁰ Captured aircraft crews were killed during the first days of the war almost without exception. In the early hours of June 22, 1941, a non-commissioned officer of the 77th Air Combat Regiment who parachuted from his plane was immediately killed after landing at Kedainiai by Soviet soldiers who rushed to the spot. A gold dental crown was then torn out of his jaw.¹¹ The Polish house-

6 BA-MA, RH 20-17/458, 17. 2. 1943; BA-MA, RH 20-17/330, undated.

7 “Erfolge der Freischärler” (Partisan Successes), author’s archives.

8 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 6. 11. 1941.

9 *Ibid.*, 5. 2. 1942.

10 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 23. 11. 1941.

11 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 19. 1. 1942.

wife Maria Morocz witnessed Soviet soldiers near Sokho Wola shooting a wounded aviator whom she had desired to help.¹² Violations of international law by members of the Red Army became, in fact, so frequent in the final days of June 1941 that only a few of the cases investigated in accordance with the military courts and confirmed by eyewitnesses can be mentioned here.

On June 24, 1941, twelve wounded members of an infantry regiment who were left behind were found horribly mutilated after participating in an attack with the 23rd German Engineer Battalion at Surazh, west of Białystok. One of the wounded soldiers was found nailed fast to a tree, with his eyes gouged out, and his tongue cut out.¹³ On June 25, 1941, members of a reconnaissance troop of the 36th Infantry Regiment in platoon strength were found driven together and "bestially slaughtered," in a village in East Poland.¹⁴ On July 1, 1941, the bodies of Major Söhngen of the 7th Infantry Regiment as well as that of a First Lieutenant, two Master Sergeants, and several other soldiers were found in the Skomorocchy fortifications, north of Sokal, having been mutilated the day before. A medical investigation by Medical Captain Dr. Stankeit and Acting Medical Officer Wendler confirmed that severe violence, in the form of knife cuts, particularly in the vicinity of the eyes, had been inflicted.¹⁵ First Lieutenant Hufnagel of the 9th Panzer Division, following in the wake of the border crossing in late June 1941, found approximately eighty massacred German soldiers, including three officers of an unnamed infantry regiment, on the Busk-Tarnopol' road.¹⁶ Similarly, also in late June 1941, members of an advance detachment, apparently of the 9th Infantry Regiment, were cut off while crossing a small river near Białystok, and were killed and mutilated.¹⁷ In late June 1941, the staff and support sections of the 161st Infantry Division were surprised by Soviet troops near Porzecze, with the resulting capture of a number of wounded officers and soldiers. The Wehrmacht evangelical Protestant clergyman Klinger and Catholic military priest Sindesberger made the following eyewitness statements before a military court on June 8 and June 15, 1941:¹⁸ Lieutenant Sommer and six other soldiers were burned alive; Lieutenant Wordell and the others were either shot or beaten to death and then robbed. German medical personnel, clearly recognizable due to

12 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 31. 10. 1941.

13 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 5. 2. 1942.

14 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 26. 11. 1941.

15 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 103, 427ff.

16 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 17. 6. 1942.

17 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 12. 2. 1942.

18 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 8. 7., 15. 7. 1941.

their Red Cross armbands, including Medical First Lieutenant Dr. Adelhelm and Medical Second Lieutenant Dr. Hottenroth, were also murdered by the Soviets, and lay in rows with other murdered soldiers. On June 28, 1941, Soviet soldiers surprised a clearly recognizable column of the 127th Motor Ambulance Platoon in the region of Minsk and butchered a great many of the wounded and accompanying medical personnel.¹⁹ According to the testimony of a survivor, "the terrible screams of the wounded" could be heard for a very long time. The victims of acts of violence that were contrary to international law occurred at numerous locations, even during the very first days of the war, and included medical personnel, in addition to wounded combat personnel.

A distinction must, of course, be made between the "spontaneous" murders of German prisoners of war by Soviet soldiers that began on June 22, 1941, and continued "all along the entire front"—no matter how "bestial" they may have been—and the mass murders organized and committed by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) that also began upon the outbreak of the war. As stated by the American Congressional Committee, chaired by Representative Charles J. Kersten, in the Conclusions to Special Report No. 4 of December 31, 1954, members of the NKVD shot "all political prisoners in every city of the western Ukraine in the first days of the war, with the exception of a few who survived as if by a miracle." Victims of these mass murders included the inmates of the prisons and concentration camps in the western Ukraine, *i.e.*, eastern Poland, as well as those in the Baltic States, White Russia and, with the continued advance of German troops, inmates in the hinterland of the Soviet Union as well. Ukrainian, Polish, Lithuanian, Jewish, Latvian, Estonian, and, of course, Russian civilians, in addition to ethnic Germans and others, of all ages and both sexes, fell victim to these deliberately planned, cold-bloodedly systematic executions by shooting in all localities, all over the country. The great numbers of localities in which prison inmates were murdered, included, to cite just a few: Dubno, Luck, Dobromil', Zolkiev, Brzezney, Rudki, Komarno, Pasichna, Ivano-Frankivsk (Stanislav), Chortkov, Rovno, Sarny, Drogobych (Drahobych), Sambor, Tarnopol', Stalino (Jusowka), and, of course, Lemberg in eastern Poland (the western Ukraine); Pravienshkie, Rumshishkes (near Kaunas), Kaunas (Kovno) Telshiai, and Globokie (east of Vilna) in Lithuania; and Riga, Dünaburg (Daugavpils), Rositten in Latvia; Dorpat, and Reval in Estonia. Since liquidations occurred almost everywhere, it is practically impossible to list all locations;

19 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 5. 2. 1942.

it should, however, be mentioned that over 4,000 corpses were found in Lemberg; 1,500 in Dubno;²⁰ and 500 in Luck.²¹

The NKVD not only shot their prisoners but, in many proven cases, tortured them to death by tearing out their fingernails, scalding and tearing off their skin, and comparable horrors. This was often done in the torture chambers that formed an integral part of all NKVD prisons in accordance with the traditions of the Cheka, founded by Lenin.²² The doctor of forensic medicine, Medical Captain Dr. Buhtz, listed a number of such cases on behalf of the Army Medical Investigation, in a "Preliminary Report on the Findings of the Forensic Medical Criminal Investigation of Bolshevik Violations of International Law in the Regions of the Army Group North (AOK 16 and 18)" of December 4, 1941.²³ For example, he investigated the case of three Roman Catholic priests murdered during the first few days of the war in Lankishkiai, one of whom was crucified and another of whom had his mouth sewn shut; he also investigated the murder of three doctors and a nurse in Panevezhys. In addition to male prisoners, women and children were also liquidated or tortured to death in the prisons and camps of the NKVD in the first days of July. A report of the Advanced Unit of the Secret Field Police of the XXXXVIII German Army Corps of July 1, 1941, stated that the bodies of 550 persons, murdered a few days before, including 100 women, had been found on July 26, 1941, in the prison of Dubno, adding:

"On entering the prison cells, the sight was so horrible that it cannot even be described in words. Over one hundred bodies, of men, old people, women, and girls approximately sixteen years of age, lay in the cells, shot, and mutilated with bayonet wounds."²⁴

Corporal Steinacker of the Staff of the Signals (61st Infantry Division) declared, during a military court interrogation:

"All persons were completely naked. Approximately three or four women hung in each cell with their heads downward. They were fastened to the ceiling by cords. As far as I can remember, all the women had had their breasts and tongues cut out. The children lay crumpled up on the floor."²⁵

It was found possible to identify a few of the perpetrators by name, such as NKVD Commissar Vinkur and a female NKVD agent Erenshtein.

20 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 29. 6. 1941.

21 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, p. 328.

22 Wilhelm, "Die Einsatzgruppe A," pp. 300ff.

23 BA-MA, H 20/290, 4. 12. 1941.

24 BA-MA, RH 24-48/198, 1. 7. 1941.

25 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 19. 6. 1942.

The horrible details of the massacre of over 4,000 Ukrainian and Polish prisoners in the city of Lemberg (such as Brigidki Prison, Zamarstynow Prison, and the NKVD prison) have already been the object of detailed military court and forensic medical studies and post-war international investigations and require no further comment here.²⁶ The forensic medical officer, Medical Captain Dr. Schneider, a professor of medicine, stated in an official letter to Medical Major General Dr. Zimmer on July 21, 1941:

"It has become clear to me that the atrocities against Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and, unfortunately, against captured members of the Wehrmacht as well, committed by the GPU in Russia shortly before the evacuation of the cities, far exceeds everything previously... known in terms of atrociousness and cruelty... My assistant, who spent two days in Lemberg, told me that these events could neither be described nor even intimated. The murder victims were without any doubt sadistically tortured before death, in torture chambers installed for the purpose."²⁷

As already mentioned and confirmed by extensive source material, in the present connection it is relevant that captured members of the Wehrmacht were also discovered among the civilian victims of the NKVD terror in Lemberg. The Soviets enforced a basic regulation that German prisoners, in violation of international law, were to be transferred from the military departments of the Commissariat of Defense (NKO) to the police departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). For this purpose they were immediately transferred to the custody of NKVD convoy troops after interrogation, in keeping with a directive of August 4, 1941, of the Commander of the NKVD troops, Major General Appolonov. Just what it meant for prisoners of war to be transferred to the NKVD is best illustrated by the fact that Krivenko, who was responsible for the executions of the Polish POW officers in the Ostashkov camp in 1940 as Brigade Commander of the NKVD, and who was later to become a Lieutenant General of the NKVD, was appointed Chief of the Main Administration for Prisoners of War and Internees (GUPVI).²⁸

In addition to German soldiers of the ground forces, captured members of the Luftwaffe, in particular, were very soon transferred to NKVD prisons, where they met with violent deaths from the very outset of the war. Several airmen of the German Luftwaffe were even discovered among the mountains of bodies in the Lemberg NKVD prison; NKVD Commissars Loginov and Maslov shot three wounded German fliers, including two

26 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 333ff.

27 BA-MA, H 20/290, 21. 7. 1941.

28 Kilian, "Die 'Mühlberg-Akten,'" p. 1142.

officers, in the Lemberg military hospital on June 29, 1941, before the Soviet retreat. On June 25, 1941, after an emergency landing near Tamopol, several crew members of a Ju 88 bomber of the 51st Bomber Wing, including Master Sergeant Harenburg, were transferred to the local NKVD prison. There they were murdered in an inconceivably cruel manner, together with other captured crew members.²⁹ One crew member, Master Sergeant Scheurich, who was hidden by an Ukrainian farmer named Picum and a few women, as well as First Reserve Lieutenant Küster, a mayor with a doctor of law degree, and Lance Corporal Kaluza, a lecturer on photography in civilian life, both from the staff of the 129th Artillery Command, described their impressions under oath in a military court deposition.³⁰ According to them, the bodies of the aviators murdered in Tamopol prison were in some cases chained, after which their eyes were put out, their tongues, ears, and noses cut off; and in some cases, the skin on the hands and feet was partially torn off.

A horrifying discovery was made on June 27, 1941, in the central office of the NKVD in Luck.³¹ Technical Military Administrative Advisor Brüggmann, of the 14th Panzer Division testified under oath that the mutilated bodies of four members of the German Luftwaffe, including Second Lieutenant Sturm and an unknown First Lieutenant, were found with their limbs hacked off, accompanied by horrible burns caused by a soldering iron found next to them. On October 9, 1941, two medical officers of the Luftwaffe, Medical Major Dr. Golla and Medical First Lieutenant Dr. Knak, autopsied the bodies of eleven German fliers (including a First Lieutenant) and two army soldiers found in the NKVD prison of Proskurov.³² A Ukrainian prison supervisor, Kolomyets, testified in his military court deposition that the men were transferred on June 27-28, 1941, and killed in the cellar by a shot in the back of the neck during the night of July 4, 1941.³³ In this case, as at Lemberg, at least some of the perpetrators were identified by name: the Deputy Chief of the NKVD in Proskurov, Deputy Chief of the NKVD Prison, and Watch Commander Kasanshy, and the "Chekists" Vassermann, Makhnevich, and Lubchak. The bodies of other murdered German fliers were discovered in the prison of the NKVD Border Troops in Slobodka on June 28, 1941.

29 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 14. 1. 1942.

30 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 22. 9. 1941.

31 *Ibid.*, 1. 10. 1941.

32 *Ibid.*, 9. 10. 1941.

33 *Ibid.*, 28. 11. 1941.

Although a distinction must be made between the systematic murder actions of agencies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the unrestrained murders committed by members of the Red Army, increasing numbers of violations of international law, committed by regular troops of the Red Army were observed under the influence of the then-current atrocity propaganda of July 1941 that absolutely exceeded all bounds of hatred. The seriousness of such violations may be illustrated by a series of randomly selected examples. On July 1, 1941, 165 wounded and unwounded members of the II Battalion of the 35th (motorized) Infantry Regiment of the 25th (motorized) Infantry Division were shot, or, as may be inferred from the investigation reports of July 2 and 5, 1941, "bestially" stabbed or beaten to death, west of Broniki, between Rovno and Luck.³⁴ According to the testimony of a few survivors, these acts were committed deliberately, after robbing and partially undressing the soldiers, and chaining the "service rank" soldiers. This was done to the accompaniment of inflammatory shouting by, and even the personal participation of, a group of Soviet officers.³⁵ On June 30, 1941, an unknown number of wounded were murdered in the district of the 119th (motorized) Infantry Regiment.

On July 1, 1941, Soviet soldiers in the Rokitno region mutilated 20-30 wounded members of the 465th Infantry Regiment, including Second Lieutenant von Ponigau; a few of these men were burned alive.³⁶ Also murdered were 80 wounded members of the 295th Infantry Division who were left behind on the battlefield near Dabrovka (south of Rava Ruska) in early July 1941.³⁷ Approximately 30 members of a medical company, some of them wearing Red Cross armbands, were killed in a Soviet massacre west of Minsk in early July 1941.³⁸ According to eyewitness testimony, 26 members of an assault troop mission were mutilated near Bialystok on July 8, 1941; near Supraszl on the same date, 20 members of the 23rd Anti-Tank Battalion were mutilated, almost all of them "to the point of unrecognizability," following an ambush.³⁹ Medical Second Lieutenant Dr. Berge testified that 48 members of the 1st Battalion of the 111th Infantry Regiment, "including the wounded and prisoners, were slaughtered by shooting, stabbing, or beaten to death with bludgeons" near Romanovka, west of Berdichev, on July 10, 1941.⁴⁰ Seventeen wounded members of the 272nd Infantry Regi-

34 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 273ff.

35 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 1. 7. 1941; BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 2. 7., 5. 7. 1941.

36 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 18. 6. 1942.

37 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, p. 273.

38 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 8. 4. 1942.

39 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 26. 1. 1942.

40 BA-MA, RH 24-48/200, 10. 7. 1941.

ment left behind in a patch of forest near Raja north of Dorpat in mid-July 1941 were laid next to each other and strangled or shot by the Soviets after the cruelest mutilations.⁴¹ As Medical Major Dr. Schmidt testified under oath in the military court investigation, 12-15 wounded German soldiers, captured by the Soviets on the Bobrujsk airfield before they could be evacuated, were killed on the same day, some of them after horrible tortures, such as gouging out their eyes, cutting out their tongues, and crushing their testicles.⁴²

Near Are in Estonia on July 29, 1941, a wounded Lance Corporal of the 1st Artillery Regiment, having survived by accident, watched as uniformed and armed Soviet women murdered his wounded comrades, cutting open the abdomen of one of them, whose both legs had been shot off, with a curved knife.⁴³ Medical Master Sergeant Dr. Stock testified under oath to the bestial murder of the battalion doctor of the 171st Infantry Regiment, Medical First Lieutenant Dr. Reichardt, near Chelovka not far from Korosten' on August 6, 1941.⁴⁴ On August 16, 1941, the 16th Panzer Division reported that 40 members of the 79th Infantry Regiment and a few Hungarian soldiers had been found murdered at the Grejgovo railway station.⁴⁵ According to the report of the commander of the III Battalion, Major Lenz, 48 members of the 164th Infantry Regiment, including a Lance Corporal Graf von Granier-Turawa, were obviously murdered after the battle near Barishovka on September 23, 1941.⁴⁶ The wounded soldiers of an artillery battalion having fallen into Soviet captivity near Vjaz'ma in early October 1941 suffered a frightful fate. As described under oath by Medical Master Sergeant Dr. Sonnleitner of the 2nd Medical Company of the 23rd Panzer Division, the men were burned alive in a nearby barn, together with 60 other wounded.⁴⁷ By contrast, the mere shooting of 11 unwounded and 8 wounded soldiers at Rzhavvej (Tula district) on the order of an unknown politruk in the fall of 1941, described under oath by Mazel, a Russian, seems almost merciful.⁴⁸ Medical Captain Dr. Buhtz, a professor of medicine, autopsied or otherwise medically examined a total of 44 murdered German soldiers, including 9 fliers, 11 infantry soldiers, 14 anti-tank soldiers, and other soldiers and medical ranks in the district of the Army Group

41 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 23. 1. 1942.

42 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 11. 6. 1942.

43 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 30. 10. 1941.

44 *Ibid.*, 22. 11. 1941.

45 BA-MA, RW 24-48/200, 16. 8. 1941.

46 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 29. 9. 1941.

47 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 10. 3. 1942.

48 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 6. 7. 1942.

North between August 28 and November 11, 1941. His report of December 4, 1941, to which reference has already been made, indicates that, in the majority of cases, death was caused, not merely by shooting, but also by terrible tortures, by multiple cuts, in one case by "bestial gagging," by blows with blunt instruments, gouging out their eyes, cutting their throats, cutting or hacking off their limbs, cutting off or crushing their genitals, and burning them alive.

The killing of German prisoners of war and wounded by Soviet soldiers that began on the first day of the war all along the entire front, and that soon rapidly increased, raises the question of how the leadership agencies of the Red Army felt toward these actions. The Soviet government, in reply to an initiative of the International Red Cross, and with a view toward the attitude of the Western powers, attempted to give the impression that they would, "on the condition of reciprocity," recognize the principles generally applicable between civilized states relating to the legal treatment of prisoners of war under international law. The "Decree on Prisoners of War" of the Council of People's Commissars of July 1, 1941, the Circular Letter of the Chief Administrative Officer of the Red Army on the standards of care for prisoners of war of July 3, 1941, and the Proposal of the Chief of the Medical Administration of the Red Army on adequate hospital treatment for prisoners of war of July 29, 1941, which was confirmed by the Chief of the Main Administration for Prisoners of War and Internees of the NKVD, were not, and there is clear evidence for this, enforced among Soviet troops, and were, in any case crassly ignored everywhere, as has been proven in all cases.

These decrees were obviously intended, primarily, to deceive foreign countries, for example, like the much lauded Stalin Constitution of 1936, guaranteeing and proclaiming every conceivable form of human rights and civil rights in the USSR, not a single one of which, in practice, ever existed, but that were, quite the contrary, cynically twisted to imply the exact opposite in every instance.

Were it not so, it would, for example, be impossible to understand how the prohibition of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union Shaposhnikov, directed to the Staff Chiefs of the Fronts and Armies, against the confiscation of "personal valuables, money, and papers from prisoners" could have been quite so ostentatiously ignored.⁴⁹ The commander of the Crimean troops, Vice Admiral Levchenko (together with Member of the Military Council, Corps Commissar

49 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, undated.

Nikolaev, Chief of Staff, Major General Ivanov), by Order No. 091 of November 1941, openly declared that all sums of money and valuables of prisoners of war were the property of the People, immediately ordering their surrender to the agencies of the Soviet State Bank by Directive No. 0146 of the Council of the People's Commissars. In practice, the treatment of prisoners of war was determined, not by the directives and decrees of the central authorities, which were only intended to serve as window-dressing, but rather, by the orders of the commanders, commissars, and political leaders, who were inspired by Soviet hate-propaganda slogans.

Many orders, reports, and statements of Soviet officers and soldiers, in any case, reveal the lack of restraint with which prisoners of war and wounded were simply massacred. Thus, before June 28, 1941, the Soviet commander of the 36th Machine Gun Battalion, near Rava Ruska, ordered all German prisoners of war to be shot.⁵⁰ The Commander of the 225th Mountain Infantry Regiment, Major Savelin, ordered the shooting of 400 Romanian prisoners of war and a few captured German officers and non-commissioned officers west of Starozynine in Bucovina, on July 2-3, 1941, on the grounds of mere transportation problems. When the nurse Elena Ivanovna Zhivilova protested against the intended shooting of a wounded German soldier on the battlefield at Bjel', not far from Sukhari, in early July 1941, she was reprimanded in the presence of First Lieutenant Tolkach, Lieutenant Khaliulin, and a few politruks, and threatened with proceedings by the responsible battalion commissar, who had already shot a German prisoner of war at the end of June.⁵¹ The order was drummed into her to shoot all future captured officers personally, or, as she testified: "Even we nurses were supposed to shoot them with our 'Nagans.'"

"Captured officers were all shot without exception," say the notes of a member of the Red Army having returned to his parents at Usovka: "I have seen many executions of prisoners of war... thirty in one place alone."⁵² At Khomutovka, the same Red Army officer observed the manner in which a politruk killed a wounded officer and wounded soldier. The Combat Report of a No. 304 tank, signed by Second Lieutenant Efremov, the crew of which was said to be inspired by "the ardent desire ... to exterminate a whole load of fascist reptiles..." is typical of the manner of Soviet thinking on a lower level. This report contains an entry, dated August 31, 1941, reading: "Destroyed one medical vehicle consisting of two horses and ten wounded fascists."⁵³ The Chief of the 1st Company, Captain Gadiev,

50 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 273, 282.

51 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 13. 10. 1941.

52 BA-MA, RH 21-1/481, 13. 1. 1942.

reported on August 30, 1941: "Shot 15 wounded," while the political leader of the company, Junior Politruk Bulanov, reported on September 5, 1941: "Destroyed one medical unit."

Numerous documents also reveal the responsibility of higher command agencies for the murder of prisoners of war. Thus, a major on the staff of the 21st Infantry Corps, commanded by Major General Borisov, shot two German officers by order of the Corps Staff on July 4, 1941.⁵⁴ A driver on the staff of the 154th Infantry Division testified that 22 German prisoners of war were shot in the neck after interrogation by the divisional commander and divisional commissar in early August, after being forced to dig their own graves.⁵⁵ The Chief of Staff of the 26th Armored Division, Lieutenant Colonel Kimbar, and the Chief of the Operations Branch, Major Khrapko, reported the shooting of 80 prisoners of war in Operational Report No. 11 on July 14, 1941, quite casually, as if it were a matter of course: "80 men surrendered, and were shot" (*sdalos' v plen do 80 chelovek, kotorye byli rastreljany*).⁵⁶

That such crimes could be committed on the basis of official military orders has been confirmed by Colonel Gaevsky of the 29th Armored Division, in his testimony of August 6, 1941, relating to the shooting of lower-ranking German officers.⁵⁷ That an order to give no quarter should be issued prior to the attack on Prokopovka on September 9, 1941, as testified to by Soviet Second Lieutenant fon Granc, Battalion Adjutant in the 800th Infantry Regiment, was, therefore, quite consistent.⁵⁸ Shooting the wounded officers was reserved for the Regimental Commissar personally. Like other captured Soviet officers, the captured Commander of the 141st Infantry Division, Major General Tonkonogov, in his interrogation in August 1941, objected that he had no knowledge of the shooting of German prisoners, and that the wounded could be shot only as the result of "lack of discipline on the battlefield."⁵⁹ It was later discovered that Major General Tonkonogov had personally ordered the shooting of a German officer for refusal to provide information.⁶⁰ Another Soviet general demanded information from a wounded sergeant, Seyboth, of the 35th Motorized Infantry Regiment, relating to a position not yet occupied by the Germans on September 19, 1941.

53 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 30. 8.-2. 9. 1941.

54 BA-MA, RH 21-2/v. 647, 6.-7. 7. 1941.

55 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 20. 3. 1942.

56 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 13. 7. 1941.

57 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 6. 8. 1941.

58 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 24. 1. 1942.

59 Interrogation of Major General Tonkonogov, undated, author's archives.

60 BA-MA, RH 21-1/472, 16. 8. 1941.

The interrogated soldier testified under oath "that he would slowly torture me to death" for failure to provide the correct information.⁶¹ This Soviet General was also later captured by the Germans.

Refusal to provide information, which is permissible under international law, was repeatedly cited by Soviet staffs as grounds for shooting prisoners of war, perhaps even as a matter of basic principle. Thus, to cite a few examples,⁶² the chief of a German Engineer Company was personally shot by the Chief of Staff of the 53rd Infantry Division at Ilinskoe on October 14, 1941, after being given twenty minutes to consider, and being permitted to write a letter to his family. A German corporal was similarly shot on the order of Lieutenant Colonel Chicherin, the Chief of Staff of an unidentified division.⁶³ Although similar actions can also be proven in relation to the Army, Corps, and Divisional Staffs, a "general order" for the shooting of prisoners does not appear to have existed during this phase of the conflict. The large numbers of such killings, which can be proven on the basis of testimony by Soviet officers, political officials, doctors, and soldiers as early as July 1941, were attributed by the Germans to "individual or special orders" of the various Soviet command agencies.

Captured officers and commissars accused each other of issuing such orders,⁶⁴ but the commissars appear to have been chiefly responsible, as they had the earliest opportunity to do so, and were, furthermore, inclined to liquidate "capitalists" and "fascists" in addition to German officers. "The Soviets committed horrible murders all along the front, from the first days of the Eastern campaign onward," stated a summary by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on September 15, 1941.⁶⁵ The argument, heard on occasion, that these murders were, in fact, committed in reprisal for application of the notorious Commissar Order by the Germans, must be excluded since the order was, of course, unknown to the Red Army during the early phases of the war.

The fact that Soviet command authorities can be proven to have issued repeated orders to shoot prisoners of war for refusing to make statements, in no way contradicts their simultaneous efforts to prevent the shooting of prisoners of war by Soviet troops on their own initiative—due to the desire of the Soviet leadership to keep prisoners of war alive for interrogation purposes. A great deal of material is available in this regard; for exam-

61 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 7. 5. 1942.

62 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 17. 10. 1941; BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 19. 1. 1942.

63 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, p. 282.

64 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 25. 7, 27. 7. 1941.

65 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, p. 305.

ple, the Commander of the 168th Cavalry Regiment of the 41st Independent Cavalry Division, Colonel Pankratov, and the Regimental Commissar, Senior Politruk Kutuzov, protested against the shooting of prisoners of war during the most difficult phase of the winter, on December 28, 1941, simultaneously conceding that subordinate unit leaders were shooting all "captured German fascists" immediately instead of delivering them to the staff, thus hindering the intelligence gathering about the enemy.⁶⁶ The Chief of Staff of an unnamed Infantry Division, apparently the 65th, Major Kotik, and the Commissar of the Staff, Battalion Commissar Kitsa, warned against taking the law into one's own hands and simply shooting captured soldiers and officers "without even asking any questions."⁶⁷ Since such cases were becoming constantly more numerous, especially in the 38th Infantry Regiment, the Regimental Commander and Regimental Commissar were threatened with severe punishment in the event of repetition. Colonel Kashanskij, Chief of Staff of the 30th Infantry Division, in an order dated early July 1941, referred to the urgent need to deliver captured prisoners of war to the divisional staff for interrogation, even "if they are severely wounded."⁶⁸ The Chief of Staff of the 62nd Army, Major General Moskvina, the Military Commissar of the Staff, Regimental Commissar Zaytsev, and the Chief of the Department for Enemy Reconnaissance, Colonel German, prohibited the subordinate units (31st, 87th, 196th, 131st, 399th, 112th Infantry Divisions, 33rd Guards Infantry Division, and 20th Motorized Infantry Brigade) from "shooting prisoners on the battlefield, regardless of the numbers involved," under the threat of severe punishment, leaving the question of subsequently shooting them apparently open.⁶⁹ Also, the Chief of Staff, of the 14th Army in the section of Murmansk, Colonel Malitsky, and the Commissar of the Staff, Battalion Commissar Burylin, in an order issued on September 8, 1941, complained that the subordinate units, such as the 88th Infantry Division, had simply begun to liquidate all prisoner transports *en route*, instead of delivering them to staff headquarters.⁷⁰ The objection was not, however, made on the grounds, for example, that the executions constituted a crime against humanity or a violation of international law, but simply that it amounted to a "failure in the military training organization."

The methods of interrogation in the staff headquarters have been described by a person who should know: a captured Regimental Commis-

66 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 28. 12. 1941.

67 *Ibid.*, undated.

68 Zayas. *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, p. 288.

69 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 9. 9. 1942.

70 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 29. 11. 1941.

sar. In the winter of 1941-42, he stated that a form of "simple interrogation" existed in the Regimental Staff, as well as a form of "severe interrogation." A form of "most severe interrogation" also existed in the Army Staffs, conducted by the Special Department of the NKVD.⁷¹ If the prisoner of war was unwilling to testify, then during the "severe interrogation" by the Regimental Staff:

"The soldiers present each held him tight by the head or feet, after which the prisoner received five to ten blows on the buttocks and back with a club, in the presence of the Regimental Commanders and Regimental Commissars. If the prisoner was still unwilling to testify, the beatings continued for approximately five to ten minutes, in increasing severity. He was again intermittently interrogated. The beatings only stopped when the prisoner was unconscious or dead."

As for the "most severe interrogation" in the Army Staff, Major Kyanchenko of the Army Staff of the 19th and, later, the 33rd Army, reported:

"that the prisoners, stripped naked by the NKVD, were beaten with rubber truncheons, and that their ears were battered off at the same time since the face was also beaten. Their fingernails were also torn out. Another method was to cut off the tips of the fingers with sharp knives. To increase the pain, the fingertips were not cut off with a single blow, but gradually, with several blows."

During comparable interrogations in the Divisional Staff, braided leather straps were used on prisoners of war, who were naked in these cases as well. If the prisoner of war gave testimony of slight value after a "severe interrogation," he was "finally shot on order of the regimental commander."

When the interrogation was completed, the command authorities took no further interest in the fate of the prisoner, but rather handed him over to the Special Department of the NKVD, "which is known to have shot all prisoners." Thus, for example, according to the testimony of the Chief of the Operations Branch in the Staff of the 1st Motorized Proletarian (Infantry) Division, Lieutenant Colonel Liapin, Quartermaster Colonel Rosentsvaig of the 57th Armored Division personally shot two German officers shortly after interrogation on September 16, 1941. On February 21, 1942, a Soviet Colonel reported the shooting of a German flight officer even in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, and other high-ranking officers of the Army Staff.⁷²

71 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 16. 4. 1942.

72 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 21. 2. 1942.

The Chief of Staff of the 47th Army in the Caucasus, Colonel Vasil'ev, the Military Staff Commissar, Senior Battalion Commissar Makov, and Department Chief for Enemy Reconnaissance Lieutenant Colonel Baranov, in reference to the usual murders of prisoners of war in the units in 1942, cited the case of two fliers shot by the 83rd Independent Marine Infantry Brigade. The commanders and commissars of all units were not, for example, fundamentally prohibited from shooting prisoners of war, but, rather, only from "shooting prisoners of war without permission by the Military Council of the Army."⁷³ The usual Red Army manner of procedure in dealing with German aircraft crews after interrogation was described by the liaison officer on the Operational Staff of the Defense District of Tuapse (TOR), Second Lieutenant Redko, on November 26 and December 1, 1942:

"At the staff of the 47th Army, three German fliers were interrogated for three days, they were given nothing to eat, then they had to take their uniforms off, dig their own graves, and were shot."⁷⁴

A directive of December 1941 from the Chief of the Political Department of the 9th Cavalry Division to the commissars of all units states:

"Inform the combatants and commanders that, in this sense, the enemy will never find any protection, anywhere, even among the highest staffs... there will always be time to settle accounts with them. None of the invaders will leave our land alive."⁷⁵

The Wehrmacht Investigation Office for the Violation of International Law issued its express conclusions after an evaluation of captured documents and hundreds of prisoner testimonies in a memorandum of March 1942, stating that the Soviet prohibition against the murder of German prisoners of war was "not based on any concern for the legality of treatment of prisoners of war under international law, but rather, and exclusively, upon the Russian staff interest in the delivery of the prisoners of war for intelligence purposes."⁷⁶

Many documents, nevertheless, reveal something approaching a political motive in addition to considerations of purely military expediency. Thus, the Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Army Major General Potapov (together with Member of the Military Council, Divisional Commissar Inki-shev, Chief of the Political Propaganda, Brigade Commissar Kol'chenko) in his Order No. 025 of June 30, 1941, referred to the shooting of German

73 BA-MA, RH 20-17/368. 1942.

74 Hoffmann, *Kaukasien 1942/43*, p. 122.

75 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, undated.

76 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, p. 306.

officers and soldiers as, of course, "perfectly legal," while, nevertheless, prohibiting "arbitrary" shootings in the future, not merely to get a chance to interrogate German soldiers before they were shot, but for the political purpose of encouraging the disintegration of the German army.⁷⁷

The Chief of the Department for Political Propaganda of the 31st Infantry Corps, Brigade Commissar Ivanchenko, apparently still imbued with erroneous precepts of class consciousness, in his Order No. 020, addressed to the political agencies of the 193rd Infantry Division of July 14, 1941,⁷⁸ not only complained "that prisoners of war are being strangled and stabbed to death," but that "shameful acts... of robbery"—*i.e.*, the violent confiscation of "watches, pocket knives, and razors"—were taking place as well. The same Brigade Commissar, who was obviously rather naïve, cited the political hazards of this "prisoner procedure that is unworthy of the Red Army." He explained to his subordinate political agencies that "German soldiers—workers and farmers—are not fighting voluntarily; when a German soldier surrenders, he is no longer an enemy." It was therefore necessary to take "all possible steps to ensure the capture of soldiers and officers in particular." And, in complete ignorance of the Party line and actual conditions, he added: "Remember that prisoners are permitted to keep all personal possessions, to wear their uniforms, and even retain their medals."

Similarly, the Chief of Staff of the 21st Army, Major General Gordov, who was later subject to reprisals, *i.e.*, persecuted, and the Staff Commissar, Brigade Commissar Pogodin, in an order to the troops on August 8, 1941, which was also brought to the attention of the Military Public Prosecutor's Office and the Chief of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 21st Army, once again emphasized the alleged "governmental prohibition" against "the mistreatment of prisoners, or the theft of their personal effects," whether it involved a "gold watch" or a "handkerchief."⁷⁹ This was an extremely naïve misconception of customary practice among soldiers in the Red Army. The order further stated that the Red Army should put an immediate stop to the "disgraceful excesses" of these marauders. The political motive in other cases was perhaps not so evident, for example, when the Commander of the 6th Infantry Corps, Major General Alexeev, the Military Commissar, Brigade Commissar Shalikov, and the Chief of Staff, Colonel Eremin, stated on July 23, 1941, that it was impossible for the leadership agencies to obtain information on the situation of the enemy "since many units of the corps have shot all the prisoners taken thus far."⁸⁰ The Chief of

77 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 14. 9. 1941.

78 *Ibid.*, 14. 7. 1941.

79 *Ibid.*, 8. 8. 1941.

Political Propaganda of the 159th Infantry Division, Battalion Commissar Sevastianov, and the Chief of the Special Department, Rakhuv, were at least reprimanded for a "terrible case" of arbitrary execution. At the same time, the Divisional Commanders and the Commander of the Corps Troops were warned that they would be strictly called to account for any violations of international law. As late as December 2, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Coastal Army in Sevastopol objected, by Order No. 0086, to the widespread practice of "exterminating" prisoners of war without prior interrogation. He also believed that the "common practice of shooting prisoners immediately after capture makes us an object of dread to the enemy and prevents the enemy from surrendering."⁸¹

Orders of this type originated from a phase of the war when the old slogans of the Communist class warfare "Proletarians of the World, Unite" still existed *pro forma*. This slogan, it was now stated, had led to "uncertainties" in some cases, and, therefore, "to disorient a certain stratum of members of the army." Since it was now admittedly a matter of "destroying all fascist villains," it was now thought advisable to replace the "Proletarians Unite" slogan with another one. On December 10, 1941, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Army Commissar First Rank Mekhlis, by Directive No. 278, caused the slogan "Proletarians of the World..." to be immediately deleted and replaced by the clearly visible words: "Death to the German Occupiers!" in the letterheads and headings of all political organizational texts—from the Army newspaper *Krasnaya zvezda* to the most insignificant leaflet.⁸² This slogan was accordingly believed, by the entire Red Army, to constitute the unchanging guideline, and, in that sense, was now understood to be taken literally.

80 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, undated; BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 29. 11. 1941.

81 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 8. 9. 1942.

82 BA-MA, RH 20-17/330, 10. 12. 1941; BA-MA, RH 2/2411, 26. 1. 1942.

**“To the Last Man”
The Endless Murders of Prisoners of War**

The principle of "national" extermination in Soviet political propaganda, as opposed to the formerly applicable principle of international class warfare (which had hitherto always been adhered to and had not yet been forgotten), made its first appearance in Stalin's official call for a war of extermination against the Germans in his speech upon the occasion of the twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow on November 6, 1941.¹ He proclaimed to the representatives of the party and social organizations during the commemorative session of the Moscow Soviet:

"Well now, if the Germans want a war of extermination, they will get it (thunderous, long drawn-out applause). From now on, it will be our task, the task of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the task of all the fighters, commanders, and political officials of our Army and Navy, to exterminate to the last man all Germans having invaded the territory of our homeland as occupiers (thunderous applause; shouts of 'Quite right!'; cheers). No mercy to the German occupiers! Death to the German occupiers! (Thunderous applause.)"

Of course, Stalin's wish was his command. His Soviet propagandists took him literally, and the new slogan was disseminated throughout the Red Army in accordance with the established rules of political agitation. The manner in which Ilya Ehrenburg, in particular, gave free rein to his instinctive hatreds has been clearly described elsewhere. Ehrenburg seized upon Stalin's proclamation, constantly adding new variants in his calls for the indiscriminate murder of all German soldiers. "Five million... bodies will be buried in our earth," he wrote on December 2, 1941. "We have decided to kill all the Germans invaders," he proclaimed to the soldiers of the Red Army on December 3, 1941:

"We quite simply intend to kill them. The accomplishment of this humanitarian mission has now become the responsibility of our people. We are continuing the work of Pasteur, who discovered the anti-rabies vaccine.

¹ Stalin, *Über den Großen Vaterländischen Krieg*, pp. 31, 37.

We are continuing the mission of the scientists who discovered the means of destroying deadly microbes.”

“The Germans... must be driven into the ground. They must be killed, one after the other,” he wrote on December 22, 1941, and on February 20, 1942: “Your assignment is to kill them—to put them below ground.” On March 13, 1942, he reiterated: “You must wipe the Germans from the face of the earth.”²

Ehrenburg’s proclamations, as confirmed by a document found on the body of a dead Soviet soldier, had by 1942 become a long since established commonplace in the Red Army. The document found on this particular soldier was entitled: “Topic of Presentation for the Politruks,” based on the Ehrenburg slogan already quoted:

“When you have killed one German, kill the next, the third... Kill the Germans—your aged mother begs this of you. Kill the Germans—your children beg this of you. Kill the Germans—the earth of your homeland calls out to you. Do not let a single one escape...”³

“Let us destroy the fascist villains to the last man,” stated the lead article in the daily army newspaper *Leninskij Put* and quite accordingly on November 30, 1941:

“Every one of us must faithfully carry out Comrade Stalin’s order to exterminate all German occupiers to the last man. To kill ten, twenty, one hundred fascists villains—is the responsibility of every Soviet fighter, officer, and political worker.”⁴

Ehrenburg’s remarks, and those of the Political Main Administration, were in every respect in accordance with the High Command agencies of the Red Army.

The Commander-in-Chief of the West Front, General of the Army Zhukov, with Member of the Military Council and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR Bulganin, on December 14, 1941, jointly issued an order that contained slogans such as: “Not one Hitlerite bandit having invaded our country must escape alive... our holy duty consists of taking cruel revenge... and destroying the German occupier to the last man.”⁵ The Military Council of the Leningrad Front addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants to the rear of the German lines on January 1, 1942, directing them not to permit German soldiers—referred to as “Hitler-

2 *Russia at War*, pp. 86, 113, 229, 234, 267.

3 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 454, 14. 10. 1942.

4 BA-MA, RH 2/2411, 30. 11. 1941.

5 *Moskva-frontu*, p. 91.

ite dogs” and “fascist cannibals”—to escape anywhere, “except in the earth, in their graves.”⁶ All methods were said to be justified in this “unmerciful war of extermination,” “rifles, grenades, axes, scythes, crowbars.” On occasion of the turn of the year 1941/42, the Commander-in-Chief of the 54th Army, Major General Fediuninsky, Members of the Military Council, Brigade Commissar Sichev, and Brigade Commissar Bumagin as well as the Chief of Staff, Major General Sukhomlin, in an “Order to the Troops of the 54th Army”, demanded that they “exterminate the German two-legged beasts at the entrances to the great city of Leningrad.”⁷ Another order, this time issued jointly with Member of the Military Council, Brigade Commissar Kholostov, and Chief of Staff, Major General Berezinsky, called for “the extermination of all fascist bandits to the last man.”⁸ Stalin’s words of November 6, 1941, also formed the motto of Colonel General Yeremenko, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Shock Army on December 30, 1941.⁹ Upon the transfer of command, Yeremenko’s order of the day, issued to the troops of the 4th Shock Army jointly with Member of the Military Council, Brigade Commissar Rudakov, and Chief of Staff, Major General Kurassov, read:

“I call upon all members of the Army to exterminate and destroy all occupiers to the last man in execution of the orders of our great political and military leader, Comrade Stalin.”

According to the findings of the German General on Special Assignment with the High Command of the Army, in the Red Army, Stalin’s words were generally “understood and interpreted...” to mean that “every member of the Wehrmacht—whether in combat, wounded, or captured—was to be killed.”¹⁰ Captured documents and the testimonies of Soviet prisoners leave no doubt whatsoever that Stalin’s words were to be considered an order. Thus, according to the testimony of a captured regimental commissar, “Stalin’s order of November 1941” stating that “all prisoners of war ... are to be shot,” was decisive in the treatment of German prisoners of war. Although this particular commissar, nevertheless, wished to make the restriction that German deserters should be transferred to the rear as prisoners. He was, however, contradicted in the deposition of Red Army member Kisilov of the 406th Infantry Regiment. Prior to the attack on Leskij on January 17, 1942, so Kisilov, his platoon leader, Second Lieutenant Kolesnichenko,

6 BA-MA, RH 22/271, 1. 1. 1942.

7 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, 1. 1. 1942.

8 BA-MA, RH 2/2425, 3. 4. 1942.

9 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 742, 26. 2. 1942.

10 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, 15. 3. 1942.

announced the following order from the regimental commissar: "No prisoners are to be taken; all Germans are to be killed. Not a single one must be left alive."¹¹ Also found among the papers on a dead Soviet officer was a reference to corresponding treatment of the matter in the approaching Party meeting of the 8th Battery on December 28, 1941. According to this reference, the oral propaganda and agitation that formed the central emphasis of Party work "extends in particular to execution of Comrade Stalin's order: All Germans... are to be exterminated to the last man."

According to the comment in the politruk's notebook, "the task of exterminating the fascists having invaded our territory, as established by Stalin," also formed the topic for political education in the 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 870th Infantry Regiment of the 287th Infantry Division on February 10, 1942.¹² According to the testimony of Second Lieutenant Paramonov, Stalin's Order also advocated killing the wounded, "since, after all, they could not work, and therefore represented no advantage to us."¹³ Master Sergeant (*Starshij serzhant*) Marushak of the 28th Mechanized Infantry Regiment and other prisoners of war unanimously confirmed that Stalin's order "to take no more German prisoners, and to shoot all captured German prisoners and wounded immediately," was read out to the troops by the political leaders in all units on a daily basis, and sometimes by the officers as well, starting on November 6, 1941.¹⁴ According to Red Army soldier Seibel of the 337th Infantry Division, a copy of Stalin's order to exterminate every German soldier was handed out to every Red Army soldier.¹⁵ According to Master Sergeant Shcherbatiuk, leader of the Independent Signal Detachment of the 351st Infantry Division, "Stalin's Order to destroy all Germans was universally made known."¹⁶ Shcherbatiuk added that he had personally heard of "numerous shootings and massacres."

As early as November 15, 1941, the Divisional Doctor of the 20th German Infantry Division, Medical Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Mauß, and the Battalion Doctor, Medical Captain Dr. Buchard, performed autopsies on the bodies of seventy soldiers of the 90th Infantry Regiment who had fallen into the hands of the enemy near Borovik. The conclusion was that most of them were murdered after being wounded in combat.¹⁷ By order of the Commissars of the 1st Soviet Motorized Guards Infantry Division (*gmsd*, i.e. *gvard-*

11 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 22. 1. 1942.

12 BA-MA, RH 21-2/v. 706, 19. 4. 1942.

13 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 22. 12. 1941.

14 *Ibid.*, 18. 1. 1942, 22. 12. 1941.

15 *Ibid.*, 25. 1. 1942.

16 BA-MA, RH 21-1/481, 18. 2. 1942.

17 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 17. 11. 1941.

ejskaja motostrelkovaja divizija) one hundred German prisoners of war were shot at Naro-Fominsk in this region between December 1 and 6, 1941, while an additional number, as stated in a report by the Chief of the Reconnaissance Department of the Staff of the 33rd Army, Captain Potapov, were shot by other units, for example, the 222nd Infantry Division.¹⁸ Seventy-two members of the German 76th Infantry Regiment, (20th Motorized Infantry Division) some of whom were wounded, were mutilated, murdered, and robbed at Budogoch west of Tikhvin in mid-December.¹⁹ Amadeo Casanova, a member of the 250th Spanish Infantry Division, described the murder of a wounded Spanish lieutenant and four wounded Spanish soldiers north of Novgorod on December 27, 1941, under oath in his military court deposition.²⁰ Wounded soldiers of the "Blue Division" were also murdered and mutilated at another location.

"One of the worst atrocities of this terrible war," according to Sir Reginald T. Paget, the British defender of Field Marshal von Manstein before a British military tribunal—at least concerning the hideousness of the homicides—was the systematic murder of German prisoners of war, especially the wounded, captured by the Soviets during the landing operations at Feodosija (Crimea) in very late December 1941.²¹ In the hospitals of Feodosija alone, approximately 160 severely wounded soldiers who were left behind, and a medical second lieutenant and six medics of the 715th (Motorized) Army Medical Company, as well as a Russian male nurse remaining with them, who all "exhibited the highest degree of sacrificial courage," were shot, thrown out of the window, beaten to death with iron bars, or allowed to freeze to death in the breakers of the sea, or otherwise gruesomely murdered by Soviet soldiers, and to some extent by Red sailors. The unanimous testimonies of Russian and German eyewitnesses, including Medical Captain Burkhardt, provide an unequivocal picture of these cruel events while simultaneously indicating the identity of the persons responsible.²²

The Russian (most likely Tatar) male nurse Kalafatov testified under oath to the murder of wounded soldiers in the hospital located opposite the Villa Stamboli on January 6, 1942, after a Soviet army officer who acted properly was replaced by a hate-filled junior grade lieutenant from the Black Sea Fleet by the name of Aidanov.²³ At another location, the Tatar

18 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 8. 12. 1941.

19 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 19. 6. 1942.

20 *Ibid.*, 19. 3. 1942.

21 Paget, *Manstein*; p. 41; Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 308, 315.

22 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 31. 1., 2. 2. 1942.

male nurse Bursud, in fear of being personally shot, watched the murder of wounded German soldiers from a hiding place while they were being stabbed, cut, or hacked to death, during which he was able to hear the "horrible cries of the Germans." According to a shocked Russian married couple, a German soldier left lying on the street with a severely wounded thigh who "whimpered day and night" and whose limbs were frozen in the meantime, was killed by shots in the face by members of the Soviet Navy called over for that purpose by a uniformed Soviet woman ("a doctor or commissar").²⁴

When the Russian Dr. Dmitriev cautiously asked the Commissar of the 9th Infantry Division (mistakenly referred to as the 9th Infantry Corps), in the presence of other commissars, why the wounded were being shot, he was told that the executions were being committed according to instructions based on "Stalin's speech of November 6, 1941, stating that all Germans... were to be exterminated."²³ The commissar "therefore thought it perfectly logical that the German wounded should also be annihilated." German wounded were also "cruelly mutilated" by Soviet soldiers during a landing attempt at Evpatorija (Crimea) on January 5, 1942.²⁵

It is obvious that the incidents cited above represent only the tip of the iceberg; there is a great deal of proof that indicates that this is so. Technical Administrative Officer 2nd Rank Malyuk mentions the shooting of twelve German prisoners of war within the immediate staff zone of the 2nd Shock Army near Paporotno on January 13, 1942, by order of the Chiefs of the Special Department of the NKVD and the Army Commissar of the 2nd Shock Army, Brigade Commissar Vasil'ev.²⁶ The general mentality of the troops of the Red Army is also revealed by a front-line report by the Soviet writer Oleg Erberg, broadcast by Radio Moscow on January 24, 1942, relating to the shooting of a captured German officer by a "heroic" Soviet tank crew. The tank commander was said to have declared: "I want to shoot this dog from in front, using my revolver, so as to feast my eyes on his fear."²⁷ The Chief of Staff of the 636th Infantry Regiment, Major Sushinsky, reported emotionlessly to the Chief of Staff of the 160th Infantry Division, together with Junior Politruk Duchkov on February 4, 1942, that Master Sergeant Kabulov had stabbed a wounded German to death with his bayonet at Besedino "because he was seriously wounded."²⁸ Wehrmacht Corporal

23 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 14. 2. 1942.

24 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 30. 1. 1942.

25 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 152, 10. 1. 1942.

26 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 9. 6. 1942.

27 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 151, 24. 1. 1942.

Emmerich testified under oath during his deposition by a military court that thirty wounded German soldiers left behind the day before at Shellesharo on February 17, 1942, were found in the following condition: "Their eyes had been poked out, some of them had had their ears, noses, tongues, and sexual organs cut off... they were all tortured to death."²⁹

Rector Ziekur of the Staff of the German 62nd Infantry Division, in his capacity as burial officer, had to identify the bodies of 42 horribly mutilated soldiers from the 179th Infantry Regiment at Trojchatyj (on the Kharkov-Lozovaja highway) on February 24 and 25.³⁰ He reported:

"The first impression was unnerving in several cases, their noses had been cut off and their eyes gouged out. In very many cases, their ring fingers had been cut off... On one soldier, all the fingers of the left hand had been cut off, while the left arm was dislocated and torn off." Rector Ziekur stated that the Russian population was "disgusted and shocked by these mutilations."

In testimony before the 570th Squad of the Secret Field Police, two partisans who had been caught in the act, Kleshnikov and Kusmenkov, described the manner in which the partisans usually treated their captives.³¹ According to their testimony, six German soldiers were forced to dig their own graves in the snow by order of Commissar Yudenkov after their interrogation by partisan staff at Gortop near El'nja on February 27, 1942, a very cold day, and were then slaughtered in the following manner:

"They were lined up and then pushed out individually and stabbed in the back with a bayonet. Several partisans then stabbed the wounded with their bayonets. After each individual killing, the bodies were thrown to one side, and the next one was killed. The prisoners were taken to the place of execution bare-footed and dressed only in a shirt and underwear. I myself stabbed them several times."

Technical Administrative Officer 2nd Rank Kalepchenko, head of the burial detail of the 1260th Infantry Regiment of the 380th Soviet Infantry Division, testified to having buried 40 German soldiers at Griva in mid-March 1942, all of whom showed signs of severe mutilation.³² All these examples, selected from among innumerable others, can, of course, only provide a general idea. Information relating to the Soviet murder of prisoners of war often reached the Germans only by accident. For example, that a

28 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 4. 2. 1942.

29 *Ibid.*, 2. 7. 1942.

30 *Ibid.*, 9. 3. 1942.

31 *Ibid.*, 26. 5. 1942.

32 *Ibid.*, 6. 7. 1942.

German "transport of wounded soldiers had been captured by the Russians near Toropec, and that all the wounded had been shot or horribly stabbed" during the winter of 1941-1942 only became known to the Germans at a later time.³³

It has already been stated that the mistreatment of prisoners of war for which the Stalin regime was responsible was not universally understood by the Soviets either, and was sometimes the matter of objections that were at least partly politically motivated. In Uspenovka on March 1, 1942, Efrosinia Mikhailova was an eyewitness to the consultation between a Soviet Major, a First Lieutenant, and a Commissar in her house as to what to do with eight German prisoners of war.³⁴ When even the commissar advised further transport of the prisoners, he was overruled by the Major who said: "But you know Stalin's order." The eight German prisoners of war were thereupon taken out behind the house and shot. At Komary (Sevastopol) in November 1941, a Soviet platoon leader shouted at a Soviet soldier, Demshenko, who wanted to help a wounded soldier: "Leave the German devil alone, he will be shot." Demshenko was only able to delay the shooting temporarily by saying: "The poor wounded fellow can't help it, it's our humanitarian duty to bandage his wounds."

It was not, however, humanitarian considerations that finally led to a new interpretation of Stalin's Order of November 6, 1941, but rather interest on the part of the command agencies, an interest that still existed during this phase of the war, as before, in obtaining enemy intelligence through prisoner of war interrogations. This was accompanied by an even more compelling interest in furthering the disintegration of the German army. After all, it was obvious that if German soldiers knew that they were going to be shot or mutilated after falling into Soviet captivity, the result would be a stiffening of German resistance. On November 6, 1941, Stalin left no doubt in the minds of the Red Army that all Germans invaders of the Soviet territory were to be "exterminated to the last man," and his words were interpreted accordingly. On February 23, 1942, Order No. 55 was issued by Stalin on the founding anniversary of the Red Army in his capacity as People's Commissar of Defense. His prior interpretation was now suddenly construed to mean something entirely different.³⁵ Stalin now claimed, in particular, that the assumption that the Red Army would "fail to take German prisoners due to hatred for everything German..." was a "stupid lie and a foolish slander" against the Red Army, which was said to be imbued with feelings of respect

33 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 472, 21. 5. 1943.

34 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 7. 3. 1942.

35 Stalin, *Über den Großen Vaterländischen Krieg*, p. 50.

for other peoples and races—a truly shameless allegation in view of the hate propaganda being propagated by Stalin himself on the Soviet side. Nevertheless, it was unmistakable what Stalin's words contained in Order No. 55 meant:

“The Red Army captures German soldiers and officers and spares their lives if they surrender. The Red Army annihilates German soldiers and officers if they refuse to lay down their weapons...”

The Commander-in-Chief of the West Front, General of the Army Zhukov, who, on December 14, 1941, together with Bulganin, a Member of his Military Council, had called upon his troops to “take cruel revenge” and not to permit a single “Hitlerite bandit” to escape alive, now felt himself compelled to make an about-face. In an order directed to the “Commanding Officers and Members of the Military Councils,” Zhukov, together with Member of the Military Council Khokhlov, in regard to the Order of Stalin No. 55, now prohibited “all shooting of prisoners... no matter who they are.”³⁶ He suddenly made the allegation that “Comrade Stalin has never mentioned the shooting of enemy soldiers if they lay down their weapons, allow themselves to be taken prisoner, or voluntarily desert to us.” According to an order of Army Commissar 2nd Rank Kuznetsov of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, German troops were to be exposed to a heavy propaganda barrage designed to convince them that the Red Army “feels no racial hatred against the German people, and does not have the idiotic intention to destroy the German people and German Reich.” Consequently, German soldiers and officers who surrendered would be taken prisoner and the Red Army would guarantee their lives.³⁷

The mere fact that the anti-German hate propaganda disseminated by Ehrenburg and others continued to rage without restraint reveals the deception. Stalin personally used ambiguous language in his order of the day of May 1, 1942, speaking of the duty to exterminate the “German” invaders—not “fascist” invaders—to the last man, unless they lay down their weapons.”³⁸ Order of Stalin no 130, also disseminated among the units of the Red Army in 1942, called for irreconcilable hatred from Soviet soldiers.³⁹ The Germans had received information relating to an alleged Stalin “secret order” to take no more individual German prisoners but rather, only in groups, on the grounds of practicality. Soldiers offering resistance to the

36 BA-MA, WO 1-6/578, undated.

37 BA-MA, RW 4/v. 330, 2. 6. 1942.

38 BA-MA, RH 2/2411, 1. 5. 1942.

39 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 454, 14. 10. 1942.

last, aviators, and so-called "fascists," were also to be shot, as revealed by many reports that, in fact, mention the shooting of officers, National Socialist party members, or prisoners of war expressing "fascist" ideas.⁴⁰ This was a clear counterpart to the shooting of commissars and political leaders partly practiced by the Germans until the spring of 1942.

The *Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle für Verletzungen des Völkerrechts* (Armed Forces Department of Inquiry for Violations of International Law) of the German High Command of the Wehrmacht, which evaluated the relevant material, considered the Soviet "change of course" initiated since February 23, 1942, to be a pure propaganda measure directed, in any case, at foreign countries. They observed, in September 1942:

"an incessant series of brutal violations of international law, not decreasing in the slightest degree. The methods and systems of Russian actions have remained the same from the beginning of the campaign against Russia until September 1942."⁴¹

In fact, the mistreatment of prisoners continued, as will be seen from a number of examples.

Thirty-eight bodies of German soldiers, found chained together after the end of the winter frost near Promenaja, showing "signs of the cruelest torture" inflicted to their heads, may have been murdered even before February 23, 1942.⁴² According to the report of the 6th Panzer Division to the High Command of the 9th Army of April 29, 1942:

"For example, their eyes had been gouged out, the tips of their noses cut off, and their tongues torn out. Others had their jaws and limbs smashed, probably with rifle butts, after which they were finally killed by pistol shots. A few of them were completely naked, others again wore only a few items of clothing. There were also clear indications of strangulation."

After February 23, 1942, an isolated case is reported in which a culprit, platoon leader Second Lieutenant Kudriavtsev of the 1264th Infantry Regiment of the 17th Guards Infantry Division, was handed over to a Soviet court martial for murdering four German prisoners of war, but only because his actions prevented the gathering of enemy intelligence. Otherwise, Order of Stalin No. 55 remained broadly disregarded.

First Lieutenant Shevanov, a Battalion Commander in the 1129th Infantry Regiment of the 337th Infantry Division, stated in evidence during his military court deposition that the leader of the Infantry Regiment, Major

40 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 283, 299, 301.

41 BA-MA, RW 2/v., 153, September 1942.

42 *Ibid.*, 29. 4. 1942.

Ashkinaze, had ordered a severely wounded non-commissioned officer shot, and that Regimental Commissar Kondrat'ev had ordered two wounded Germans shot at Glasunovka between March 14-17, 1942.⁴³ He was said to have learned from First Lieutenant Shoftyak, the leader of the Infantry Platoon of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Division, that all officers and severely wounded Germans and Finns were, on principle, to be shot. First Lieutenant Nishel'sky, Company Chief in the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry Brigade, testified on July 8, 1942, that the Brigade Commander of the 15th Infantry Brigade, Balabukha, had issued him an order to "gouge out the eyes of German soldiers," an order that Nishel'sky personally considered a "shame and a disgrace," and that he had therefore not forwarded.⁴⁴ Sergeant Yurchenko of the 764th Infantry Regiment of the 393rd Infantry Division reported under interrogation on July 20, 1942, that his Battalion Commander, Captain Bursky, had by his own hand shot five wounded German soldiers with a pistol behind the hospital in Chernoglasovska near Kharkov.⁴⁵ In Besabetovka in July 1942, two mass graves were discovered of German soldiers of the 92nd Infantry Regiment who, according to the doctor of forensic medicine, Medical Major Dr. Panning of the Army Medical Inspectorate, had either been killed by shots to the back of the neck, or who had been tortured to death, like the Commander of the 1st Battalion, Major Schönberg. According to testimony of Red Army member S.F. of September 26, 1942, Commissar Andropov of the 851st Infantry Regiment, before an attack, described another commissar as a "brilliant example" because he killed 150 Italian prisoners of war near Serafimovici.⁴⁶ In July 1942, at Aleevka, between Lozovaja and Kharkov, First Lieutenant Sutya-gin was an eyewitness to the shooting of forty-six German prisoners of war, including four officers, who had not been interrogated and were forced to dig their own graves.⁴⁷ The order for the executions was issued by the Commander of the 123rd Infantry Regiment of the 22nd Infantry Division, Major Kulikov, and Regimental Commissar Otmikhalsky. When nearby Soviet officers gave voice to their disgust, they were accused of treason and threatened with being shot by Regimental Commissar Otmikhalsky.

The circumstances surrounding the mass murders near Grishino, Postyshevo and Krasnoarmejeskoe have been unequivocally elucidated. Here, over 600 members of the Wehrmacht and allied armies as well as

43 *Ibid.*, 27. 3. 1942.

44 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 158, 8. 7. 1942.

45 BA-MA, RW 2/v. 153, 20. 7. 1942.

46 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Unterstellungsstelle*, pp. 146f., 294.

47 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 496, 5. 10. 1943.

members of the army entourage, including Red Cross nurses and female communication assistants, were either shot or horribly butchered in the days after Stalingrad, between February 11 and 18, 1943.⁴⁸ According to incomplete data, it was possible to identify the following persons in particular: 406 German, 89 Italian, 9 Romanian, 4 Hungarian, and 8 Ukrainian soldiers; 58 members of the Organization Todt; 15 railway workers; and 7 German civilian workers. The investigation of the occurrence began immediately after recapture of the territory by the German 7th Panzer Division on February 18, 1943. The record of a subsequent military court legal investigation reads in part: "All the bodies were naked...almost all the bodies had been mutilated... many bodies had had their noses and ears cut off. Other bodies had had their sexual organs cut off and stuck in their mouths." "Truly animalistic" attempts had also been made "to cut off the breasts" of the Red Cross nurses. The chief of an anti-aircraft battery of the 14th Guards Armored Brigade, Second Lieutenant Sorokin, named as responsible persons for this massacre, among others: the Political Department of the 4th Guards Armored Corps, under Major General Poluboyarov, and its subordinate 14th Guards Armored Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Shibankov, who apparently had been killed some time before.

The unanimous testimonies of prisoners of war, in addition to captured documents and radio conversations intercepted by the Germans, therefore leave no doubt that prisoners of war continued to be murdered in 1942-1943 as before. It must, furthermore, be noted that it was only possible to discover and investigate crimes such as those of Feodosija, Grishino, Krasnoarmejskoe, and other places when German troops managed to recapture the scenes of such massacres, which became more and more rare with the progress of war. The dehumanization evoked in the Red Army as a result of Soviet war propaganda is further illustrated by two reports. For example, in the 875th Infantry Regiment of the 158th Infantry Division, prisoners of war were murdered on a daily basis with the personal participation of the Chief of Staff, Major Borisov, and other officers. Sina Krasavina, a female medical auxiliary in the (above mentioned) regiment, admitted to personally murdering a German prisoner of war in March 1943 at the order of the Chief of the Special Department of the NKVD, Samarin, an act for which she was decorated with the Order of the Red Flag. In the region of another division, according to one eyewitness, able-bodied German wounded were led in groups to a ravine in October 1943,

48 Hoffmann, *Deutsche und Kalmycken*, p. 108, Hoffman, "Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion," p. 790.

"where the bodies of men shot previously lay in rows; they were shot with machine guns and machine pistols. I saw the shooting of two such groups... In the valley, I saw at the place of execution approximately two hundred corpses of persons already shot."⁴⁹

The reaction of the German Wehrmacht to the uninterrupted series of murders of German soldiers must now be examined. It has already been mentioned that the High Command of the Wehrmacht prohibited all reprisals as early as July 1941 on the grounds that "reprisals would fail because of the mentality of the Russians, thus unnecessarily contributing to the bitterness of the war." The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, was also of the opinion that reprisals would be ineffective in regard to the Soviet Union in contrast to the Western powers, and would, furthermore, have a negative influence upon the abstractly favorable prospects for German front-line propaganda where the Red Army was concerned.⁵⁰ An order to this effect was issued to all divisions of the German Army of the East, without regard to "serious violations of international law by the Russians." At the same time, on July 1, 1941, a decision of the "Führer and Supreme Commander" was issued to treat the wives of all "officers and commissars," and all Soviet women, "carrying weapons in accordance with orders as prisoners of war when found in uniform."⁵¹ Whereas, if captured in civilian clothing, they were to lose all protection under international law and be treated as partisans.

On July 5, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, Field Marshal von Reichenau, ordered Red Army Major Turta of the 781st Infantry Regiment of the 124th Infantry Division summarily shot because, as stated in the execution order, the division had since June 22, 1941, "deliberately mistreated, tortured, mutilated, and murdered German soldiers of all ranks following capture, whether wounded or not, in a manner so cruel and bestial as to be hitherto inconceivable." These bestialities were done "under the very eyes of, and with the toleration of, officers fully and entirely responsible for the crimes of their subordinates."⁵² Although von Reichenau continued to grant Soviet soldiers ordinary treatment according to the customs relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, he believed himself obligated to administer a "hard and justified atonement" to the officers of the Red Army's 124th Infantry Division on behalf of his "murdered comrades."

49 BA-MA, RH 21-3/v. 496, 29. 10. 1943.

50 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 16. 7. 1941.

51 BA-MA, RH 20-4/672, 1. 7. 1941.

52 BA-MA, RH 20-6/489, 5. 7. 1941.

This was, after all, simply an isolated case of reprisal, the victim of which may perhaps have been the person responsible.

Generally, the German command authorities do not appear to have deviated from the provisions of international law in regard to prisoners, even on the eastern front. For example, on July 10, 1941, the battalion doctor of the II Battalion of the 53rd (Motorized) Infantry Regiment reported to the divisional doctor of the 14th Motorized Infantry Division that one officer, eight non-commissioned officers, and sixty-five soldiers of his regiment, some of them wounded, had been captured by the Soviets, and that, as proven by an investigation, all had been murdered "deliberately and according to order" by shooting them in the back of the neck, stabbing them with bayonets, or beating them with rifle butts, at the bridgehead at Dzisna on July 8, 1941.⁵³ A number of the wounded men showed signs of the "cruellest forms of mutilations." When the shocked head physician asked his professional superiors for instructions on the proper future treatment of wounded Russians, on the grounds, as he wrote, that "it was difficult for me to continue to act as I would have previously considered it my duty to do, after learning of this criminal attitude on the part of the enemy in relation to our wounded," he received an order that was characteristic. The Chief of the General Staff of the 3rd Panzer Group, Major General von Hünersdorff, reported, through the battalion doctor on July 13, 1941, that "on the grounds of fundamental considerations, there could be no question of a change in attitude on the part of German soldiers toward enemy wounded."⁵⁴ He simply ordered that there should be no reduction in the quality of care for the fellow German wounded as a result.

When it was proposed to the High Command of the 17th Army that high-ranking officers of the Soviet 6th and 12th Army be shot in reprisal for the murder and mutilation of nineteen German wounded soldiers and two medics in a Red Cross vehicle in August 1941, the army commander, Lieutenant General von Stülpnagel, rejected this idea as well, with quite analogous justification. When German soldiers became enormously embittered after the massacre of Grishino-Krasnoarmejskoe, the Commanding General of the XXXX German Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Henrici, issued an order of the day on his own initiative on March 3, 1943, warning the troops against permitting themselves to become carried away to the point of engaging in acts of revenge as a result of these occurrences. The order read in part:

53 BA-MA, RH 21-3/437, 10. 7. 1941.

54 *Ibid.*, 13. 7. 1941.

"We, nevertheless, wish to adhere closely to the soldierly principle that an enemy who has been captured in uniform, who is no longer capable of fighting and is unarmed, belongs in a prisoner of war camp."⁵⁵

At Nuremberg on March 22, 1946, the President of the International Military Tribunal, Judge Lawrence, rejected an application by defense lawyer Dr. Stahmer for admission into evidence of the White Book of the German Reich Government on "Bolshevik Crimes against the Laws of Humanity and the Laws and Customs of War," first series, 1941, as evidentiary material for the defense. Lawrence concurred with the application of Soviet Chief Prosecutor General Rudenko, who permitted himself to portray the legal investigation documents collated in the White Book as "inventions" and "forged documents" characteristic of "fascist propaganda," purely and simply intended to "hide the crimes which were perpetrated by the fascists."⁵⁶ Since the victims of the crimes investigated and analyzed in the White Book consisted solely of German and German-allied soldiers, the International Military Tribunal considered such material "irrelevant" in full accordance with the London Agreement. It is precisely this fact that justifies the presentation of a few of the innumerable documented cases of mistreatment of German prisoners of war who are otherwise consciously and methodically relegated to forgetfulness by the journalistic profession in relation to the German-Soviet war.

⁵⁵ BA-MA, 34561/2, 3. 3. 1943.

⁵⁶ *Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, vol. IX, pp. 754ff.

**“No Mercy, No Leniency”
Atrocities of the Red Army
upon Entering German Territory**

The Soviet Union had disavowed the Hague Conventions on Land Warfare and refused to recognize the Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions. The occupation of the eastern provinces of the German Reich in 1944-1945 was, therefore, carried out by Soviet troops in a spirit of contempt for the international laws of war. The Red Army's invasion of East Prussia, West Prussia, and Danzig, of Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia, was—everywhere, and in the same manner—accompanied by atrocities that have no equivalent in the modern history of war. The mass murder of prisoners of war and civilians of all ages and both sexes; the mass rape of women, including old women and children, under the most disgusting conditions—repeatedly, and sometimes until death ensued; the deliberate destruction by arson of houses, villages, city districts, and entire cities; the systematic robbery, plundering, and destruction of private and public property; and, finally, the mass deportation of men—and, very often, of women and young people—for slave labor in the Soviet Union (the mothers, as usual, separated from their children, and the families torn apart); were the common characteristics of an event that was in flagrant violation of all the principles regulating the conduct of war.¹

Murder, the most serious crime, was committed in every conceivable way, in endless variations on a theme. Lines of fleeing refugees were crushed by tanks or blasted to bits; men and women were shot, beaten to death, or stabbed by infantry troops and tank crews leaping down from their tanks, the women often after being raped.² Civilians were murdered everywhere: in private homes, on the street, in public buildings, forester's houses, barns, and sheds, and were sometimes burned alive. Men attempting to protect their wives and daughters from rape were usually killed, as were women who attempted to defend themselves against rape. There are endless reports of sadistic sexual attacks and murders and sometimes even of the rape of persons already murdered.³ During the so-called "de-Nazification,"

1 *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung*, pp. 60E ff, 79E ff.

2 *Vertreibung und Vertreibungsverbrechen*, pp. 28 ff.

members of the NSDAP and their membership organizations were shot, along with other "fascists," such as local farming village leaders and, very often, the officials and employees of civil service administrations and, of course, members of the police and all persons wearing the uniforms of the German civil service, regardless of whether they were railway workers, postal employees, members of the fire department, or forestry officials, in addition to members of the Reich Labor service and the Organization Todt. Often killed were the so-called "capitalists," such as landowners, farmers, shop-owners, and homeowners. Also killed, were all those who could in any way be considered potential "partisans," such as members of the Hitler Youth, and, very often, the residents of houses in which German soldiers or weapons had been found. The formal basis for all of this was Order No. 0016 of the NKVD of January 16, 1945, issued by the People's Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Beria.⁴ During the deportation of "mobilized Germans" (*mobilizovannykh nemcev*), all those who were unable to keep pace due to exhaustion were beaten to death or shot by the Soviets, while many others died under interrogation from inhuman tortures in NKVD torture chambers. The residents of entire localities—men, women, and children—were sometimes massacred simply because they were German, as illustrated by the examples of Nemmersdorf in 1944 and Metgethen in 1945.⁵ There were no established guidelines for the unrestrained activities of the inflamed Soviet "soldateska" (soldiers).

In his memoirs, Field Marshal Montgomery, to whom some knowledge of events in the Soviet zone of occupation later penetrated, called the "Russians" (meaning the "Soviets") "truly uncivilized Asians." He added: "Their behavior disgusted us, especially in regard to women. In some areas of the Russian zone, there were practically no Germans left. They fled before the assault of the barbarians."⁶ To an American, General Keating, who only knew of circumstances in Berlin, the "unrestrained actions" of the Russians were "similar in many cases to those of Ghenghis Khan."⁷ George F. Kennan once again confirmed to the American expert on international law, Alfred M. de Zayas, what he had written in his memoirs: that the Soviets "swept the local population from the face of the earth in a manner which has no equal since the days of the Asiatic hordes."⁸

3 Murawski, *Die Eroberung Pommerns*, p. 18.

4 Kilian, "Die 'Mühlberg-Akten,'" p. 1144.

5 Yakusevskij, "Rasstrel v klevernompole."

6 Montgomery, *Memoiren*, pp. 399ff.

7 Keating, "Das Verhalten der Roten Armee," p. 201.

8 Zayas, *Die Anglo-Amerikaner und die Vertreibung*, p. 86.

The number of prisoners of war murdered in the German eastern provinces alone will never be known. Concerning the number of civilian victims, the investigations of the German Federal Ministry for Victims of Expulsion and the German Federal Archives, based on resident population statistics, provide at least an approximate idea, although their estimates are very conservative and only include the victims of immediate acts of violence. According to these estimates, 120,000 men, women and children were murdered, most of them by Soviet soldiers, while 100,000-200,000 more perished in various prisons and camps.⁹ More than 250,000 others died during the deportations—which began on February 3, 1945—and in Soviet work camps as “reparations deportees.”¹⁰ Many more died from the inhumane living conditions under the Soviet military administration of the following occupation period—90,000 in Königsberg alone. There was also an extremely high proportion of persons who put an end to their own lives out of desperation. This does not include the tremendous losses in human life caused by immediate acts of violence in the prisons, concentration camps, and extermination camps of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, such as the 43,000 civilians—at a minimum—who died of hunger or epidemics in the concentration camps (*special'nye lageri, speclager' NKVD SSR*) of the Soviet occupation troops (*okkupacionnykh vojsk*).¹¹

As for conditions in Bohemia and Moravia in particular, one need only quote the proclamation broadcast over British radio on November 3, 1944, by the commander of the Czech armed forces in exile, General Ingr:

“When our day comes, the entire nation will follow the old war cry of the Hussites: Strike them, kill them, leave no one alive! Everyone should start looking for the best possible weapon with which to hit the Germans as hard as possible, right now. If there are no firearms available, some other weapon should be prepared and hidden—one that cuts, stabs, or hits.”¹²

In the spirit of this and other, similar proclamations, to cite just one example, the Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 1st Czechoslovakian Army Corps in the Soviet Union, General Klapálek, who left London to join with the Soviets, was jointly responsible for the mass murder of 763 German civilians at Postelberg (Postoloprty) in June 1945.¹³ Czech military personnel were also involved in the massacre at Aussig (Usti nad Labem) on July 31, 1945, where up to 2,000 German civilians were murdered fol-

9 *Vertreibung und Vertreibungsverbrechen*, pp. 11, 22, 40.

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 48; Fischer, “Kleiner Kriegsverbrecher.”

11 Winters, “Sowjetunion;” Gillissen, “Gut ausgerüstet und stets in hoher Kampfbereitschaft.”

12 Birke, “Schlagt sie, tötet sie!”

13 Filip, “Untatzen an Deutschen.”

lowing a provocative explosion incited by the Benesh government, under circumstances of horror that exceed the normal powers of imagination.¹⁴ A total of up to 270,000 defenseless Germans were murdered in Czechoslovakia (CSR) beginning in May 1945, some in an animalistic manner. In general, an estimated total number of 2.2 million "unsolved cases" were reported in the so-called "Expulsion areas," most of which, upon broader interpretation of the term, must be viewed as "crime victims," *i.e.*, the victims of anti-German genocide.¹⁵

The present exposition is primarily concerned with the zone of responsibility of the Red Army, which had already committed serious crimes against the civilian population in Yugoslavia in 1944. It will be seen that Stalin, the Politburo, the Members of the State Defense Committee, the political and military leadership of the Red Army, the subordinate army and unit leaders, and their subordinate officers of all ranks, bear immediate responsibility for everything that occurred. The commanders and other officers are especially responsible, since they not only failed to restrain their troops from committing acts that were criminal under international law, but, on the contrary, incited them to commit such crimes, tolerated and encouraged such acts of violence, and, to a great extent, even participating in them. Particular responsibility falls upon the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd White Russian Front, General of the Army Chernyakhovsky, and of the 1st White Russian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, and their Military Councils, the full texts or extracts of whose criminal orders have been found. Similar orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd White Russian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky, and the Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev, have apparently not been found, but the conditions in their zones of responsibility were in no way different.

Fundamentally, the above mentioned men were, like Chernyakhovsky and Zhukov, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky, responsible in each case for the deportation of peaceful residents for slave labor in the Soviet Union, a crime under international law similar to that for which Alfred Rosenberg and Fritz Sauckel were sentenced to death, and Albert Speer to twenty years imprisonment, by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The deportation of all able-bodied ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia to compulsory labor

14 Kohler, "Als in Aussig die Jagd auf die Deutschen begann."

15 *Vertreibung und Vertriebsverbrechen*, p. 54.

in the Soviet Union had been ordered by Directive No. 7161 of the State Defense Committee (*Goko*), signed by Stalin as early as December 16, 1944. According to the implementation order issued (on the basis of the above directive) by Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky, all able-bodied ethnic German men aged 17-45, and all able-bodied ethnic German women aged 18-30, on the territory of Hungary and Romania (Transsylvania), were ordered arrested for this sole purpose.¹⁶ On February 3, 1945, the State Defense Committee, by Directive No. 7467, also ordered the mass deportation of German men and women from the territory of the Reich itself. In addition, all able-bodied Reich Germans aged 17-50 were now to be arrested, organized in labor battalions, and deported to the Soviet Union for slave labor. The document, signed by Stalin in collaboration with Colonel General of the NKVD Serov and the Deputy of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Beria, instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the 1st White Russian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, and his Military Council, "to take consistent measures" in this regard.

Professor Semiryaga who held a position of responsibility in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) for five years, wrote:

"For two and a half months, transport trains traveled eastward, loaded with tens of thousands of German women and old people (since the entire population of young males was at the front)."

In reality, minors, and even children aged 12-13, were also deported under terrible conditions resulting in innumerable fatalities, often during transport.¹⁷ Professor Semiryaga does not conceal his awareness of the fact that "Soviet military authorities in all the countries liberated by the Russian Army" had undertaken the "illegal deportation" of peaceful German civilians. Through their collaboration with Stalin's order, which was "in fact, criminal," the leadership of the Red Army had become guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including those in the sense of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

As far as military discipline was concerned, the Red Army was in fact experiencing an increasingly rapid degeneration into savagery even in 1944. During the reincorporation of former Soviet territories, such as the Ukraine, but also in Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, excesses and acts of violence against the local population reached

16 Semiryaga, "Wie Berijas Leute in Ostdeutschland die 'Demokratie' errichteten," p. 742. *Ibid.* for the following.

17 Holm, "Gutsbesitzertöchter und Hitlerjungen als Zwangsarbeiter;" Pfeiffer, *Mit 15 in die Hölle*; Klier, *Verschleppt ans Ende der Welt*.

such proportions that the Soviet Command authorities were compelled to take severe measures.¹⁸ Colonel General Petrov, Army Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, in Order No. 074 of June 8, 1944, denounced the “disgraceful excesses” by members of the Army of his Front in the Soviet Territory of the Crimea, excesses “that even included the armed robbery and murder of local residents.”¹⁹ He referred to the guilty soldiers, including high-ranking officers, as “bandits,” “rogues,” and “armed criminals” who, exploiting “the helplessness of the population,” had tarnished the honor of the Red Army. Directive No. 0017 from the Chief of the Political Administration of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Shatilov, of April 6, 1944, which is quite similar, mentions “plundering,” “murders,” “terrorist attacks,” “marauders having grown bold,” and “criminals” from “many units and agencies,” and other crimes committed against the populations of the western regions of the Ukraine, *i.e.*, eastern Poland, very often with the tolerance of political officials.²⁰ The tenseness of the situation in Poland is revealed by the diary of an officer in the 2nd Guards Artillery Division of the 5th Artillery Corps of the 1st Baltic Front, Yuri Uspensky, who was later killed. “Amongst ourselves, we speak of the Poles with great hostility,” this highly meditative officer writes in regard to the conditions in Vilna: “The soldiers even say that the Poles must all be hanged, adding the following cultural platitude: ‘The Polish people, historically, are totally unfit to live.’”²¹

Of course, a single occurrence, such as the “Violation of International Law” reported on November 1, 1944, by the Chief of Staff of the German 16th Army, cannot be generalized in regard to the non-German region; but it, nevertheless, illustrates the crimes of which some Soviet soldiers had already become quite capable.²² On September 20, 1944, behind the Soviet lines, in a small forest belonging to the farm-hand Araj in the municipality of Grünhof, not far from Mitau (Latvia), at about 10 o’clock in the morning, three Latvian soldiers in the German army became aware of “inhuman screaming, moaning, and death-rattles.” They observed the following from a hiding place:

“The screams came from a woman, apparently twenty to thirty years old, completely naked, fastened to a wooden support, apparently in a kind of crucifixion, her back upward, her face turned downward toward the under-support, which was leaning up against a tree at an angle of 45 degrees. The

18 BA-MA, RH 2/2686, 21. 12. 1944.

19 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 11. 1. 1945.

20 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 6. 4. 1944.

21 BA-MA, RH 2/2688, undated.

22 BA-MA, RH 2/2686, 1. 11. 1944.

body of the woman was inclined diagonally to the right, on top of this wooden support, the arms stretched outward sideways and apparently fastened, the palms of the hands turned upward, the legs together, reaching to the ground. I consider it possible that the body was held in place by the nails driven through the plank-like under-support, and may perhaps even have been held up by them. Two to four Soviet soldiers, recognizable from a distance only as uniformed soldiers of unknown rank, went walking around from time to time, without stopping, but, nevertheless, apparently gloating at the woman's suffering, the real cause of which could not be discerned. They walked around mostly in groups of two, at a distance of 20 meters from the woman, walking around her, as far as I could tell, but otherwise making no other movement, which led me to assume that tortures of this kind are not at all unusual amongst them. We all three heard the cries for about two hours. The cries continued for the most part without interruption and grew mute toward the end of this time, apparently due to exhaustion on the part of the woman. The cries were so inhuman, that one of us, whose family had been unable to flee from the Soviets, lost control over his nerves for a while, although we were all three old veterans of the former Latvian army. We conclude that the woman's sufferings must have been quite inhuman."

It proved impossible to provide any assistance.

In the non-German countries, the Soviet command authorities, though often in vain, continued to intervene occasionally against excesses and plundering by members of the Red Army. Upon entering the territory of the German Reich, however, all inhibition was lost. Thus the Corps Commander of the 43rd Infantry Corps, Major General Andreev, threatened his soldiers in Poland with court martial in January of 1945 in the event of excesses, then simultaneously continued: "But as soon as we get to Germany, I will not waste one word over such things."²³ The basic attitude of the Red Army soldiers after crossing the Reich border was characterized by the hate propaganda of I. Ehrenburg, A.N. Tolstoy, E.V. Tarle, M.A. Sholokhov, K.M. Simonov, A.A. Fadeev and many others who deserve to be mentioned here. On August 24, 1944, Ehrenburg, who was the spokesman for the inciters, wrote:

"On the German borders let us once again repeat the holy oath to forget nothing ... we say this with the calm of a long ripening and invincible hatred, we say this at the border of the enemy: 'Woe to thee, Germany!'"²⁴

"We will kill," was Ehrenburg's unmistakable proclamation to the Red Army soldiers in the front newspaper *Unichtozhim Vraga* (We Will Exterminate the Enemy) on September 17, 1944.²⁵ "We will put an end to

23 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 11. 3. 1945.

24 *Soviet War News*, 24. 8. 1944.

Germany," he wrote on November 16, 1944. "It is not enough to defeat Germany. Germany must be extinguished." "There can be no mercy, no leniency given," he repeated on February 8, 1945. "The only historical mission, as I see it," Ehrenburg wrote on March 3, 1945, "consists, modestly and honorably speaking, in reducing the German population."

The articles and proclamations of Ehrenburg and other inciters, disseminated in *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, *Krasnoarmejskaja Pravda* and in the newspapers on the frontline, were hammered into the minds of the troops and recalled into awareness again and again by the numerous cadres of the political bodies, all the more fiercely before attacking. In the German cities, there were signs with "Red Army soldier, you stand on German soil—the hour of vengeance has come!"²⁶ "Tremble, Germany! ... Tremble, cursed Germany! We will pass through you with fire and sword and, in your heart, stab to death the last German who has trodden Russian soil," wrote the frontline newspaper *Boevaja Trevoza* (Combat Alarm) on October 20, 1944. However, it was not true, as it is continually claimed in Soviet propaganda even today, that Soviet soldiers were filled with infernal hate feelings and desire for vengeance from the outset. Rather, such feelings first had to be systematically inculcated in them by means of deliberate and cold calculation. Soviet soldiers were incited with a quite definite intention. Since Stalin and the military and political leadership of the Red Army were quite well aware of the often deficient "Soviet patriotism" and increasing war weariness of the Soviet soldiers, and since one could not appeal to higher human sentiment, it was necessary to arouse the baser instincts in order to achieve a maximum degree of combat effort. The *History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* makes no secret about it when it states, among other things, "that one cannot defeat an enemy unless one hates him with all one's soul." For this reason, it was said to be one of the most important tasks of the political work of commanders and political workers to inculcate in Soviet soldiers an "ardent hatred of the fascist occupiers."²⁷ For this purpose even the most reprehensible methods were justified.

The well-known Germanic scholar and former political officer of Jewish descent, Major Kopelev, a witness of many crimes, in his military memoirs *To Keep for All Time! (Aufbewahren für alle Zeit!)*, quotes his superior, the Chief of the 7th Department of the Political Administration of the 50th Army, Lieutenant Colonel Sabashtansky, as saying:

25 Zayas, *Die Anglo-Amerikaner und die Vertreibung*, p. 85.

26 Murawski, *Die Eroberung Pommerns*, p. 19.

27 *Vertreibung und Vertreibungsverbrechen*, pp. 24f.

"What can one do to make the soldiers maintain their joy in fighting? Firstly, he must hate the enemy like the plague; he must wish to exterminate him root and branch. And secondly, to keep him from losing his will to fight, so that he knows why he is jumping out of the trench and crawling through mine fields toward machine-gun fire, he must know: He is coming to Germany, and everything will belong to him—property, women, everything! Do anything you want! Hit them so that their grandchildren and great-grandchildren may still tremble! ... by far, not everyone kills children ... but now that you mentioned it: Let those who kill in blind, passionate, boiling rage, also kill little Fritzs...."²⁸

This was not the attitude of soldiers, but of robbers and murderers. Kopelev attempted in vain to talk his comrades into some feelings of conscience:

"...and all of us—generals and officers—are acting according to Ehrenburg's formula... just imagine, what is to become of our soldiers, after pouncing upon a woman by the dozens? After raping schoolgirls, murdering old women? ... They will turn into hundreds of thousands of criminals, they will be the criminals of the future, cruel and bold, but demanding the glory due to heroes."

Denounced by his own comrades, Kopelev was arrested and spent years in the concentration camps of the GULag for slandering the Red Army and favoring the Germans.

The invasion of Germany by Soviet troops was preceded by a campaign of "systematic, propagandistic incitement," "in which hatred of everything German" was blown into a flame "in a manner previously inconceivable," as the Chief of the Foreign Armies East Branch of the General Staff of the German Army, Major General Gehlen, stated after an analysis of captured Soviet documents on February 22, and March 23, 1945.²⁹ However, it was not just the agitation of the political apparatus that incited Soviet soldiers to take cruel revenge against the Germans. The military command authorities were no less zealous. Orders of the day were also issued by the Staffs of the Fronts and Armies, the contents of which were generally interpreted and intended as instigation to "murder and robbery." In any case, the average soldier in the Red Army was left in no doubt that he would be given a free hand in Germany, and would be allowed to do as he liked with the civilian population and their property. Stalin's permission to send army postal service packages and captured property (generals: 16 kilograms (35 lbs.); officers: 10 kilograms (22 lbs.); non-commissioned officers

²⁸ Kopelev, *Aufbewahren für alle Zeit!*, pp. 55, 118, 129.

²⁹ BA-MA, RH 19 XV/6, 23. 3. 1945.

and lower-ranking soldiers: 5 kilograms (11 lbs.) to the Soviet Union, issued orally and in writing in October 1944 for the first time, and reaffirmed by Major Koshalov of the Staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in January of 1945, must have aroused the criminal instincts of unstable persons and, as shown by army postal service letters and the testimonies of prisoner of war, was actually understood to mean that "plundering was expressly permitted by the supreme leadership."³⁰

The supreme leadership, as illustrated by the following, continued to set a bad example. Even the Hero of the Soviet Union (the highest military decoration) Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, the former Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army who had accepted the capitulation of the German Wehrmacht in Berlin-Karlshorst on May 8, 1945, as Commander-in-Chief of the 1st White Russian Front, was no exception to this rule. In late August 1946, long after Zhukov had exchanged his position as Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Occupation Troops in Germany for that of Commander of the Troops in the Military District of Odessa, Deputy Defense Minister Bulganin, reported in a letter to Stalin that the customs authorities had stopped seven railway carriages with "a total of eighty-five boxes of furniture from the firm 'Albin Mai' in Germany," being transported to Odessa for Zhukov's personal use.³¹ In a later report to Stalin of January 1948, Colonel General of the Ministry of State Security Abakumov stated that a "secret search" of Zhukov's Moscow dwelling and dacha had revealed large quantities of looted property. The following items, among others, were inventoried in particular: 24 gold watches, 15 gold necklaces with pendants, various gold rings and other jewelry, 4,000 meters of wool and silk material, more than 300 sable, fox, and Persian lamb furs, 44 valuable carpets and tapestries, some of them from Potsdam and other castles, 55 very valuable paintings as well as chests with porcelain dishes, 2 boxes of silverware, and 20 hunting rifles. Zhukov admitted his plundering in a letter to Member of the Politburo Zhdanov on January 12, 1948, in conclusion swearing "an oath of honor as a Bolshevik" "that similar acts of foolishness and mistakes will not happen again." He only barely escaped arrest.

In view of the actions of the Commander-in-Chief, it is not surprising that even the Deputy General Director of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, Colonel General of the NKVD Serov, and other high State Security officials, committed "the most serious crimes" in Germany, *i.e.*,

30 BA-MA, RH 2/2688, 12. 3. 1945.

31 Bacia, "Marschall Stalins und Held der Sowjetunion."

robbery and pillaging," so Professor Semiryaga.³² According to the testimony of the Chief of the Operational Sector in Berlin, Major General Sidnev (Serov's "right hand man"), Serov, himself an organizer of international mass terror, shuttled his plane back and forth between Berlin and Moscow to transport "large quantities of furs, carpets, paintings, and other valuables" to his dwelling while evading border controls. "With similar freight and loaded with automobiles," it was stated, "he even sent railway cars." When Sidnev's agencies found "approximately 100 sacks with 80 million Reichsmarks" in the cellars of the Reichsbank, "Serov personally decided not to surrender it to the Soviet State bank. He appropriated part of the money for himself, and used the rest of it to bribe useful persons." Major General Sidnev himself, General Bezhanov, Chief of the Operational Group in Thuringia, from whom Theodor Plievier in the *Berlin* volume of his trilogy got his characterization of Serov as cool and deliberate, and General Klepov, Chief of the Operational Group in Saxony, also committed similar crimes of plundering and pillaging.³³

An order of the day issued to the troops of the 3rd White Russian Front by the Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Chernyakhovsky, Member of the Military Council, Major General Khokhlov, and Chief of the Political Administration, Major General Razbitsev, appealed to the "basest instincts of the broad masses of the Red Army" before entering the territory of East Prussia in October 1944.³⁴ Crossing the border of the Reich now served as an opportunity to incite the Soviet soldiers with the factually inaccurate allegation that German soldiers had "murdered Russian children, raped wives, brides, and sisters, [and] shot mothers and fathers." In his order of the day, the Military Council of the 3rd White Russian Front stated:

"The torments of the murder victims, the moaning of persons buried alive, the unquenchable tears of the mothers, call out to you for merciless revenge... May the bloodthirsty hated enemy who has brought us so much suffering and torment, tremble and drown in the streams of his own black blood."

Since, as this shows, the leading command authorities had depicted acts of revenge as a "holy duty," it is not surprising that subordinate command agencies "not only tolerated the senseless cruelty and destruction, but rather encouraged the subordinate units in such actions." Thus for example, an order of the Divisional Commander, Colonel Eliseev, to the 1st Battalion

32 Semiryaga, "Wie Berijas Leute in Ostdeutschland die 'Demokratie' errichteten," p. 751.

33 Plievier, *Berlin*, pp. 296ff., 428.

34 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 26. 3. 1945.

of the 557th Infantry Regiment of the 153rd Infantry Division in early October 1944, announced the following:

"We are marching into East Prussia. Soldiers and officers of the Red Army will be permitted the following: 1. To exterminate any living German. 2. To plunder property. 3. To rape women. 4. To commit arson. 5. There will be no arrests of soldiers of the ROA [Russian Liberation Army]. Every bullet for them is wasted. They will be beaten to death or trampled underfoot."³⁵

Similarly, the Commander of the 352nd Infantry Division also informed the Red Army in a speech that they would now have an opportunity "to revenge themselves on the Germans."³⁶

According to German investigations, the following persons—the "actual chief guilty parties in spirit and deed"—were "to the fullest extent" responsible for the atrocities committed in East Prussia in the Goldap district, as early as the fall of 1944: the Commander-in-Chief of the 31st Army, Colonel General Glagolev, and the Members of his Military Council, Major General Karpenkov, Major General Lakhtarin and Major General Riapasov, and particularly the Commander of the 88th Infantry Division, Colonel Kovtunov, as well as a few other officers mentioned by name.¹⁹ The Commander of the 87th Guards Infantry Division, Major General Tymchik, and the Commander of the 2nd Guards Artillery Division, Colonel Kobtsev, whose units were already notorious "for their excesses and robbery sprees" on Soviet soil, were named as responsible for shootings, rapes, and senseless destruction in the Memel region, as well as in Heydekrug. Of course, these names which were documented only by chance are only a few from the long list of responsible persons.

The "excesses and bestial atrocities" committed in the fall of 1944 in East Prussia were, therefore, in no way isolated phenomena; on the contrary, these events were repeated throughout the German eastern provinces on a gigantic scale after the beginning of the Soviet winter offensive on January 13, 1945. No one would reproach an army commander or squad leader who, in the orders of the day always issued to soldiers before decisive battles, calls upon his troops to show courage and stubborn determination in order to win victory; such orders are always very verbose in this sense. But when, as it so happened, the Commander-in-Chief of the 1st White Russian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, appealed to the basest feelings of hatred and revenge, when he incited his troops to commit acts of violence

35 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 18. 11. 1944.

36 BA-MA, RH 2/2686, 26. 9. 1944.

against the civilian population—almost openly, in full awareness of how his words would be interpreted by the political organizations—he was acting, not least of all, in violation of the traditions of the Russian army. A model of Russian military virtues like the Czarist Russian Field Marshal Count Suvorov-Rymniksky, to whom Soviet Marshal Zhukov sometimes compared himself without justification, commanded his troops in a spirit of generosity and mercy toward the defenseless and the defeated on all occasions, reminding his troops of soldierly virtues at every opportunity like, for example, at Warsaw in 1794.³⁷

In contrast to this, Zhukov, who had already demanded the indiscriminate killing of all German prisoners of war on December 14, 1941, slandering them as “Hitlerite bandits,” issued an order of the day before the beginning of the winter offensive in January 1945, also signed by the Members of the Military Council of the 1st White Russian Front, Lieutenant General Telegin, Colonel General of the Artillery Kazakov, Colonel General of the Air Force Rudenko, and the Chief of the Front Staff, Colonel General Malinin.³⁸ This order of the day, addressed “to the soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers, and generals of the units of the 1st White Russian Front,” and referring to the “historical task” set “by our beloved Stalin... to finish off the fascist beast in his own lair,” stated among other things:

“The time has come to reckon with the German-fascist rascals. Great and burning is our hatred! We have not forgotten the torments and suffering visited upon our people by the Hitlerite cannibals. We have not forgotten our burned cities and villages. We are thinking of our brothers and sisters, our mothers and fathers, our wives and children, who were tortured to death by the Germans. We will revenge ourselves for those burned in the devil’s ovens, for those suffocated in the gas chambers, for those shot and martyred. We will take cruel vengeance for everything. We are going to Germany, and behind us lie Stalingrad, the Ukraine, and White Russia. We are walking through the ashes of our cities and villages, and the bloody traces of our Soviet people, tortured to death and torn apart by the fascist beast. Woe to the land of the murderers! ... the fascist robbers must pay for the death, for the blood of our Soviet people, with multiple quantities of their low-down black blood... this time, we will crush the German brood once and for all!”

Taken in the same way was General of the Army Chernyakhovsky’s proclamation to the troops of the 3rd White Russian Front on January 12, 1945:

37 Anthing, *Versuch einer Kriegs-Geschichte*, pp. 106, 110f., 113, 115, 120, 134f., 143.
38 BA-MA, RH 19 XV/6, January 1945.

“There shall be no mercy—not for anyone, just as no mercy was shown to us... there is no need to ask the soldiers of the Red Army to be merciful. They are burning with hatred and thirsting for revenge. The land of the fascists must be made a desert, like our land, which they have devastated. The fascists must die, as our soldiers have died.”³⁹

The term “fascist” was always understood to refer to the Germans generally.

According to evidence established by the High Command of the German Army in the theater of various Soviet Armies, the immediate consequence of these proclamations, disseminated and commented upon by the political apparatus in accordance with all the rules of agitation and propaganda, was a command to “shoot or beat to death all captured German soldiers (including the wounded).” Also in violation of international law was the order that “members of the Volkssturm were to be treated, not as a members of a military unit, but rather as partisans, and, therefore, shot.” German radio-reconnaissance intercepted again and again radio messages from various zones of the front that indisputably revealed the reality of such murders of prisoners of war.⁴⁰

On January 27, 1945, the following order was intercepted being sent to an unknown unit: “Don’t take any prisoners, taking prisoners cannot be tolerated, every enemy soldier must be killed.” On February 4, 1945, a report was intercepted from the region of Zakopane (4th Ukrainian Front): “I took 35 prisoners, including two First Lieutenants; they have all been shot.” A unit from the 2nd White Russian Front sent this radio message on January 20, 1945: “I only know that we took 15 prisoners. But none of them arrived; they were all shot on the way.” A unit of the 70th Army from the same Front reported on February 9, 1945: “We only took 30 prisoners today... we slew them, just like all the others.” The following order was issued in the region of the 39th Army of the 3rd White Russian Front on February 13, 1945, from Mandeln near Königsberg: When the Germans “arrive in large groups, you are to take no prisoners.” Also in the region of the same Front, the 331st Infantry Division reported to its corps staff from the Heilsberg-Landsberg district on January 30, 1945: “I took 22 prisoners, including a battalion commander. I killed the rest...” And on February 2, 1945: “Have taken prisoners, 14 of them. I sent one of them to you, and shot 13.” The 129th (or else the 269th) Infantry Division of the 3rd Army also reported to the superior staff from the region of Mehlsack an increase in the number of murders of

39 See note 34; see also Lasch, *So fiel Königsberg*, p. 138.

40 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 20. 2. 1945.

prisoners on February 19, 1945. This division was ordered to shoot all prisoners of war: "*Vedro an Usor*": "Exterminate them, even when you capture them alive."⁴¹

The manner in which the proclamation of the command authorities was in fact put into effect may be illustrated by the following individual example. The Commander of the 72nd Infantry Division, Major General Yastrebov, guaranteed full freedom of action to every Red Army soldier before entering the territory of the German Reich, while simultaneously issuing an order to shoot all prisoners.⁴² This was once again expressly confirmed by the Regimental Commander of the 14th Infantry Regiment of this Division, Lieutenant Colonel Korolev. The commander of the 3rd Battalion, First Lieutenant Vasil'ev, having informed his subordinates to this effect, the very same day, raped a young girl on January 29, 1945, in Stöblau near Krappitz while threatening to shoot the despairing mother, and finally ordered six or seven prisoners of war shot.⁴³ Units of the 72nd Infantry Division murdered eighteen residents, including an infant, alone in Burgwasser near Krappitz on the same day. In Krappitz, the units murdered twelve juvenile Luftwaffe orderlies, together with their corporal, by shooting them in the back of the neck. After recapturing the territory, German troops discovered "numerous murdered German soldiers and civilians."

The effects of hate propaganda upon the Red Army were faithfully echoed in captured Red Army postal service letters, a few of which will be quoted here.⁴⁴ All these letters were written by members of the motorized units of Army Postal Service Number 20739 in East Prussia in January-February 1945. "Every day, we continue to advance further forward through East Prussia," Smolkin, for example, wrote to his parents in Smolensk: "And we are taking revenge upon the Germans for all the atrocities that they committed against us... We are permitted to do anything we want to the German villains." On January 29, 1945, an unidentified Soviet soldier wrote to his girl friend near Kalinin:

"How the heart grows joyful when one drives through a burning German city. We are finally beating the Germans in their own land, in their cursed hideaway. We are taking revenge for everything and our revenge is just. Fire for fire, blood for blood, death for death!"

"The Germans are all trying to escape, they are afraid of our revenge," says another letter, written by Laptev, in the Tiraspol' region on

41 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 23. 2. 1945.

42 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 15. 2. 1945.

43 *Ibid.*, 30. 1. 1945.

44 BA-MA, RH 2/2688, March 1945; *Ibid.*, RH 19 XV/6, 22. 2. 1945.

January 30, 1945, "but not everyone succeeds in escaping us. The German mother shall curse the day on which she bore a son. The German women shall now feel the horror of war. They must now experience what they have intended for other peoples." Such phrases were taken almost word for word from Ehrenburg's inflammatory articles.

"The civilian population is no longer fleeing," writes Klimov on January 30, 1945, in the Vladimir region. "What is happening generally is really uncanny." Ivanishev informed his wife in Tambov on January 31, 1945: "We have occupied almost all of East Prussia. We spend the nights in their houses and drive all the Germans out into the cold... we are taking all kinds of loot, all kinds of beautiful things...." Poletaev wrote to his parents in Alma Ata on February 1, 1945:

"Now we are waging war in the truest sense of the word, smashing the villains in their hideaway in East Prussia... Now our soldiers can also see their burning dwellings, their families wandering about dragging their breed of vipers with them. They still hope to stay alive, but there is no mercy for them."

On February 1, 1945, the Red Army female soldier Nina wrote to her mother Demidova near Kostroma:

"Among the Germans, there are only old people and children left... There are few young women, and even they are being killed. Really, what is happening here one can neither say nor describe... Yesterday I entered a railway station. I couldn't stand it there, I simply ran away. The children absolutely hurled themselves at me."

"There are enough German women," wrote Yefimenko on February 3, 1945, "you don't need to sweet-talk them, just point your Nagan revolver at them, bid them 'lie down,' finish the job, and go away." A letter to a Captain Kliushin dated the same day states: "We are smoking out the Prussians, and the feathers are flying. Our boys have already 'tried' all the German women. There is really a lot of loot." The letter of one unidentified Soviet soldier puts the monstrosity of hate propaganda in a nutshell: "German women and children who fall into our hands are killed with a shot in the head. That is our revenge for everything they destroyed in our country for two years."⁴⁵

It is superfluous to attempt to supplement the irrefutable evidential material through the immense quantities of unanimous testimonies of prisoners of war and deserters that merely provide more and more terrible new details of increasingly horrible new atrocities. A very few testimonies are

45 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 31. 3. 1945.

sufficient for purposes of illustration. One eyewitness, for example, Master Sergeant (*Starshij serzhan*) Razygraev of the 358th Infantry Division, stated in evidence:

"The adjutant of the 11 Battalion of the 919th Artillery Regiment, First Lieutenant Pugatschew, took three girls approximately eighteen years of age (including a Pole), dragged them into his room, and raped them one after the other. Afterward, he gave the girls to Red Army men, who severely mistreated them ... and then raped the girls each in turn. One of the girls was shot afterward. The civilian population was considered free game, you could do anything you wanted with them. There was also complete freedom to plunder. The Soviet Jewish propagandist, Ilya Ehrenburg, is the chief proponent of this method of treating the German population."⁴⁶

A captured Soviet soldier from the 343rd Infantry Division:

"saw the first murder victims in Sensburg. They were two elderly women. He saw the next murder victims a few kilometers east of Sensburg... On the road east of Sensburg, he saw more and more murder victims on the road, including a rape victim about five kilometers from Johannsburg. She lay there with her skirts lifted up, and with the handle of a whip stuck up her vagina. Even though the prisoner says he had seen very many murder victims, he could not indicate a number, such a number would be very hard to estimate. On the road between Sensburg and Johannsburg, he saw new murder victims every kilometer. Very many Soviet soldiers spoke openly of the numbers of civilians they had murdered and, at the same time, how many women they had raped first. Many said that, upon entering German houses, they immediately threw the first woman who came along on the bed and raped her in the presence of the family... the last one had then shot the woman involved."

Another member of the 343rd Infantry Division, not mentioned by name, attributed such crimes to Stalin's order that, as his comrades told him on January 31, 1945, in a village near Johannsburg burned by the Russians,

"instructed them that Soviet soldiers in East Prussia could wreak havoc anywhere they wanted. The leadership said they could devastate cities and villages and rape women. If a German girl resisted, they were to rape her while threatening her with a pistol, easily five to six men, one after the other, and then kill her with a pistol shot to the head."

Even Yuri Uspensky, the above mentioned officer of the 2nd Guards Artillery Division, himself a meditative almost philosophically inclined individual filled with "humanitarian" instincts, long since sick of the war and deploring the victims and destruction, was unable to remain unaffected

46 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 7. 3. 1945.

by the hate propaganda. With some satisfaction, he wrote the following entry in his diary in the burning city of Insterburg on January 24, 1945: "This is the revenge for everything that the Germans have done in our country. Now their cities are being destroyed, and their population is now experiencing the meaning of the word: War!" In Starkenberg, he admitted on January 27, 1945:

"We feel tremendous hatred for Germany and the Germans... in one house, for example, our boys saw a murdered woman with two children. We often see murdered civilians on the road as well ... of course, it is horribly cruel to kill the children... but the Germans have deserved these cruelties."

But Uspensky, who was killed in Samland in February, repeatedly rejected the vicious circle of Soviet hate propaganda in favor of his basic humanitarianism, albeit distorted by socialism, when, at Fuchsberg, near Königsberg, he learned the details of the gang rapes of women, and even of 13 to 15 year-old girls (sometimes in the house of a Soviet divisional staff), of murders and atrocities "against the peaceful population," of arson, and all the many acts of vandalism. He wrote at Kraussen, near Königsberg, on February 7, 1945: "Horrible atrocities are being committed on the earth." "It is terrible." On February 13, he noted:

"The civilian population looks wretched. They wander around exhausted, afraid, and starved. The old men and women are completely helpless... as for the soldiers, they have not one ounce of pity. There are horrible scenes. O God, what is happening in the world!"

Incited by Soviet war propaganda and by the command authorities of the Red Army, soldiers of the 16th Guards Infantry Division of the 2nd Guards Armored Corps of the 11th Guards Army, in the last ten days of October 1944, began to slaughter the rural population in the invasion zone south of Gumbinnen.⁴⁷ After recapturing the territory in this region, which was an exception, the Germans once again conducted exact investigations. At least seventy-two men, women, and children were killed in Nemmersdorf alone; the women and even small girls were raped beforehand, while a few of the women were even nailed to a barn door. Not far away, a great number of Germans and French prisoners of war, formerly in German captivity, fell in Soviet murder hands. The bodies of bestially murdered residents were found everywhere in the surrounding localities, as in Bahnfelde, Gut Teichhof, and Alt Wusterwitz, where the remains of several people

⁴⁷ Zayas, *Die Anglo-Amerikaner und die Vertreibung*, pp. 81ff.

were found who had been burned alive in a stable, in addition to other villages.⁴⁸ First Lieutenant Dr. Amberger reported:

“By the side of the road, in the courtyards of houses, lay piles of civilian bodies... Among other things, I saw numerous women who had been... raped and then killed with a shot in the back of the neck, some of them next to their children, who had also been killed.”⁴⁹

In his deposition before a military court, German gunner Erich Czerkus of the 121st Artillery Regiment described his observations in Schillmeyszen, near Heydekrug in the Memel region, which had been penetrated by units of the 93rd Infantry Corps of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front on October 26, 1944, as follows:

“In a barn, I found my father, face down, with a bullet wound in the neck... In one room lay a man and a woman, their hands tied behind their backs, both tied up together with cord... in another farmstead, we saw five children with their tongues nailed to a large table. I found no trace of my mother, despite the most laborious searches ... On the way, we saw five girls, tied up with cord, their clothing almost completely removed, and their backs showing severe abrasions. I had the impression that the girls had been dragged a long way. Besides that, on the road, we also saw several lines of refugees crushed to death.”⁵⁰

It is hopeless to attempt to describe all the frightful details, or even attempt to provide a complete survey of these events. A series of selected examples may give an idea of the actions of the Red Army in the eastern provinces after the resumption of the Soviet offensive in January 1945. The Federal Archives, in its report on “The Expulsion and Related Crimes” of May 28, 1974, have published exact data from so-called evaluation sheets of atrocities in two selected districts, the East Prussian border district of Johannisburg, and the Silesian border district of Oppeln. According to these official investigations, the crimes that were thus emphasized in the Johannisburg district, which were committed in the sector of the 50th Army of the 2nd White Russian Front, included, in addition to innumerable other murders, the murder of 120 civilians (according to other data, 97 civilians), as well as a few German soldiers and French prisoners of war from a line of refugees on the Nickelsberg-Herzogsdorf road south of Arys on January 24, 1945.⁵¹ Thirty-two refugees were shot on the Stollendorf-Arys road, and on February 1, on the order of a Soviet officer, approximately fifty people—

48 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, folio 168, 22.-23. 10. 1944.

49 Zayas, *Anmerkungen zur Vertreibung*, pp. 62ff.

50 BA-MA, RH 2/2687 10. 1. 45.

51 *Vertreibung und Vertreibungsverbrechen*, pp. 60ff., 90f.

mostly children and young people who were torn away from their parents and relatives in refugee carts and wagons—were shot on the Arys-Drigelsdorf road, near Schlagakrug. At Groß Rosen (Groß Rosensko) in late January 1945, the Soviets burned approximately thirty people alive in a barn. On the road to Arys, an eyewitness saw “one body lying on top of another.” A “great number of people were shot dead” in Arys itself, at an assembly place, while cases were recorded of “the worst kinds of mistreatment” resulting in death in an NKVD torture chamber.

In the district of Oppeln, in Silesia, members of the 32nd and 34th Guards Infantry Division of the 5th Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front murdered at least 1,264 German civilians by the end of January 1945. Russian workers from the east, mostly deported for compulsory labor in Germany, as well as Soviet prisoners of war in German captivity, shared the same fate in several cases. In Oppeln, they were driven together on an open square and massacred after a short propaganda speech. A similar event occurred at the Kruppamühle camp for eastern workers on the Malapane in Upper Silesia.⁵² Here, on January 20, 1945, after Soviet tanks had reached the camp, several hundred Russian men, women and children were called together and slaughtered by machine gun fire or crushed by tanks as “traitors” and “fascist collaborators.” In Gottersdorf on January 23, 1945, Soviet soldiers shot approximately 270 residents, including small children and 20-40 members of the Marian Congregation. In Carlsruhe, 110 inhabitants were shot, including the residents of the Anna Stiftung, a charity foundation. In Kupp, 60-70 residents were shot, including the residents of an old people’s home and a pastor who had attempted to protect the women from rape, and so on and so forth in other localities. Johannisburg and Oppeln, however, were only two of a great many districts in the eastern provinces of the German Reich that were occupied by the troops of the Red Army in 1945.

Based on the reports of the German Field Command Agencies, the Foreign Armies East Branch of the General Staff of the German Army drew up several lists “of the atrocities and violations of international law committed by the Red Army in the occupied German territories” that document many Soviet crimes with some reliability under the fresh impression of the events, although they likewise do not offer an overall picture. Thus, German Army Group A reported on January 20, 1945, that all residents of the villages of Reichthal and Glausche, near Namslau, which had been recaptured during the night, had been shot by Soviet soldiers of the 9th Mechanized

52 Hoffmann, *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee*, p. 405.

Corps of the 3rd Guards Armored Army.⁵³ The German Army Group Center report on January 22, 1945, that a line of refugees four kilometers long near Grünhayn in the Wehlau district, "mostly women and children," had been "crushed, and shot with armor piercing shells and machine gun fire" by tanks of the 2nd Soviet Guards Armored Corps, "while the rest were shot by infantry with sub-machine guns."⁵⁴ Something similar occurred on the same day at Gertlauken, where fifty people from a line of refugees were killed by Soviet soldiers, some of them with a shot in the back of the neck. Also in West Prussia at the end of January, in a locality not specifically named, a long line of refugee wagons was overtaken by Soviet tanks. It was reported by a few surviving women that the tank crews (from the 5th Guards Armored Army) poured gasoline over the horses and wagons and set them on fire.

"Some of the civilians, mostly women and children, jumped down from the vehicles and attempted to run away, some of them were already living torches. The Bolsheviks opened fire at this point. Only a few were able to save themselves."⁵⁵

Likewise, in Plohnen in late January 1945, a line of refugees was attacked and shot to pieces by tanks from the 5th Guards Armored Army.⁵⁶ In this locality, near Elbing, all the women between thirteen and sixty years old were unceasingly raped by Red Army men "in the most brutal manner." German soldiers from a tank reconnaissance company found a woman with her abdomen ripped open by a bayonet; another young woman lay on a wooden plank, her face completely smashed. Destroyed and plundered refugee wagon trains on both sides of the road and the bodies of the passengers lying in ditches by the side of the road were also found in Meislstein near Elbing.⁵⁷

Cases of wanton crushing by tanks or machine-gunning of lines of refugee wagons and carts, fleeing everywhere on the roads and clearly recognizable as refugees, were reported from all parts of the eastern provinces, as well as from the operational zone of the Soviet 2nd Guards Armored Army. In the Waldrode district on January 18 and 19, 1945, refugee wagon trains were stopped, attacked, and in some cases crushed in several localities: "The women and children were shot or crushed as they jumped down off the wagons." According to another report, "most of the women and chil-

53 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 30. 1. 1945.

54 *Ibid.*, 22. 1. 1945.

55 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, folio 186, 25. 2. 1945.

56 *Ibid.*, 26. 2. 1945.

57 *Ibid.*, list 2, folio 174, January 1945; *ibid.*, folio 187, undated.

dren were killed.”⁵⁸ Soviet tanks at Waldrode bombarded a German hospital train with cannons and machine guns, with the result that “it was only possible to save 80 out of 1,000 wounded.” Reports of attacks by Soviet tanks on stretches of refugees were also received from Schauerkirch, Gombin, where “approximately 800 women and children were killed,” as well as from Dietfurth-Filehne and other localities. On January 19, 1945, several such wagon trains were overtaken near Brest, south of Thorn, in what was then the Warthegau, all the passengers, in many cases women and children, were shot down. According to a report of February 1, 1945:

“in this region, approximately 4,500 women and children out of a total of approximately 8,000 persons were killed in three days, the rest being entirely dispersed; it may be assumed that most of them were killed in a similar manner.”

The figures stated are not, of course, guaranteed to be accurate, and in this case appear exaggerated, but, nevertheless, indicate that particularly heavy losses must have been suffered by the civilian population of this region.

Only a few examples, of course, can be selected from the multiplicity of reported violations of international law. For example, it was an established rule of the Red Army to massacre all German prisoners of war without delay. In late January 1945, Members of the Soviet 38th Army in Makau, at the southern border of what was then the General Gouvernement, murdered 30 German soldiers by way of putting out their eyes, cutting off their hands, and crushing their heads. At Meseritz, Soviet soldiers, apparently from the 8th Guards Army, murdered the entire Volkssturm assigned there from Fürstenwalde, with the exception of two men, who were abused but escaped. On January 19, 1945, a few kilometers from Warthebrücken, Soviet soldiers from the 8th Mechanized Guards Corps of the 1st Guards Armored Army killed 15 prisoners of war.⁵⁹ On January 22 at Hohenkirch in the Briesen district, members of the 162nd (or else the 186th) Infantry Division of the 65th Army killed ten soldiers and nine civilians, including one woman, all shot in the back of the neck.⁶⁰

Near Krotoschin, on the same day, members of the 3rd Guards Army murdered fifteen members of the Volkssturm. At Petrikau, south of Lodz, nine German soldiers were murdered by members of the 9th Guards Armored Corps. At the Palzig-Nickern intersection, members of the Soviet

58 *Ibid.*, list 1, folio 168, 18.-19. 1. 1945.

59 *Ibid.*, list 2, folio 175, 19. 1. 1945.

60 *Ibid.*, list 1, folio 168, 22. 1. 1945.

33rd Army murdered 20 soldiers, including a medical first lieutenant, apparently members of the medical personnel, along with two women. Five young non-commissioned officer cadets were murdered near Seefeld, in the vicinity of Reppen, presumably by members of the Soviet 69th Army, and so on and so forth in innumerable localities.⁶¹ In a forester's house at Soldin, the forester's family, and all refugees stopping there, were killed by Soviet soldiers of the 2nd Guards Armored Army. Not far away, German soldiers, having concealed themselves in a barn, were burned alive.⁶² A mass grave with the skeletons of 120 civilians was found near Soldin (Mysciborz) in 1995.

It is only possible to indicate a few of the atrocities being constantly recorded in East Prussia. Near the small village of Tollnicken, a family of seven, including small children, was shot by Red Army soldiers of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps after the parents resisted the rape of their two daughters; a young man, a farmer, and three German soldiers were also shot.⁶³ Detailed investigations, as in Gumbinnen, Goldap, Elbing, and in other localities, could, of course, only be carried out after the recapture of lost territory by German troops—which seldom occurred, for example, in the villages surrounding Preußisch Holland, which was occupied by units of the Soviet 10th Armored Corps of the 5th Guards Armored Army between January 28 and 30, 1945. A report of the German Army Group North of February 2, 1945, states, for example, that local residents had been beaten to death or shot in Göttchendorf, Döbern, and Bordehnen:

“In Göttchendorf, near Preußisch Holland, seven civilians, including two elderly women, two men, and a boy approximately 14 years of age, lay beaten to death in one room alone. A nine-year-old boy lay crumpled up in the corner with his skull completely crushed, and on top of him was a 15 year-old girl with stab wounds in her hands and scratches on her face, bayonet wounds in her breast and abdomen, and her lower body completely naked. An 80 year-old grandfather lay shot before the door.”⁶⁴

Here again, “captured German soldiers, as well as a few members of the Wehrmacht on furlough, were shot on the street” by Soviet soldiers.

In late January, when German troops succeeded in liberating the small Pomeranian city of Preußisch Friedland and the surrounding localities “from the Soviet fiends,”—the 175th Soviet Infantry Division under Colonel Drosdov, a member of the 47th Army commanded by Colonel General

61 *Ibid.*, folio 171.

62 *Ibid.*, folio 185.

63 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 73 c 1, undated.

64 *Ibid.*, 3. 2. 1945.

Gusev—legal and medical officers of the German 32nd Infantry Division conducted interrogations of the survivors. One report from the High Command of the 2nd Army of February 14, 1945, stated:

“On January 29 and 30, most of the men of Preußisch Friedland and the village of Ziskau were shot after horrible tortures. Houses and dwellings were plundered, demolished, and set on fire. Women and children attempting to flee to safety were shot by the Bolshevik murderers with rifles and machine guns.”⁶⁵

In Preußisch Friedland and the neighboring villages, the investigations “brought even more cruelties to light.” 15 German soldiers murdered by shots in the head were discovered in the vicinity of the Tannenhof estate after the liberation. In Linde, on January 29, 1945, “16 residents were murdered, at least fifty women raped, and at least four women murdered after being raped.” Among the rape victims was an eighteen-year-old girl who lay in her own blood after being shot. In Ziskau, civilians and soldiers having concealed themselves, including a member of the German navy, were shot after the “most painful tortures.” The women were raped, some of them many times, including a “86 year-old woman and an 18 year-old girl from Bromberg, who died after terrible suffering.” “In Ziskau,” concludes the report of the High Command of the 2nd Army, “the wife of an officer was nailed down on the floor. She was then raped to death by the Bolsheviks.”

65 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 14. 2. 1945; BA-MA, RH 2/2685, list 2, folio 177, 31. 1. 1945.

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**“Woe to Thee, Germany!”
The Crimes Continue**

The political administrations and command agencies of the Red Army appealed to the hate feelings and thirst for revenge of Soviet soldiers in order to achieve the highest degree of combat readiness and performance. This procedure, as discreditable as it was risky, was resorted to for the purpose of generating heroism; yet the inevitable results of unleashing base human instincts soon made themselves apparent. An "unrestrained instinctual behaviour, unworthy of human beings," set in among Soviet soldiers with the rapidity of the wind, leading to a degree of demoralization and descent into savagery of such proportions that "control over the troops was lost in many units and formations."¹ Order no. 006 of the Council of War of the 2nd White Russian Front, issued on 22 January 1945, discussed in more detail below, lamented that the discovery of large quantities of alcohol had led to "excessive indulgence" among Soviet troops, in addition to "robbery, plundering, arson"—the murders were hushed up—and "mass booze-ups" (*massovoe p'janstvo*) in all sections of the front, even with the participation "of the officers," to the chagrin of the superior command authorities. The case of the 290th Infantry Division, assigned to the front line, in which the soldiers and officers drank so much that "they no longer even looked like warriors of the Red Army," was cited as one example. It was stated that wine barrels had been placed upon the chassis of tanks of the 5th Tank Army and that munitions vehicles had been so heavily laden with "all possible kinds of household goods, looted food and civilian clothing, etc." that "they became a burden to the troops," "reducing troop mobility" to the detriment of "the breakthrough capacity of the tank units."

Individual examples in Soviet orders must be immediately generalized, here as everywhere else. Soviet soldiers began to wear "civilian hats instead of the regulation headgear," or, as noted by Yuri Uspensky in his diary, to wear "Napoleon caps" and to carry "walking sticks, umbrellas, rubber raincoats," immediately acquiring the outward appearance of robbers and marauders. Failure to obey orders also became quite prevalent. As

¹ BA-MA, RH 19 XV/6, 22.1.1945; BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 26.3.1945.

observed by the Council of War of the 2nd White Russian Front, "these failings on the part of the rear units show no signs of abating; on the contrary, they are even increasing." The needless destruction of "the dwellings required to quarter troops and staff, and to store military materiel"—*i.e.*, the burning of existing German buildings—was very detrimental and referred to as a "shameful phenomenon" against which Soviet commanding officers not only failed to intervene, but, quite the contrary, even encouraged through their refusal to act. In this connection, the only mention made was of shortcomings having a detrimental effect upon the combat readiness of the Red Army. There was no mention of excesses and crimes committed against the German population, offences which, in comparison, were far more serious. Nevertheless, the need to restore some kind of military discipline, in addition, last but not least, to a concern on the part of Soviet leadership for the possible negative propaganda effect upon their Western Allies of the actions of Soviet troops—skilfully exploited by the Germans while Soviet troops continued their rapid advance into Central Europe—caused the leadership of the Red Army to take severe measures after only ten days.

The Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd White Russian Front, Marshall of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky, was the first to intervene. Order no. 006, issued as early as 22 January 1945, signed by Rokossovsky himself as well as by Member of the Council of War, General Subbotin, and the Chief of Staff, General Bogomolov, and referred to above, was, remarkably enough, to be made known to all ranks, even down to platoon leaders.² In the severest language, Marshall Rokossovsky ordered the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, all corps and divisional commanders, and all commanders of all independent units of his front, "to extirpate these occurrences, which bring shame upon the Red Army," "with red-hot steel," in all units, squads, and divisions; to bring those responsible for plundering and drunkenness to account; and to "punish such behaviour with the severest penalties, including shooting." The political administration of the Front, the military state prosecutor's office, military tribunals, and SMERSH—an NKVD organization—were assigned to take all necessary measures to implement this order.

Marshall Rokossovsky now demanded that the entire officer staff establish "exemplary order and iron discipline" in all units. The widespread reality of the murders of prisoners of war received further confirmation in this regard as well, though only peripherally: Rokossovsky saw fit to remind his officers and soldiers that enemy soldiers were to be killed in combat, but taken prisoner when they surrendered ("*chto vraga nuzhno*

² "Prikaz Komandujuscego 3-go Belorusskogo Fronta," 22.1.1945, BA-MA, RH 2/2687.

unichtozhat' v boju, sdajushchichsja brat' v plen”). There was particular concern for the situation in the rear zones. The Chief of the Political Administration of the Rear Front Zone was called upon to establish the immediate order necessary in the units of his zone as well. But the principal matter of concern was simply the preservation of material values. The Chief of the Rear Zone and the Superintendent of the Front received a special order to “take all measures to ensure the seizure and confiscation of all loot,” and to prohibit “the misappropriation and black-market sale” of the same. The Commander-in-Chief of the 1st White Russian Front, Marshall of the Soviet Union Zhukov—who had incited his troops to the commission of acts of revenge and “inhuman acts of violence” in unmistakable language on 12 January 1945—now performed a perfect 180-degree turn, just as had done once before, in the winter of 1941-42, by suddenly announcing that his subordinates would be held personally responsible for “actions in violation of international law.”³

Contrary to many reports in the relevant literature, Marshall Rokossovsky, the most nearly moderate among the four Commanders-in-Chief at the front as far as we know, never wasted one official word relating to the violations of international law committed by his troops against the German population, even though such violations were quite well known to him. The problem was nevertheless openly discussed in at least a few implementation orders. On 23 January 1945, and with reference to the demands of the Councils of War of the Front and the 48th Army, the Military Prosecutor of the same army, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Malyarov, issued an order to all military prosecutors of the subordinate units, such as, for example, those of the 194th Infantry Division (the 0134th, 0135th, and 0137th). This order was chiefly concerned with the preservation of material values.⁴ The principle that “all material values in East Prussia, from the moment upon which they come into the possession of the troops of the Red Army, are to be transferred to the ownership of the Soviet Union, subject to seizure and transport into the USSR”—a principle in violation of international law—was now bluntly proclaimed. No distinction was made between private property and public or governmental German property. If the Soviet military authorities now complained of the “enormous material damage” caused “by wantonness and hooliganism” (*ozorstva i chuliganstva*) in the cities and villages, this was due solely to a preoccupation with a possible reduction in the harvest of loot which it was hoped could be collected from the Germans.

³ BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 26.3.1945.

⁴ “Vsem Voennym Prokurorum,” 23.1.1945, BA-MA, RH 2/2687.

Simultaneously, however, the order of the military prosecutor of the 48th Army denounced the crimes against the civilian population and prisoners of war for the first time. Malyarov pointed out that there had indeed been "cases" of the use of firearms by military persons "against the German population, particularly, against women and old women." It was also stated that "numerous cases of shootings of prisoners of war" under unjustifiable circumstances of pure "maliciousness" had been established. The military prosecutors were ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Malyarov to inform the members of the army, in cooperation with the political apparatus, that the destruction of captured property and the "burning of buildings and entire villages" constituted subversive action. Additionally, it was stated that "reprisals against the population are not customary in the Red Army, the use of weapons against women and old people is contrary to law, and those guilty of such actions will be severely punished." It was furthermore added that it was in the interests of the Soviets to take German prisoners. The military prosecutors' offices were ordered to organize an immediate "show trial" ("*pokazatel'nykh processa*") against "arsonists and other louts," to notify the troops of the sentences imposed, to exercise strict control and, furthermore, in any case, to arrest the culprits immediately.

The fact—unequivocally admitted in the order of the military state prosecutor of the 48th Army, as well as in the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd White Russian Front—that an increasing demoralization and descent into savagery was now prevalent among the ranks of the Red Army, was, however, immediately hushed up by the subordinate troop leadership and political apparatus. This fact is illustrated by the manner in which shameful incidents of wanton destruction and drunkenness were interpreted for the benefit of subordinates. One example is order no. 026, issued on 25 January 1945 by the Chief of Staff of the 174th Infantry Division, Colonel Romanenko, to the troop commanders, in this case, the 508th Infantry Regiment. In this order, the arsonists are no longer described as marauding Soviet soldiers, but rather, as enemy agents and provocateurs—*i.e.*, Germans, who, "dressed in the uniforms of the Red Army," were alleged to be seeking to prevent the advance of Soviet troops by "burning settlements and individual buildings."⁵

The official explanation for the widespread alcoholism among the members of the Red Army, accompanied by "mass booze-ups"—as Rokossovsky called them—with the participation of Soviet officers and with devastating consequences, was very similar. The Political Administration,

5 *Ibid.*, 25.1.1945.

which was best acquainted with the attitude of the Council of War of the 3rd White Russian Front, in an instruction leaflet addressed to the "Comrade combatants, sergeants and officers" even attempted to place responsibility for unrestrained Soviet drunkenness upon the Germans—the "reprehensible, treacherous enemy" (*gnusnogo, kovarnogo vraga*)—who was said to be deliberately poisoning the supplies of alcohol and food "in an attempt to cause casualties among our soldiers and officers and to harm the Red Army."⁶ For example, if members of a Red Army unit commanded by First Lieutenant Klimets, or some other Soviet commander, drank huge quantities of methyl alcohol, or if a group of Soviet soldiers under the command of the officer Nikiforov quaffed "a barrel containing a fluid which smelled like alcohol," and died horribly, the deceased were, of course, simply the victims of the "treacherous enemy" (*podlomu vragu*): an enemy which, in his efforts to harm the Soviet Army, never shrank from the "basest, most reprehensible, and horrible means of fighting." The question now arises: how were excesses against the civilian population to be prevented if the impulsive lack of restraint of the Red Army soldiers was mendaciously attributed, as described above, to German treachery, countered with the mere proclamation that the "fascist beasts" ("*fashistskie zveri*") and "German monsters" ("*nemeckie zhveri*"), were to be punished for these "treacherous methods" with "renewed, devastating blows"?

The orders issued by the Soviet command authorities, were, therefore, far from unanimous. Many prisoners of war informed the Germans that they had received knowledge of the new rules of conduct in February 1945. For example, Major of the Guards of the Superintendent Service Kostikov of the 277th Guards Infantry Regiment of the 91st Guards Infantry Division (39th Army, 3rd White Russian Front), on 17 February 1945, reported that "strict orders have been issued that the German civilian population is to be left alone, nothing is to be stolen, and German women are not to be molested."⁷ According to the testimony of one Red Army soldier, Shevchuk, the "shooting of civilians and German prisoners of war," which had been customary in the Red Army until that time, was now "strictly prohibited" in the 44th Motorized Infantry Brigade as of 6-7 February 1945.⁸ Similar, quite comparable, prohibitions were also issued with regards to other units.⁹ When Soviet soldiers wantonly set fire to the city of Gleiwitz, the burning of localities was "strictly forbidden" in that section of the front

6 "Tovarisci bojcy, serzanty i oficery!;" *ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*, 17.2.1945.

8 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 5.3.1945.

9 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 2.2.1944; BA-MA, RH 2/2688, fol. 74, 25.2., fol. 5, 1.3.1945.

as well.¹⁰ The commander of the 1042nd Infantry Regiment of the 295th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Chaiko, informed his units that violations of the existing prohibition against plundering would be "severely punished."¹¹ Generally, the Soviet command authorities were not stingy about threats of punishment; the military tribunals appear to have intervened occasionally. But these were exceptions. Members of the Red Army unanimously maintained that the authorities only intervened in rare cases; in practice, everything continued as before.

German civilians and prisoners of war continued to be murdered as before, often upon the inducement of superior officers, usually the "battalion and regimental commanders involved," although a few prisoners of war testified that there were units in "which such crimes were not tolerated." German women and girls continued to be raped as before by "officers and younger soldiers of the Red Army," despite of existing prohibitions, and were very often murdered afterwards. Arson and pillaging with the participation of officers continued just as before. That the numerous orders to the contrary remained a dead letter is illustrated by the fact that anti-German hate propaganda was not amended or modified in the slightest respect. A captured second lieutenant from the 266th Infantry Regiment of the 88th Guards Infantry Division testified that posters with inflammatory slogans were to be seen on the streets everywhere, even in February 1945, such as: "Strike the Fascist Beasts Dead! Take Revenge on the Fascists! Remember the Women and Children Murdered by the Fascists and Take Revenge for Them!"¹² The watchword of agitation upon the 27th anniversary of the Red Army on 23 February 1945 was as follows:

"Let's wreak vengeance on the German-fascist monsters for plundering and destroying our cities and villages, for raping our women and children, for murdering and deporting Soviet citizens to German slavery! Vengeance and death to the fascist fiends!"

Since the powerful political apparatus employed an entirely distinct language from the command authorities of the Red Army, which had only intervened half-heartedly so far, it is no wonder that violations of international law against German civilians and prisoners of war continued to be committed on a horrendous scale throughout February and March 1945.

The manner in which the orders of the Soviet leadership were put into practice is illustrated by the multitude of reports received by the Germans

10 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 24.2.1945.

11 BA-MA, RH 2/2688, fol. 75, 6.3.1945.

12 *Ibid.*, 27.2.1945.

on atrocities by Red Army soldiers against prisoners of war and the civilian population even in February 1945. The available official material is naturally incomplete; some of it, furthermore, can only be mentioned briefly here, for purposes of example. Similar reports continued to be received from all parts of the regions of the provinces of Silesia, the Brandenburg district, Pomerania, and East Prussia, all of which were only partially occupied by the enemy. These reports unanimously described the same criminal acts, murder, rape, robbery, plundering, and arson, and provide, on the whole, a truthful picture of these frightful events. The selected cases are typical of innumerable similar atrocities committed in all parts of the four eastern provinces even in February 1945.

Silesia

Near the borders of the Reich, west of Welun, Soviet soldiers from the 1st Ukrainian Front doused the wagons in a fleeing line of refugees with gasoline and burnt them, together with the passengers. Innumerable corpses of German men, women, and children, some of them mutilated, with their throats cut, their tongues cut out, their stomachs slit open, littered the roads. Also west of Welun, 25 members (Front workers) of the Organization Todt were shot by tank crews of the 3rd Tank Army of the Guards.¹³ In Heinersdorf, as well, the men were all shot, and the women raped, by Soviet soldiers. At Kunzendorf, 25-30 members of the Volksturm were shot in the back of the neck. At Glausche, near Namslau, 18 persons, "including members of the Volksturm and female nurses" were murdered by members of the 59th Army. At Beatenhof, near Ohlau, after the recapture of the village by German troops, all the men were found shot in the back of the neck,¹⁴ murdered by members of the Soviet 5th Army of the Guards. In Grünberg, eight families were murdered by members of the 9th Tank Army of the Guards. The Tannenfeld manor near Grottkau was the scene of a cruel orgy of crime: Soviet soldiers from the 229th Infantry Division raped two girls and then murdered them after various acts of mistreatment. The eyes of one man were gouged out and his tongue cut out. A 43 year-old Polish woman received the same treatment and was then tortured to death.

At Alt-Grottkau, members of the same division murdered 14 prisoners of war, cutting off their heads, gouging out their eyes, and crushing them with tanks. Soviet soldiers from the same division were responsible for crimes committed in Schwarzengrund, near Grottkau: they raped the

¹³ BA-MA, RH 2/2685, List 2, fol. 174ff., also for the following.

¹⁴ BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 7.3.1945.

women, including the members of a nunnery, shot the farmer Kahlert, slit his wife's abdomen open, hacked off her hands, shot the farmer Christoph and his son, as well as a young girl.¹⁵ On Eisdorf manor near Märzdorf, Soviet soldiers from the 5th Army of the Guards gouged out the eyes of an elderly man and woman, apparently a married couple, and cut off their noses and fingers. Eleven bodies of wounded members of the Luftwaffe who had been horribly murdered were found in the near vicinity. 21 prisoners of war murdered by Soviet members of the 4th Tank Army were also found at Gütersstadt near Glogau. In the village of Haslicht, near Striegau, all the women were raped by Soviet soldiers from the 9th Mechanized Corps, "each one participating in turn."¹⁶ Maria Hainke discovered her husband, showing almost imperceptible signs of life, and dying in a Soviet guardroom. A medical examination revealed that his eyes had been put out, his tongue cut out, an arm fractured in several places, and the top of his skull crushed.

At Ossig, near Streigau, members of the 7th Tank Guards Corps raped the women, murdered six or seven young girls, shot 12 farmers, and also committed similar serious crimes at Hertwisswaldau near Jauer. At Liegnitz, the bodies of numerous civilians shot by Soviet soldiers of the 6th Army of the Guards were found. In the small city of Kostenblut, near Neumarkt, occupied by units of the 7th Tank Guards Corps, all the women and girls were raped, including an advanced pregnant mother of eight children. Her brother was shot for attempting to protect her. All foreign prisoners of war were shot, as well as six men and three women. Nor did the nurses in a Catholic hospital escape mass rape. At Pilgramsdorf, near Goldberg, numerous murders, rapes, and cases of arson were committed by members of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade. At Beralsdorf, a suburb of Lauban, 39 of the still remaining women were violated "under the cruelest conditions" by Soviet soldiers of the 7th Tank Guards Corps. During the rapes, one woman received a gunshot wound to the lower jaw, was locked in a cellar, and, days later, was "gang raped at gunpoint in the most brutal manner" by three Soviet soldiers even though she was running a high fever.

15 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 26.2.1945.

16 *Ibid.*, 15.3.1945.

Province Mark Brandenburg (primarily Neumark and the Sternberger region)

A report from the Russian agents Danilov and Chirshin assigned to the area by the 103rd Front Reconnaissance Unit between 24 February and 1 March 1945 provides a general idea of the treatment meted out to the population.¹⁷ According to the report, all the Germans aged 12 or upwards were ruthlessly put to work building fortifications, while all members of the population not assigned to such work were deported to the east; the old were simply left to starve. At Sorau, Danilov and Chirshin saw "piles of bodies of murdered women and men (butchered), shot (in the back of the neck or in the heart)..., lying on the roads, farms, and in the houses." According to the statements of one Soviet officer, personally shocked at the extent of the terror, "all the women and girls, regardless of age, were ruthlessly raped." Soviet soldiers from the 33rd Army also indulged in a "cruel and bloody campaign of terror" at Skampe near Züllichau.¹⁸ "Strangled bodies of women, children, and old people" were found in almost all the houses. The bodies of a man and woman were found a short distance from Skampe, on the road to Rentschen: the woman's abdomen was slit open, her embryo torn out, and the aperture in the abdomen stuffed with straw and garbage. Three members of the Volksturm were found hanged nearby.

At Kay, near Züllichau, members of the same army murdered wounded members of a transport, including all the women and children, by shooting them in the back of the neck. The city of Neu-Bentschen was plundered and wantonly burned by members of the Red Army. On the Schwiebus-Frankfurt road, Soviet soldiers from the 69th Army shot so many civilians, including women and children, that the bodies lay "underneath and on top of each other." At Alt-Drewitz, on the road to Calenzig, members of the 1st Tank Army of the Guards shot a medical major, a major and several medics, while simultaneously opening fire on American prisoners of war being retransferred from Stalag Alt-Drewitz; 20-30 of the prisoners were wounded and an unknown number killed.¹⁹ On the road to Groß-Blumberg/Oder, the bodies of approximately 40 German soldiers were found in groups of five to ten bodies each, murdered by gunshot wounds to the back of the head or neck, and then robbed. In Reppen, all the men in a passing line of refugees were shot by Soviet soldiers from the 19th Army

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.3.1945.

¹⁸ BA-MA, RH 2/2685, List 1, fol. ff., also for the following.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 67, 7.2.1945.

and the women raped. At Gassen, near Sommerfeld, civilians were indiscriminately shot at by tanks from the 6th Mechanized Guards Corps. At Massin, near Landsberg, members of the 5th Assault Army shot an unknown number of residents, raped the women and young girls, and carried away looted objects. In an unknown location near Landsberg, members of the 331st Infantry Division shot eight male civilians, after robbing them.

When units of the Soviet 11th Tank Corps or the 4th Infantry Corps unexpectedly invaded the city of Lebus west of the Oder, they immediately began to rob the residents, shooting a number of civilians. Soviet soldiers raped the women and girls, two of whom were beaten to death with rifle butts. The sudden breakthrough of Soviet troops as far as the Oder and, in some localities, even across the Oder, had fearful consequences for innumerable residents and German soldiers. At Groß-Neuendorf/Oder, ten German prisoners of war were locked in a barn and machine gunned, apparently by Soviet soldiers from the 1st Tank Army of the Guards. In Reitwein and Trettin, all German soldiers, police officials, and other "fascists," as well as entire families in whose houses members of the Wehrmacht had found lodgings, were shot by Soviet soldiers, apparently from the 8th Army of the Guards. In Wiesenau, near Frankfurt, two women aged 65 and 55 were found dying after being raped for several hours. At Zehden, a uniformed Soviet woman officer, of unknown rank, from the 5th Tank Guards Corps, shot a sales representative and his wife. At Genschmar, Soviet soldiers murdered a manor owner, the manor manager, and three workers.

An assault group from the Vlassov Army under Colonel of the ROA Sakharov retook the villages of New-Lewin and Kerstenbruch, in the Oderbruch, on 9 February 1945 with German support. The population in both villages, according to a German report of 15 March 1945, had been "mistreated in the cruelest manner" and were still suffering from the "frightful effects of Soviet terror." At Neu-Lewin, the mayor was found shot, as well as a member of the Wehrmacht on furlough. In a barn lay the bodies of three women who had been raped and beaten to death, two of them with their feet tied. A German woman lay shot in front of the door to her own house. An elderly married couple were strangled to death. The 9th Tank Guards Corps was found to have been responsible, both here and in the village of Neu-Barnim, not far away. At Neu-Barnim, 19 residents were found dead. The body of the inn keeper, a woman, was found mutilated, her feet tied together with wire. Here, as in the other localities, the women and girls were raped; at Kerstenbruch, the rape victims included a 71 year-old woman with one leg amputated. Pillaging and wanton destruction also formed part of the pattern of violent crime committed by Soviet troops in these villages of the Oderbruch, as well as everywhere else in the German regions of the East.

Pomerania

Only relatively few reports are available for Pomerania during the month of February 1945, since the real breakthrough battles only began towards the end of the month. A report by the Georgian Lieutenant Berakashvili, who was commandeered from the Georgian Liaison Staff to the German officer cadet school at Posen, where he participated in the German defence of the Posen fortress with other officers from volunteer units and then managed to get through to Stettin, provides a few impressions relating to the region south east of Stettin.²⁰ Persons wearing the uniforms of any German civil service—not only Party members and members of the Hitler Youth, but also railway employees, etc.—were shot everywhere. Soldiers and civilians killed by shots to the back of the neck often lined the roads; the bodies were “always half naked, and in all cases without boots.” At Schwarzenburg, Lieutenant Berakashvili witnessed the brutal rape of a farmer's wife in the presence of her crying children, and saw signs of pillaging and destruction everywhere. The city of Bahn was “cruelly destroyed”, and many civilian bodies” lay piled up in the streets, killed “in reprisal,” as Soviet soldiers explained.

The conditions in the villages around Pyritz completely confirm these observations. At Billerbeck, the manor owners, as well as the old and sick, were shot. All women and girls, down to the age of ten, were raped, the dwellings plundered, and all surviving residents deported. On Brederlow manor, Soviet soldiers raped the women and girls, one of whom, as well as the wife of a German soldier on furlough who succeeded in escaping, were then shot. At Köselitz, the principal official, a farmer, and a lieutenant on furlough were murdered. At Eichelshagen, the Local Group Leader and a six-member family were murdered. The perpetrators in all cases were members of the 61st Army. A series of similar events took place in the villages around Greifenhagen south of Stettin. At Jädersdorf, ten evacuated women and a 15 year-old boy were shot, the surviving victims killed with bayonets and pistol shots, and entire families with small children “slaughtered” by members of the 2nd Guards Tank Army. At Rohrsdorf, Soviet soldiers shot numerous residents, including a wounded soldier on furlough. Women and girls were raped and frequently murdered afterwards. At Groß-Silber, near Kallies, Soviet soldiers from the 7th Cavalry Guards Corps raped a young woman with a broomstick, cut off her left breast, and crushed her skull. In Preußisch Friedland, Soviet soldiers from the 52nd Guards Infantry Division

20 BA-MA, RH 2/2688, 12.3.1945.

shot eight men and two women and raped 34 women and girls. A cruel crime was reported by the Commander of a German tank engineer battalion of the 7th Tank Division.²¹

In late February 1945, Soviet officers from the 1st or 160th Infantry Division used several children aged 10 to 12 north of Konitz to clear a minefield. German soldiers heard the "horrible screaming" of the children, severely injured by exploding mines, "bleeding to death helplessly after being blown to bits."

East Prussia

In East Prussia, the scene of heavy fighting, atrocities in February 1945 continued uninterrupted despite any official Soviet prohibition. German soldiers and civilians were murdered on the road near Landsberg—stabbed with bayonets, beaten to death with blunt objects, or shot at point-blank range, and some of them severely mutilated—by members of the Soviet 1st Tank Army of the Guards. At Landsberg, Soviet soldiers from the 331rd Infantry Division drove the surprised population, including women and children, into the cellars, set fire to the houses, and shot at all those fleeing in panic.²² Many people were burned alive. In a village on the Landsberg-Heilsberg road, 37 women and girls were locked in a cellar for six days and nights by members of the same Infantry Division; many of them were chained together and raped several times a day with the participation of the Soviet officers. Two of the Soviet officers cut two women's tongues out "with a curved knife" in front of everyone because of their horrible screaming. Two other women had their hands placed on top of each other and were pinned to the floor with a bayonet. A very few of the unfortunate victims were finally liberated by German tank soldiers; 20 women died of their injuries. At Hanshagen near Preußisch Eylau, Soviet soldiers from the 331st Infantry Division shot two mothers for resisting the rape of their daughters, as well as a father whose daughter was dragged out of the kitchen at the same time, and raped by a Soviet officer. A married couple, teachers with three children, as well as an unidentified young female refugee, an inn-keeper, and a farmer, whose daughter was raped, were also murdered. At Petershagen near Eylau, members of the same division murdered two men and a boy aged 16 named Richard von Hoffmann during the continuing rape of the women and girls.

21 *Ibid.*, 5.3.1945.

22 List of Soviet war criminals, 17.3.1945, BA-MA, RH 2/2685, also for the following.

Soviet troops made a surprise breakthrough into the western part of the Samland in early February 1945, with the result that a large number of localities fell into their possession. The Germans succeeded in defeating and to some extent forcing a withdrawal of the invading forces after a few days, and in restoring the broken land and sea link with Königsberg by means of a bold, large-scale counterattack on 19-20 February 1945. The High Command of the German Army Section Samland and the German Army Group North conducted investigations on the fate of the population in the recaptured regions with the help of the police, the results of which are of course only available for a few localities. Members of the 271st Special Motorized Battalion (motorcyclist) of the 39th Army murdered four civilians in Georgenwalde and threw the bodies into a burning house. Women and girls, including some no older than children, were cruelly raped by officers and Soviet soldiers. At Kragau, two young women were raped and strangled by members of the 91st Infantry Division; at Medenau, at least eleven persons were murdered by members of the 358th Infantry Division: the bodies of two murdered women, a small child, and an infant were found in front of a house. Two elderly men and a 14 year-old boy were beaten to death, as well as two women and two small girls after being raped. The completely nude body of a woman, approximately 30 years of age, was found with stab wounds in the breast, her skull split open, and the body riddled with bullets. At Groß-Ladtkeim, members of the 91st Guards Infantry Division shot two German prisoners of war and four civilians, including the mayor and his wife. There was no trace of their 18 year-old daughter. However, the body of a young girl was found with her breasts cut off, her eyes gouged out, and showing obvious signs of rape.

The Soviet 91st Guards Infantry Division penetrated the Krattlau-Germau region by way of Thierenberg and was then encircled and, to some extent, defeated on 7 February 1945 after heavy fighting. Serious violations of international law were established in the localities occupied by the same division.²³ For example, at Thierenberg, 21 German soldiers were dragged out of a home for disabled war veterans near Sorgenau, taken to Thierenberg, and murdered. Elisabeth Homfeld was raped and killed with her father-in-law by pistol shots to the head, along with Minna Kottke, who had attempted to protect herself from rape, and the son of the tenant of the parsonage, Ernst Trunz. Three women and a man were shut inside a shed and killed by the explosion of a hand grenade thrown inside, several other persons being seriously injured. Soviet officers and soldiers later admitted in

23 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 13/16.2.1945.

German captivity to having gang-raped women and even minor girls without interruption and in a "bestial manner." In Krattlau, members of the 275th Guards Infantry Regiment of the 91st Guards Infantry Division murdered six men and two German soldiers by bayonet wounds or shooting in the head. All the women and girls, including thirteen-year olds, were raped without interruption, many women being "sexually violated 5 to 8 times a day by 6 to 8 soldiers at a time." Three to four of the youngest women were reserved for the officers, who handed them over to their subordinates when they were finished with their rape. At Annental, the German liberators found the bodies of two women who had been raped and then strangled, one of them on a dungheap.

It was possible to begin detailed investigations in Germau, which had been occupied by the Staff of the Soviet 91st Guards Infantry Division and the Staff with sections of the 275th Infantry Guards Regiment. The bodies of 21 murdered men, women, and children were found at Germau. Eleven persons were unable to withstand the horrible tortures and committed suicide. 15 German wounded soldiers were murdered by crushing their skulls, one of them with a harmonica crammed violently in his mouth. According to investigations carried out by medical captain Dr. Tolzien, one female corpse exhibited the following injuries: bullet wound to the head; crushing of lower left tibia; gaping, open cuts on the interior of the left lower leg, gaping, open cuts on the upper part of the left thigh, all inflicted by means of knives. Another woman, as well as a young girl found nude, died from crushing fractures to the back of the head. A married couple named Retkowski, as well as another married couple named Sprengel, with their three children, a young woman with two children and an unidentified Pole, were all found murdered. The bodies of an unknown female refugee, as well as a German woman named Rosa Thiel (maiden name Witte), and a 21-year-old Polish girl, were all found in a common grave, the girls cruelly murdered after being raped; the bodies of two master handicraftsmen of the village were also found, one of whom, the miller Maguhn, had been shot for attempting to protect his young daughter from rape. Two small girls were found on the Germau-Palmnicken road, at kilometre stone 5, having been shot in the head at close range; one of them had her eyes gouged out. The female population of Germau, approximately 400 women and girls, were confined in the church on the order of the commander of the 91st Guards Infantry Division, Colonel Koshanov, allegedly to protect them from excesses, according to Major Kostikov, a prisoner of war. But Soviet officers and soldiers stormed the church and committed "mass rapes" in the choir loft. The women in the surrounding houses were raped uninterruptedly during the following days, mostly by officers. Young girls were raped up to twenty-two times a night.

13 year-old Eva Link was raped eight times before the eyes of her despairing mother in the bell-loft of the church by an officer and several Soviet soldiers. The mother apparently suffered the same fate.

The events in the city suburb of Metgethen, west of Königsberg, which was occupied by units of the Soviet 39th Army (192nd, 292nd, and 338th Infantry Regiments) during the night of 30-31 January 1945, and liberated on 19 February after bloody fighting by sections of the German 1st Infantry Division, the 561st Volksgrenadier Division and the 5th Tank Division, have been described in detail many times in the literature, including, recently, in a publication of the Russian periodical *Novoe Vremija* under the headline "Crimes of the Red Army Soldiers" ("*Prestuplenija krasnoarmejcev*").²⁴ The American expert on international law, Alfred M. de Zayas made a particular study of the atrocities committed at Metgethen; his work deserves mention here.²⁵ German soldiers found horrible evidence of atrocities at Metgethen and the near vicinity. According to the former 3rd General Staff Officer (Ic) in the Staff of the Commander of the fortress of Königsberg, Major in the reserves Professor Dr. G. Ipsen, the survivors were "in a condition bordering on madness."

The bodies of several hundred German soldiers, some of them mutilated beyond recognition, lay in the access roads, while men, women, and children, beaten to death, lay in almost all the houses and gardens, the women exhibiting obvious signs of rape, often with the breasts cut off. In one location, according to the former ordnance officer on the Staff of the 561st Volksgrenadier Division, K. A. Knorr, the bodies of two girls approximately 20 years old, were found torn apart by vehicles. At the railway station stood at least one refugee train from Königsberg. Each carriage contained the bodies of "brutally murdered refugees of all ages and both sexes." German prisoners of war and civilians had been driven together on the tennis court in Metgethen and then killed by explosives. Parts of human bodies were found even 200 metres from the gigantic crater. As late as February 27, 1945, a Captain on the Staff of the Fortress Commander, Sommer, accidentally discovered the bodies of 12 completely nude women and children in "a jumbled heap," lying on top of each other in a gravel pit behind a house on the intersection of the road and railway lines near Metgethen. All had been cut to pieces by bayonet and knife wounds.

In addition to individual corpses scattered all over the entire residential suburb and numbering several hundred, large earth mounds were discov-

24 Mlechin, "Prestuplenija krasnoarmejcev."

25 *Anmerkungen zur Vertreibung*, pp. 67ff.

ered, containing, as was later established, 3,000 corpses, according to Captain Sommer and Prof. Dr. Ipsen.²⁶ The investigations of the commission of investigation created by the Commander of the Fortress, Infantry General Lasch, proved very difficult: the Soviets had poured gasoline over the bodies and attempted to burn them. It nevertheless proved possible to establish that most of the victims had not been shot. Instead, they were cruelly murdered, often with the use of blunt objects and cutting weapons. A great proportion of the dead, moreover, were not even German. They were Ukrainian refugees, approximately 25,000 of whom had been stranded at Metgethen, or members of the so-called Ukrainian "labour service," recruited for compulsory labour service (and poorly treated by the Germans); like many of their compatriots in another location, these then fell victim to Soviet acts of revenge.

According to Captain Sommer, west of Metgethen, on the road to Powayen, the bodies of murdered civilians lay everywhere, killed by bullet wounds in the back of the neck, or "completely naked, raped, brutally stabbed to death with bayonets, or bludgeoned." On the intersection before Powayen lay the bodies of four nude women, dragged to death behind a Soviet tank. A truly symbolic crime committed by Soviet soldiers in the church at Groß-Heydekrug is testified to by Captain Sommer, as well as by Major Ipsen, a professor of law: a young girl had been crucified between two German soldiers, who were hanged next to her on either side. All this took place before the very gates of the provincial capital of Königsberg. The indescribable orgy of cruelty and crime committed by inflamed Soviet soldiers²⁷ after the fall of the city of Königsberg on 7-9 April 1945 is impossible to describe, and is mentioned in the diaries of the doctors Deichelmann and Count von Lehndorff only by way of suggestion.²⁸

The violations of international law committed on German soil placed large parts of the Red Army outside the tradition of ordinary military virtues. Criminal acts against the defenceless such as the above, which are described only by way of example and committed with the incitement and participation of the military leadership, were unknown in the armies of other European countries, even during the Second World War; they would never have been tolerated by the command authorities of any other country. The German Wehrmacht was no exception to this rule. Robbery and plundering, not to mention murder and rape, were punishable by severe penalties

26 *Vertreibung und Vertreibungsverbrechen*, Document 4, pp. 146ff.

27 See also Shturm, *Königsberg*.

28 Deichelmann, *Ich sah Königsberg sterben*; Lehndorff, *Ostpreussisches Tagebuch*; Wieck, *Zeugnis vom Untergang Königsbergs*.

under the compulsory provisions of the German military criminal code. To maintain military discipline, German military tribunals, as a rule, even in the Soviet territories, punished criminal acts by members of the Wehrmacht against civilians with severe penalties, including the death penalty, often inflicted without hesitation.²⁹ The question of responsibility for the war crimes committed in the German eastern provinces must now be raised. According to the ancient military principle that the superior is responsible in each case for the actions of his subordinates, the majority of the commanders and troop leaders assigned to these zones, as well as many members of the middle and lower-ranking leadership, would be "war criminals" under the terms of the Nuremberg statutes. Due to its expert knowledge, the Foreign Armies East Branch of the General Staff of the German Army was decisively involved in the "identification of enemy war criminals." According to the "lists of war criminals" drawn up, and like, for example, the High Command of the German Army Group Centre, the Foreign Armies East Branch was inclined from the outset to find Soviet commanders and unit leaders responsible for the crimes of their subordinates.³⁰ The concept should, however, be more narrowly defined in the present connection. When we refer to a number of Soviet officers by name in the following paragraphs as bearing responsibility based upon documentation which is furthermore only available as a result of pure chance, this occurs solely where the existence of aggravating circumstances or joint responsibility in violations of international law has been proven on the basis of documentary evidence, or insofar as compelling grounds exist for suspicion to this effect.

The following officers have already been referred to as bearing responsibility for violations of international law committed in the German eastern provinces: the Commander-in-Chief of the 1st White Russian Front, Marshall of the Soviet Union Zhukov and leading officers of his front staff, such as Member of the Council of War, Lieutenant General Telegin; Colonel General of Artillery Kazakov; Colonel General of Aviation Rudenko; Chief of the Front Staff, Colonel General Malinin, and, even more clearly, the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd White Russian Front, Army General Chernyakhovskiy; Member of the Council of War, Lieutenant General Khokhlov; and, finally, the Chief of the Political Administration of the Front Staff, Major General Razbitsev. Among the many persons implicated, the following officers bear particular responsibility: the Commander-in-Chief of the 31st Army, Colonel General Glagolev; the Members of the Council of War

29 Zayas, *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle*, pp. 72ff.

30 See Note 22; see also BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 21.2.1945.

of the 31st Army, Major General Karpenkov, Major General Lakhtarin, and the Chief of the Political Administration of the Army, Major General Riapsov; the Commander of the 43rd Infantry Corps, Major General Andreev; the Commander of the 72nd Infantry Division, Major General Yastrebov; the Commander of the 87th Infantry Guards Division, Major General Tymchik; the Commander of the 88th Infantry Division, Colonel Kovtunov; the Commander of the 153rd Infantry Division, Colonel Eliseev; the Commander of the 2nd Artillery Guards Division, Colonel Kobtsev; the Chief of the 7th Department of the Political Administration of the 50th Army, Lieutenant Colonel Sabashtansky,³¹ whose subordinates included two German collaborators, Major Bechler and Lieutenant Graf von Einsiedel, so-called "Front Delegate" members of the NKFD (*Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland*, National Committee for a Free Germany); the Commander of the 611th Infantry Regiment of the 88th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Sotkovsky; the Commander of the 14th Infantry Regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Korolev; the Commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division, First Lieutenant Vasil'ev; and, finally, Adjutant of the 2nd Section of the 919th Artillery Regiment, First Lieutenant Pugachev.

The following Soviet officers, identified on the basis of documents available solely as the result of chance, are responsible for the commission, advocacy, or deliberate toleration of war crimes on German soil: Lieutenant General Okorokov, Chief of the Political Administration of the 2nd White Russian Front, personally participated in "extensive plundering" and other serious crimes committed in his sector of the front.³² At Petershagen near Pr. Eylau on 2 February 1945, Major General Berestov, the Commander of the 331st Infantry Division, accompanied by one of his officers, raped the daughter of a farmer's wife, after personally being served food and drink by her; he also raped a Polish girl. He is also fully responsible for the many war crimes committed by his division at Pr. Eylau and Landsberg, "only a very small proportion of which could be investigated." Major General Papchenko, the Commander of the 124th Infantry Division, and Major General Zaretsky, the Commander of the 358th Infantry Division, bear responsibility for the crimes committed at Medenau between 15 - 21 February 1945, as well as for the crimes committed at Kragau and Groß-Ladtkeim on 4 February 1945 by the the Commander of the 91st Guards Infantry Division, Colonel of the Guards Koshanov. The latter is moreover responsible for "the

31 Kopelev, *Aufgewahren für alle Zeit*, p. 94.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 130.

murders and rapes committed by his soldiers at Thierenberg." Lieutenant Colonel Muratov, the Commander of the 1324th Infantry Regiment of the 413th Infantry Division, bears responsibility for inciting Soviet soldiers, through his political representative (*Zampolit*), to commit acts of vengeance against the Germans: "You may now revenge yourselves. Combat troops may do whatever they want with German prisoners..."³³

Lieutenant Colonel Bondarets, *Zampolit* of the 510th Infantry Regiment of the 154th Infantry Division of the 2nd Army of the Guards of the 3rd White Russian Front, informed Soviet soldiers in East Prussia that "of course, they could rape German women," but that they ought not to shoot them. Lieutenant Colonel Tolstukhin, the Commander of the 85th Guards Infantry Regiment of the 32nd Infantry Guards Division, a well-known "German hater," caused "most of the German prisoners of war" in East Prussia "to be shot".³⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Rosentsvaig, *Zampolit* of the 72nd Guards Infantry Regiment, informed the soldiers of the Red Army through their unit leaders that they "had full freedom to plunder".³⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Sashenko, the Commander of the 275th Infantry Regiment of the 91st Guards Infantry Division, is fully responsible for the "war crimes committed by his soldiers between 2 and 8 February 1945 in Germau and Krattlau." Major Beliaev, Chief of the "Anti-Fascist School" of the 2nd White Russian Front, shot a helpless old woman at Neidenberg, and three wounded soldiers at another location, in addition to other crimes.³⁶ Major Sadykov, the Commander of the 870th Infantry Regiment, personally committed rapes in Upper Silesia and "had many prisoners of war shot" purely on the grounds of personal hatred.³⁷ Major Kobuliansky, the Commander of the 271st Special Motorized Battalion of the 39th Army, and several of his officers, including company leader Alt-Metveden and platoon leader Zinoviev personally participated in aggravated rapes in the Ostsee bathing resort of Georgenwalde between 3 and 5 February 1934, and are responsible for a number of murders in the immediate vicinity. A few of the immense numbers of Soviet top-ranking officers who committed crimes or morals offences in the German eastern provinces include the following: Captain Sobolev;³⁸ Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion of the 691st Infantry Regiment of the 383rd Infantry Division, First Lieutenant Sherebsov;³⁹ Chief of Staff of a

33 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 12.2.1945.

34 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 21.3.1945.

35 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 17.2.1945.

36 Kopelev, *Aufbewahren für alle Zeit!*, pp. 87, 94.

37 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 12.3.1945.

38 BA-MA, RH 2/2688, fol. 74, 3.3.1945.

39 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, fol. 72, undated.

section of the 788th Artillery Regiment of the 262nd Infantry Division, First Lieutenant Sliusarev;⁴⁰ Chief of Staff of the 1st Battalion of the 72nd Guards Infantry Regiment of the 24th Guards Infantry Division, Lieutenant Shilkov of the same battalion; and Lieutenant Kalinin, Political Representative of the 2nd Battalion, who expressly incited Soviet soldiers to the commission of crimes, stating that "they should spare no one and nothing." These are just a few of the names which could be listed here. But they make it sufficiently clear that officers of all ranks, from Marshall of the Soviet Union down to the ranks of lieutenant, general, staff officer, as well as top-ranking officers in the Red Army, were equally guilty of the commission of war crimes against the civilian population and against defenceless prisoners.

Was the Red Army, taken as a whole, guilty of participation in violations of international law? The constant and enduring campaign of inflammatory propaganda conducted by the Political Main Administration and its subordinate political organizations, coupled with the fact that the sudden countermanding orders, issued by the troop leadership, were in total contradiction to the initial proclamations, that they were not emphasized and were furthermore only enforced in exceptional cases, hardly encouraged humanitarian intervention. Not a few Soviet officers and soldiers took offense at the horrible crimes and excesses of their own comrades. The Soviet agents active on the German side, Danilov and Chirshin, for example, spontaneously reported the case of an unidentified officer who voiced disgust at the extent of the terror.⁴¹ In view of the atmosphere of incitement and hatred prevalent in the Red Army, however, criticism of the barbaric treatment of the civilian population and prisoners of war, which "made a mockery of all human decency," was rendered difficult and dangerous by the immediate possibility of intervention by the political supervisory bodies.

Soviet prisoners of war "unanimously" confirmed that it was "strictly prohibited to express one's moral outrage to the leadership, since there was the danger of being called a Hitlerite and being treated accordingly."⁴¹ For example, when Captain Beliakov, referred to once again below, reported to his superiors relating to the brutal rape of a 17 year-old girl in the presence of her mother by eight Red Army soldiers, he was reprimanded by his *Zampolit*, Lieutenant Colonel Bondarets, with the rhetorical question of whether he "wished to defend the civilians?" If not, he should get out, and go back to his battalion. Other critics were treated more harshly. Captain Efremov, Battalion Commander in a regiment of the 4th Guards Tank Corps, who had

40 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 11.2.1945.

41 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 22.2.1945.

raped a woman in Lindenhagen near Cosel on 2 February 1945, shot out of hand a Red Army soldier who condemned this act. At another location, as testified to by a captured Second Lieutenant of the 287th Infantry Division, several Soviet officers were shot by inflamed Red Army soldiers for "trying to intervene on behalf of the civilian population and to prevent the excesses."⁴²

There are reports of tank crews who warned the residents of the cruelty of the following units,⁴³ and there were always Soviet officers and soldiers who helped women and children or distributed bread to them. Shining examples of humanity were set by Captain Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and Major Lev Kopelev, who paid for their intervention on behalf of the mistreated civilian populations of East Prussia with years of deportation to the concentration camps of the GULag, having been accused and convicted of "bourgeois humanitarian propaganda, sympathizing with the enemy population, and slandering the Soviet military leadership."⁴⁴ This series of cruel occurrences was described in prosaic form for posterity by the later Nobel Prize winner Alexandr Solzhenitsyn in his publication "East Prussian Nights."⁴⁵

Soviet officers occasionally succeeded in intervening against the uniformed criminals, in some cases because they had superiors who felt the same, since a great deal always depended upon the "attitude of the particular commander." Attitudes were not unanimous, even in the "Duchachina" 91st Guards Infantry Division. Horrible atrocities were committed at Germau and the surrounding vicinity by the 275th Guards Infantry Regiment, including the divisional staff,⁴⁶ although no murders or rapes at all were reported in localities like Willkau, occupied by other units of the same division. When one newly assigned commanding officer was informed of the many crimes committed in Germau, he issued orders, including to sentries surrounding the church, that mistreatment of women would no longer be permitted: "otherwise it will be necessary for you to fire on your own men." Conditions in the 72nd Infantry Division, commanded by war criminal Major General Yastrebov, were quite different. For example, the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment committed serious atrocities, while Soviet soldiers in the 3rd Battalion of the 187th Infantry Regiment were warned against the commission of any criminal acts against civilians.⁴⁷

42 *Ibid.*, 23.3.1945.

43 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 11.3.1945; *Vertreibung und Vertreibungsverbrechen*, pp. 25, 27.

44 Zayas, *Die Anglo-Amerikaner und die Vertreibung*, pp. 88f.

45 Solzhenitsyn, *Ostpreußische Nächte*.

46 BA-MA, RH 2/2687, 15.2.1945.

But all things considered, these appear to have been exceptional cases. The Chief of the Foreign Armies East Branch of the General Staff of the German Army, Major General Gehlen, whose agencies gathered all relevant reports, reported the "correct behaviour" of Soviet officers and soldiers in individual cases, but felt simultaneously compelled to add that "a large proportion of the officers tacitly tolerated excesses, and very often even committed them personally".⁴⁷ Captain Beliakov, the Commander of the 1st Battalion of the 510th Infantry Regiment of the 154th Infantry Division of the 2nd Army of the Guards of the 3rd White Russian Front, mentioned above, deserted to German troops on 10 February 1945 at Dulzen near Pr. Eylau because, as he explained: "I could no longer stand by and watch the way Soviet soldiers treated the German civilian populations in the areas we conquered."⁴⁸ Captain Beliakov, who had already shot a sergeant of his battalion and another Soviet soldier caught in the act of brutally raping a totally deranged minor girl in a remote barn, believed that he could only escape forthcoming arrest by the military counter intelligence SMERSH (under Colonel General of State Security Abakumov) by deserting to the Germans.

47 BA-MA, RH 2/2684, 15.2.1945.

48 BA-MA, RH 2/2685, 3.3.1945.



Conclusions

The German-Soviet war was inevitable. The only open question was which of the two competing powers would strike first to preempt its adversary. The rapidly increasing superiority and strength of Soviet armaments, especially in tanks, aircraft, and artillery, over the troops of the Wehrmacht, dispersed over all parts of Europe, led the Germans to view June 1941 as the last possible opportunity for German initiation of preventive war. Further delay would have eroded the only factor favouring the Germans, which was their level of training. The most recent discoveries in Soviet archives illustrate the extent to which Soviet military preparation and deployment had in fact already been completed. To all appearances, Stalin moved the attack date forward from 1942 to the months of July-September 1941. This would offer a plausible explanation of Stalin's desire to postpone the initiation of hostilities "even if only for... a month, a week, or a few days," to complete his own military preparations—without the slightest fear of German attack. Soviet research has also arrived at the conclusion that the "military struggle against Germany might have begun in July 1941."¹

The actual strength of the Soviet army remained unknown to the Germans, although they obviously recognized that preparations for an attack were taking place on their eastern border. The German command authorities were nevertheless surprised by the enemy potential encountered in the East after 22 June 1941. Statements alleged to have been made by Hitler, and confirmed by Goebbels in his diaries, indicate that the decision to attack would have been much more difficult to make had Hitler been aware of the full strength of the Red Army. The results for Germany, and the rest of Europe, if Hitler had not given the order to attack on 22 June 1941—if Stalin, on the contrary, had been permitted to initiate his planned war of extermination in Europe—are best left to the imagination. This does not, of course, constitute a justification of the politically and morally detrimental methods employed by Hitler in Russia (and Poland). Hitler planned a war of conquest, too. The National Socialist war on the Soviet Union was con-

¹ Mel'juchov, "Spory vokrug 1941, goda," pp. 104ff.

ducted in the spirit of a statement once made by Benjamin Disraeli, the Earl of Beaconsfield: "The racial question is the key to world history." It should be borne in mind, in this regard, that, by the very nature of things, no conflict between the National Socialist German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, could possibly resemble an "ordinary" war; the war was inevitably fated to acquire extraordinary features from the very outset. Militarily speaking, the great initial successes of the troops of the Wehrmacht and their rapid penetration of Soviet territory resulted in an underestimation of Soviet strength and powers of resistance which ultimately proved fatal.

Stalin's intent was to destroy the forces of the Wehrmacht concentrated on his western border in several heavy blows constituting one huge attack operation; he was not even swayed from this concept by Hitler's preventive attack. Stalin and the Soviet leadership, in full awareness of the enormous superiority of the Soviet Union, and quite well-informed as to the many weaknesses of the Wehrmacht, fighting on two fronts, retained an absolute confidence in the certainty of victory, even after 22 June 1941. These illusions only evaporated after the unexpectedly successful German attack. After a brief phase of lethargy, however, the Bolshevik regime (Stalin, the Politburo, and the newly-founded State Defence Committee) proclaimed a "patriotic war," the radicalism of which made the so-called "total war" proclaimed in Germany only after the defeat at "Stalingrad" appear a mere figure of speech.

Stalin's initial concern, and that of the STAVKA was, essentially, to restore the stability of the wavering front. This was achieved through the ruthless application of the tried-and-true Stalinist methods: first, utterly shameless propaganda, and, secondly, the most brutal terror. The system was as simple as it was effective: anyone who did not believe the propaganda, experienced the terror. Of course, the Soviet leadership was perfectly well aware that any attempt to inspire Soviet soldiers with "ardent and self-sacrificing Soviet patriotism," with "limitless dedication to the cause of the Communist Party," with enthusiasm and "endless love for the Party and government, for Great Comrade Stalin," and whatever other words might come to mind, would be doomed to failure. The solution was believed to lie in a far deeper, more wide-ranging, appeal to the baser instincts. It was considered necessary to generate feelings of hatred and thirst for vengeance against the foreign invader, against the "fascists"—the German occupier and German allies. In this respect, Soviet propaganda, with decisive assistance from Ilja Ehrenburg, was to descend to a level of primitive baseness and degeneracy which could hardly be surpassed.

The primary necessity was to generate an atmosphere of fear and terror in the Red Army and Navy by creating conditions which would leave Soviet soldiers and sailors no choice but to fight and die—"to the last bullet," "to the last drop of blood"—for the "Soviet homeland" (whatever that might mean), "for the Party and government," "for our beloved Stalin." Contrary to the allegations of certain German historians,² the possibility of escape through surrender to the Germans, or German-allied armies, never for a moment existed where members of the Red Army were concerned. In this regard, Stalin, Molotov, and other leading Soviet officials, including Soviet woman Ambassador Kolontay, never left the slightest doubt in anyone's mind. The Soviet Union was the only country in the world to denounce the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, and had refused to ratify the 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. In the Soviet Union, the concept of "prisoner of war" was simply unknown. The provisions of Soviet military law and the *Ugolovnyj kodeks* (Soviet Criminal Code) only recognized the terms deserter and traitor, flight to class-enemy occupied territory and anti-Soviet collaboration with the enemy. The Soviet Air Force is known to have carried out deliberate bombing attacks against columns of Soviet prisoners of war. The principle of brutal retaliation against the families and relatives of Soviet prisoners of war, including shootings, was also standard practice.

The measures taken to prohibit flight into captivity were also accompanied by other measures intended to prevent flight to the rear. A system of spying and surveillance by the political apparatus, by the NKVD organizations of the Special Departments and their spies operating in secrecy, by terrorist activities of blocking units, by military tribunals as well as by the measures announced in Stalin Orders nos. 270 and 227 was intended to leave Soviet soldiers no alternative. All this is inconceivable in the armed forces of any other state. But this—plus the mass shootings of soldiers and even members of the command authorities, including many generals up to the rank of Commander-in-Chief of the Front—generated the state of mind which continues to be praised as the "mass heroism" and "Soviet patriotism" of the "Great Patriotic War." Generally speaking, bravery and contempt for death are common characteristics of Russian soldiers in any case. But true heroism is not generated by terror. The casualties resulting from driving Soviet soldiers forward into enemy machine gun fire, like cattle, were horrendous, amounting, during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War of

2 The facts of the matter were turned upside down in a paper by Attorney-General Streim as late as 1991; see Streim, "Das Völkerrecht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen."

1939-40, to at least five times the casualty rate inflicted upon the Finns. "Human life must not be spared": such was the Stalinist motto upon which the Soviet military strategy was based, even where Soviet soldiers and civilians were concerned.

In describing the Stalinist war of extermination, it proved inevitable, no matter how delicate the entire topic may be, to make a brief comparison between the mass killings perpetrated by the Stalinist regime on the grounds, oversimplifying somewhat, of class struggle, and those of the Hitler regime, committed on the grounds of racial struggle. These politically-ideologically motivated crimes, which have no equal in the history of the world, were committed, in part, as a result of the propaganda war conducted parallel to the military conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany. It must, of course, be borne in mind, if a proper sense of proportion is to be maintained, that, in the unanimous opinion of all persons having studied the matter, the Soviet authorities killed at least 40 million people even before the murder squads of the Reichsführer SS ever even could go into action. Kolyma, with its three million deaths, was only one of the central concentration camps in the system of the GULag, preceding Auschwitz in time. In accordance with Stalin's orders, the shootings of real or imagined political adversaries began in all parts of the country—in Eastern Poland, in the Baltic States, in White Russia, the Ukraine, in Greater Russia, and finally in the Caucasus—immediately following the beginning of the German-Soviet War. The Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and SD, which began to shoot the totally innocent Jewish population in so-called retaliation for the Soviet massacres already committed in Lemberg and leaving a trail of blood throughout the country, simply followed in the footsteps of the NKVD. Hugo von Hofmannsthal has stressed that the Austrians and Germans of the occupation regiments of the Commander-in-Chief for the East during the First World War acted in a spirit of justice for all, including the Jewish populations—which were very pro-German. The events now taking place in the occupied eastern territories would have been quite inconceivable under the *ancien régime* of the Kaiser, and were the expression of a new age of barbarism. In any case, these actions had no precedent in German tradition, and they were carried out without the knowledge or even approval of the German population.

A series of murder locations have acquired particular significance in the war of German-Soviet propaganda. Lemberg, Kiev, Khar'kov, Minsk, are symbolic of the crimes of the two belligerents, although in differing respects. Beria was responsible for Katyn and Vinica, while Himmler was responsible for Majdanek and Auschwitz, their superiors being Stalin and Hitler respectively. The concentration camps of the system of the GULag

nevertheless lay outside the eastern theatre of war, and were therefore not taken into consideration in this context. The Soviet Union, initially on the defensive both militarily and politically, appears to have been increasingly successful in regaining ground, politically, when the anti-Jewish excesses of the Einsatzgruppen came to light during the German withdrawal. An "Extraordinary State Commission" was created to serve as the suitable instrument for the concealment of Bolshevik crimes and for the propaganda exploitation of fascist crimes. Katyn and Vinica were mendaciously represented to the normally well informed Allied Governments as "fascist" crimes. The endless mass graves of Bykovnia, Darnica, and Bielhorodka, with their hundreds of thousands of victims, in the vicinity of Kiev, disappeared behind the propaganda smokescreen of Babij jar—the Ravine of the Old Woman—which nevertheless continues to cast up certain unsolved riddles. The massacre of the NKVD and its Chekist predecessors at Khar'kov, Minsk, and Lemberg were also concealed by the Soviet propaganda roaring about the "fascist crimes" also committed there.

Soviet propaganda gained the upper hand after the further advance of Soviet troops into the concentration camps of the General Gouvernement of Poland, particularly, Auschwitz and Majdanek, in late 1944/early 1945. The locations of horror in the extermination camps of Poland, immediately exploited with self-satisfaction by the "Extraordinary State Commission," appeared to confirm all previous Soviet allegations and made a devastating impression, particularly in the Allied countries. That the numbers of victims were exaggerated in this context was irrelevant within the dispute and is still considered irrelevant. Today, it is considered almost a criminal offence "to speak of Jewish losses as having been horrendously exaggerated."³ Historians are particularly disturbed by this situation, since it means that they are caught between a system of political justice and spying and informants on the one hand, and their professional duty to the truth on the other hand, *i.e.*, their duty to determine the number of victims with the greatest possible

3 The efforts of the political parties to restrict the legally guaranteed freedom of scientific research are gradually taking on truly grotesque proportions. The result, as Eckhard Fuhr correctly remarks, would be that controversies relating to contemporary history would, in future, be laid before the court, and decided by criminal courts according to criminal law; see Fuhr, "Die Lüge verbieten?" (Forbidding the Lie?); see also chapter 7, note 51. According to Friedrich Karl Fromme, "A proviso for scientific research was noted" by the legislators. "This was an attempt to counter the objection that future historical research would have to steer a course between the warning lights of criminal punishment." Nevertheless, in his opinion, "criminal law [is] in conflict with the freedom of expression of dissenting opinion"; see Fromme, "Strafrecht gegen Unverstand" (Criminal Law vs. Failure to Understand). According to Dr. Ernst Nolte, "The law against the Auschwitz Lie, given suitable interpretations by the courts, signifies a danger to intellectual freedom in Germany"; see Nolte, "Ein Gesetz für das Außergesetzliche" (A Law for Matters Standing Outside the Law).

accuracy: Hans Delbrück, for good reason, stressed the demand for strict critical analysis of figures; even Friedrich Engels once called the statesman Adolphe Thiers a “big swindler” because of the alleged incorrectness of all of his numerical statements.

With regards to the losses in life caused by the Anglo-American air raids on the open city of Dresden in February 1945, mentioned purely for purposes of example, the minimum figure of 35,000, dictated by the Soviet occupation authorities on political grounds in early 1945, continues to be quoted to this day, even though the municipal administration of the regional capital of Dresden, in a letter dated 31 July 1992, described a figure of 250,000 - 300,000 deaths, mostly women and children, as “realistic,” based on “proven data.”⁴ With regards to the losses in human life occurring in Auschwitz extermination camp, however, the maximum figure of four million deaths continues to be considered valid, although the figure can be proven to originate from the Soviet NKVD. The number of victims at Auschwitz was, however, seriously reduced in 1990, and now amounts to 631,000 to 711,000 according to the latest reports; this is, of course, just as frightful, but appears to be approaching a realistic order of magnitude.⁵ That the figure of 74,000 supported by the documents, only relates to a part of the actual total, cannot be doubted. Generally, however, the mere fact that it can be proven to have been none other than the perpetrator of crimes against humanity, Ilja Ehrenburg, who first mentioned the figure of Six Million Jewish victims of National Socialism on 22 December 1944, and then introduced that figure into Soviet propaganda, must nevertheless give rise to caution. How, one must ask, did he arrive at this figure? Auschwitz concentration camp with its four to five million deaths—or so we were told—was only captured by Soviet troops on 27 January 1945! This question remains unanswered.

Stalin’s war of extermination, by contrast, began with the mass murders at Lemberg in June 1941, although he only used the term personally on the 24th anniversary of the “Great Socialist Revolution” for the first time on November 6, 1941. The murders of German prisoners of war, which began spontaneously on 22 June 1941 along the entire front, were not, as often

4 Saxon Capital Dresden, Municipal Administration, 31.7.1992.

5 A letter to the editor from Thilo Bode in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 1.9.1994 refers to Dr. Franciszek Piper, who, in his book, *The Number of Auschwitz Victims — Based on the Sources and 1945-1990 Research Findings*, makes it clear that the “majority of scientific publications” on Auschwitz uncritically continue to disseminate the figure of 4 million (established by the NKVD). The last word on the number of victims, which has already been drastically reduced several times, has not yet been spoken, even today; see Bode, “Nochmals: Die Zahl der Opfer von Auschwitz” (Yet Again: the Number of Auschwitz Victims).

alleged, in reprisal for the Commissar guidelines, which were unknown to the Soviets at the outset, and were furthermore rescinded in May 1942 as a result of protests within the German army. The murders of helpless German prisoners of war, and prisoners from the German-allied armies, were frequently ordered, or at least tolerated, by Soviet officers, often of higher rank, although many command agencies repeatedly, and in vain, attempted to prohibit the arbitrary shooting of prisoners, if only on the grounds of the need to capture Germans for reconnaissance purposes. But what could one expect of the mass of Soviet soldiers if they were incited to "kill all German invaders," "just destroy them," "fulfilling this humanitarian mission," in continuation of "the work of Pasteur," "the work of all those scientists" having "discovered the means of destroying all deadly microbes"—to "put the Germans underground," or, quite simply, "wipe them off the face of the earth"—all in the space of just a few days, by the front propaganda led by someone like Ilja Ehrenburg? In view of the genocidal attitude generated in the Red Army—an attitude which was not directed against "fascists" at all, but rather, against all Germans—it was very difficult (and very often quite dangerous) for the moderate segments of the Soviet command agencies to attempt to stop the unrestrained activities.

Following the breakthrough of Soviet troops into the territory of the German Reich in October 1944, the victims of inflamed soldateska, often incited by their officers, were no longer limited to defenceless German prisoners of war, but rather included German civilians, men, women, and children. At least 120,000 German civilians were killed outright, and at least 100-200,000 others perished in Soviet prisons and camps. More than 250,000 civilians died during or after deportation to the Soviet Union for slave labour, while innumerable others simply starved to death: 90,000 in Königsberg alone. A total of 2.2 million "unexplained" fatalities are estimated to have occurred in the subsequent "deportation regions," fatalities which must, for the most part, upon a closer examination, be viewed as "victims of terrorism," *i.e.*, anti-German genocide. The internationally known expert, Prof. Dr. Dr. de Zayas,⁶ furthermore, considers that the actual number of victims may have been lower—"while it may also have been higher"—than the official figure of 2,379,000 "deaths testified to by eyewitnesses", plus unexplained fatalities." The Soviet Commanders-in-Chief at the Front, who had themselves personally called for acts of revenge, soon found themselves compelled to intervene against the descent into savagery

6 Zayas, "Die deutschen Vertreibungsoffer schwer zu zählen." (Number of Expulsion Victims Difficult to Count).

and sadism on the part of considerable numbers of their troops. All such efforts nevertheless remained without effect in view of the anti-German hate propaganda, which, under the Ehrenburg's leadership, continued unabated until shortly before the end of the war, culminating in the demand to "put an end to Germany," as well as in a demand, which Ehrenburg considered "modest and honourable," to "reduce the German population," in which case the only decision that remained to be made was whether it was preferable to "kill the Germans with axes or clubs."

Stalin personally was fully aware of all these monstrous measures and procedures; it was he who personally ordered them; it was he who bore immediate responsibility for them. This is clear from an order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, signed by Stalin and the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Antonov, on 20 April 1945, which speaks of the "cruel measures" of the Soviet armed forces—not on humanitarian grounds, or out of any concern for international law, but purely and simply on the basis of political considerations. As explained by Professor Semiryaga,⁷ this order from the STAVKA, signed by Stalin, constitutes an admission that Stalin personally considered the acts of the Red Army to be cruel, "both against prisoners of war and the civilian population."

The German-Soviet conflict, conducted by both powers as a war of extermination, each in its own way, would have represented an absolute low in German-Russian relations had there not, despite everything, been an aspect of hope. During the initial phase of the war, the friendship with which a large proportion of the Soviet population greeted the German troops is quite obvious—if not in the large industrial centres, then at least in the cities and villages of the steppes and plains generally. This was true of the Baltic States and Eastern Poland, of White Russia and the Ukraine, of Greater Russia as far as Smolensk and beyond, of the Crimea in 1942, and even of the Caucasus. "The further east we go," reported the Supreme Command of the Army on 12 July 1941, "the friendlier the attitude of the civilian population towards the German Wehrmacht seem to be, particularly in the countryside."⁸ In many localities, the Germans were actually welcomed as liberators. But even where this was not directly true, even where the population merely greeted the Germans with amicable reserve or expectant curiosity, the situation was still in absolute contradiction to official Soviet doctrine. Unjustified requisitions and, in certain cases, plundering and other excesses by German soldiers, against which the German command authori-

7 Semiryaga, "Wie Berijas Leute in Ostdeutschland die 'Demokratie' errichteten," p. 744.

8 BA-MA, RH 24-3/134, 12.7.1941.

ties naturally intervened,⁹ led to disillusionment in certain areas without, however, seriously disturbing the reciprocal relationship. A sudden change in the attitude of the population set in with further developments. This change in attitude resulted from the absence of any constructive German occupation programme, combined with many repressive measures and irresponsible actions in reprisal for the actions of partisans in guerrilla warfare. This partisans warfare was, of course, illegal under international law and was initiated by the Soviets in a spirit of cold calculation. The persecution of the Jews may also have made a greater impression on many segments of the Russian population than the Germans were aware. It should, however, be noted that the areas controlled by the German Army and Wehrmacht, despite many injustices, often contrasted very favourably with other zones under German civilian administration. Army Group A, for example, assigned to the Caucasus, was granted full political authority: the result was that relations with the minority nationalities living in the region, the Cossacks as well as Russians, were extremely positive. In the Caucasus, the foundations of preliminary forms of independent states for these nationalities, including a Cossack state, were even laid with German assistance.

When it is furthermore recalled that, regardless of all the Soviet deterrent terror and horror propaganda, a total of no less than 3.8 million Soviet soldiers, from enlisted men up to the rank of generals, surrendered to the Germans in 1941 alone—a total of 5.3 during the entire war—it becomes clear how favourable the prospects for a political and military cooperation between the “Russians” and the “Germans” actually were. The unconditional precondition for such cooperation, would, however, have been the recognition of Russia as a German-allied state. The essential preconditions for Russian cooperation with the Germans against the Stalinist regime were stated, from the very beginning of the war and throughout the years that followed, by Soviet officers of all ranks in German captivity, including a considerable number of Army Commanders-in-Chief, corps and divisional commanders. These conditions were: the formation of a “Russian national government and Russian army of liberation under entirely Russian leadership,” the “actual recognition of a Russian national government,” and their “own national liberation army.” Soviet officers and commanders stating these requirements included the Commanders-in-Chief of the 22nd (20th) Army, Lieutenant General Ershakov; of the 5th Army, Major General Potapov; of the 12th Army, Major General Ponedelin; of the 19th Army,

9 The commanding general of the III (Motorized) Army Corps, Cavalry General von Mackensen, warned his troops on July 27, 1941, that he would punish excesses against the population with “the severest penalties, if needs be, by court martial”; *ibid.*, 27.7.1941.

Lieutenant General Lukin; of the 3rd Army of the Guards, Major General Krupennikov, and other military leaders, of whom the following deserve particular mention: Generals Abranidze, Alaverdov, Besonov, Egorov, Kirillov, Kirpichnikov, Kulikov, Ogurtsev, Sibir, Snegov, Tkachenko.

It was Hitler who destroyed the attractive possibilities of a German-Russian alliance, substituting "racial-ideological" principles for realistic negotiation, as a result of which his policy of conquest, oppression, and exploitation was doomed to failure. And yet, although they never received the slightest concession, a small group of Soviet generals as well as hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers, trusting in an ultimate, inevitable change in German attitude, decided to take up the struggle on the side of Germany. These generals included the Representative Commander-in-Chief of the Volkhov front, Lieutenant General Vlassov; Army Commissar and temporary leader of the 32nd Army Zhilenkov; and Major Generals Artsezo (Assberg), Blagoveshchensky, Bogdanov, Malyshkin, Shapovalov, Sevastianov, Trukhin, and Zakutny.

The resulting military cooperation, arising from the most insignificant beginnings in 1941 and contrary to Hitler's original intentions, was also, politically speaking, perhaps the most positive phenomenon of the German-Soviet war. Although political considerations may have been less decisive than military considerations on the German side, at least initially, the deployment of these volunteer units, consisting of members of all nationalities of the Soviet Union, was the only way in which Hitler's efforts in the East, doomed to failure, could successfully be countered. Hitler declared on 8 June 1943 that he will never build a Russian army, since that would mean abandoning "complete control over the war aims from the very outset."¹⁰ The creation of volunteer units, however, conducted with the support of nearly all Commanders-in-Chief and commanding officers of the Army of the East and Central Army Agencies with the *de facto* cooperation of the responsible Group Leader II in the Organizational Division of the General Staff of the Army, Major on the General Staff Count von Stauffenberg, could no longer be countermanded, and now acquired, on the contrary, new momentum. National armies of liberation were now created, recruited from the peoples of Turkestan and the Caucasus, of the eastern legions of non-Russian minority nationalities of Turkestan, the North Caucasus, Azerbajdzian, Georgia, Armenia, and Volga Tatars. Units of Crimean

10 *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen*, p. 257 (conference of Hitler with Field Marshal Keitel and General Zeitler, 8th June 1943, on the Berghof).


Tatars, of Kalmuck and Cossack cavalry corps, now arose to liberate the Cossacks of the Don, Kuban, Terek, and Siberia, parallel with a Ukrainian liberation army in divisional strength.

All soldiers of Russian nationality within the structure of the German army after 1943 could consider themselves members of a Russian Liberation Army, although it existed in name only. But with the creation of the Committee for the Liberation of the Russian Peoples (KONR) in Prague on November 1944, a Russian Liberation Army (ROA) actually came into being, with its own Supreme Command and all arms of the service, including a small air force, referred to as the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Russian Peoples (VS KONR). General Vlassov, as Chairman of the Committee—equivalent to a government-in-exile—also became the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of a Russian national army which was entirely independent, both *de jure* and *de facto*, and simply allied with the German Reich. Thus was Hitler's stated principle turned upside-down. If, as Alexandr Solzhenitsyn writes, hundreds of thousands, but in reality, as we know, one million Soviet soldiers of all ranks took up the struggle against their own government on the side of the enemy, in a war described as a "great patriotic struggle," the reason for it lay, not in any variety of treason, no matter how that word may be defined, but rather, in an elementary political phenomenon which never before existed on such a scale at any time in history. This unique historical phenomenon would, in itself, suffice to refute the mindless catchword of the unlimited validity of a so-called "Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism."

The war between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was conducted with methods reflecting their ideology on both sides. After the battle of Kiev in 1941, Stalin personally ordered Beria in the Kremlin to spare no means in the generation of "hate, hate, and more hate." On 6 November 1941, he expressly proclaimed a war of extermination against the German Reich. Ultimately, however, it was the soldiers on both sides who bridged this gap of hatred for the first time. "In the years of the common struggle," General Vlassov announced to his troops upon assuming Supreme Command on the Münsingen drill ground on 10 February 1945,¹¹ "a friendship arose between the Russian and German peoples. The errors committed on both sides, as well as their means of rectification, prove the existence of common interests. The main thing is the trust, the mutual trust, in the task of both sides. I wish to thank all German and Russian officers having participated in the deployment of this unit." These were expres-

¹¹ BA-MA, RH2/v. 921. 10.2.1945.

sions hardly ever before heard in this war of extermination. Vlassov closed his speech, which was joyfully received, with the following appeal: "Long live the friendship between the Russian and German peoples! Long live the soldiers and officers of the Russian Army!" Hitler and Stalin were never even mentioned with as much as a single word. The Russian liberation movement, which also pursued the objective of a renewed Germany, naturally failed, as a result of the unfavourable turn of events in 1945, but it was not in vain; nor were the failed attempts at liberation in the history of other peoples, bequeathing a particularly brilliant power of example to the annals of history.



Appendix

Abbreviations

(b)	bol'shevikov, of the Bolsheviks
BA	Bundesarchiv, German Federal Archives, (Coblentz)
BA-MA	Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, German Federal Archives-Military Archives (Freiburg/Potsdam)
CIC	Counter-Intelligence Corps
CSR	Československa Republika, Czechoslovakian Republic
Gestapo	Geheime Staatspolizei, Secret State Police
GKO	Gosudarstvennyj Komitet Oborony, State Defence Committee
GPU	Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, State Political Administration
GULag	Glavnoe Upravlenie Ispravitel'no-Trudovych Lagerej, Main Administration of Labour Improvement Camps
GUPPKA	Glavnoe Upravlenie Politiceskoj Propagandy Krasnoj Armii, Main Administration for Political Propaganda of the Red Army
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti, Committee for State Security
Komsomol	Kommunisticheskij Sojuz Molodezh, Communist Youth Association
KONR	Komitet Osvobozhdenija Narodov Rossii, Committee for the Liberation of the Russian Peoples
MG	Machine Gun
MGB	Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti, Ministry for State Security
MGFA	Militär-geschichtliches Forschungsamt, Research Department for Military History of the German Bundeswehr
MSB	Mediko - Sanitarnyj Batal'on, Medical Battalion
MVD	Ministerstvo Vnutrennich Del, Ministry of the Interior
Narkomindel	Narodnyj Komissariat Inostrannich Del, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
NKFD	Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, National Committee for a Free Germany
NKGB	Narodnyj Komissariat Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti, People's Commissariate for State Security
NKO	Narodnyj Komissariat Oborony, People's Commissariat for Defence
NKVD	Narodnyj Komissariat Vnutrennich Del, People's Commissariat for the Interior

NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, National Socialist German Worker's Party
OKH	Oberkommando des Heeres, Supreme Command of the Army
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
PAAA	Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Political Archive of the Foreign Office
Politruk	Politicheskij rukovoditel', Political Leaders
PPM	Punkt Pervoj Medicinskoj Pomosci, Point of Medical First Aid
RKKA	Raboche-Krestjanskaja Krasnaja Armija, Red Worker's and Farmer's Army
ROA	Russkaja Osvoboditel'naja Armija, Russian Liberation Army
RSFSR	Rossijskaja Sovetskaja Federativnaja Socialisticheskaja Respublika, Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic
SD	Sicherheitsdienst, Security Service
SMA	Soviet Military Administration
SMERSH	"Smert Shpionam!", "Death to Spies!", Counter-Espionage
SNK	Sovet Narodnych Komissarov, Council of People's Commissars
SS	Schutzstaffel, Protection Detachment
SSR	Sovetskaja Socialisticheskaja Respublika, Socialist Soviet Republic
SSSR	Sojuz Sovetskich Socialisticheskich Respublik, Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
STAVKA	Main Headquarters, former Russian designation for the Command Post of the Commanders-in-Chief
TASS	Telegrafnoe Aгенstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza, Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union
TOR	Tuapskij Oboronitel'nyj Rajon, Defence Region of Tuapse
Cheka	Chrezvychajnaja Komissija po bor'be s Kontrevoljuciej i sabotzhem, Extraordinary Commission for the Combating of Counter-revolution and Sabotage
VKP (b)	Vsesojuznaja Kommunisticheskaja Partija (bol'shevikov), All-Union Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks)
VS KONR	Vooruzhennye Sily, Armed Forces (of the KONR)
Zampolit	Zamestitel' Komandira po Politicheskoi Chasti, Representative of the Commanders in Political Matters
Ia	1 st General Staff Officer (Leadership Division)
Ic	3 rd General Staff Officer (Division for Enemy Intelligence and Counter-Espionage)
Ic/AO	3 rd General Staff Officer (Intelligence Officer)
Ila	Adjutant (Officer personalities)

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Documents

The Soviet war of aggression against Poland.

"Soldiers of the Polish Army! The aristocratic-bourgeois Polish government, which has drawn you into a war of adventure, has obviously fallen. It has proven itself unable to govern the State or to organize a defence. The Ministers and Generals took the gold which was stolen from you, and fled like cowards, abandoning the Army and the entire Polish people to its fate... Do not stand in the way of the Red Army of Workers and Farmers. Resistance is useless and would mean your total destruction... Throw away your weapons!

The Commander-in-Chief of the White Russian Front, Army Commander 2nd Rank Michal Kovalov, 17 September 1939."

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 19 II/15

Rzeczniarze Armii Polskiej!

Państwo-burżuazjny Rząd Polski, wolałowszy Was w awantu-
rystyczną wojnę, pozornie przewaliło się. Ono okazało się bez-
silnym rządzić krajem i zorganizować obronę. Ministrowie i gene-
rałowie, schwycili nagrałione imi złoto, tchórzliwie uciekli, pozostawiają armię i cały lud Polski na wolę losu.

Armia Polska pocierpleła surową porażkę, od którego ona nie
oprawi wstanie się. Wam, waszym żonom, dzieciom, braciom i
siostram ugraża głodna śmierć i zniszczenie.

W to ciężkie dni dla Was potężny Związek Radziecki wyciąga
Wam ręce braterskiej pomocy. Nie przeciwcie się Robotniczo-
Chłopskiej Armii Czerwonej. Wasze przeciweństwo bez korzyści
i przerzeczono na całą zgubę. My idziemy do Was nie jako zdo-
bry, a jako wasi bracia po klasę, jako wasi wyzwolenicy od
ucisku obszarników i kapitalistów.

Wielka i niezwołczona Armia Czerwona niesie na swoich
szfandarach procującym, braterstwo i szczęśliwe życie.

Rzeczniarze Armii Polskiej! Nie proliwacie doemnie krwi za
cudze Wam interesy obszarników i kapitalistów.

Was przymuszają uciskać białorusinów, ukraińców. Rządzące
kole Polskie sieją narodową rużność między polakami, białorusinami
i ukraińcami.

Pamiętajcie! Nie może być swobodny naród, uciskający drugie
narody. Pracujące białorusini i ukraińcy—Wasl procujące, a nie
wrogli. Razem z nimi budujcie szczęśliwe dorobkowe życie.

Rzucajcie broń! Przechodźcie na stronę Armii Czerwonej.
Wam zabezpieczona swoboda i szczęśliwe życie.

*Naczelný Dowódcá Białoruskiego frontu
Komandarm Drugiej kangi Michal KOWALOW.*

17 września 1939 roku.

The Soviet war of aggression against Finland.

Introductory terror attacks by the Soviet Air Force upon residential districts of Finnish cities in 1939 (according to data from the Finnish General Staff).

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 19 III/381

O Qu IV
 Berlin, den 15. 2. 1940.

Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost/II
 Nr. 922/40 geb.

Geheim

Secr. Gruppenkon:
 15. FEB. 1940 g. 1172
 Beh. T. 1

al. III/16

Kohler

Die russischen Luftoperationen gegen Finnland
von Kriegsbeginn bis Mitte Januar 1940.

(Nach zuverlässigen Nachrichten.)

Bisher lassen sich drei Operationsabschnitte unterscheiden:

- 1) der einleitende Luftschlag 30.11. - 1.12.39
- 2) Angriffsabschnitt 19. - 26.12.39
- 3) Angriffsabschnitt 10. - 17. 1.40.

1) Der einleitende Luftschlag 30.11. - 1.12. erstrebte die moralische Einwirkung auf die unvorbereitete Zivilbevölkerung. Die Ziele waren daher in erster Linie die Wohnteile von Städten (Helsingfors, Hangö, Kotka, Lahti, Wiborg), erst in zweiter Linie Industriezentren (Kymi- und Vuoksenindustrie) und Knotenpunkte (Antrea, Kouvola). Alle Angriffsziele lagen in der Peripherie (Süden, Südosten) Finnlands.

Der Einsatz von Maschinen war gering und überstieg an keinen der ersten Angriffstage insgesamt 150. Am ersten Tage wurde die finnische Abwehr überrumpelt. Nur 4 Maschinen wurden abgeschossen. Am zweiten Tage jedoch stieg die Abschussziffer auf 21, davon 11 durch Jagdflieger.

An den Fla-Abschüssen haben gewöhnliche s.M.Gs. einen großen Anteil, hervorgerufen durch die niedrige Flughöhe infolge 5 - 800 m tiefer Schlechtwetterstratusdecke.

Obwohl die Menschenverluste unter der Zivilbevölkerung groß waren (etwa 120 Tote, 181 Verwandete), wurde das Ziel der Angriffe, die moralische Erschütterung der Zivilbevölkerung, nicht erreicht. Als Erfolg jedoch muß die danach in vollem Umfang einsetzende finnische Evakuierung der Bevölkerungszentren auf das Land und in die kleineren Orte angesehen werden.

Die

The planned Soviet war of aggression against Rumania.

Order of attack no. 001. Staff of the Mechanized Cavalry Group Kolomea, 26.6.40 - 22 hours.

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 19-I/122 (No Russian original available; p. 5 of document translation reproduced on first page for reasons of space.)

157
24

H Qu, 4.18.10.40

Oberkommando des Heeres
Generalstab des Heeres
O Qu IV/Fremde Heere Ost
Nr. 3536/40, Geh.

A.O.: <i>[Signature]</i> K.O.M.: <i>[Signature]</i> Dollm.: P. Nr.: P. Ort:	Freigegeben am 10. Okt 1940 Nr. 1483/40 Hst.
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G e h e i m
R U S S I A N E N

Es werden überhandelt

1.) Ausriffbefehl einer "Mechanisierten Reiter-Gruppe".
 Durch Oberleutnant Kow der Generalstab eines anderen Landes in den Besitz eines russischen Originalbefehls vom Juni 1940. Er ist für russische Befehlshaber typisch und für die Erkenntnis von Abwehrschwachheiten wertvoll. An gekannter Echtheit ist nicht zu zweifeln.

Die russische 12. Armee stand im Sommer 1940 an der Nordwestgrenze der Bukowina in unbekannter Stärke bereit, um die hier stehenden rumänischen Kräfte anzugreifen. Sie wollte hierzu mit Infanterie-Divisionen und Panzerbrigaden den Grenzfluss Gorenz aus überqueren, das Höhengebirge südwestlich Czernowitz gewinnen und sodann von hier aus mit einer nachgeführten schnellen Stoßgruppe (2 Kav. Korps, 6 Panzer-Bat., 1 Mot.-Div.) nach Südosten durchbrechen. Ein dem A.O. H. I. 105 durch Rumänien freiwilligen Verzicht nicht gekommen.

Es liessen begl
 a) Karte 1 : 200 000
 b) Karte zum besseren Verständnis und zur Erkennung des Aufstiegs der Orte. In der Skizze ist die tatsächliche rumänische Aufstellung rot eingezeichnet. Die russischen Formungen sind in Ziffer 1 des Befehls nicht unklar.

- 2 -

c) Gliederung eines russischen Kav. Korps. (Obstabschef des Kav. Korps. in der 1. Kav. Div. (Schab) mit. Ist unbekannt.)
 d) Zusammenfassung einer russischen Kav. Div. (Schab) mit. Ist unbekannt.)
 e) Bitte, die dieser russischen Mot. nach. Brigade über russische Urkunden.

2.) Bericht des deutschen Militärattachés Moskau über russische Urkunden.

Die Generalkommandos der 12. Armee werden gebeten, die beiden Schriftstücke allen Generalen und Generalstabsoffizieren ihres Bezirkes zur Kenntnis zu bringen.

I. A.
[Signature]

"Erteile
 Alle Abt. des Genstabs,
 Stellen des OQu, OQu,
 OQu, OQu und alle Dienststellen bis zu den Generalmajoren."

- 5 -

und alle Kampf- und Transportmaschinen zu übernehmen.

Der Oberbefehlshaber der 12. Armee
 und der nach. Reiter-Gruppe
 Generalmajor Hedin
 Ober d. Stabs der MG
 Generalmajor Hedin
 Das Mitglied des Krieges
 Div. F. 100
 Mikulin

16 Ausfertigungen.

Gruppehaupt R. I. C. Nr. 2/112

Übersetzung

ÜMSG sehen

Besondere wichtig. 1. Ausfertigung.
Angriffsbefehl Nr. 001. Stab der mechanisierten Reiter-Gruppe.
Kolomoa, 26.6.40 - 22.00 Uhr

Karte 1 : 200 000 von 1932.

1.) Die rumänische Armee besteht lt. Agentennachrichten in Gegend Czernowitz aus 7 Inf.Div., einer Geb.Schütz. Brig. und einer Kav.Div.. Von diesen Truppen befinden sich im Abschnitt Wisniz-Bachometh-Hliboka-Woloka etwa 2 Inf.Div. (7.u.d.). Südlich des Abschnitts Sereth Fluss-Storozynetz-Czernowitz-Pruth befinden sich etwa 4-5 Inf.Div. (7.u.6.A.K.). Die Abchnitte an den Flüssen Dnejestr, Pruth und Sereth werden weiter ausgebaut und verstärkt.

Die nächstliegenden feindlichen operativen Reserven sind bei Rodantz, Suczawa, Botseyn und Dornobin anzuhaben.

2.) Die 12. Armee führt den Hauptstoß aus der Linie Popilniki-Snatyn-Sorafino in allgemeiner Richtung auf Czernowitz, Jassy. Sie durchbricht die feindliche Linie Czornobusy-Oroscheny-Sarafino und erzwängt den Einsatz der mech.Reiter-Gruppe zum Durchbruch im Abschnitt Storozynetz-Michalce.

Am Schluß des 3. Tages erreicht die Armee die Linien: Satalnary-Vitkhai-Bereca-Gorjantfi-Pomario-Comarniczi-Kiszla Salijewa.

3.) Die mech.Reiter-Gruppe, bestehend aus dem II. und IV.Kav.Korps, der 81.mot.Div., der 5., 23., 24. Kampfwagenbrigade

12 *) der 26. und 38. Kampfwagenbrigade 7-26, der 10. Kampfwagenbrigade 7-28 und 10 Kampfwagen K.7. **), wird um x Uhr zum Durchbruch antreten und zwar von allgemeinem Abschnitt: Storozynetz - Michalce heraus mit Schwerpunkt auf ihrem rechten Flügel. Allgemeine Stoßrichtung auf Dornobin. Zum Schluß des Tages hat sie den Raum Dornobin-Darobani-Furatesa zu erreichen, sodass sie am Morgen des nächsten Tages in Richtung auf Botseyn vorgehen kann.

Der Beginn der Bewegung in die Durchbruchsstelle findet um x Uhr statt und erfolgt auf Pnax 89 621.

a) Die 81.mot.Div. mit der 23.Kampfwagenbrigade 81 bricht bei Storozynetz auschl.Lachi (?) durch. Sie führt ihren Stoß in Richtung auf Hliboka.Vörfal Gd-pnau. Sie hat den ihr zugehörigen Gegendern Gegendern vernichtet, indem sie verhindert, dass er nach Osten zurückgeht. Sie sichert das Vorgehen der mech.Reiter-Gruppe gegen Feind aus der Richtung des Sereth. Am Ende des 1.Tages hat sie den Raum Vörfal Gd-pnau - Kopolacni-Galinetzi zu erreichen. Durch eine starke Spreitteilung hat sie die Brücken über den Sereth bei Sereth zu nehmen und zu halten.

Sie muss im Auge behalten, dass sie am Morgen des nächsten Tages in allgemeiner Richtung auf Sata Söu (?) vorgehen kann.

Ihre rechte Grenze ist der Sereth, die linke die Linie auschl. Ro Kjud (?), Willawce, auschl.Ko-stetie, auschl.Volova, auschl.Bereca, Vankulisti.

b) Das IV.Kav.Korps mit der 24.Kampfwagenbrigade 87, der 10.Kampfwagenbrigade 7-28 und den 10 Kampfwagen K.7. bricht im Abschnitt Storozynetz auschl.Lachi (?)

*) Die Bezeichnungen 87.7-26 u.7-28 bedeuten die bekannten russischen Kampfwagen-Modelle.
**) K.W. = Klism Koroschniow. Name für den russischen 42 t Tank (7 32, jeit 7 35 genannt).

CO

- 3 -

durch und entwickelt sich hinter der 81. mot. Div. Das Korps besetzt am Schluss des 1. Tages mit seinen Hauptkräften den Raum Bobala-Gorjanski-Berona-Visadni, mit der Panzerbrigade den Raum Filipowic-Ohrana-Doroholu.

Am Morgen des nächsten Tages ist für das Kav. Korps vorgehen in allgemeiner Richtung auf Botosani, Urcaeni vorgesehen. Trennungslinie links ist: Aussehl. Roznow, Willawca, aussehl. Kosterstie, aussehl. Woloka, aussehl. Podmila, Corliwani.

- c) Das II. Kav. Korps mit der 5. Kampfgruppenbrigade 2F und der 30. Kampfgruppenbrigade 1-26 bricht in Abschnitt Ludzi (7) aussehl. Czernewitz durch und führt den Hauptschlag mit seinem linken Flügel in Richtung auf Herta. Am Tagesende hat das Korps folgende Gegend zu erreichen: Kampfgruppenbrigade 1; Darobani; die Hauptkäfte des Kav. Korps: Pombala-Mama-Pundol Herta-Herze-Polana.
- Eins durch das Korps vorausgeschickte starke Vorausabteilung nimmt die Übergänge über den Frath bei Maduti und Nowotlicia in Besitz.

Das Korps hat am Morgen des nächsten Tages den Kampf in allgemeiner Richtung auf Vorniceni, Borsesti, Wynstori (7) zu führen.

- d) Die Trennungslinie links ist der Frath.
- Die 26. Kampfgruppenbrigade 1-26 bildet die Reserve der nach-Reiter-Gruppe. Sie geht hinter dem IV. Kav. Korps vor, und zwar auf dem Wege über Dracynetz, Storozynetz, Klihoka.

Am Abend des 1. Tages versammelt sich die Brigade in der Gegend von Bogostie-Epirul Negru-Mikhilani. Den Luftstreitkräften der 12. Armee fallen in Übersichtsleistung mit dem Armeebefehl der 12. Armee folgende Aufgaben zu:

- a) Wiederhaltung der Feuerstellung, der lebenden Kraft und der Artillerie des Feindes in den Abschnitten von Burtawo (7)-Beresmitze (7), die Rügen Ostl. Willawca-

- 4 -

Zamoitie-Warbows, die Höhen nördl. Woloka, die Höhen westl. Kalinestie und die Truppenansammlungen bei Beroneth-Storozynetz-Klihoka-Czernewitz-Kabestie.

b) Zusammenarbeit mit den Truppen auf dem Kampfplatze.

c) Wiederhalten der feindlichen Luftwaffe auf den Flugplätzen in Raums Storozynetz-Czernewitz-Gotin-Bereth-Doroholu-Botosani-Radautz-Solka-Suczawa-Falica-ni (7).

- d) Verbindern des Ammarsches feindlicher Reserven aus den Richtungen Oberwikkow, Radautz, Doroholu.
- e) Decken der nach-Reiter-Gruppe bei ihrem Vormarsch in die Ausgangsstellung zum Durchbruch und während desselben aus der Luft.
- f) Zerschlagen der feindlichen Truppenführung durch Vernichtung der Drahtverbindungen und durch Angriffe auf feindliche Stäbe.
- g) Deckung der Übergänge über den Czerenez aus der Luft.

- 5.) Der Stab der nach-Reiter-Gruppe geht auf der Strasse Därow, Kosterstie, Kucarsmare, Staneitie vor.

Am Abend des 1. Tages befindet sich der Gruppenstab in Berona. Verbindungen mit den Stäben der Verbände durch Punk, Flugsäuge und Verb. Offiziere. Meldungen durch Passieren der Kontrollabschnitte sind durch Punk zu geben. Diese liegen in Anlage des Kampfbefehls bei. Meldungen über Kämpfe, Lage und Zustand der Truppen sind lt. Tabelle Nr. 1 durch Punk oder Verb. Offiziere zu erstatten.

- Termine zur Einreichung von Sammelmeldungen: Operative und Aufklärungsleistungen: 5,00, 10,00 und 22,00 Uhr. Berichte über Nachschub und andere: 16,00 Uhr.
- 6.) Das Versorgungsbüro befindet sich auf der Eisenbahnstation Kolosna. Nach Erfüllung der Tagesaufgaben sind in dem Versammlungsräumen Vorräte aller Art aufzumüllen

Stalin's Speech on January 13, 1941.

Notes by NKVD major (with the rank of Major General) Murat, on Stalin's speech in the Central Committee of Commanding Officers of the Red Army. The author of the present work was the first to discover and present this important item of proof in 1991.

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 24-24/335 (No original Russian document available.)

Generalkommando XIV. Pz. Korps

X.G.St., den 24. 9. 1941.

Io

Betr.: Wichtiges Beutepapier.

Wichtig.

Der

Panzergruppe 2 - Io/A.O.

Anliegend werden ein Taschenbuch und vier Personalausweise des Majors der NKVD Murat vom Stabe der 21. Armee vorgelegt. Murat wurde am 24.9. als Leiche in einem Waldstück südostwärts Drjukowschtohina (12 km südwestlich Lochwiza) mit tödlichen Verletzungen aufgefunden. An der bezeichneten Stelle sind der Frontstab der Süd-West Front und die Stäbe der 5. und 21. Armee umzingelt und nach starken Widerstand zu grossen Teilen gefangen genommen worden. Unter zahlreichen Leichen wurde auch der Oberbefehlshaber der Süd-West Front, Generaloberst Kirponos, aufgefunden.

Das Taschenbuch des Majors der NKVD Murat enthält Aufzeichnungen über Ausführungen Stalins in einer Sitzung von Truppenkommandeuren der Roten Armee vom 13.1.1941; ferner Aufzeichnungen über Ausführungen Stalins in einer Sitzung der Flieger im Zentral Komité vom 8.2.1941 über das, was in der russischen Luftwaffe veraltet ist und das, was bis zum Jahre 1942 geschaffen werden sollte. Das Taschenbuch ist unzweifelhaft von erheblicher politischer Bedeutung. Entwurf einer Übersetzung der ersten Seite ist beigelegt. Nach persönlicher Prüfung des Kommandierenden Generals ist verantwortliche Übersetzung im Hinblick auf die sich aus dem Text ergebenden besonderen Schwierigkeiten nur durch durchgebildete Kenner der militärischen Fachsprache möglich. Im Hinblick auf etwaige Reproduktion durch Fotokopie dürfte es sich empfehlen das Taschenbuch völlig unverändert zu lassen und keinerlei Einzeichnungen vorzunehmen.

Für das Generalkommando
Der Chef des Generalstabes

Short notes (*Kratkaja Zapis*) on Comrade Stalin's appearance on the occasion of the graduation of students of the Academies of the Red Army in the Kremlin on 5 May 1941. See full translation.

Source: Rossijskij Centr Chranenija i Izucenija Dokumentov Novejsej Istorii, Moscow, f. 588, op. 1.

1.1.1941
№ Ст. 3208

Семанов г.

КРАТКАЯ ЗАПИСЬ ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЯ тов. СТАЛИНА
НА ВЫПУСКЕ ОФИЦЕРОВ АКАДЕМИИ КРАСНОЙ АРМИИ
В КРЕМЛЕ 5 МАЯ 1941 г.

Тов. СТАЛИН в своем выступлении говорил об изменениях, которые произошли в Красной Армии за последние 3 - 4 года, о причинах поражений Франции; почему терпит поражение Англия, а Германия одерживает победы и о том, действительно ли германская армия непобедима.

Товарищи, разрешите мне от имени Советского правительства и Коммунистической Партии поздравить вас с завершением учебы и пожелать успеха в вашей работе.

Товарищи, вы покинули армию 3 - 4 года тому назад, теперь вернетесь в ее ряды и на службу армии. Красная Армия уже не та, что была несколько лет тому назад.

а) Что представляла из себя Красная Армия 3 - 4 года тому назад?

Основным родом войск была пехота. Она была вооружена винтовкой, которая после каждого выстрела перезарядилась, ручными и станковыми пулеметами, гаубицей и пулем., имевшей начальную скорость до 900 метров в секунду.

Самолеты имели скорость 400 - 450 км. в час.

Танки имели тонкую броню, противосталинную пушке 37 мм.

Числа дивизия насчитывала бойцов до 18 тыс. чел., но это не было еще показателем ее силы.

2.

3) Чем стала армия Армия в условиях войны

Мы расскажем о том, как армия, вооруженная современными танками, в то же время все еще остается, что многие танкисты предпочитают значению боя, а не боям и хитростям. Это, в точности, как в военное время. Здесь мы слышим не о современной армии, а о армии в военное время. Но это не совсем то, о чем мы хотим сказать.

В начале войны в Хитин-Гол армия получила роль. Как полковник роль заключается в том, что в первом и во втором случае мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Но в то же время мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Но в то же время мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка.

В то время, что мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка, мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка.

Речь идет о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка.

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4. Чем стала армия Армия в условиях войны

Речь идет о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка.

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5. Чем стала армия Армия в условиях войны

Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка.

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Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка. Мы слышим о том, что армия не имеет ни одного танка.

2.

оцениваются не так, а армиям врагов, с танками, с самолетами, с бронетанками, с артиллерией, с авиацией и с артиллерией, с танками, с самолетами, с бронетанками, с артиллерией, с авиацией.

Эта задача является основной.

Или их можно считать, но в основном роль артиллерии и авиации является основной и не наоборот.

Роль артиллерии и авиации в основном является основной. Она будет развивать успех после прорыва фронта. Она будет прорываться отсюда и сюда, прорываться в прорыв. В случае прорыва, она должна прорываться отсюда и сюда, прорываться в прорыв. В случае прорыва, она должна прорываться отсюда и сюда, прорываться в прорыв.

Эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной.

Я не понимаю, почему это. Почему это произошло, почему это произошло, почему это произошло.

О смысле этого вопроса, почему.

Эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной.

Эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной.

Эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной.

Проложить путь к этому, почему это произошло, почему это произошло, почему это произошло.

Эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной.

Именно поэтому, почему это произошло, почему это произошло, почему это произошло. Именно поэтому, почему это произошло, почему это произошло, почему это произошло.

3. 1/2

А теперь, когда мы уже знаем, почему это произошло, почему это произошло, почему это произошло.

Проложить путь к этому, почему это произошло, почему это произошло, почему это произошло. Проложить путь к этому, почему это произошло, почему это произошло, почему это произошло.

С а р о н о: 1/2/1/2

Эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной, эта задача является основной.

1/2/1/2 - 1/2/1/2

Semyonov K.

ABSTRACT OF COMRADE STALIN'S SPEECH AT THE RED ARMY
ACADEMIES GRADUATION CEREMONY IN THE KREMLIN
ON MAY 5TH, 1941.

In his speech, comrade STALIN talked about the changes which had happened in the Red Army during the last 3-4 years, about the causes of defeat in France, why England faces defeat and Germany wins, about the myth of the invincibility of the German Army.

Comrades, let me on behalf of the Soviet Government and Communist Party congratulate you on the completion of your studies and wish you success in your work.

Comrades, you left the army 3-4 years ago and now join it again and won't recognize it. The Red Army is not the same any more.

a) What was the Army like 3-4 years ago?

The main kind of troops was infantry. It was armed with a rifle which needed to be re-loaded after each shot by hand, hand-operated machine guns, heavy machine guns, a howitzer and a cannon capable of an initial speed of 900 meters per second. The planes had a speed of 400-450 kilometers per hour. The tanks traveled 37 meters per minute and had a cannon resistant thin armor-plating. Our division numbered approximately 18,000 soldiers but it did not show evidence of its strength.

b) What did the Red Army become?

We reconstructed our Army and armed it with modern military equipment. I must underline the fact that many comrades attach too great an importance to what happened at Lakes Khasan and Khalkin-Gol from the military point of view. We had to deal with an outdated army there. Not to mention this is to deceive you.

Certainly, Khasan and Khalkin-Gol had a positive effect. In both cases we won victory over Japan. But we derived the genuine experience of reconstructing our army from the Russian-Finnish War and the modern war in the west.

I mentioned earlier that we have a modern army armed with the newest equipment. What is the Army like nowadays? We used to have 1[?]0 divisions in the Red Army. Now we have 300 divisions. The divisions themselves possess fewer people but they are more mobile. A division which numbered 18,000-20,000 people now numbers 15,000 men.

One third of the total number of divisions are mechanized. You must know about it although it is not being discussed widely. Out of one hundred divisions, two thirds are armored and one third is mechanized. The Army will have 500,000 tractors and trucks in the current year.

Our tanks changed their appearance. Earlier they had thin armor. It is not enough anymore. We need 3-4 times thicker armor now. We have the first line tanks which will break through the front. We also possess the 2nd and 3rd tanks which will accompany the infantry. The firing capacity of the tanks has also been increased.

THE FIRST SPEECH OF COMRADE STALIN AT THE CEREMONY

Let me propose a toast to the executive personnel of the academies, to the chief officers, and to the professors, for bridging the gap in teaching modern equipment.

Why did the gap appear? First, our professors find it easier to teach old equipment with which they are very familiar. In order to instruct students concerning modern equipment, one has to know it well and learn it himself. The professors have to re-learn themselves first. The academies used outdated programs of study.

Second, our military supplying organizations do not provide new equipment to military colleges and academies. The students need this new equipment to learn with in order to bridge the gap in our colleges and academies.

SECOND SPEECH OF COMRADE STALIN AT THE CEREMONY

To the artillerymen's health! Artillery is the most important arm of the service. Artillery is the god of modern war. All the arms of the service have artillery: infantry, tanks, airplanes.

To members of the tank crew's health! Tanks are moving, armor-protected artillery. One can mount artillery up to 130 mm.

To the aviators' health!

There are two types of aviation. Long-range aviation which guards the home front and is used in guerrilla operations, diversion aviation, but it is not that very important in this war. The most important is short-range aviation which was undervalued and was thus neglected. I am speaking about aviation which directly cooperates with artillery, tanks, infantry, and I am talking about fighters, divers, and ground support aircraft.

To cavalrymen's health!

We decreased the number of our cavalry but it is still important and we do possess a certain number.

Cavalry in modern war is extremely important. Cavalry will ensure the success of the offensive after breaking through the front line. It will pursue the enemy's withdrawing troops and will drive wedges into the front line. In particular, the cavalry's urgent task is to pursue the withdrawing enemy's artillery before they occupy new emplacements.

To our signalers' and our renowned infantrymen's health!

I have not mentioned infantry yet. Modern infantry are soldiers clad in armor, members of the tank crews, operators of self-propelled guns.

Now about the importance of self-loaded rifle.

A soldier with one self-loading rifle is equal to three soldiers armed with one old rifle which needed to be re-loaded.

THE THIRD SPEECH OF COMRADE STALIN AT THE CEREMONY

Major-General of the Armored Troops is speaking. He proposes a toast to STALIN'S peaceful foreign policy.

Comrade STALIN – Let me propose an amendment. Peaceful policy ensured peace for our country. Peaceful policy is a good cause. We had put forward an idea for defense for some time until we reconstructed our army and supplied it with modern battle equipment.

Now after we reconstructed the Army and supplied it with modern military equipment when we became strong, we must proceed from defending to attacking.

While defending our country we must act in an offensive way. To move from defense to a military policy of offensive actions. We have to reorganize education, propaganda, agitation, and the press with an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army and a modern army is an offensive army.

Confirmation of the content of Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941.

Three reports independently written by three Soviet officers in German custody confirm the main points of Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941. Compiled by Foreign Army East Branch in the General Staff of the German Army, Colonel on the General Staff Gehlen, to the Representative of the Foreign Office at the OKH / General Staff of the Army.

Source: PAAA Bonn, Handakten Elzdorf, vol. 24

<p>Vertreter des Übergangslagers Amt beim Oberkommando des Heeres (Generalstab des Heeres)</p> <p>— 2279/42 K. —</p> <p>Z.00., den 22. Oktober, 1942</p> <p>Zubehörsprache Stalins am 5. Mai 1941:</p> <p>In der Anlage überreiche ich Übersetzungen von drei Berichten gefangenener sowjetischer Offiziere über die von Stalin am 5. Mai 1941 auf einem Podest hinsichtlich des Abchlusses eines Abkommens zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion im Krasnodar-Gebiet in Krasnodar.</p> <p>Nach den Berichten ist Stalin zur Zeit dieser Rede bereits stark erkrankt und hat in diesem Zustand Kriegserklärungen gegen Deutschland ausgesprochen, die für die Unterbrechung der politischen Zusammenhänge von Wert sein können. Die Berichte sind von den Gefangenen nur dem Ordonnanzniedergeschrieben und können Verletzungen in sich bergen.</p> <p>Die drei voneinander unabhängigen verfaßten Berichte bringen übereinstimmendes Folgendes Zentrale:</p> <p>1.) Aufruf, sich zum Krieg gegen Deutschland bereit zu machen.</p> <p>2.) Ausführungen über Kriegsvorbereitungen der Roten Armee.</p>	<p>3.) Die Aera der Friedenspolitik der Sowjetunion ist verfallen. Ausdehnung der Sowjetunion auf Waffengebiet nach Osten ist nunmehr notwendig. Es lebe die aktive Angriffspolitik der Sowjetunion!</p> <p>4.) Der Kriegszugang steht in nicht allzuferner Zeit bevor.</p> <p>5.) Ausführungen über die großen Kriegsergebnissen der Sowjetunion im Krieg gegen Deutschland.</p> <p>Einer der drei Berichte enthält die bemerkenswerte Forderung, daß der mit Deutschland bestehende Friedensvertrag "nur eine Täuschung und ein Vorwand sei, hinter dem man offen arbeiten könne".</p> <p>Die Berichte haben den Führer vorgelesen.</p> <p>Ich darf in diesem Zusammenhang ferner darauf hinweisen, daß nach hier vorliegenden Berichten die sowjetische Seite seit dem 1. September 1942 Internierten gefangenener sowjetischer Offiziere veröffentlicht nach dem Stalin im Mai 1941 Pläne gegen Deutschland geschickt und einen Erweis von Offizieren gegenüber gehabt habe, jetzt oder nie sei die Gelegenheit, den Kapitalismus zu liquidieren, der Sowjetunion in diesem Kampf werde Deutschland erst</p>
<p>34</p>	<p>34</p> <p>305170</p> <p>Ministerialschreiben</p>

Evidence for aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union against Germany.
 Plan of the Department for Political Propaganda of the Soviet 5th Army in Luck "for politically securing the army—operations during attack", and a survey about the "public sentiment in the General Government" (Poland) and about "the political-moral condition of the German Wehrmacht" from May 1941.

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RW 4/A. 329

<p>Abwehr: Geheint</p> <p>F. S. B.</p> <p>Für die politische Sicherung der Armees-Operationen beim Angriff.</p> <p><u>I. Der politische Zustand (Stimmung) der Armeetruppen.</u></p> <p>Die politische-moralische Stimmung der Armeetruppen ist gesund, widerstandsfähig und leidet nicht abwärts über die Erfüllung der Kampf-aufgaben der Armees- und Operationen haben sich wesentlich gehoben. Aber in manchen Truppenteilen ist die Disziplin noch weit entfernt vom Stand, der von Volkstümlichkeit und Organisationsfähigkeit ausstrahlt, strenger Disziplinarstrafen, Kultur, Erhaltung der Leute und anderer. /Acht./ Die Folgen davon treten während der, zummindest über die politische-moralische Arbeit die Qualität, die Disziplin und dem höherwertigen Antriebe abwärts. (siehe Anlage 1).</p> <p><u>II. Der politische Zustand (Stimmung) der Truppen des Feindes und der Bevölkerung.</u></p> <p>Die Truppen der Roten Armee werden einem starken, organisierten und disziplinierteren Feind begegnen, von sehr starken, blitzartigen Bewegungen, die im ersten Jahr des Krieges Kampffähigkeit der Soldaten zu erschüttern, die im ersten Jahr des Krieges Kampffähigkeit verloren werden ist, die Truppen der Wehrmacht sind durch die Erfahrungen des ersten Jahres des Krieges (Polen, Norwegen, Dänemark, Holland, Belgien, Frankreich). Auch die Rote Armee wird erschüttert sein. Am Ende des Krieges wird die Rote Armee sich gegenüber den deutschen Truppen in den letzten Jahren zur Folge haben (abwärts der Disziplin und politischen-moralischen Stimmung, Verlust der Kampffähigkeit, Trunkenheit, Straftat, mangelhafte Disziplinarstrafen, Selbstmord und Raub). (siehe Anlage 2).</p> <p>Die Truppen der Wehrmacht werden sich gegenüber den deutschen Truppen in den letzten Jahren zur Folge haben (abwärts der Disziplin und politischen-moralischen Stimmung, Verlust der Kampffähigkeit, Trunkenheit, Straftat, mangelhafte Disziplinarstrafen, Selbstmord und Raub). (siehe Anlage 2).</p> <p>Die Truppen der Wehrmacht werden sich gegenüber den deutschen Truppen in den letzten Jahren zur Folge haben (abwärts der Disziplin und politischen-moralischen Stimmung, Verlust der Kampffähigkeit, Trunkenheit, Straftat, mangelhafte Disziplinarstrafen, Selbstmord und Raub). (siehe Anlage 2).</p>	<p>Abwehr: Geheint</p> <p>F. S. B.</p> <p>Für die politische Sicherung der Armees-Operationen beim Angriff.</p> <p><u>I. Der politische Zustand (Stimmung) der Armeetruppen.</u></p> <p>Die politische-moralische Stimmung der Armeetruppen ist gesund, widerstandsfähig und leidet nicht abwärts über die Erfüllung der Kampf-aufgaben der Armees- und Operationen haben sich wesentlich gehoben. Aber in manchen Truppenteilen ist die Disziplin noch weit entfernt vom Stand, der von Volkstümlichkeit und Organisationsfähigkeit ausstrahlt, strenger Disziplinarstrafen, Kultur, Erhaltung der Leute und anderer. /Acht./ Die Folgen davon treten während der, zummindest über die politische-moralische Arbeit die Qualität, die Disziplin und dem höherwertigen Antriebe abwärts. (siehe Anlage 1).</p> <p><u>II. Der politische Zustand (Stimmung) der Truppen des Feindes und der Bevölkerung.</u></p> <p>Die Truppen der Roten Armee werden einem starken, organisierten und disziplinierteren Feind begegnen, von sehr starken, blitzartigen Bewegungen, die im ersten Jahr des Krieges Kampffähigkeit der Soldaten zu erschüttern, die im ersten Jahr des Krieges Kampffähigkeit verloren werden ist, die Truppen der Wehrmacht sind durch die Erfahrungen des ersten Jahres des Krieges (Polen, Norwegen, Dänemark, Holland, Belgien, Frankreich). Auch die Rote Armee wird erschüttert sein. Am Ende des Krieges wird die Rote Armee sich gegenüber den deutschen Truppen in den letzten Jahren zur Folge haben (abwärts der Disziplin und politischen-moralischen Stimmung, Verlust der Kampffähigkeit, Trunkenheit, Straftat, mangelhafte Disziplinarstrafen, Selbstmord und Raub). (siehe Anlage 2).</p> <p>Die Truppen der Wehrmacht werden sich gegenüber den deutschen Truppen in den letzten Jahren zur Folge haben (abwärts der Disziplin und politischen-moralischen Stimmung, Verlust der Kampffähigkeit, Trunkenheit, Straftat, mangelhafte Disziplinarstrafen, Selbstmord und Raub). (siehe Anlage 2).</p> <p>Die Truppen der Wehrmacht werden sich gegenüber den deutschen Truppen in den letzten Jahren zur Folge haben (abwärts der Disziplin und politischen-moralischen Stimmung, Verlust der Kampffähigkeit, Trunkenheit, Straftat, mangelhafte Disziplinarstrafen, Selbstmord und Raub). (siehe Anlage 2).</p>
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Evidence for the mobilization of the Soviet Army.

"People's Commissariat For Defense USSR

Headquarters of Baltic Special Circuit

Organizing Department of Mobilization

Unit 2

June 6, 1941

No. 001702

Extremely Confidential

Copy No. 105

To The Commanders of Independent Units

(According to the List)

Only to Director of Depot No. 245

Riga

On the grounds of the Red Army General Staff's telegram 1955 dated June 2:

THE COMMANDER OF THE CIRCUIT TROOPS ORDERED:

1. Cease clarification of the mobilization plans as far as MP-1940 is concerned.
 2. Concentrate all your attention on fulfilling MP-1941 and completing it within the time limit ordered in the order of Circuit Military Council No. 001040 dated April 6, 1941.
- To the commanders of the units: intensify personal leadership providing high quality fulfillment of mobilization plans in all the units, especially garrison mobilization plans. Save the mobilization plan MP-1940 until further special directions.

DEPUTY COMMANDER OF CIRCUIT HEADQUARTERS

FIRST RANK QUARTERMASTER - KAMSHILIN

ORGANIZING DEPARTMENT OF MOBILIZATION DEPUTY COMMANDER

REGIMENTAL COMMISSIONER - CHERENTSOV

108 copies typed

executive: Khvorostov

typist: Malinina

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RW 4/v. 329

Verified: Second In Command Of Unit 2

Major (Khvorostov)"

ПРИКАЗ
 ОСОБОГО ВОЗМОЖНОГО
 КОМАНДИРА
 6 июля 1941 года
 001702

КОМУ: Командирам отдельных частей (по списку)
 Только. № 245

На основании телеграммы Генерального Штаба Красной Армии 1955 от 2 июня с.г.

КОМАНДИР: ВОЗМОЖНО СВЕТА ПРИКАЗЫ:

I. Уточнение мобилизационных планов по М. 1940 в р а б о т а т ь.

II. Все внимание сосредоточить на отработке М. 1941 выполнить его точно и точно, установленному директивной Военного Совета округа за № 001040 от 6.4.41 года. Командирам частей усилить лично ру оязание, обеспечить высококачественную отработку мобилизов во всех частях, особе по гарнизонным мобилизам.

III. Мобилизационный план М. 1940 хранить в тайне до особого указания.

Зам. Бريا ЗИ: МИНА; СКА ЗИНА ОКРУГА
 МЕНЕДЖЕР I РЯТА - КОМАНДИР
 ЗАМ НАЧАЛЬНИКА РЕГ.ОТДЕЛА
 КОМАНДИР КОМ.ОТДЕЛА - КОМАНДИР

Врио: Ст. арт. ...
 (Khvorostov)

Russian aggressive intentions against Germany.

The "proofs of Russian aggressive intentions against Germany", compiled by Foreign Army East Branch under Colonel on the General Staff Gehlen, confirming, with some discrepancies, Stalin's statements on the superior strength of the Red Army in early 1941. The Germans correctly recognized the existence of approximately 65 Soviet tank divisions, but not the existence of approximately 35 motorized divisions, one of which was already equivalent, in terms of fire power, to that of a tank division in the German army.

Source: Bundesarchiv - Militärarchiv RH 2/2092

77

Personelle Heere Ost (II)

H.Qu., don 9.Sept.1943

Belege für russische Angriffsabsichten gegen Deutschland.
(Personelle Kriegsbereitschaft und Aufmarsch)

Daß die SU zu einem Offensiv-Krieg gegen das Deutsche Reich vorbereitet war, läßt sich aus dem Zeitpunkt des Aufbaues und der Zusammensetzung des Heeres sowie aus dem Aufmarsch erkennen.

1.) Stärke und Aufbau des russ. Heeres.

Am 21.6.41 dürfte das russ. Heer aus

247 Schtz.Div., 65 Pz.Div., 23 Kav.Div. und einer geringen Anzahl Schtz.- und Pz.Brig. bestanden haben.

Von dieser Anzahl Divisionen sind nachweislich aufgestellt worden:

von Herbst 1939 - 31.12.40 :	39 Schtz.Div.,	10 Pz.Div.
von 1. 1. 41 - 22. 6.41 :	46 " "	12 Pz. "
zusammen	85 Schtz.Div.,	22 Pz.Div.

Dies bedeutet, daß die SU in reichlich 1/2 Jahren rund 1/3 seines am 22.6.41 stehenden Heeres neu aufgestellt hat, wobei hiervon wiederum die Hälfte in der Zeit vom 1.1.41 - 22.6.41 aufgestellt wurde. Dabei ist besonders zu berücksichtigen, daß sich die Zahl der Neuaufstellungen voraussichtlich noch erhöht, weil bei einer Anzahl Divisionen das Aufstellungsdatum nicht eindeutig bekannt ist.

Ohne Zweifel sind die im Jahre 1939/40 durchgeführten Neuaufstellungen auf die Feldzüge gegen Polen und Finnland sowie die Besetzung des Baltikums zurückzuführen. Jedoch kann die ab

60

-2 -

so vor 1940 durchgeführte Heeresvermehrung als nur im Sinne der
Revolution gegen Deutschland gerichtet betrachtet werden,
zumal die territorialen Ansprüche der SU befriedigt waren.

In der Zusammenfassung des Heeres 1940 der sehr starke An-
teil an Pz.Div., den benutzten Aufbau eines Angriffsheeres erzei-
gen.

Wie weit aber die SU in der Vorbereitung eines offensiv-
en Krieges vorgeschritten war, erhält die Tatsache, daß die SU
allein in den Monaten Juli und August 41 90 Schtz.Div., neu
aufgestellt und ausgesendet und noch im Herbst 41 in den Kampf
gesendet hat. Dies ist nur möglich, wenn die Aufstellung mate-
riell und personell bereits lange vor Kriegsausbruch planmäßig
abgelaufen war.

2.) Aufmarsch.

Aus zwei Tatsachen geht hervor, daß das russ. Heer am
22.6.41 offensichtlich gliedert an der deutschen Ostfront aufmar-
schiert war.

a) Abschluß der aufgetriebenen Verbände bis August 1941
Es traten bis August 1941 auf:

von 247 Schtz.Div., - 183 Schtz.Div., an der
deutschen Ostfront

und 16 Schtz.Div., an der
Westfront.

2) Schtz.Div., waren in Fernost als Verbände unterhalten.

Lediglich 24 Schtz.Div., also nur 10%, sind in 2 Monaten
Zug nicht zum Einsatz gekommen. Dies ergibt unter Berücksich-
tigung der "Teilhaftigkeit" der Gebiete und semioffiziellen Transport-
Verhältnisse an dem Schluss, daß fast die gesamte verfügbare
Bestimmung der SU in einer Woche demontiert transportiert aus den

Zumal an die deutsche Ostfront herantransportiert
werden war. Diese Vorräte sind dadurch erhöht, daß von
den 193 Schtz.Div., allein 34 aus den entferntesten Gebieten
der SU - Sibirien einseh. Fernost, Kamkama und Inzerasen -
bereits im Juli 1941 an der deutschen Ostfront in Kampf stan-
den.

Knüchlich liegt das Verhältnis bei den Pz.Div., von 65 Pz.
Div., standen bis August 1941 bereits 56 im Kampf, von denen
7 aus dem Gebiet östwärts des Ural stammten.

b) Art des Aufmarsches.

Bei den bis 22.6.41 durchgeführten russ. Aufmarsch ha-
ben sich besonders zwei stark Scherzpunkte herausgebildet.

1. Der Raum um Leningrad mit rund 20 Schtz.Div., 6 Pz.
Div., 3 Lot.Div., 5 Kav.Div., und einer operativen
Reserve von 3 Pz.Div., 1 Kp.Div. und 2 Kav.Div.

2. Der Raum um Bialystok mit 18 Schtz.Div., 7 Pz.Div.,
8 Kav.Div. und einer operativen Reserve von 10
Schtz.Div., 2 Pz.Div., und 1 Kav.Div.

Diese beiden Scherzpunkte lassen deutlich die Absicht erkennen,
durch Vorstoß in allgemeiner Richtung Litauenstadt die in den
verringerten Teil des Generalgouvernements stehenden deutschen
Kräfte einzukesseln und zu vernichten, und bei günstiger Ent-
wicklung der Lage im Norden durch Vorstoß in Richtung Eiding
Streifen vom Reich abzutrennen.

Deterrent order of Marshall of the Soviet Union Timoshenko and of Army Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis to the troops of the West Front of 7.7.1941:

"Confidential"

**ORDER
TO THE WESTERN FRONT TROOPS**

No. 02

*CONTENTS: Prosecution of the Red Army Engineers Inspecting Officer Major Umanets
July 7, 1941*

Army In The Field

The Western front command issued an order on June 26, 1941, to the Borisovsky Sector troop commander – corps commissioner Comrade Susaykov to get ready for the explosion of the bridges over the river Berezina in case the enemy troops try to use the bridges to cross the river and invade the city of Borisov. Comrade Susaykov entrusted this urgent task to the Red Army Engineers Inspecting Officer Major Umanets. Major Umanets F. N., instead of honorably carrying out the commander's order as befits a Red Army commander, criminally organized demolition work but did not ensure a trouble-free explosion, protection of members of the demolition squad, or a timely signal for the explosion. As a result, the enemy crossed the river, invaded the city of Borisov, and killed the entire demolition squad which did not have time to explode the bridges.

1 ORDER:

To arrest and to bring to trial the Red Army Engineers Inspecting Officer Major Umanets for the non-fulfillment of the order and act of treason which resulted in the enemy's invasion of Borisov. To announce this order to all the officers including platoon commanders.

COMMANDER OF WESTERN FRONT

Marshall of Soviet Union
TIMOSHENKO

MEMBER OF WESTERN FRONT
WAR COUNCIL

Army Commissioner, Rank 1
MEKHLIS"

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 21-1/471

СЕКРЕТНО	
П Р И К А З	
Войскам Западного фронта	
№ 02	
СОДЕРЖАНИЕ: об отдаче под суд инспектора инженерных войск К А Майора Уманец .	
<p>7 июля 1941 года</p> <p>26 июня 1941 года командованием Западного фронта был отдан приказ командующему группой войск Борисовского направления — корпусному комиссару тов. СУСАЙКОВУ о подготовке к взрыву мостов через реку Березина в случае попытки использования их противником для переправы через реку с целью захвата Борисова. Тов. СУСАЙКОВЫМ осуществлена этой задачей было возложено на инспектора инженерных войск К А майора УМАНЕЦ. Майор УМАНЕЦ Ф. Н. вместо того, чтобы с честью, как требует командир Красной армии, выполнить боевой приказ командования, преступно организовал подрывные работы, не обеспечив безопасности</p>	<p>Действующая армия.</p> <p>взрыва, отраву команды подрывников и своевременной подачи сигнала к взрыву. В результате противник уничтожил команду подрывников, не успевших произвести взрыва, осуществил переправу и захватил город Борисов.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">П Р И К А З Ы В А Ю:</p> <p>За неисполнение боевого приказа и предательство, результатом которого явилось захват города Борисова противником, инспектору инженерных войск К А — майору Уманец арестовать и предать суд Военного трибунала.</p> <p>Приказ обложить всему командный состав до командира взвода.</p>
КОМАНДУЮЩИЙ ЗАПАДНЫМ ФРОНТОМ	ЧЛЕН ВОЕННОГО СОВЕТА ЗАПАДНОГО ФРОНТА

Deterrent order of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the USSR of 15. 12. 1941:

"Confidential
Copy No. 1

[The coat of arms of the Soviet Union]
OFFICE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTORS
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
CENTRAL MILITARY OFFICE OF PROSECUTORS

December 15, 1941

No. 08683

MOSCOW, Pushkinskaya Ul.,

D. 15a

Tel:

TO THE 54TH ARMY MILITARY PROSECUTOR (NORTHWESTERN FRONT)

Military Prosecutor of infantry division No. 286 in his memorandum of November 22, 1941 informed the office that the Red Army man PANSTYAN Gregory Andreevich was killed while attempting an act of high treason and the charge against him has been sent to the military tribunal of Army No. 54 for examination. The actions of the division Military Prosecutor contradict point 1 article 4 of UPK (criminal trial code) of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic).

The charge against PANSTYAN must be terminated in light of his death and the copy of the well-reasoned resolution of the indictment termination must be sent to the local NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) for the latter to call to account for his relatives according to Part 2 Article 58-1 "v" of UK (criminal code) of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic).

Please give instructions to the division Military Prosecutor on this case.

ACTING DEPARTMENT NO. 1, CHIEF OF CENTRAL MILITARY,
OFFICE OF PROSECUTORS MILITARY JURIST, RANK 1 Signature (VARSKOI)

2 Copies typed

December 15, 1941"

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 2 v. 158

-3-

Секретно 87
в.к. № 1

110

ПРОКУРАТУРА
Союза Советских
Социалистических Республик

ГЛАВНАЯ
ВОЕННАЯ ПРОКУРАТУРА

15 декабря 1941 г.
№ 08683
МОСКВА, Пушкинская ул., д. 15-а.
Телефон: _____

ВОЕННОМУ ПРОКУРОРУ 54 АРМИИ.
ал. ван. фр.

Военный Прокурор 286 стрелковой дивизии своим отношением от 22 XI-41г. донес ч.к. при попытке изменить родину убит кр-ц ПАНСТЯН Григорий Андреевич, а дело по обвинению его направляется в 54 Армию на рассмотрение. Действия ВП дивизии противоречат п.1 ст.4 УК РСФСР.

Дело по обвинению ПАНСТЯН должно быть прекращено в виду его смерти, а копию мотивированного постановления о прекращении дела нужно направить в органы НКВД по месту жительства отца обвиняемого для привлечения последнего к ответственности по ч.2 ст. 56-1 УК РСФСР.

Прошу дать указания ВП дивизии по этому делу.

И.д. НАЧАЛЬНИКА 101 ДЕТ. ГВК
ВОЕННОЙ БР.СТ. 1 РАЙОНА

(ВАРСКОИ)

СП. / ЭКД
г. № 15.XI-41г.

German front propaganda: attempts to win Soviet soldiers as allies.

"Red Army Soldiers, Commanders, Commissars of the 144th Infantry Division!

Because of Stalin's order, you have incessantly for two weeks rushed against the German lines with the result of bleeding to death by senseless attacks. What is now left of your Division? Only fragments lumped together of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, remnants of Battalions which have sunk to the strength of a weak Company, of Companies which only now are as strong as one Group!

Where remain the 1. and 2. Btl./S. R. 449? Why are the 1., 2., 3., 7. Kp./S. R. 612 not together as formerly more than 50 man strong? Why is the 3. Btl./S. R. 785 dissolved and now drawn up out of its leftover people with few drivers, cooks, manual laborers as a new 1. Kp.?

These facts suffice to make clear to you the fate of your Infantry Regiments. You all face the same: death!

There is only one way out for you, if you do not wish to be rushed into death by the Blocking units of the NKVD.

Come over to us! Save your life for your families, take part in a free life in a Russia, after the War, without Kholchosa, without Cooperative, without N.K.V.D.!

If you come to us, you will live as free farmers on your own farms and as self-employed workmen with your own good profits!

Make an end to the War! Come over to the Germans!

Permit-Pass [...]"

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 21-3/v. 782

Красноармейцы, командиры и комиссары 144 стрелковой дивизии!

По приказу Сталина, в течение двух недель вы, истекшая кровью, безрезультатно атакуете германские позиции. От трех стрелковых полков получились жалкие остатки. Вновь сколоченные батальоны по численности не превышают состава рот, а число бойцов в роте не достигает даже взвода.

Куда делись 1 и 2 батальоны 449 стрелкового полка? Почему из состава 1, 2, 3 и 7 вместе взятых рот 612 стрелкового полка осталось всего лишь 50 человек? Почему 3 батальон 785 стрелкового полка переформирован в роту, а неполный состав которой входят даже шоферы, повара и другие бойцы из хозяйственных команд?

Эти факты крикливо говорят об участи ваших стрелковых полков. Всех вас ожидает то же!

Но есть один выход. Не давайте взводам НКВД гнать вас на верную смерть!


Переходите к нам! Спасайте вашу жизнь для своих семей. После войны вас ожидает веселая жизнь в России, освобожденной от колхозов, стхановщины, НКВД.

Если перейдете к нам, вы станете свободными крестьянами, работающими на собственной земле, самостоятельными ремесленниками, обеспеченными хорошими доходами!

Копайте войну! Переходите к нам!

ПРОПУСК

Для неограниченного количества бойцов, командиров и комиссаров, переходящих на сторону Германских войск. Действителен до конца войны.



Passierschein Inhalt: An die Soldaten, Offiziere und Kommandeure der 144. S.D. und 449, 612 und 785 S.R. mit genaues Angaben der Verluste und Aufgliederung zum Überleben.

WAK 48

Soviet Soldiers want to co-operate with the Germans to liberate Russia.

The prisoner of war General Major Zakutny, former Commander of the 21st Soviet Infantry Corps, reports to the German Commander of the Oflag XIII (officer POW camp) on October 30, 1941, about the widespread wish of captured Soviet Generals and other officers for a German-Russian reconciliation.

Source: author's archive.

Abschrift.	D 78 518
Kriegsgef. AZ 2 f 24. 74d Ch 2 Nr. 7543/41	Berlin, den 22.11.41
Wehrkr. XIII Kdr. Kgf. Az Ib Nr. 13390/41	Nürnberg, den 30.10.41 <i>ju 12</i>
<u>Betr.:</u> Haltung der sowjet. Kriegsgef. Generale im Oflag XIII D.	<i>R</i>

Der russ. Kriegsgef. General Z a k u t n i wurde auf seinen Wunsch hin vom Kdt. Oflag XIII d Oberst Toeipe empfangen und meldete:

Von den im hiesigen Lager befindlichen 10 Generälen sind 9 Anhänger eines sozialen und politischen Aufbaues in Rußland auf nationaler Grundlage in Verbindung mit einer Verständigung zwischen dem deutschen Reich und dem zukünftigen nationalen Rußland.

Die Generale bitten, sie zum Aufbau in den besetzten Gebieten einzusetzen und sie aktiv an einen Kampf gegen die Sowjet-Union als Hochburg des Weltkommunismus, teilnehmen zu lassen.

Von der Aufrichtigkeit der Gesinnung der Generale Truchin, Blagoweschtschenski, Jegorow, Kulikow, Tkatschenko und Sibir ist der General Zakutni überzeugt. Er hat auch keine stichhaltigen Gründe, an der Gesinnung der Generale Alawerdow und Potapow zu zweifeln, hält es jedoch für seine Pflicht, ihnen gegenüber eine vorsichtige und abwartende Stellung einzunehmen. insbesondere Alawerdow gegenüber.

Die Mehrzahl der Offiziere des ukrainischer-weißruthenischen Blockes und etwa die Hälfte aller Stabsoffiziere bekennen sich zu der von ihm gemeldeten Auffassung.

Vorstehendes wird dem OKW als Material zur Kenntnis gebracht. Eine Stellungnahme zu den Gedankengängen ist hier nicht möglich.

Im Auftrage des Wehrkreisbefehlshabers
Der Kommandeur der Kriegsgefangenen
gez. Schemmel.


Amt Ausland/Abwehr Abt. Ausland 12811/41 I f	Berlin, den 27.11.41
---	----------------------

Abschriftlich: I
V A
Abw I, II
O Qu IV, Pr. H. Ost
S. Skl. Luftw. Führ. St. Ic
Ausl III, VI, VIII
mit der Bitte um Kenntnisnahme.
I. A.
gez. Bode.

Soviet Order to kill all Germans.

"All fighters, officers and polit workers of the 54th army." The Supreme Commander of the 54th army, General Major Feduninskij, member of the Military Council, Brigade Commissar Kholostov, and the Chief of Staff, General Major Berezinsky, demand in an army order "to completely exterminate all fascist bandits until the very last."

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 2 / 2425.



"Series 'B'"

OPERATION REPORT NO. 11, 10:00 AM, JULY 13, 1941

*26TH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN EDGE OF THE WOODS,
THE 1ST KILOMETER OF WESTERN SLASTYONA, MAP 50.000.*

1. During July 7-9, 1941 the enemy finished the encirclement of the division and moved to Honovo-Ugolia district.

2. As a result of the probing attack of the reconnaissance detachment it was ascertained that the enemy was passive [...illegible...] in front of the division on the driver Drut' during July 7-9 1941 and moved out into the flanks barring the way of withdrawal to [...]onovo-Ugolia.

At 12 noon on July 9, 1941 a powerful detachment [...] was dispatched [...] with the task to annihilate the enemy in the district of [...]onovo. Leaving [...]onovo the detachment was met with hand-operated and machine-gun fire from the district of the north-eastern Honovo edges of the woods from opportune emplacements. A battle started as a result of which:

from our side - two Red Army men and a commander of the [...] machine gun and tank section [...] battery were wounded;

from the enemy's side - one machine gun carrier and three [...] light machine guns were destroyed.

Before dark the enemy persistently defended itself.

At 4 PM on July 9, 1941 the reconnaissance ascertained the northeastern movement of the "SS" division towards Honovo-Vendoro.[...] There were mines set up along the route of the "SS" division movement by stationary reconnaissance detachment which resulted in the explosion of three enemy tanks; simulataneously, a reconnaissance group on foot acting in the district of Honovo-Ugolia determined the progress of the enemy's motorized infantry and small tanks towards the north-east.

At 7:30 PM the reconnaissance detachment ascertained that the enemy barred [...] the way of the division's withdrawal and occupied most of the inhabited areas: Ugolia [...], Pervomaysky, Honovo-Kokshne and Bokatovka.

At 7:00 PM an order was received from the corps headquarters according by which the division was to advance to a new area of defense on the line of Guslitsche, Galtanovka [...].

At 11:30 PM while carrying out the corps order the division took the field along the route - Staraya Lyada, Bokatovka, Kurgan, Demaschkovka, Zabolot, Zhabin[...] and Guslitshe.

At 3:45 PM July 10, 1941 the division staff following the leading tank sub-unit No. 51 at the village Kurgan was suddenly fired on by guns, machine guns, and mortars from the eastern edges of the woods - the first kilometer of western Kurgan where the enemy had strategic emplacements.

The dispatched reconnaissance detachment ascertained that approximately [...] one enemy infantry battalion [...] equipped with artillery and mortars held the defense along the rest [...] of the edges of the woods in the first kilometer of western Kurgan Nizovka.

At 5:00 AM the 52nd tank subunit and a motorized infantry regiment started to arrive which were to attack in the southeastern direction and in cooperation with the 51st tank subunit to annihilate the enemy in the district of Nozovka and upon completion of the operation to follow along the route according to the orders of the division [...].

There were destroyed: one Engineers regiment battalion; one signallers battalion; some more approaching units of Engineers regiment imperial division; other smaller rear subunits as a result of the battle in the district of Kurgan-Nizovka.

There were two light enemy bombers shot down by antiaircraft machine guns.

The enemy left approximately 400 dead bodies on the battlefield. About 80 Germans surrendered and were executed by shooting afterwards.

The attack of the 52nd subunit and motorized infantry regiment the enemy's flank and rear was absolutely unexpected and made the rest of the enemy's units flee in a southwestern direction towards Zabrodie (5-7 kilometers southwest of Kurgan).

In addition there were destroyed two tanks, one radio station, and approximately 50 machine gun carriers and 30 transport vehicles with Engineers equipment. The Howitzer artillery performed especially perfectly and silenced the enemy's mortars and artillery in the district of Kuchin (6 kilometers southwest of Kurgan).

The division continued a further attack during July 10, 1941 from 9 AM to 4 PM and was severely bombarded by the enemy's bombers force.

As a result of the above-mentioned battles and enemy's bombing attack the division has the following losses:

Seven men are killed;

Eleven men are wounded.

3. During July 11-12 1941 the division put itself in order and was simultaneously holding a strong defense in the district of Tumanovka-Golinets and in the groves to the east and south of Kochurino. By 5 AM on July 13, 1941 the units of the division occupied the area of defense on the line of Khoroshki, Mal. Bushkovo, according to the accompanying map.

COMMANDER OF 26TH TANK DIVISION STAFF,

LIEUTENANT COLONEL Signature (KIMBAR)

COMMANDER OF 1ST SECTION

MAJOR, Signature (KHRAPKO)

Typed: 6 Copies Copy No. 2

Sent according to list No. 1

"Vsego bylo rasstreljano 115 cel." All in all, 115 men were shot.

Report of the Chief of the Reconnaissance Division of the Staff of the 33rd Army, Captain Potapov, of 8.12.1941, on the shooting of 115 prisoners of war (Spravka Nacal'nik RO Starma 33 Kapitan Potapov, 8. XII. 41 g.).

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RW 2 v. 151 (No Russian original available)

8

Aus dem Russischen.

Auskunft.

Vom 1. XII. 41 bis zum 6. XII. 41 einschliesslich, wurden 15 kriegsgefangene Soldaten der deutschen Armee aufgebracht.

- 1.) 7 Mann - 29. Mot. Inf. 3. Mot. Div. - 1. "G.M."-Schützen-Div.,
- 2.) 5 Mann - 478. Inf. Reg. 258. Inf. Div. - von einem Ski-Batl.;
- 3.) 2 Mann - 478. Inf. Reg. 258. Inf. Div. - 136. oder 140. Panzer-Batl.,
- 4.) 1 Mann - 351. Inf. Reg. 183. Inf. Div. - 110. Schützen-Div.

insges. 15 Mann.

Anmerkung: 100 Kriegsgefangene, die von der 1. "G.M." Schützen-Div. gemacht wurden, wurden in Anbetracht der komplizierten Lage auf Befehl des Kommissars der Division erschossen.

- 3 Mann wurden der 43. Armee übermittelt.
- 8 Mann wurden von dem Ski-Batl. erschossen,
- 4 Mann wurden von der 222. Schützen-Div. erschossen.

Im ganzen wurden 115 Mann erschossen.

Der Chef der Aufklärungs-Abteilung des Stabes
der 33. Armee

gez. Hauptmann Potapow

Call for the "honourable" execution of Stalin's order:

**"ORDER
TO THE TROOPS OF THE 4TH SHOCK ARMY**

Battalion 3

December 31, 1941

ARMY IN THE FIELD

By the order of the USSR People's Commissioner of Defense dated December 16, 1941 No. [...illegible...], I am appointed Commander of the 4th Shock Army and very proudly enter the command of it. In this connection I call upon all the soldiers, commanders, and political instructors of the army formations and units to be ready for concerted, intensive militant work, to fight with heroism and courage against the sworn and brutal enemy—Fascist—Nazi aggressors who pillaged our villages and cities on the invaded territory, and I also call upon all the officers of the armies to honorably fulfill our Great Leader and Commander Comrade STALIN'S directions—to annihilate and exterminate every single aggressor who invaded our sacred Soviet Land.

**DEATH TO THE GERMAN INVADERS!
HURRAH TO THE HEROES OF THE RED ARMY!**

Signature: **COMMANDER OF THE 4TH SHOCK ARMY, MEMBER OF MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE 4TH SHOCK ARMY**


**COLONEL GENERAL
(YEROMENKO)**

**BRIGADE COMMISSAR
(RUDAKOV)**

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE 4TH RED ARMY STAFF, GENERAL MAJOR (KURASOV)

Verified – Chief Clerk: [Signature]"

Source: Bundesarchiv–Militärarchiv RH 21-3/v. 742



Soviet prisoners of war, on 18.1.1942, confirm that Stalin's order of 6.11.1941 for the destruction of all German soldiers was read aloud to them on a daily basis.

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv RH 2/v. 158

Annahme Regt. (bet. 2. Aufl. 5) 96 Jg.

Anlage zu Br. D. Nr. *252/42* g. 88

Vernehmung-Offiz. Rgt. Gef. Std., den 18. Januar 1942.

O. Lt. Schubert Adj. I. R. 164

Verhandlung.

auf Befehl des Regt. erscheinen die russ. Überläufer

- 1.) Oberfeldw. Michael Haruschak, I./28 (mot. Regt.), geb. am 20.10.1916, wohnhaft vor Kriegsausbruch in Winiaki Oblast Rayon Braslowski,
- 2.) Soldat Michael Jiwkow, I./I. R. 556, geb. am 3.11.12 wohnhaft vor Kriegsausbruch Stalinski Oblast Rayon Lemanski.
- 3.) Soldat Michael Sintchenko, I./I. R. 68e, geb. im Jahre 1906, wohnhaft vor Kriegsausbruch in Poltawa, Rayon Saisjonowka.
- 4.) Soldat Fodor Masjudja, I./I. R. 68e, geb. im Jahre 191e, wohnhaft vor Kriegsausbruch Winitzki Oblast Rayon Dultschinski

und sagen zur Wahrheit ernannt, aus:

Ab 6.11.41 ist uns von unserem Politruk täglich bei der Befehlsausgabe vorgelesen worden, daß Stalin in seiner Rundfunkrede vom 6.11.41 befohlen hat, alle Deutschen, die auf russ. Boden angetroffen werden, ganz gleich, ob es sich um Volksdeutsche oder gefangene deutsche Soldaten handelt, seipen restlos zu vernichten. Danach ist auch zu handeln.

Falls Deutsche Soldaten in Gefangenschaft geraten, werden diese nach hinten transportiert, was mit ihnen dort geschieht, ist uns nicht bekannt.

Wir versichern an eidesstatt, daß unsere obigen Aussagen der Wahrheit entsprechen und bestätigen dies durch unsere Unterschriften.

Die vorstehenden Aussagen sind uns durch den Dolmetscher in russ. Sprache vorgelesen worden.

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.) <i>Maryjan</i> 2.) <i>Milski</i> 3.) <i>Murko</i> 4.) <i>Murko</i> 	<p><i>Musaw</i></p> <p><i>Musaw</i></p> <p><i>Musaw</i></p>
---	---

Der Vernehmende: *Shubert, O. Lt.* Der Dolmetscher: *Dawid*

93

The murder of German prisoners of war continued without interruption until 1945. Murders of German prisoners investigated by German intelligence-reconnaissance in January/February 1945.

Source: Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv 2/2684

185
188

Raum W. A. T. S. B. A. D. U. E. I. (siehe Nr. 6). XIII. Pr. K.)
"Ich habe 2 Gefangene gesichtet. Ich habe sie erschossen."
Raum von Kompaniefront

27.1. "Von 50 Gefangenen habe ich 5 erschossen."
Raum H. E. I. S. B. A. R. E. - T. A. B. G. S. P. F.

30.1. 15.30 Uhr Stoß an Schützschuka (337. S. B. - Korps)
"22 Gefangene habe ich geschah, darunter einen Abt. Kar.
Die übrigen habe ich wegwirft, sie werden nicht dorthin gelangen."

2.2. 15.30 Uhr wiege (?) an Schützschuka
"Habe Gefangene gemacht, 14 Mann. Mienen habe ich zu Ihnen geschickt, 15 erschossen."
Alfred-Waldung 2.2.45

23.50 Uhr "11. Bojaron von 34. Schrift
Es Wo ist der Mikroskop?"
B: Dar ist hier bei mir, wir sind zusammen hergekommen.
A: Bringt die Leihung in Ordnung und laßt verbündet mit uns!
B: Wir hatten einen Gefangenen, wir haben ihn vergiftet und er ist verreckt."

Raum an Sakonawa (4. Ukrainische Front!)

A: "Ich habe 35 Gefangene gesamt, darunter 2 Obite, sie sind erschossen worden."
B: "Geben Sie alle erschossen?"
A: "Ich bin noch dabei. 13 Mann leben noch, das Obite auch."
B: "Zweifelhaft Sie niemand mehr, vor allem die Obite bringen Sie alle zu mir."
A: "Ich werde die 13 ausleben und nacht zu Ihnen schicken."
B: "Die Obite lassen Sie. Die bekommen ihr Urteil hier."

Raum an Elstrin (1. Weißrussische Front!)

2.2. "Ich habe bei 5. Stoßarmee an neeres-Pr. Krig. der Front:
"Ich habe Ihnen einen ganzen Zehner verschiedener Sachen geschickt.
verteilen Sie es untereinander. Die Kleider und sonstigen Sachen
habe ich meiner Schwester geschickt."
Raum an Wain (2. Weißrussische Front!)

2.2. 17.15 Uhr 256

185
188

Raum W. A. T. S. B. A. D. U. E. I. (siehe Nr. 6). XIII. Pr. K.)
"Ich habe 2 Gefangene gesichtet. Ich habe sie erschossen."
Raum von Kompaniefront

27.1. "Von 50 Gefangenen habe ich 5 erschossen."
Raum H. E. I. S. B. A. R. E. - T. A. B. G. S. P. F.

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"Habe Gefangene gemacht, 14 Mann. Mienen habe ich zu Ihnen geschickt, 15 erschossen."
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23.50 Uhr "11. Bojaron von 34. Schrift
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B: Dar ist hier bei mir, wir sind zusammen hergekommen.
A: Bringt die Leihung in Ordnung und laßt verbündet mit uns!
B: Wir hatten einen Gefangenen, wir haben ihn vergiftet und er ist verreckt."

Raum an Sakonawa (4. Ukrainische Front!)

A: "Ich habe 35 Gefangene gesamt, darunter 2 Obite, sie sind erschossen worden."
B: "Geben Sie alle erschossen?"
A: "Ich bin noch dabei. 13 Mann leben noch, das Obite auch."
B: "Zweifelhaft Sie niemand mehr, vor allem die Obite bringen Sie alle zu mir."
A: "Ich werde die 13 ausleben und nacht zu Ihnen schicken."
B: "Die Obite lassen Sie. Die bekommen ihr Urteil hier."

Raum an Elstrin (1. Weißrussische Front!)

2.2. "Ich habe bei 5. Stoßarmee an neeres-Pr. Krig. der Front:
"Ich habe Ihnen einen ganzen Zehner verschiedener Sachen geschickt.
verteilen Sie es untereinander. Die Kleider und sonstigen Sachen
habe ich meiner Schwester geschickt."
Raum an Wain (2. Weißrussische Front!)

2.2. 17.15 Uhr 256

110
1. Anlage

10

33

Verband der 70. Armees. meldet:
 "Heute haben wir nur 30 Mann gefangenommen, die sich einzeln durchschlagen versuchten. Wir haben sie alle erschossen, wir es mit den anderen auch getan haben."

Bereich 2. Wehrmachtliche Front:
 20.1.
 "Die Feindlage ist hier in Einzelnen nicht bekannt, da es nur daß 15 Gefangene gemacht wurden, jedoch kein kleinerer, sie wurden alle auf dem Wege erschossen."

Bereich 3. Wehrmachtliche Front: 29. Armees.
 In Frontabschnitt Mandel (10 km nördlich Königsberg) wurde am 19.2., 02.10 Uhr, folgender Befehl erteilt:
 "Die Deutschen, welche die Hände hochheben, oder eine weiße Fahne zeigen, sollen gefangenommen werden. Wenn sie ja. In Masse kommen, sind keine Gefangenen zu machen."

Untersamter Bereich:
 27.1.
 A.: "Gefangene" sind nicht zu machen, es ist ein unregelmäßiger Zustand, jeder Feind muß getötet werden".
 B.: "Ich habe verstanden, aber was soll ich mit der Masse anfangen?"

Sturzkampf an Posen, 15.20 Uhr:
 Habe 2 Gefangene gemacht, einen gleich erschossen. Beide konnten nicht aussagen, da sie zum prof. gehen ...
 (Bum 6 km ostw. Sinesa, Angehörige der 56. I. P.)

Obkdo. der Heeresgruppe Nord
 3. Aufstellungsmäßig
 Nr. 15/24.0. Fr. 24/45 K. Kdo. 7351
 Gm. 2. Abt. Aufst. u. M.
 1. HILZBAS
 Nr. 15/24.0. Fr. 24/45 K. Kdo. 7351

6. Abt. Aufst. u. M.
 Nr. 15/24.0. Fr. 24/45 K. Kdo. 7351

Auszug aus einer Meldung der Heeresfernsprecher-Abt. (S. 6)
 19.2.45:
 (Baum Gaudem 7 5 km NW Heilsenck - 3. sowjet. Armees.)
 15.40 Uhr: Am westl. von westl.
 Der Obergangriff des Gegners wurde abgeschlagen. Gestalt
 Foto des Gegners 30 Mann.
 westl. haben. Sie Gefangene?
 westl. Anzahl, von der 18. Div., 30 Sgt., 10. Nr.
 2 davon sind noch da. Die übrigen wurden von einem
 Feind erschossen, 20 waren Mrt.-Schützen.
 westl. Schicken Sie die 2 Mann zu mir.
 westl. Angeblich gibt es nicht. Im Wald sitzen
 nach Mrt.-Schützen. Diese verweigern sich sehr stark
 und die von Franz heilen mit. Es wird wohl noch ein
 schweres Kampf kommen.
 westl. Verhüten Sie die, auch wenn Sie die 2 Mann
 haben. Die 2 Mann sind
 westl. haben. Sie verstanden?

Weitergabe an OIV/Wpr. ist zur Sicherung der Geheimhaltung
 der Hochschichtmantrierung nicht erfolgt.
 Div.-Zugehörigkeit nicht einzufließen an Führer, möglichster
 129. oder 269. S. D.

Nur das Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Nord
 Der Chef des Generalstabes

Verteidiger
 HILZ. Fronte Heeres Ost = 1. Aufst.
 OIV, Heeresstab, Nr. 2.

W. A.
 Nr. 15/24.0. Fr. 24/45 K. Kdo. 7351

255

January 23, 1945

TO ALL MILITARY PROSECUTORS
OF 48th ARMY FORMATIONS

Confidential

Only: [Signature]

Some servicemen's conduct causes the State colossal material loss resulting in the destruction of valuable property and the burning of buildings and whole villages out of theft and pillaging in the cities and villages of eastern Prussia and the above mentioned servicemen are ignorant of the fact that all the property on the territory of eastern Prussia from the moment of seizure becomes the property of the Soviet State and is to be protected and sent to the USSR. The destruction and burning of property are performed by members of rear sub-units and most of them are in a state of intoxication.

There were also reported cases of using arms by the servicemen against the German inhabitants and in particular against women and old people. Numerous cases of killing prisoners of war in circumstances when execution was not necessary and was performed out of mischief were also reported. Many officers and privates loaded unit transports and their kit bags with spoils of war which reduced battle maneuverability of the officers and Red Army men.

War Front and Army Councils categorically demanded from all members of the public prosecutor's office to mercilessly punish drunkards and persons who destroy property and burn inhabited areas and houses and who use arms against German inhabitants and who commit other transgressions of military discipline.

I O R D E R:

1. To carry out an explanatory campaign in the sub-units together with the political workers that destruction of captured property from the Germans and arson of the inhabited areas is harmful anti-state conduct and those guilty of it will be severely punished. To explain to the servicemen that such harsh treatment of the civil population is not characteristic of the Red Army and that to use arms against women and old people is criminal and those guilty of it will be severely punished.

2. To urgently organize one or two public trials of malicious arsonists of the inhabited areas and of servicemen who destroy property and other valuables. To study the guilt verdicts with all the officers.

3. To take drastic measures against drunkenness. To call to severe account servicemen who are found guilty of drunkenness while on duty by bringing them to trial before the War Tribunal.

4. To help the command to organize a campaign to discard spoils of war which decrease the battle maneuverability of the unit from servicemen's unit transports and kit bags. To require the command to allow the best officers and servicemen to send home parcels of spoils of war including both property and food-stuffs.

5. To organize a determined fight against the killing of prisoners of war and to explain to the servicemen that the Red Army is interested in the surrender of Germans because it will hasten the end of the war and will preserve thousands of Red Army men's and officer's lives. I suggest not to limit yourselves to prosecuting criminal cases according to the received reports from the command but personally along with the investigator to visit the inhabited areas nearest to your location daily and nightly and to catch the arsonists and pillagers. To carry out this campaign in coordination with the command and with its help (this, of course, does not relieve the command from responsibility for organizing the campaign against all the above-mentioned criminal misconduct).

The investigation of the cases must be completed promptly. Inform us immediately about each prosecuted criminal case.

Coordinate the contents of the campaign's edifying lectures with the political sections of divisions. The lectures must be brief and convincing—preparation for the lectures must be thorough.

MILITARY PROSECUTOR OF THE 48th ARMY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL OF JUSTICE

[Signature] (Malyarov)

11 Copies typed
January 23, 1945

REMEMBER, REMEMBER, REMEMBER

By Ilya Ehrenburg

Soviet War News, 22 Dec. 1944

THE *Pommersche Zeitung* writes: "Our fight was honest from the very first, for we did not cross our frontiers in a fit of blind folly, with the intention of subjugating other nations. On the contrary, having been forced to leave our frontiers behind us, we came as heralds of a new order and a new justice. No German ever harboured the idea of destroying the English, punishing the French or enslaving the Dutch or any other people, or living on the blood and sweat of other nations. On the contrary, our victories radiated tranquility."

The poor little fellows, it appears, were forced to march to the Caucasus and Egypt in order to radiate tranquility, and now they have been allowed to return to Cologne and East Prussia they declare mockly, "If we have injured anybody, we bear him no malice."

On maps they printed in 1939 and 1942, truly the atlas of their blind folly, we find Lillo and Kiev, Riga and Nancy included in "Greater Germany."

They Snivel While They Shoot

They say they did not wish to enslave other nations, to live on other men's blood and sweat. But was it so long ago that Gruppenfuhrer Hass declared in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* that "former Russia will be colonized by storm troops and the children of storm troops"? The *Danziger Served* calculated: "Every German colonist will be vorpied by eight or ten families."

Ah, they were not so modest then! The German firm known as "Bremen" promised its shareholders Turkestan cotton. "There's no place on earth for that nation of shopkeepers, the English," shouted the *Volkischer Beobachter*. "The shooting of hostages will teach the French we intend to stop at nothing," threatened the *Pariser Zeitung*. They deported Netherlandsers to the Ukraine and declared: "Holland as a state is a concept which will be preserved only in history books." (*Angriff*)

They have begun to repudiate themselves rather early. They are still shooting, yet they are already snivelling. While they are still hacking children's bodies to pieces, they have begun to wash their blood-stained hands.

There is a saying that "to remember is to live." And indeed, the man who loses his memory loses half his life. He becomes an ephemeral creature. But to remember is not only to live: it is to save life, to save future generations, to save the very concept of humanity.

The Typhus Louse

Some phenomena in history have made the sages rack their brains for centuries. But Hitler Germany is no sphinx; it is a typhus louse. Everybody understands now what Fascism is, but not everybody wants to remember what he understands. To forget means to forgive; and to forgive the furnace-tenders of Maidanek means to bring up children who will meet their end in more efficient Maidaneks.

I am not a politician; my occupation is one that has to do with human feelings, for every writer is, in a way, a psychologist. But every writer is also a moralist, even if he never stops to think about morals. I want, as a writer, to recall the spiritual sources of Fascism.

For years the Hitlerites have been moulding the minds of German adolescents. What did they instil into the young Fascist? A sense of superiority. The world now knows what racial and national arrogance mean. If every nation is going to decide that it is the best in the world, and is therefore entitled to dominate the rest, we shall be seeing more Maidaneks before the twentieth century is out.

What is Germany's arrogance based on? On her past, some will say. True enough, the Germans in the past had wonderful philosophers, musicians, poets and scientists. No anti-Fascist would think of repudiating Goethe or Beethoven. But culture is not an annuity; it is a process of creation. In Fascist Germany nothing

is left of Germany's great past. We laugh at the degenerates who would substitute a genealogical tree for intelligence or knowledge. The nation that burns down museums and libraries and yet boasts of Schiller or Kant is ridiculous and repulsive.

The Germans are proud of their present, others declare. What have they to be proud of? Goering's avarice? Goebbels' lechery? The ignorance and corruption of their Ministers? Himmler's industry? Or perhaps they pride themselves on their technical development, the tidiness of their cities, the comfort of their homes? But these things were not created by the Fascists. All Hitler did was to ruin Germany. In any case, American technique is more highly developed than German, Holland's cities are tidier than Germany's, and the Swedes have more comfortable homes.

What is more, technical knowledge is nothing for a nation to be proud of unless the iron flesh of the State is the home of lofty aspirations. In Fascist Germany civilization is only the handmaid of vile aims. Gas chambers for the wholesale asphyxiation of men and women are the natural consummation of German technology.

Buckwheat and Frogs

No, the sense of superiority with which the Fascists imbue their children derives from neither the past nor the present. German arrogance rests on superstition, on belief in the magical properties of German blood, on the conviction that everything German is superior to everything non-German.

About thirty years ago I overheard a Gascon remark, on seeing buckwheat porridge in a Russian soldier's mess tin, "In my country they feed cattle with that stuff." To which the Russian retorted, "You eat frogs, but in my country cattle wouldn't look at them!" They say there is no arguing about tastes. Personally, I like both buckwheat porridge and frogs. But the Fascists drenched the earth in blood in order that German lack of taste might triumph.

The young Fascist is made to believe that the fair Katchon is superior to the dark Jeannotto, that beer is a nobler beverage than cider or kvass, that Berlin is more beautiful than Leningrad or London, that the man who says *zdravstvuyte* or *bonjour* instead of *guten tag* only displays his inferiority.

Birch and Cedar

The sources of rivers of blood are the seemingly innocent bogs of human stupidity. Children are given to laugh at what is strange and unaccustomed. The mother rebukes them, and when they grow up they learn that the world isn't confined to their home or their street. Every individual and every nation loves the things known from childhood. What Russian can be indifferent to a silver birch tree?

But we don't assert, we have never asserted, and we don't intend to assert that the birch is a nobler or more worthy tree than the cypress or the cedar. Of course, one's mother may be cleverer than her neighbours, but one loves her not for that, but because she is one's mother. True patriotism is modest, and has nothing in common with nationalism. Patriotism means brotherhood; nationalism means slaughter and death.

"Man muss den Slaven an die Wand drucken"— "The Slavs must be forced to the wall." The Germans were reared on this stupid, disgusting maxim. They weren't told that the Slav peoples had produced Huss and Copernicus, Tolstoy and Chekhov, Chopin and Tchaikovsky, Mendeloyev and Lobachovsky. And the brutalized pupils did really come to believe that great, talented, virile nations must be "stood against the wall."

And why? Because Hans wears a green hat with a feather, because Willi adores scittles, and because Fritz whispers "Katchon" into his bride's ear.

In regions they seized the Germans killed all the Jews from the old folk to infants in arms. Ask any German.

prisoner why his fellow countrymen annihilated six million innocent people and he will reply quite simply: "Why, they were Jews." It all began with vulgar anecdotes and hootings of street urchins, with scrawls on fences. But it ended at Maidanek and Babi Yar ravine, at ditches crammed with corpses. If before Maidanek anti-Semitism may have seemed just an ugly blot, today the word reeks of blood. The Polish poet Julian Tuwim was right when he said, "Anti-Semitism is the international language of Fascists."

The whole world now sees whose racial and national arrogance lead. Those awful furnaces at Maidanek where the Germans burned people of thirty nationalities just because they were Russians or French, Poles or Jews did not spring up all at once; the ground was prepared by long education in human hatred.

The Road to Maidanek

People all over the world must remember that nationalism is the road to Maidanek. If the liberty of a nation rests on oppression of other nations, if a country limits the rights of certain citizens whose skin happens to be of a different colour, if society persecutes a man because his nose differs in shape from those of his neighbours, then that nation, that country, that society is in danger.

We have shown the world a lofty example of friendship among nations. We see that this same ideal is inspiring the new Yugoslavia, whose peoples who only recently hated one another now fool they are brothers. We believe that all nations, big and small, will pronounce every manifestation of racial or national intolerance a heinous crime.

Fascism was engendered in the vilest human minds. No wonder its first experiments were men bereft of morals: murderers, pimps, unbridled failures, adventurers and bandits. However, it is not enough to know where the Fascists came from. It should be remembered that these criminals were aided by "respectable" (or reputedly respectable) people.

Of late we have rather tended to forget about the founder of Fascism, the ambitious and bloodthirsty Duce. Since Italy has awakened to new life, Mussolini has become just another German retainer. But one should recall the days of his success; recall in order to remember, and remember in order to live.

Mad Wolves as Watchdogs

For many years Mussolini was regarded by certain democrats as a wise statesman, yet Mussolini began his career as a ruffian: his blackshirts burned down workers' clubs, destroyed books, poured castor oil down the throats of teachers, students and workers, and killed honest citizens. At that time certain "democrats" thought, "Better Italian castor oil than Russian books," just as later, in the days of Munich, they consoled themselves: "Better Hitler than the triumph of liberty."

Political madmen, to use mad wolves as watchdogs! They thought the mad wolves would bite only those instructed. Europe and the world can now see the moral of this immoral policy in the ruins of Warsaw, the woe of Paris, the wounds of London. That is the price the nations have had to pay to have their eyes opened.

A RUSSIAN COUNTRY CRAFT

By A. Prynin

THE former Nizhni Novgorod Gubernia, now the Gorky Region, has since time immemorial been famous for village handicrafts. Articles manufactured from wood were the main speciality. Wooden household utensils were turned out by the million: cups, salt-cellars, dishes, trays. They were found everywhere, but were most popular in the southern, timberless areas.

The centre of the wood-turning industry was the town of Somyonov. In the old days whole families would be engaged in the craft. They excelled in primitive ornament, grass, flowers and berries.

Russia liked the wooden ware, and so did foreigners. The growing demand led to an improvement in the style, which culminated in the famous "Khokhloma" patterns.

We must remember that Fascism was engendered by the greed and stupidity of some, and the porfiry and cowardice of others. If mankind wants to put an end to the bloody nightmare of these years, it must put an end to Fascism.

Half measures won't do. If Fascism is left anywhere to brood again, rivers of blood will be flowing once more ten or twenty years hence. A wedge is used to break a wedge, but Fascism cannot be driven out by Fascism. There is no sense in liberating nations from Fascists of one variety, only to deliver them into the hands of Fascists of another variety.

Fascism is a terrible cancer. It cannot be cured with mineral water. It has to be excised. I don't believe in the kind hearts of people who are sorry for butchers and traitors; these sham humanitarians are paving the way for the death of millions of innocent people.

Liberation Without Reservation

The peoples of Europe fought the aggressors heroically, and people aren't fools, to go their way when their work is done. There is a good French proverb, "the coalman is master in his own home." It is understood not only by the French. The Red Army has shown how to liberate: Poles, Norwegians, Serbs and Slovaks know that we don't replace Fascism by semi-Fascism. We liberate without reservation. We know that democracy is a daughter of the people, not an illustrious lady to be admired only from afar, and then only by kind permission.

The peoples who have known the tyranny of Fascists will understand us without many words: this is an age of peoples, not diplomats. We will be understood by the gallant people of France. We will be understood by all our Allies.

There was a time when the English believed in the magic properties of the English Channel. Now they realise it is no barrier against Fascism. The import of dogs into England has long been controlled: by this means the English seek to protect their country from rabies. But mad bipeds differ from mad quadrupeds in that they possess a variety of weapons. And the only way to protect Britain is to destroy Fascism completely — from Warsaw to La Linea, a little town near Gibraltar.

They Count on Bad Memories

Even the ocean is no defence. America can be saved from now was only by the friendship of nations and the death of Fascism.

If the *Pommersche Zeitung* makes so bold as to assert that Germany went to war as the most peaceful of uplifters, it must mean that the Fascists' only hope is that we shall lose our memories. Such loss of memory sometimes follows severe wounds, and is known as amnesia. The wounds of the world are severe enough in all conscience, but the peoples will not suffer from amnesia. They will remember everything when the trials come. Even after victory, they will not forget the terrible years.

We must remember. It is our duty to the dead heroes, and to our children.

Let the awful sights we have witnessed be ever before our eyes: by paying that price we shall save the world. I know it is easier to forget, but we will not forget. We swear to remember, to remember and remember.

For many years the most talented craftsmen were the Krasnikov family from the village of Bezdeli (now Novo-Podolensk, Kovermin Region). At its head were Fyodor Krasnikov, his son Nikolai and his younger brother Stapan.

With his great fondness for what was native to Russia, our great writer Maxim Gorky, who was born in Nizhni Novgorod, greatly prized the Khokhloma style. The Krasnikovs were personal friends of his. While living at Sorrento, Italy, he received a present from home in the shape of 125 articles painted by Fyodor Krasnikov. He was highly pleased, and wrote to tell friends at Nizhni: "I admired them every day. And as for the Italians, they are in raptures over them."

There is no one left alive now of the Krasnikov family, but their craft is carried on by young artists carefully reared by the veteran Fyodor himself.

ILYA EHRENBURG, back from a two-weeks' visit to Germany, sums up his impressions



Ehrenburg lectures in the Hall of Columns, Moscow, on his recent experience in occupied Germany.—Picture by Al. Nikholsky for the Soviet News Weekly.

side, bombs and daggers at the order of some unenlightened absolutist or autocrat.

I have not met genuine romance in a single German—only fear and pretence. If there are any creatures at all to be pitied on the roads of Germany, it is only the tiny beset children, the crazed, unloved sons, and the abandoned cats and dogs. These have had no share in Germany's atrocities. All honour to the Soviet soldier who does not believe in the magic of blood, to whom an infant is an infant.

We are not fighting children and old women—we are not Fascists. We never come to Germany not to vent our feelings, but to eradicate the very memory of the vampire state.

The bones of the burglers are carefully furnished with portraits of Hitler and green goblets for libations. The beer halls have special tables marked with flags "for regulars."

The Germans have always been in the habit of sowing a greater part of their income on their horses. From potatoes they did not waste much on manure. They dressed loudly. But they liked their horses with sofas and armchairs, tuces and cushions, staterooms and "accoutrements."

During the war they have accumulated all sorts of loot from Paris and Rotterdam. Plaster and Warsaw. They have some regular low-brass troops. I heard a Red soldier say to a typical German (from the front): "One could live all right in this, God be so!"

But no. It was not enough for them. Good drove them towards the Czech and Iraq. In

the Graudenz parliament camp if they caught us at it. They said: "If you help Belorussia you are betraying the idea of the New Europe!"

No. Germany cannot obliterate her crimes by putting the clock forward.

The world now knows that Germany has killed six million Jews. Do they think it is enough for them to take down the street signs, for their atrocities to be forgotten? They are not doing anything about it. We are innocent. But the evidence is there. They can away from us as much as they like, they discarded not only their city banners, not only their official seals and police regalia, but even their personal papers.

In Germany, side by side with prosperity, everywhere we find intellectual degradation. Every home has its collection of books, especially low-quality copies of "Mein Kampf," "The March into Poland," "Rosa Hygiene," "The Jewish Plague," "Russian subversion," "Our Faithful Prussia." What intellectual poverty! However, those books weren't often opened, by the look of them. They were part of the furniture, like the vase and the porcelain cats.

Kindergarten Songs

I looked in vain in Loetzen, Rastenburg and Graudenz for a public library. There wasn't such a thing. I found only one museum—in Barstentien. What did it contain? Portraits of Hindenburg and the epistles of Hitler. An officer of the last war, labelled "Victory at Tannenberg."

The other exhibits were the uniform of a Polish officer and a photograph of the ruins

Wolves they were

Soviet News Weekly
15 March 1945

I HAVE spent two weeks in Germany—sterilized, flaming, smoking Germany, where hogs wander in and out of deserted town halls, and the wind ruffles the tatters of municipal banners emblazoned with eagles, lions and stags.

We might gloat and say: It serves them right—of malice were not beneath us. For us, this is the triumph of justice.

Many, when they talked of retribution, thought only of the clauses of some future treaty. One thing is certain. Fascist obscenities will find its defenders, zealous champions of "equilibrium"—equilibrium between light and darkness.

This May Teach Them

But whatever our ideas of the future peace may be, one thing is clear—retribution has begun. Germany has come to learn what war means. And who knows—perhaps these weeks and months of war on German soil will make a far deeper impression on German memories than any treaty stipulations.

To-day they even salute our heroes. World conquest? Why, the notion never entered their heads. I was present at the interrogation of Colonel Heingardt. At first he kept reticent: "Germany is invincible." Then, as if some spigot had run down, he protested in an entirely different voice: "How can you call me a Nazi? Why, I was married to a Jewess!"

Yes, they are trying to get off their feet. "I am a Prussian"—"I have many German blood in me." "My mother was a Dutchwoman."

The girls gaze at the passing Red Army men indignantly, feverishly, as if they were cabinet ministers instead of burglars' daughters.

Splitting on the Butcher

The Germans know all the orders of our military commanders by heart. "In the instructions of Iler Russian Commandant," they say piously.

They inform against one another. "The local butcher is an active Nazi!" "Here Hitler is in a secret Nest!" "The Willy the staid and the Allied Polish woman"—"Frau Schmidt received the thanks of the gauleiter himself!"

They all try to prove their innocence. One brought a certificate to show that eleven years ago the Hitlerites jailed him for a month. Another produced a testimonial signed by his ex-wife, a certain Mrs. Pridmore. A third bore up a membership card of the social-democratic party, dated 1918.

A woman in trousers climbs up the front of a building to remove a swastika sign. No one orders her to do it. She is all anxiety and grief. She thinks she has relinquished herself in the eyes of

history. But don't ask her how she treated Galya, her Russian maid-servant. The German admirer's behind-of-his watch two hours—"It is now exactly twelve minutes past three Moscow time," he beams. He is prepared to fire by Vlasov's clock, so long as he isn't asked about the four Frenchmen who worked for him.

"I am a doctor, and therefore a humanist, whereas the Nazis are fiends," says a venerable physician, while the vice-governor rubs his hands and murmurs: "The Catholic Church always condemned Hitler. Of course, I couldn't condemn him openly, still, I condemned him in my own heart. But as for the Evangelicals—"

The Lutheran pastor, for his part, says: "We also condemned the ungodly regime." An Elbing engineer declares: "As a man of progressive views, I am against Hitler." There, with a crafty smile: "And I'm quite willing to work for Russia!"

A worker exclaims indignantly: "No one dare call me a Nazi. My father was a social democrat. I myself once voted communist. Of course, I couldn't speak against the regime, because that was strictly verboten. But now I'm prepared to come out against Hitler!"

Here in Germany the corrupting influence of fear is a patent incident, and it is our duty to see the between the looper and the dagger. The saddest man that I have seen had a Red soldier beside him, German and two Christian. The last one is his own father! "What do he need with such a man? Christian there." "Read the verses on his wall!"—"Ordnung ist das oberste Gesetz!"—"The day for useful work, the night for pleasure sleep!"—"A little extra never comes amiss!"

The two stolen sheets didn't come amiss to the Lithuanian saddle-maker. But in the end he had his on the Doctor, and he lost his workshop, his God and his twelve German sheets.

"We Are Innocent" They can put their watches forward, they can pull down the "Hitlerstrasse" street signs, but the damning evidence remains at every turn, and cannot be destroyed.

A French army doctor, freed by the Red Army, said to me: "Of course, the Germans behaved brutally to us, too. But we lived like pigs compared with the Russians. We tried to share our food with them, but the Germans sent us to the front."

And if they are allowed a breathing space, if they are not taken in hand, if a watch is set here on them, if a X-ray is not turned on every one of them, then even the meekest of them, those who are now crying "Red front!" and stamping on pictures of the feathered soldier, will show their contempt for Germany again, and will be taking to

HERENVOLK DO THE CHORES

Left: German civilians clean up the streets of Lipsitz, Brandenburg, after the capture of the town by the Red Army.—Photograph by H. Karonen

Right: A German town has been cleared of the enemy. The crews of Soviet self-propelled guns attack by their own combat vehicles the last stage of the offensive.—Photograph by A. Minkov.



Wolves they were

of Warsaw, the skeleton of an ape, not less than a hundred portraits of Hitler, a beer-mug of the time of Bismarck, and a photograph of a benefactor of the town. That was also our final "museum."


Loetzen has an splendid school building. I found in one of the desks a soap-book intended for juvenile super-ones, containing the words and motto of "Merrily fall the bombs on England," "I wish my blood flow," and "Let the Baldovalia write at the sound of our drums." On the classroom wall was an immense portrait of Hitler with a little antler of five or six standing in front of him, holding a toy gun.

Allied Prisoners' View

One could not live in such a den of Culture is not measured by vacuum cleaners or mixing machines. We see the revolving face of Germany, and we are proud to have set the hair of the beast tatty-tatty.

I have spent many hours in cordial conversation with men freed by the Red Army—Frenchie, Poles, Englishmen and Czechs, Belgians and Dutch. They had seen Poland, Canada, America and Australia. Some are innocents, others soldiers, some are Jews, some safe, others are glib, others are fatal. But I have not met among them a single defector of the German.

The people who have been through the German prison camps know Germany well. The people who have been liberated by the Red Army know what Soviet Russia means. These people from a dozen continents, portraying from captivity, years not for any "equilibrium" between good and evil, but for the triumph of justice.



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